Off Topic Posts Split From Deification Of Robert E Lee

[Scott Bowden]

Excellent!

 

[John Winn]

Mr Winn, I hope that you will be able to do some reading on this subject. The theory put forth by those mentioned cannot support their theory by a single example in the modern era. Since we are discussing the ACW, that means that not a single war (not campaign or battle---but a war) was won by this method. Since I have written extensively on this subject, it is impractical to reconstruct it here. However, I encourage anyone interested in this subject to do some reading. You can send me a PM if you are interested in some titles that might assist you.

Regards,

Thanks for the offer of some titles - I'd be interested in seeing, say, the two you think best defend your position. I'm far from a scholar but think it fair to say I'm also far from poorly read o the subject and, as I said, two respected historians think the Confederacy didn't have to win. I guess I don't see that just because that hadn't been the winning strategy in other wars why that necessarily means it wouldn't have worked in our civil war. I don't know much about wars prior to our civil war but can imagine circumstances simply being different here. As you won't summarize I'll just have to say I'm not yet convinced.

I'll leave it at this point and will give some consideration to references you might provide.

 

[C. Kelp]

i understand the argument that the south didn't have time but time could be bought and men could not. if the confederacy had any chance to win that was it . if that is not the case then they had no chance, with one exception , imo, Gettysburg. i think vicksburg and chattanooga were inevitable , but had lee pulled off gettysburg (which was not his intent) things might have been different. northern moral might have given in. but at gettysburg lee showed poor generalship and violated protocol and it caught up to him this time, and his response was basically all-in with a blind hand, then double down. then the buck got passed to longstreet.

 

[jgoodguy]

Thanks for the offer of some titles - I'd be interested in seeing, say, the two you think best defend your position. I'm far from a scholar but think it fair to say I'm also far from poorly read o the subject and, as I said, two respected historians think the Confederacy didn't have to win. I guess I don't see that just because that hadn't been the winning strategy in other wars why that necessarily means it wouldn't have worked in our civil war. I don't know much about wars prior to our civil war but can imagine circumstances simply being different here. As you won't summarize I'll just have to say I'm not yet convinced.

I'll leave it at this point and will give some consideration to references you might provide.

As I understand it, the CSA strategy was to depend on war wariness in the North along with foreign intervention that is important in the ACW because that drove the war.

I have 2 threads that say that traditional evaluation of Northern moral was flawed and War Wariness over estimated.
The fall of Atlanta and Lincoln's reelection: 'Game-changer' or campaign myth?
Wartime Events & Electoral Consequences in Civil War America

A brief investigation comes up with very little evidence to support war wariness by itself as a factor in winning a war.

 

[C. Kelp]

"." ...................

As I understand it, the CSA strategy was to depend on war wariness in the North along with foreign intervention that is important in the ACW because that drove the war.

I have 2 threads that say that traditional evaluation of Northern moral was flawed and War Wariness over estimated.
The fall of Atlanta and Lincoln's reelection: 'Game-changer' or campaign myth?
Wartime Events & Electoral Consequences in Civil War America

A brief investigation comes up with very little evidence to support war wariness by itself as a factor in winning a war.

but had lee prevailed at gettysburg that might have made the difference and chattanooga, atlanta, and lincoln would not be issues. i am not sure but i think northern moral was at it's lowest just before gettysburg? but who knows what would have happened . it might have only meant a bigger battle to come, and steeled northern resolve. as it was lee showed poor generalship in the events.

 

[jgoodguy]

"." ...................

but had lee prevailed at gettysburg that might have made the difference and chattanooga, atlanta, and lincoln would not be issues. i am not sure but i think northern moral was at it's lowest just before gettysburg? but who knows what would have happened . it might have only meant a bigger battle to come, and steeled northern resolve. as it was lee showed poor generalship in the events.

Anything is possible, but in this time line, the CSA dependence on the strategy did not work.

 

[C. Kelp]

https://www.c-span.org/video/?407279-1/myth-lost-cause

jump to 1:17:02 for the section on lee as the wrong general for the south

 

[jgoodguy]

https://www.c-span.org/video/?407279-1/myth-lost-cause

jump to 1:17:02 for the section on lee as the wrong general for the south

Maybe, but without the plunder of the Pennsylvania Campaign the ANV would have simply starved into impotence.

 

[jgoodguy]

IMHO..

• Wars are political events. If a war forces political change in favor of one side or another, then it is successful even if it fails to win a single battle.
• It is my understanding that insurgencies without major power help fail
  
• The Strategy of the US revolution was not to lose and it worked until the French, Spanish, Dutch et. al. got into a war with Britain, accepted the US as allies of convenience, and the British simply could not fight everyone at once. The British could have continued fighting in the colonies and with the defeat of the French Fleet that meant victory at Yorktown, the British could have won, but the political cost was too high.
• The Grand Strategy of the CSA was originally to hang on until the British and French got involved. The so called Cotton is King strategy. In short a repeat of the American Revolution.
• Armies are expensive and are intended to be used. Disused armies fall apart due to morale and other problems.
• If defeat comes from preserving the lives of the soldiers and victory from risking those lives what is the thing to do?
• There are political pressures for military victories from Southern politicans who are allocating funds to pay for the war.
• Confederate morale depends on military victory.
• Most of the CSA resources and manufacturing are with easy reach of Union forces. In the West, rivers provided access to Tennessee, North Alabama and Georgia. In the East VA manufacturing was also close. Thus the CSA had to defeat the Union Army and unlike say Russia, there is no vast territory that can be retreated into without losing the means of war.
• Slave Societies are vulnerable in time of war. Resources need to keep slaves in slavery are diverted to the war effort. The CSA was unique in that all other slave societies in history early on offered military service in exchange for freedom and their enemies did. Occupying armies disrupt slave owner control. Marching armies also distupt slave owner control.
• While the CSA territory was vast, the border was long and there was not sufficient resources to defend every point. In that case, a flexible offense/defense strategy is about all there is.

 

[Bruce Vail]

I guess I am missing something here because it seems rather obvious to me that the American Revolution and the War of 1812 provided two (relatively) recent native examples of how a country can win a war without defeating the enemy militarily.

In both of those wars the UK clearly had superior military power. They won a lot of the battles and none of the battles they lost were that big a deal (that is to say, the manpower and hardware lost could be easily replaced). In both cases, the Americans wore down the Brits until they were ready to settle. Why couldn't the CSA succeed at the same thing?

 

[jgoodguy]

I guess I am missing something here because it seems rather obvious to me that the American Revolution and the War of 1812 provided two (relatively) recent native examples of how a country can win a war without defeating the enemy militarily.

In both of those wars the UK clearly had superior military power. They won a lot of the battles and none of the battles they lost were that big a deal (that is to say, the manpower and hardware lost could be easily replaced). In both cases, the Americans wore down the Brits until they were ready to settle. Why couldn't the CSA succeed at the same thing?

The difference is that in both 1776 and 1812 the British were or came to be distracted by a world war which drained recourse and caused political dissect. The CSA was by its lonesome.

But in theory it could have happened. A different President than Lincoln. No victorious Union General. Lincoln starts the war instead of Davis. All could have affected the outcome.

 

[Bee]

Maybe, but without the plunder of the Pennsylvania Campaign the ANV would have simply starved into impotence.

I am glad that you brought this up: it was my reasoning why a war of defense, only, by the CSA still would have run into problems.

 

[1SGDan]

I have to agree that the theory does have much credence against the background of historical fact.
The South having started the war and without the resources to continue on indefinitely could not prevent losing against a determined foe. Losing was not only a probability it was the most likely result of their rush to war. Winning a short war was their only chance of success having selected the military option.

 

[Martini-Henry]

This is all absolute gold dust to me, I am learning so much from all of you.

Many thanks & warm regards

 

[jgoodguy]

I am glad that you brought this up: it was my reasoning why a war of defense, only, by the CSA still would have run into problems.

As interesting book to look at is
Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered - Amazon.com
Discusses much of the CSA problems with a defensive strategy is discussed. Long border, critical resource and manufacturing close to the border.
Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign (Civil War America)
Discusses the logistical problems of the ANV in 1863 especially the plunder of fodder et. al.
P 388

P 389

 

[jgoodguy]

I have to agree that the theory does have much credence against the background of historical fact.
The South having started the war and without the resources to continue on indefinitely could not prevent losing against a determined foe. Losing was not only a probability it was the most likely result of their rush to war. Winning a short war was their only chance of success having selected the military option.

IMHO Short war with British and French intervention.
However think of a war in 1850 with no railroads or telegraph, a much weaker president, less nationalism by the North, less manufacturing and a vast land to conquer. Then recalculate.

We see a bright shining path to victory. It was not so in 1861. Lincoln was an unknown and untried leader. He turned out golden, but that was not obvious at the time. The Union had to organize, invent new ways of war, train an army from scratch, its leaders and figure out how to govern in war time.

 

[Bruce Vail]

The difference is that in both 1776 and 1812 the British were or came to be distracted by a world war which drained recourse and caused political dissect. The CSA was by its lonesome.

But in theory it could have happened. A different President than Lincoln. No victorious Union General. Lincoln starts the war instead of Davis. All could have affected the outcome.

Clearly, many of the Confederate leaders saw the war of the American Revolution as a model for success. A powerful foreign ally was key: for the Patriots of 1776-83 is was the French, for the Confederates of 1861-5 it was the British.

It might be said that the greatest failing of Confederate war strategy was it's reliance on British intervention for ultimate success. The Brits are fickle and greedy, as the whole world now knows....

 

[Martini-Henry]

Wow! That was cheeky. I personally would never criticize another's country.

 

[C. Kelp]

As interesting book to look at is
Retreat to Victory?: Confederate Strategy Reconsidered - Amazon.com
Discusses much of the CSA problems with a defensive strategy is discussed. Long border, critical resource and manufacturing close to the border.
Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign (Civil War America)
Discusses the logistical problems of the ANV in 1863 especially the plunder of fodder et. al.
P 388
View attachment 112680
P 389
View attachment 112679

that is kinda my point. gettysburg should never have been fought and i don't believe lee intended to have such a battle, yet he did. without proper intel . the third day absolutely should not have happened. granted he extended the ANV's viability, but that only extended the suffering, but not long enough for a political solution. and crops could be replaced in a year, maybe 6 mos. in some areas. how long does it take to grow a soldier ? so imo the original strategy was sound but lee flubbed it. also if the defensive strategy had started before Antietam it may have worked and even as events unfolded it almost did anyway. another part of the problem is that the confederacy thought it had to defend everything everywhere. they lost huge amounts of territory as it was early on and stayed viable . and i maintain that if they had grown more food instead of cotton it would have greatly reduced the effect of the blockade, eliminated the concentration of food producing areas, and reduced the need for foreign intervention.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Wow! That was cheeky. I personally would never criticize another's country.

Yes, of course you are right.

The Americans are fickle and greedy too, as seen especially in recent US policy with Egypt and Syria.

I wasn't trying to insult the current residents of the UK. Just government policy from 150 years ago.