Grant Not impressed with Grants performance

[cash]

That's crazy. In a situation like that those officers had to have agendas on their recounts.

Not necessarily.

That's why I find Sam Watkin's accounts interesting. In some battles that the South lost, he was in a position where the rebels were doing well. He couldn't figure out why they were being pulled back. Getting different perspectives from eye witnesses is really interesting.

"Any member of a regiment, officer or private, can have but little knowledge of movements outside his immediate command. He must draw upon his imagination, or from the experience of others. In all engagements with the enemy, every one has a specific duty to perform, and no time to look with a critical eye upon his comrade's conduct; he has all he can do to obey orders and keep from running—many failed even in this. Almost the first thought that comes home to a brave man is one of self preservation, and the second, the safety of his honor, when pride comes in as a powerful auxiliary, and, oftener than courage, keeps him to the front.

"The idea that a soldier, whose simple duty it is to remain in the ranks and move in geometrical lines, has an opportunity to view a Gettysburgh [sic] as he would a panorama, is simply absurd. After the first volley of musketry, he is a rare man who theorizes, or speculates on the action of his comrade, or of his regiment, much more on that of the commanding general, three miles distant." [Abner R. Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, p. 6] Abner Small was a major in the 16th Maine.

 

[67th Tigers]

We're operating under a bit of a misnomer.

He was the general in chief of all the Union armies. Since every Union army was under him it's obvious he had more men than Lee had. But George Meade still commanded the Army of the Potomac.

Grant provided strategic direction, not tactical command. When we talk about tactics in the OC we're talking about Meade.

However, he exercised no control of the armies other than those immediately to hand. Effectively Sherman and Halleck ran the war outside of the Richmond offensive. Grant couldn't get Sherman to do what he wanted - for example he didn't want Sherman to carry out the colossal waste of time that was the march to the sea. When Sherman rebuffed all Grant's suggestions he gave in and let Sherman do whatever he wanted. In the process he probably added six months to the war.

Indeed, when Lincoln had occasion to travel down to Fort Monroe and give Grant a massive bollocking it was because Grant was not acting as GinC. He ordered Grant to appoint a commander in the Shenandoah (or Lincoln would appoint McClellan) and strip his army of manpower. Indeed, the late Prof John Y. Simon wrote an article (in the book Lincoln's Generals) about this meeting and noted that it must have been extremely traumatic for Grant as he expunged it from his memoir. It marked a major sea-change in the Lincoln-Grant relationship. Initially Lincoln was happy with Grant, as he carried out the war in the attritional fashion Lincoln and the radicals thought of as "real war" (I should note, Grant was pushed into this by Lincoln). However, Jubal Early in the valley had shaken Lincoln, especially the raid on Washington, and he considered Grant negligent for letting it happen. Whilst Lincoln had for months let Grant run, he now reasserted control.

 

[David Moore]

Actually, that has been your practice... taking cherry picking to the level of DiLorenzo.

How without seeing my research papers would you know if I cherry pick?
I would be interested in seeing the fruits of your primary source research.

This one?

"Much has been written of Grant's 'brilliant' strategic insight during the final Vicksburg campaign. Historians, although pointing out the time and effort the general wasted in trying to get into the Yazoo above the batteries via the rivers and bayous to the north, claim that Porter and Grant had all along jointly intend to adopt the 'correct' strategy of landing the army below the city to operate up the Big Black. Such eulogizing is extravagant as well as factually wrong. The idea of operating without communications is often described as a conception of genius instead of the unenviable result of impulsiveness and lack of military skill. According to some military analysts, the whole campaign was a model of combined operations for its time.

Most of these claims are nonsense. Grant had no real strategic plan for the movement which led to the siege, let alone a combined plan. Nor did anyone in the Union Navy, including Admiral Porter, formulate such a plan. If not exactly an accident, the campaign seemed to develop in reaction to momentary contingencies and difficulties of detail. In fact one might describe the capture of Vicksburg as the final process in a 'chain reaction' of which the participants were hardly aware, and over which they exercised almost no control."

- Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War, 239-240.

Yes

 

[David Moore]

Much of what Ms Reed wrote about Grant is along the lines of what's on a NY Jets fan page about Tom Brady. 'He's thrown 150 interceptions, he has 100 fumbles, what a loser" " Why no, Super bowl rings don't matter, not one bit."

Tell us again how great Geno Smith is.

Not a single specific refutation of Miss Reed's comments. Football references instead.

 

[David Moore]

Much of the recent support of Grant today is based on two things:
He defeated Lee and the Confederacy and he was for a while a supporter of black rights in the south.
Any prodding below the surface image of Grant as military hero and social justice warrior is to be shut down.
This is not history it isn't even hagiography. It is tailoring history to suit a current historical notion.

This is evidenced in the following review of Ronald White's biography of Grant. That biography is very sparse in its
treatment of Elihu Washburne and most of the battle controversies that have been discussed on this site.

However people are free to research and write and increasingly those who look at Grant objectively
have discovered and written the more complex truth about him.



http://www.realclearbooks.com/articles/2017/01/26/triumph_of_ulysses_s_grant_110095.html

 

[67th Tigers]

Much of what Ms Reed wrote about Grant is along the lines of what's on a NY Jets fan page about Tom Brady. 'He's thrown 150 interceptions, he has 100 fumbles, what a loser" " Why no, Super bowl rings don't matter, not one bit."

The great thing about the late Dr. Reed (her book was her Ph.D. thesis) was that she was entirely evidence driven, even in the face of the advice of her advisor that it would be unpopular. Her untimely death was a great tragedy.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Buckner: "This army I'm surrendering to you is so small its practically not an army."
Grant: "Yep"
Pendleton: "Your whole Vicksburg campaign was a series of lucky accidents. The cooperation between navy and army was improvised. Your behavior was impulsive. Could I surrender on the Fourth?"
Grant: "Yep"
Lee: "I bet Lincoln really chewed you out. Whoa, that must of smarted. But you are a colossal screw up. Mmm...none of us have eaten in a few days. Can I have some rations?"
Grant: "Yep"
Lee: "I mean I'll be surrendering right now. But after that."
Grant: "Yep"

 

[johan_steele]

How without seeing my research papers would you know if I cherry pick?
I would be interested in seeing the fruits of your primary source research.

Yes

I have seen enough of your dodging questions, multiple on this thread, and watched you purposefully take things out of context. In short you have well over 1k posts on this site alone giving you a visible track record. I believe you have shown that you are incapable of even remotely unbiased or critical research... you read and pass on only what fits your agenda. So you'll forgive me if I lump you in with DiLorenzo for all of the same reasons.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant's reputation post-war was terrible.

Yes, so terrible he was elected two terms as president.

That was sarcasm.

 

[Sid J.]

Not a single specific refutation of Miss Reed's comments. Football references instead.

1.0 out of 5 starsMcClellan-ite Drivel
By Eric Calistri on May 12, 2011
Format: Paperback
I've given up trying to find a reason to call this book anything other than McClellanite drivel. On Page 37 there is a map diagram of "McClellan's Strategic Plan Nov 1861" Show me where GBM commited this plan to paper, or issued directives to his subordinates at this time, or EVER set any timetables for co-ordinating these actions. Reed;s shows that _NO_ offensives are planned for Virginia, subordinates have the following objectives:

Burnside: 1)Roanoke Is 2)New Bern 3)Raleigh

Sherman/DuPont: 1)Port Royal 2) Charleston 3)Augusta 4) Atlanta or Savannah

Butler: 1)New Orleans 2)Mobile/Jackson 3) Montgomery/Meridan

Farragut: 1)New Orleans 2)Vicksburg

Buell: 1)Nashville 2)Chattanooga 3)Atlanta

Halleck: 1) Corinth 2) Jackson

Foote: 1)Memphis 2) Vicksburg

Historically, and at George Brinton McClellan's insistence, the majority of the Union's resources were allocated to Washington and the AoP. Halleck especially cries out for regular army officers and troops, Buell at least has a few. If as Ms Reed claims, GBM merely intended to hold Washington while the above operations were carried out, why did he pull resources from other areas to the East, why the 273,000 men for the AoP, and where in the memo are the forces for his other "planned" operations.

I'd just like one reference of McClellan saying to Halleck first you will take this place, then move on to that place etc. What Ms Reed has done has imagined a plan for McClellan, and then imagined that it was underway until he was undermined by the politicians in Washington. Apparently completely sold on GBM's version of events she has discounted or completely ignored all others.

GBM's actions after taking the role of General-in-Chief were to concentrate a large army about Washington for offensive operations in VA (the peninsula campaign). He pulled troops from other places for this reason. His commitment of troops for Butler was insufficient for what Ms Reed views as "the plan." GBM was never in favor of increasing the size of Butler's ground forces.

GBM insisted on leading the AoP on the peninsula, this precluded him from being G/C. How was he going to control far flung forces from the banks of the Chickahominy when he couldn't do it from Washington.

How does a plan exist if GBM's subordinate commanders are unaware of it? See the OR message traffic from approx. 1/1/62. GBM is deathly ill, no one is in charge of the armies, forcing Lincoln to inquire what preparation have been made by Buell and Halleck. Their replies are of the what the heck you talking about? We know of no plans. Fort Henry and Donelson were targets of opportunity as seen by on the spot officers, not part of some grand plan hatched in Washington.

How can Mac's failure to see the importance of Norfolk be a positive thing? As is evidenced by the number Confederate Ports and coastal installations actually attacked, getting support from the Pres and the navy should have been no problem. Reed forgives Mac for his unwarranted fears of Magruders miniscule forces, but not the navy for it's fear of the Virginia? I would ask, how many casualaties had each inflicted??

Reed views all non GBM conducted operations as slipshod, half-assed affairs that were poorly, poorly executed and poorly led, that any success was a matter of luck or overwhelming confederate weakness, whereas any plan by GBM was brilliantly planned, led and executed.

Ms Reed defends GBM the way the party faithful defend their leadership: dose out massive amounts of blame elsewhere, admit no fault, and never discuss the uncomfortable topic. In short _this piece of **** is tripe of the worst sort_.

 

[huskerblitz]

Yes, so terrible he was elected two terms as president.

That was sarcasm.

I like Grant, but bringing in his presidency does not help his argument.

 

[Sid J.]

The great thing about the late Dr. Reed (her book was her Ph.D. thesis) was that she was entirely evidence driven, even in the face of the advice of her advisor that it would be unpopular. Her untimely death was a great tragedy.

It's idol worship and little else.

 

[Sid J.]

Not a single specific refutation of Miss Reed's comments. Football references instead.

Well it's a sunny day and I don't have time and besides, why don't you read a book?

 

[Bee]

Grant provided strategic direction, not tactical command. When we talk about tactics in the OC we're talking about Meade

This is very relevant when one brings up the topic of Cold Harbour. It is very difficult to have a conversation on this particular battle without first making this very important distinction mentioned in the quote.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I like Grant, but bringing in his presidency does not help his argument.

Grant had his detractors, but he certainly did not have a "terrible" post-war reputation.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Grant had his detractors, but he certainly did not have a "terrible" post-war reputation.

Grant was popular enough to be elected president twice and came close to a third nomination. His memoirs were a hot item when they first came out, right?

At what point did the 'Grant The Blundering Butcher' perception really get going, and when did it eclipse his popularity?

 

[rickvox79]

I haven't read extensively about either of the campaigns you mentioned, but what I have looked into, he basically seiged Vicksburg and didn't use battle tactics, but merely starved the inhabitants into submission.

Those quotes from Lee don't really explain much. Like I said, the end results were in Grants favor, but he always had the overwhelming manpower advantage.

I'm 8 pages late to the game here but regarding the Vicksburg campaign it wasn't like the Confederate Army said "Hey, you know what? Let's just pin ourselves in the city of Vicksburg and hope we don't get surrounded and starved out!" Grant was the one that forced them back into the city after Champion's Hill and ultimately to their surrender. "Well, Grant had more men..." yep and so did McClellan and what did he do with them? Sit around and twiddle his thumbs inventing superior enemy numbers while moving at a snails pace when he did move. "Grant attacked well fortified and entrenched positions!" He did but there aren't many examples of generals in the Civil War who did not try that at some point.

 

[David Moore]

I have seen enough of your dodging questions, multiple on this thread, and watched you purposefully take things out of context. In short you have well over 1k posts on this site alone giving you a visible track record. I believe you have shown that you are incapable of even remotely unbiased or critical research... you read and pass on only what fits your agenda. So you'll forgive me if I lump you in with DiLorenzo for all of the same reasons.[/QUOTE

Buckner: "This army I'm surrendering to you is so small its practically not an army."
Grant: "Yep"
Pendleton: "Your whole Vicksburg campaign was a series of lucky accidents. The cooperation between navy and army was improvised. Your behavior was impulsive. Could I surrender on the Fourth?"
Grant: "Yep"
Lee: "I bet Lincoln really chewed you out. Whoa, that must of smarted. But you are a colossal screw up. Mmm...none of us have eaten in a few days. Can I have some rations?"
Grant: "Yep"
Lee: "I mean I'll be surrendering right now. But after that."
Grant: "Yep"

It's idol worship and little else.

pre

Grant was popular enough to be elected president twice and came close to a third nomination. His memoirs were a hot item when they first came out, right?

At what point did the 'G Butcher' perception really get going, and when did it eclipse his popularity?

I have seen enough of your dodging questions, multiple on this thread, and watched you purposefully take things out of context. In short you have well over 1k posts on this site alone giving you a visible track record. I believe you have shown that you are incapable of even remotely unbiased or critical research... you read and pass on only what fits your agenda. So you'll forgive me if I lump you in with DiLorenzo for all of the same reasons.

Have you read my book? I'd be more likely to forgive you (your request) if I saw some examples from my documented work not from off the cuff comments that appear on websites. In all seriousness I started writing on this thread today because I saw what I regarded as the piling on the originator of this thread Captain Dan. I have seen and experienced this type of treatment before. There is a group on this site that will engage in any activity to silence any critic of Grant (whatever happened to Horace Porter?) So you win. I will withdraw from this thread as I have discovered little has changed. Too many people are more interested in promoting heat rather than light. I won't of course stop researching and writing. My current project is Iuka. I'll let everyone know when it's done.

 

[cash]

"Grant attacked well fortified and entrenched positions!" He did but there aren't many examples of generals in the Civil War who did not try that at some point.

Indeed. There were times when there was no other choice.

 

[David Moore]

Buckner: "This army I'm surrendering to you is so small its practically not an army."
Grant: "Yep"
Pendleton: "Your whole Vicksburg campaign was a series of lucky accidents. The cooperation between navy and army was improvised. Your behavior was impulsive. Could I surrender on the Fourth?"
Grant: "Yep"
Lee: "I bet Lincoln really chewed you out. Whoa, that must of smarted. But you are a colossal screw up. Mmm...none of us have eaten in a few days. Can I have some rations?"
Grant: "Yep"
Lee: "I mean I'll be surrendering right now. But after that."
Grant: "Yep"

May I ask for the documentation for this most interesting post?