Mutiny at Fort Jackson.

[major bill]

Sources give several conflicting accounts on why one of the worse mutinys of the Civil War happened at Fort Jackson. There is also debate over if the mutiny had not occurred if New Orleans could have been saved. What is the real story?

 

[bdtex]

Sources give several conflicting accounts on why one of the worse mutinys of the Civil War happened at Fort Jackson.

What sources?

 

[delta rifles]

The river defenses at the mouth of the river were flawed from the beginning, and the mutiny was just one of a series of mishaps associated with the Federal efforts to run the forts. The location of Fort Jackson made it far more vulnerable to federal mortar fire (whether it was catastrophically effective or not seems to be the biggest point of contention among historians as well as Butler and Porter themselves), the barracks at Fort Jackson caught fire relatively early in the fight, the Mississippi was at flood stage which further isolated the garrison as well, and the garrison itself suffered tremendously from sickness.

Although Fort St Philip held firm, the fight for the mouth of the river and ultimately New Orleans was over once the federal gun boats ran the forts. The geography above the forts and below the city of New Orleans were virtually defenseless until you reach Chalmette (near the site of the Battle of New Orleans), but even that area could not have effectively held out again the Farragut's armada. Most importantly, the Mississippi River as it flows through New Orleans is actually higher than the lands outside of its river banks which would mean that the federal navy had the advantage if New Orleans had resisted the landing.

What I find more interesting is that the Confederates had plans to erect earthen fortifications around the entire perimeter of the city, but they were never completed. I would love to see the plans for these and have not yet uncovered anything directly related to their existence outside of Chester Hearn mentioning them in his book about the capture of New Orleans, but Louisiana had sent most of its men to Virginia and Tennessee by that point. The Confederates had about 3,000 effectives in the city under the command of Lovell and the fall of the city was just a matter of time--with or without--the mutiny at Fort Jackson.

 

[major bill]

What sources?

David Porter believed that mortar fire from his ships had made the fort uninhabitable. Benjamin Butler believed the Fort was fine and the garrison surrendered due to the presence of his troops. Farragut believed his dash past the Fort destroyed morale. Confederate General Duncan believed that the foriegn born troops were simply disloyal.

Confederate Mansfield Lovell blamed the ethnic French and Spanish citizens of Sothern Louisians of being disloyal. Some modern historians point to many Southern Louisians being resentful of wealthy slave owners. There are also some who believe the Confederate soldiers at Fort Jackson had been treated poorly by their officers.

One of the theories is that the Union supply false information that New Orleans had surrendered and there was no need for Fort Jackson to continue to resist.

 

[bdtex]

David Porter believed that mortar fire had made the fort uninhabitable. Benjamin Butler believed the Fort was fine and the garrison surend6due to the presence of his troops. Confederate General Duncan believed that the foriegn born troops were simple d it disloyal. Confederate Mansfield Lovell blamed the ethnic French and Spanish citizens of Sothern Louisians of being disloyal. More modern historians point to many Southern Louisians being resentful of wealthy slave owners.

Which do you believe?

 

[delta rifles]

David Porter believed that mortar fire from his ships had made the fort uninhabitable. Benjamin Butler believed the Fort was fine and the garrison surrendered due to the presence of his troops. Farragut believed his dash past the Fort destroyed morale. Confederate General Duncan believed that the foriegn born troops were simply disloyal.

Confederate Mansfield Lovell blamed the ethnic French and Spanish citizens of Sothern Louisians of being disloyal. Some modern historians point to many Southern Louisians being resentful of wealthy slave owners. There are also some who believe the Confederate soldiers at Fort Jackson had been treated poorly by their officers.

One of the theories is that the Union supply false information that New Orleans had surrendered and there was no need for Fort Jackson to continue to resist.

Fort Jackson's barracks burnt down during the bombardment, and most of the men lost everything the owned. There was no point in holding out once the fleet moved past the forts. The geography of the mouth made it virtually impossible to resupply the forts and the Confederate resistance of the mouth completely failed.

At least nine Louisiana infantry regiments fought at Shiloh as well as a few artillery units. At least five infantry regiments from Louisiana were in Virginia at the start of the Peninsular Campaign. The very flower of the state's military might was elsewhere and their reputations in other theaters of war speaks for itself. The displays of vitriolic resistance to the Union occupation of the city especially early on demonstrated no lack of vigor for the southern cause either.

Tension between poor whites and the planting class isn't unique to Louisiana. It was evident in virtually every area of the South during the antebellum period.

 

[major bill]

Which do you believe?

It does appear that there was a morale problem. The exact cause of this is not clear, but may have had several factors. Most of the Confederate soldiers had enlisted in 1861 which would show some support for the Confederate cause.

While the Know Nothing movement had died out in other areas it was still strong in New Orleans. The citizen descended from Spanish and French setters were seen by the supporters of the Know Nothing party as being too foreign and not 'white' enough. Many of the Southern Louisianans were Catholics which the Know Nothing movement hated. This not being accepted by Southern society may have played a part in the dissatisfaction in Fort Jackson.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Sources give several conflicting accounts on why one of the worse mutinys of the Civil War happened at Fort Jackson. There is also debate over if the mutiny had not occurred if New Orleans could have been saved. What is the real story?

Can recall reading about the mutiny at Fort Jackson when investigating Lovell's abandonment of New Orleans. (Forts Jackson and St. Philip were in close proximity on opposite banks to each other in a bend of the Mississippi River, about 75 miles south of the city, guarding the port from any downriver approaches).

To understand this mutiny, thought one firstly needs to recognize the quality of the fort's defenders. Most of the enlisted garrison present at Fort Jackson originated from New Orleans – the South's largest city. Lovell described this city as containing heterogeneous elements, with an indulgent population that had varying interests and deep jealousies. (see 'OR': Vol. VI, at page 865). Got the impression from these descriptions that New Orleans society was rife with class tensions and had a wide economic divide between rich and poor. Apparently, New Orleans also possessed a large immigrant population at the time, and many of the mutineers actually came from the German and Irish immigrant groups in that city. At this same time, the bulk of the most resolute and perhaps fittest soldiers from New Orleans were probably already serving outside of the State in either the Army of Mississippi or the Army of Northern Virginia. Many of the defenders in these forts seemed to be urban working class persons from lower socio-economic groups who were not raised in, nor imbued with, Southern traditions, and thereby were not as dedicated to the Southern cause. There were probably lower quality and less-motivated troops that composed the garrisons in both these forts.

Knowledge of the sequence of events that immediately preceded the fall of New Orleans is also necessary to understand what triggered the mutiny. Lovell knew that Butler was assembling a force (that began in Dec.'62) on Ship Island (off the Mississippi Gulf coast) to launch a possible landing close to the city. Starting on April 18, Porter's flotilla of mortar schooners bombarded both forts for several days (with almost 3,000 shells fired on Fort Jackson), but failed to reduce either position. On the night of April 23/24, Farragut's fleet of warships penetrated the river chain barricade and passed by both forts and sailed up-river to New Orleans. During this period, Lovell and his small force evacuated the city, resulting in the city being occupied by Farragut's marines on April 26. At this time, Porter resumed his bombardment of both forts, after they rejected his demands to surrender. But apparently it was the news of New Orleans capitulation that shattered the morale of the Fort Jackson defenders, to such an extent, that they mutinied at midnight on April 27 (with half the garrison deserting and the remainder refusing to fight). However, the garrison mutiny at the larger and more formidable Fort Jackson, made Duncan (the commander of both forts) realize the situation was now untenable, and he surrendered both forts on the next day. The prospect of enduring continuing unpleasant physical conditions (like flooding and the prevalence of snakes and mosquitos) probably contributed to the erosion of morale of these defenders here, too.

Although Fort Jackson had suffered only minor damage at the time of the surrender, it seems reasonable to contend that the combination of news of the surrender of New Orleans as well as the knowledge of an impending landing of Butler's troops in their rear, likely completely demoralized the already less-than-fully-resolute defenders at Fort Jackson. By April 27, it had reached a point that they suddenly realized they were becoming isolated and would soon be cut off in an undesirable physical environment, and now felt a sense of hopelessness. All of these factors converged at this particular point in time to destroy the defenders' morale and their will to fight.

It might be valid to ask that if the defenders at both forts were of the same ilk, then why did only one garrison (at Fort Jackson) mutiny, and not the other nearby (at Fort St. Phillip), before Duncan surrendered both forts.

 

[delta rifles]

To understand this mutiny, thought one firstly needs to recognize the quality of the fort's defenders. Most of the enlisted garrison present at Fort Jackson originated from New Orleans – the South's largest city. Lovell described this city as containing heterogeneous elements, with an indulgent population that had varying interests and deep jealousies. (see 'OR': Vol. VI, at page 865). Got the impression from these descriptions that New Orleans society was rife with class tensions and had a wide economic divide between rich and poor. Apparently, New Orleans also possessed a large immigrant population at the time, and many of the mutineers actually came from the German and Irish immigrant groups in that city. At this same time, the bulk of the most resolute and perhaps fittest soldiers from New Orleans were probably already serving outside of the State in either the Army of Mississippi or the Army of Northern Virginia. Many of the defenders in these forts seemed to be urban working class persons from lower socio-economic groups who were not raised in, nor imbued with, Southern traditions, and thereby were not as dedicated to the Southern cause. There were probably lower quality and less-motivated troops that composed the garrisons in both these forts.

The Saint Mary's Cannoneers made up a large percentage of the 1st Louisiana Heavy Artillery. They were from St Mary's Parish and not New Orleans although I do believe the majority of the other Confederate forces were from the New Orleans area (still trying to pinpoint what detachments were sent to New Orleans, but I do know that Lovell left behind the units comprised of foreigners when he left the city). Incidentally, the men of the 1st Louisiana Heavy Artillery did not mutiny and were a composite of Anglos and French Creoles.

The state of the river at that point in the year, the current, and the distance between the banks made communication between both forts decidedly difficult and it is no surprise that the mutiny happened in isolation even though both garrisons hailed from essentially the same socio-demographic background.

Lovell's letter taken from the OR: Vol. VI pg 865 which was written on March 22, 1862 was essentially his justification for declaring martial law in the city. He does indeed discuss the differences in the population, but he also explained his reasoning. Supplies were in short supply and nature the threat of invasion loomed large. In light of that chaos, Level explained "I enclose to you two orders on the subject of martial law. Affairs here have reached a crisis..and it became necessary for someone to seize the helm with a strong hand, or we should have had trouble, perhaps bloodshed, between men who were all friendly to the cause." At the time of the Civil War, New Orleans was broken into three sectors (The French Quarter, the American Sector--or Les Americans, and another area of the city that housed recently arrived immigrants) or municipalities and the governed their own areas essentially independent of one another. It is not surprising that these political rivalries began to reach a boiling point once the federal navy arrived at the mouth of the river, but the outward displays of Unionism came after the city's capture.
Lovell believed that his declaration of martial law effectively solved the problem of fissures within a population already separated by cultural differences. In the same letter referenced above, Lovell stated "No movement has been made since martial law was proclaimed that has not been received with approval by the people at large. I feel sure that the administration and our cause have been saved from a terrible embarrassment here in New Orleans."

It is also important to note that Lovell was heavily scrutinized for his failure to defend the city and for its evacuation by the people of the city (I don't think he was solely responsible for the city's fall in the least). Although eventually found innocent of incompetence related to his performance in New Orleans, Lovell was essentially blacklisted from commanding Confederate troops for the duration of the war. Not surprisingly, Lovell found fault with the population of New Orleans and the uncoordinated efforts of his predecessorsafter the fall in attempt to shift attention from his own shortcomings while in command.

 

[DixieRifles]

At least nine Louisiana infantry regiments fought at Shiloh as well as a few artillery units.

Here is what I show as being at Shiloh. Arranged in order of Johston's organization.

11th Louisiana
13th Louisiana
4th Louisiana
19th Louisiana (ancestor in this unit, Capt John W. Jones)
17th Louisiana
20th Louisiana
16 Louisiana
18th Louisiana
Washington (Louisiana) Artillery, 5th Co.
1st Louisiana
Watson's Louisiana Battery

 

[General Casey]

I recommend reading Michael Pierson's Mutiny at Fort Jackson

 

[delta rifles]

Here is what I show as being at Shiloh. Arranged in order of Johston's organization.

11th Louisiana
13th Louisiana
4th Louisiana
19th Louisiana (ancestor in this unit, Capt John W. Jones)
17th Louisiana
20th Louisiana
16 Louisiana
18th Louisiana
Washington (Louisiana) Artillery, 5th Co.
1st Louisiana
Watson's Louisiana Battery

Some of my ancestors were in the 18th Louisiana, but the majority of mine arrived in the Tennessee theater with the 30th Louisiana a bit later.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Believe that the total combined garrison strength at Forts Jackson and St. Philip was somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 troops.

These garrisons comprised:

. 1st. Louisiana Field Battery (or St. Mary's Cannoneers) . This was a volunteer artillery unit

recruited in Louisiana.

. 6th Louisiana Regiment, European Brigade (or Italian Guards Battalion)

This militia unit was comprised largely of unnaturalized European residents of

New Orleans (who were predominantly French, and to a lesser extent, Spanish and

Italians).


. 20th Louisiana Infantry Regiment (several companies)

Many soldiers in this volunteer infantry unit were recent immigrants to New Orleans

from Germany and Ireland.


Apparently, the St. Mary's Cannoneers did not participate in the mutiny but they finally surrendered with the rest of the garrison.

Thought it also interesting that David D. Porter supposedly recalled later that, …'the most important event of the War of the Rebellion, with the exception of the fall of Richmond, was the capture of New Orleans and the forts Jackson and St. Philip, guarding the approach to that city.'…

 

[delta rifles]

Believe that the total combined garrison strength at Forts Jackson and St. Philip was somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 troops.

These garrisons comprised:

. 1st. Louisiana Field Battery (or St. Mary's Cannoneers) . This was a volunteer artillery unit

recruited in Louisiana.

. 6th Louisiana Regiment, European Brigade (or Italian Guards Battalion)

This militia unit was comprised largely of unnaturalized European residents of

New Orleans (who were predominantly French, and to a lesser extent, Spanish and

Italians).


. 20th Louisiana Infantry Regiment (several companies)

Many soldiers in this volunteer infantry unit were recent immigrants to New Orleans

from Germany and Ireland.


Apparently, the St. Mary's Cannoneers did not participate in the mutiny but they finally surrendered with the rest of the garrison.

Thought it also interesting that David D. Porter supposedly recalled later that, …'the most important event of the War of the Rebellion, with the exception of the fall of Richmond, was the capture of New Orleans and the forts Jackson and St. Philip, guarding the approach to that city.'…

It would be very interesting to compare the ethnic composition of those units to other Louisiana units from the New Orleans area that were already fighting elsewhere. I'd venture to say that percentage of immigrants/foreigners in the units at Fort Jackson and Fort Saint Philip were not much different at all. After all, 30% of the 20,000 men who served in the New Orleans area Confederate units were foreign born. I'll do some research to see what I can uncover.

There is no doubt that the fall of New Orleans and Southern Louisiana was a catastrophic blow to the Southern cause especially from an economic standpoint.

I've throughly enjoyed reading through Porter and Butler's spat about who actually caused the surrender of Fort Jackson and Fort Saint Philip, and I cannot figure out who's ego was bigger.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

It would be very interesting to compare the ethnic composition of those units to other Louisiana units from the New Orleans area that were already fighting elsewhere. I'd venture to say that percentage of immigrants/foreigners in the units at Fort Jackson and Fort Saint Philip were not much different at all. After all, 30% of the 20,000 men who served in the New Orleans area Confederate units were foreign born. I'll do some research to see what I can uncover.

There is no doubt that the fall of New Orleans and Southern Louisiana was a catastrophic blow to the Southern cause especially from an economic standpoint.

It would make sense that those units here predominantly populated by foreign-born ethnic groups (and who were recently arrived immigrants) might be more inclined to mutiny, as they felt no strong ties/connections to the South.

Also, the following extract in Porter's own penned 'Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War' (at page 57) possibly explains why he elevated to preeminence (second only to the fall of Richmond) as a wartime event, the capture of New Orleans and forts Jackson and St. Philip:

…"The capture of New Orleans broke up the principal stronghold of the Confederacy. It virtually gave us control of the Mississippi River, and was really the insertion of the wedge which finally split the backbone of the Rebellion. When the Mississippi was opened in all its length, the contest was virtually settled."….

 

[atlantis]

Were the forts really capable of withstanding bombardment? The effect of naval firepower on fort Pulaski appears to say the days of masonry fortifications had passed.

 

[SeanMichaelChick]

There was another mutiny at Fort Jackson, this one in 1863. I wrote a short piece for a book on Port Hudson that I have not yet finished. Below is a parphrase of it.

Lt. Augustus W. Benedict of the 75th New York joined the Corps d'Afrique. The corps rapidly expanded and officer slots had to be filled. Benedict won for himself promotion to major. He was assigned to the 4th Louisiana Native Guards, which were renamed the 4th Corps d'Afrique. He made the rank of Lt. Col. Still, command of such regiments was often seen as degradation, and many officers who thought they had no chance at regular promotion jumped over to command black regiments. Indeed, several of the commanders of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Native Guards were dismissed in 1863 and 1864 for various failings. Among the most scandalous was when Col. Nathan W. Daniels of the 2nd Louisiana Native Guards stood by as his adjutant called a naval officer "a damned **** ***" and his wife "a damned whore."

The 4th Native Guards were mustered in on March 6, 1863. Most were former slaves raised from southeast Louisiana. They were not actively engaged in the opening attack on Port Hudson, being brought over later and mostly being stationed at Baton Rouge. There they took part in a variety of parades and gained Banks' notice as a well drilled outfit. In July of 1863 they were posted to New Orleans and the following month as the garrison for Fort Jackson and St. Philip. Col. Charles W. Drew, formerly of the 75th New York, commanded the post.

Drew was an excellent drillmaster, but he failed to curtail abuses by the officers under him, particularly Benedict. In August 1863 Benedict had a man spread a man out on his back, with limbs outstretched and tied up. The soldier's face, hands, and feet were then covered in molasses. This torture lasted one full day and was continued for a time the following day. It was also not the first time Benedict used such means. He inflicted it earlier when the regiment was stationed in Baton Rouge.

On December 8 Drew gave Benedict full command of the regiment and posted him to Fort Jackson. On the evening of December 9 Benedict whipped Harry Williams and Munroe Miller, two drummer boys. Following that the men protested. Some men exclaimed "We want to be treated as soldiers" Benedict replied "Those boys were bad boys, and I treated them as such." Drew had Benedict confined to quarters. The officers quieted the men, although some thirty had left the fort already, demanding Benedict be turned over. Drew was lucky. At least half the regiment, and likely more, did not join the riot, in fact implored the men to maintain order. The men also did not hate Drew, telling him "We don't want to hurt you; it is Colonel Benedict we are after." Drew also agreed that Benedict had done wrong and he promised that justice would be done. While one soldier did exclaim "kill all the damned Yankess" it appears no one else agreed.

The next day Drew ordered Benedict to New Orleans, to report to Col. Edward G. Beckwith, the garrison commander. Drew later made it clear he did not wish Benedict to return. Commodore Henry H. Bell was requested to send one or two more gunboats immediately to Fort Jackson. A regiment of troops was moved down during the evening and a battery of artillery in the morning. A military commission, headed by Maj. Gen Francis Herron, went to Fort Jackson. From December 12-13 the commission listened to testimony from white officers. None of the enlisted men were called up. They recommended a court-martial be held. The commission blamed Benedict for his harsh measures, but thought the men did not understand how to properly redress grievances.

On December 17-19 and 30, a court-martial was overseen by Maj. G. Norman Lieber as judge-advocate and Col. Friend Smith Rutherford of the 97th Illinois. Maj. Gen. N.P. Banks, commander of the Department of the Gulf made it clear the Native Guards would be held to account stating "The conduct of the soldiers is inexcusable, and must be punished with such severity as to prevent its recurrence." He added "It will be apparent that whatever soldierly qualifications may be ultimately found in these men, their full development requires time…It is unreasonable to expect that men who have never handled a musket, who have never been admitted to civil or individual rights, can instantaneously become perfect soldiers." Banks did note that the officers, namely Benedict, had tortured some of the men, and that the rapid expansion of the Corps d'Afrique meant its officers were sometimes, and likely more than Banks cared to admit, unsuited to command. Regardless, Banks tried his best to downplay the incident, writing to Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck "there is nothing to excite apprehension or to suggest a doubt as to the perfect confidence which the Government may repose in troops of this class."

Of the thirteen men under trial, only Corp. Henry Green and Pvts. Jacob Kennedy, Volset Verrett, and James Hagan were acquitted. Musician Edward B. Smith was sentenced to hard labor for one year. Corp. Lewis Cady was sentenced to two years hard labor, Prvt. Willis Curtis to three years, and Prvts. Charles Taylor and Abram Singleton to ten years. Prvt. Julius Bourdo was given the worst of the prison sentences with twenty years. By contrast Prvt. James H. Moore only got one month, and that was itself commuted. All were sent to Fort Jefferson, Florida, in the infamous Dry Tortugas of the Florida Keys. Prvts. Frank Williams and Abraham Victoria were sentenced to death. However, those sentences were suspended until further notice, and each man sent to Fort Jefferson. It appears from the records they were not executed. Banks had Benedict stripped of his rank. He had commanded his regiment for at most two days, surely among the war's shortest tenures for a regiment commander not under fire.

The 4th Corps d'Afrique had a mostly quiet life after December 1863. They were moved to Port Hudson in February 1864 and remained there a year. On April 4, 1864 the 4th Corps d'Afrique was renamed the 76th United States Colored Troops (USCT.) Sent to Florida in 1865, they took part in the Mobile campaign and stormed Fort Blakeley on April 9, 1865, the final battle of the Civil War. At that battle, Drew commanded a brigade of USCT.

 

[1950lemans]

What I'm hearing is that the defenders were Irish stevedores and dock workers and had no great love of the Confederacy. All they wanted was to work, not die defending the city.
Enlighten me please!

 

[YoungBuck]

Were the forts really capable of withstanding bombardment? The effect of naval firepower on fort Pulaski appears to say the days of masonry fortifications had passed.

I might be of some assistance here. I'm currently an undergrad- make of this what you will- and this last semester wrote a paper on the Fort Jackson Mutiny [the 1862 mutiny of 27 April, not the 1863 Union Mutiny.] In the interest of scansion, and as I have not my notes about me, the simple answer is best: it depends who one asked. After the battle, both the US Army and Navy issued separate reports: the extent of the damage was disputed, with the Army- in any case, officers attached to Butler- claiming relatively little damage, while the Navy claimed comparatively more damage. If you have a few spare hours, Volume VI of the OR has most of the information; alternately, I can dig up my references if you'd be interested.
Of some note is the fact that most of the bombardment to Forts Jackson and St. Philip was mortar fire; I believe, though am not sure, that Fort Pulaski was hit with direct-trajectory fire.

 

[atlantis]

I might be of some assistance here. I'm currently an undergrad- make of this what you will- and this last semester wrote a paper on the Fort Jackson Mutiny [the 1862 mutiny of 27 April, not the 1863 Union Mutiny.] In the interest of scansion, and as I have not my notes about me, the simple answer is best: it depends who one asked. After the battle, both the US Army and Navy issued separate reports: the extent of the damage was disputed, with the Army- in any case, officers attached to Butler- claiming relatively little damage, while the Navy claimed comparatively more damage. If you have a few spare hours, Volume VI of the OR has most of the information; alternately, I can dig up my references if you'd be interested.
Of some note is the fact that most of the bombardment to Forts Jackson and St. Philip was mortar fire; I believe, though am not sure, that Fort Pulaski was hit with direct-trajectory fire.

Thanks, can't help but smile over the army/navy disputing extent of damage, interservice rivalry is as old as time.