Oak Hill, July 1

gettysburgerrn

Private
Joined
Sep 19, 2008
Location
massapequa, NY
Hello there- I have a question regarding Rodes initial attacks on Oak Ridge July 1. Actually its a couple of questions:
1) How far west did the right of O'Neal's brigade extend- I know he was only using a 3 regiment front (was the left by the McLean farm?) <by he way I understand why the 5th Alabama was detached but I am confused about the 3rd Alabama and if they were really detached or O'Neal just thought they were.

2) I know that Iverson didn't go forward with his brigade (I have heard multiple reasons for it), and as such he didn't send out skirmishers in advance of the main brigade line. Was he the only one who could have ordered skirmishers deployed in such a setting? In other words could the regimental commanders have ordered out skirmishers for at least their regimental fronts?

3) How was it possible that nobody from Iverson's brigade noticed what was happening just a few hundred yards away (in terms of O'neal's repulse) Did that attack take place outside Iverson's field of view? Was it obscured by the Forney farm or orchard? How did nobody hear an attack that went on for at least 15 minutes? If they did notice the attack and the results thereof how could they have been surprised by the presence of Robinson's men?

Ok thanks this part of the battle has confused me for so long and while I have read numerous articles and books I am just puzzled about how it went down

Ken
 
I suggest going to You Tube and looking up NPS Ranger tours at Gettysburg I believe Matt Atkinson has a battle walk tour that would probably answer your question. He is very good and enjoys what he does.
 
Last edited:
Coincidentally, I just read about the information that you requested in David Martin's Gettysburg July 1.
According to that book:
1) Yes, O' Neill's left would have been just about out to the McLean Farm. Evidently, the 3rd Alabama never was given the order to advance because O'Neill believed that Rodes has reassigned it as he did the 5th Alabama.

2) Who else but Iverson would have ordered skirmishers to advance? Since the brigade was ordered to advance together, it was his order to give. I assume that it wouldn't have been appropriate for the regimental commanders to do that.

3) I have personally walked the field and can confirm that Iverson's men wouldn't have been able to see O'Neills' attack because it took place on the other side of the crest of Oak Ridge. Heck...Iverson couldn't even see the Union men on the crest. That's why they were slaughtered! Actually, O'Neill was supposed to coordinate with Iverson. The record shows that Iverson was surprised when he found out that O'Neill had already begun the attack and that Iverson subsequently hurried his attack. There was fighting in other nearby areas and it's possible that Iverson would not have been sure that the gunfire that he heard was from the O'Neill attack. They were surprised by Robinson's men because they were hidden behind the crest.
 
Last edited:
There are a lot of divergent opinions among those who have studied this subject at length, but I will offer up my own. First, a brief timeline based on my personal analysis:

1. O'Neal initially launched a hasty and disjointed attack by three regiments (left to right, 6-26-12 AL) at about 1:10 p.m. that was quickly brought to a standstill by Baxter.

2. 6-26 AL then took position behind a fence 200 yards north of the McClean farm, where the 5 AL joined the left of 6 AL by 2 p.m.; 12 AL is thought to have taken shelter behind another fence to the right rear.

3. Meanwhile Iverson was moving to the attack and was ambushed at 2:05 p.m. by Baxter, who had shifted the bulk of his force westward to confront him, leaving only some skirmishers and 90 PA to hold O'Neal in his place.

4. Several of Baxter's regiments moved west into the field to bring in prisoners from Iverson between 2:15 to 2:30 p.m.

5. At 2:25 p.m. O'Neal launches his main attack against 90 PA and 12 MA of Baxter who realign to face northward and also two regiments of Paul (104 NY and 13 MA) that have just arrived. 5 AL on the far left has to contend with Paul in front and also 45 NY of Schimmelpfennig to his left and left front. Part of 6 AL and 26 AL reach the Mummasburg road, where they are somewhat sheltered in a deep depression from Federal fire, including 90 PA and 12 MA less than 50 yards away, which are nevertheless totally invisible to them.

6. By 3:05 p.m., 104 NY and 13 MA have advanced to the road and captured or driven back 26-6 AL, while at the same time four companies of 45 NY have advanced to the McClean barn and mopped up a good portion of 5 AL. Baxter is now falling back southward toward the cut, Paul having fully replaced him. 3 AL has moved northward into the field south of the Forney buildings.

7. At 3:40 p.m., Paul has fallen back, except for 16 ME sent to the junction of the stone wall with the Mummasburg road. They are being pressured by 3 AL to the west. Ramseur's brigade is moving southward from Oak Hill.

8. By 3:45 p.m. 16 ME is collapsing under pressure by Ramseur, joined on his right by 3 AL of O'Neal.

Now to answer your specific questions:

O'Neal's right was held by the 12 AL, which was somewhat separated by the rest of the brigade by a fence and an extension of Oak Ridge southward, so that it was fighting pretty much on its own hook and not really in sync with 5-6-26 AL. Of course, 3 AL was 600 yards further to the right and south, initially between Iverson's right regiment (12 NC) and Daniel's left regiment (53 NC). When 5 AL moved forward to join the left of 6 AL at the fence it was in rear (north) and somewhat to the left rear (north-northeast) of the McClean barn/house.

Great question about Iverson's skirmishers. I suppose the individual regimental commanders could have made the decision to deploy additional skirmishers, but generally it was a brigade function and they may have expected Iverson to make that call.

In my estimation, O'Neal's initial disjointed advance was halted 45 minutes before Iverson's advance and O'Neal's men thereafter maintained a steady exchange of fire. Given that Oak Ridge separated the two brigades, Iverson's regiments could not know what O'Neal was doing, other than perhaps the 12 AL, which was on their side of the ridge. Some Confederate skirmishers had worked their way into the fields south of the Mummasburg road to Iverson's left front as he swung around the Forney buildings and moved in a southeasterly direction, at which time only two Federal regiments (97 NY and 11 PA) lay in their immediate path (although hidden behind a stone wall). Baxter, not facing great pressure from O'Neal, could quickly shift the bulk of his force to reinforce 97 NY and 11 PA in time to counter Iverson. However, O'Neal's main attack at that moment would actually have caught Baxter in a very bad place were it not for the timely arrival of the vanguard of Paul's brigade, coupled with a brutal flanking cross-fire coming from 45 NY and some Eleventh Corps artillery.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top