Grant Not impressed with Grants performance

[Bee]

I have some eyewitnesses who didn't hear battle sounds at Iuka

Did NOT hear, or DID hear the battle sounds? (wondering if this is a typo)

 

[David Moore]

Did NOT hear, or DID hear the battle sounds? (wondering if this is a typo)

Both.I have 5 who did. Also some who were there and didn't write about sounds. The key is finding letters from soldiers who were with Ord's force and wrote about sounds.

 

[David Moore]

Did you leave these people out of your book?

It's in my book. Have you read it yet? Frank Varney's? Evan Jones' essay? Albert Castel's book? Any of those can help you better understand the case for the Union taking Vicksburg in 1862.

 

[David Moore]

---------------
Just curious but have you read Grants book?

Memoirs. Only the parts that dealt with Rosecrans. More important to me are his papers which I have used extensively.

 

[hankc]

Grant's situation at Shiloh on Day 1 was similar to Pemberton's at Vicksburg. Both were penned in an impregnable position with their backs to a wide river. We know how Vicksburg ended and without a navy, or as I said earlier a competent CS navy to oppose his, Grant would have been in the same pickle as Pemberton.

This is a impartial modern, educational view of the 2nd day of Shiloh:

http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/PDFs for Jul-Dec 08/Shelton-Shiloh.pdf

 

[David Moore]

When discussing the merits of General Grant's performance during the Civil War,
one thing has not been mentioned so far: his organizational and administrative
skills. For example, when he issued an order it was written in clear, simple language
and the objective of the order was plain to see. There was none of the confusion and
contradiction that plagued other commanders when their orders were issued and
not followed in the spirit in which they were written.

In my opinion, General Grant was every bit the equal of any of the army commanders
during the Civil War in performance and character. His determination, willingness to
adapt his tactical and strategic goals to fit the situation he was in and the cool head
he showed during adverse situations all combine to make him a leader that is hard
to beat whenever one discusses the top generals in American history. Add his modesty
and his moral character to this and you have a noble and decent man.

I don't claim to be an expert on Grant outside of his dealings with Rosecrans. However I know people have discussed his intentions at Missionary Ridge at Cold Harbor the Crater etc. I know his intentions at Iuka and Corinth were muddled at best.

 

[Captain Davis]

One of the biggest surprises about sourcing was encountered as I read Pfanz Gettysburg The First Day. The author will actually place two eyewitness officer accounts side by side, and they read like different events. Each one had to be further corroborated to choose the correct version. I suppose that a less than honest author could pick one version or another if it supported his point, and still document the use of 'primary source'

That's crazy. In a situation like that those officers had to have agendas on their recounts.

That's why I find Sam Watkin's accounts interesting. In some battles that the South lost, he was in a position where the rebels were doing well. He couldn't figure out why they were being pulled back. Getting different perspectives from eye witnesses is really interesting.

 

[Bee]

Memoirs. Only the parts that dealt with Rosecrans. More important to me are his papers which I have used extensively.

I, too, have read quite a bit of Grant's Papers. They are online if anyone else is interested in looking at them:

http://digital.library.msstate.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/USG_volume/id/27900

 

[Bee]

That's crazy. In a situation like that those officers had to have agendas on their recounts. .

I agree. It has rattled my foundation to the core about how I view "Primary Source" going forward.

 

[David Moore]

I, too, have read quite a bit of Grant's Papers. They are online if anyone else is interested in looking at them:

http://digital.library.msstate.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/USG_volume/id/27900

They are immense and John Simon deserves credit for what he did. I have found the footnotes to be of more interest because they provide context and often provide relevant letters from other parties.

 

[Bee]

They are immense and John Simon deserves credit for what he did. I have found the footnotes to be of more interest because they provide context and often provide relevant letters from other parties.

I should correct myself in saying that I have done quite a bit of reading of the Grant Papers. I don't want to give anyone the impression that I have begun to make a mere dent in this immense repository.

 

[Sid J.]

It's in my book. Have you read it yet? Frank Varney's? Evan Jones' essay? Albert Castel's book? Any of those can help you better understand the case for the Union taking Vicksburg in 1862.

But my question, which has been met only with these types of dodges by you for the last year and half, is not about "the case for the Union taking Vicksburg in 1862."

But since you are so apparently forgetful, I'll ask one more time:

Rosecrans said years after the war:



"If Grant had not stopped us, we could have gone to Vicksburg ... We were about six days' march from Vicksburg."

Did Rosecrans propose going to Vicksburg in October 1862?
Was he 6 days march from Vicksburg in October 1862?


Wanna give it a shot? Or will you just continue to demand that I read books you know I've read.

 

[67th Tigers]

Anyone on this thread familiar with Rowena Reed's comment on Grant during the Vicksburg campaign.

This one?

"Much has been written of Grant's 'brilliant' strategic insight during the final Vicksburg campaign. Historians, although pointing out the time and effort the general wasted in trying to get into the Yazoo above the batteries via the rivers and bayous to the north, claim that Porter and Grant had all along jointly intend to adopt the 'correct' strategy of landing the army below the city to operate up the Big Black. Such eulogizing is extravagant as well as factually wrong. The idea of operating without communications is often described as a conception of genius instead of the unenviable result of impulsiveness and lack of military skill. According to some military analysts, the whole campaign was a model of combined operations for its time.

Most of these claims are nonsense. Grant had no real strategic plan for the movement which led to the siege, let alone a combined plan. Nor did anyone in the Union Navy, including Admiral Porter, formulate such a plan. If not exactly an accident, the campaign seemed to develop in reaction to momentary contingencies and difficulties of detail. In fact one might describe the capture of Vicksburg as the final process in a 'chain reaction' of which the participants were hardly aware, and over which they exercised almost no control."

- Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War, 239-240.

 

[atlantis]

Grant had good instincts, letting Sherman do his thing showed that he had sized up Sherman right. Another good quality Grant had was he didn't lose his nerve, a weaker general would have pulled out at Shiloh.

 

[johan_steele]

That may be....The ANV was still outnumbered 3-1 and had no supplies to sustain itself. Absolutely no clothing of any description. It had just enough food to sustain a division on full rations in 1864 to absolutely NO food in 1865 toward the end. Your post is duly noted but irrelevant considering men were deserting the army at a rate of hundreds if not thousands per day right up to Appomattox. Let's not forget about losses to disease and exposure to the elements.

Call it irrelevant all you wish. I see it as an indication of how much effort the CS was doing to put men in the field. You have shown how little effort was being made to feed them once they got there. As to the ANV being naked and sans foot wear. Period photos do not support that. The rather famous pics of recently captured CS POWs in the "Fishbowl" show well shod and clothed men, nary a naked man in sight.

Lee did just fine when outnumbered 3-1 on numerous occasions... but not so good against Grant. To paraphrase a CS soldier after the war: "Grant didn't skeer worth a ****."

Wars are won by the least incompetent Army.

 

[johan_steele]

So primary sources and eyewitness accounts are to be disregarded when they go against one's opinion? That seems like the end of history and the beginning of propaganda.

Actually, that has been your practice... taking cherry picking to the level of DiLorenzo.

 

[Sid J.]

This one?

"Much has been written of Grant's 'brilliant' strategic insight during the final Vicksburg campaign. Historians, although pointing out the time and effort the general wasted in trying to get into the Yazoo above the batteries via the rivers and bayous to the north, claim that Porter and Grant had all along jointly intend to adopt the 'correct' strategy of landing the army below the city to operate up the Big Black. Such eulogizing is extravagant as well as factually wrong. The idea of operating without communications is often described as a conception of genius instead of the unenviable result of impulsiveness and lack of military skill. According to some military analysts, the whole campaign was a model of combined operations for its time.

Most of these claims are nonsense. Grant had no real strategic plan for the movement which led to the siege, let alone a combined plan. Nor did anyone in the Union Navy, including Admiral Porter, formulate such a plan. If not exactly an accident, the campaign seemed to develop in reaction to momentary contingencies and difficulties of detail. In fact one might describe the capture of Vicksburg as the final process in a 'chain reaction' of which the participants were hardly aware, and over which they exercised almost no control."

- Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War, 239-240.

Much of what Ms Reed wrote about Grant is along the lines of what's on a NY Jets fan page about Tom Brady. 'He's thrown 150 interceptions, he has 100 fumbles, what a loser" " Why no, Super bowl rings don't matter, not one bit."

Tell us again how great Geno Smith is.

 

[cash]

I stand corrected. Thank you. How about commander of the Union Army? He still gave the orders to the army in the Eastern Theater in the ensuing battles after G-Burg. He made the decisions where to march, where to fight, etc. My point was that he couldn't help but to have larger numbers than Lee so it wasn't his fault that he outnumbered his foe. Not to mention that POW paroles were ended which hurt Lee even further.

We're operating under a bit of a misnomer.

He was the general in chief of all the Union armies. Since every Union army was under him it's obvious he had more men than Lee had. But George Meade still commanded the Army of the Potomac.

Grant provided strategic direction, not tactical command. When we talk about tactics in the OC we're talking about Meade.

 

[67th Tigers]

I've come to the conclusion that besides a couple of small time battles along the Cumberland against subpar leadership and accepting the surrender of Lee, Grant was an unimpressive tactical general.

Grant's reputation post-war was terrible. From the 1940's forward some historians and journalists tried to revive his reputation, and they started feeding an orgy of eulogization. This became what Prof. Ludwell H. Johnston referred to as the "Lincoln-Grant school" and others also identified as a separate school; for example colloquially the late Prof. Joseph Harsh called it the "American Heritage school". This latter name I think is the most appropriate as it was heavily promoted by American Heritage magazine.

Sadly, there's been a case of one-upsmanship in the case of revising Grant's reputation. The last author (until the recent works of Varney, Moore etc.) to be even remotely critical of Grant was McFeely in 1981. Hence we get some oddities like:

Considering that Grant's "Army" as you might say, was of roughly equal size when the Fort was first invested, it's very fair.

Which isn't true, when Grant first invested Fort Donelson he outnumbered the defenders 3:2 (I look at this here).

Or

Well, when Grant slipped beneath Vicksburg, he was actually outnumbered by all the Rebel forces in the area.

Which I've heard before (and commented on); it is a bizarre construction counting Confederate troops 130 miles to th south of Vicksburg under attack from Banks' forces, and troops 100 miles north of Vicksburg, but not counting the Federal troops 130 miles south or 100 miles north facing them, or even troops facing Vicksburg on the west side of the river. It also has to be very precise in its timings, as when Grant crossed the river the movement took until 4 am, and to make Grant outnumbered those troops the count is made at midnight, before the rest of the troops cross.

Someone really wanted to do a Jubal Early on this one, and the first time I encountered it the aggregate present for the rebels was used as well!

 

[cash]

Beware. Grant to some people is never blameworthy and always praiseworthy regardless of what he did in a battle. He gets credit for Iuka and Corinth even though he took no part in the fighting and is exonerated for Cold Harbor and the Crater, Some would say he is the true Marble Man.

And there are those who believe Rosecrans' only fault is he was too modest.