Most Overrated General?

[BillO]

Naw. They thought he was the bee's knees at first, but it wasn't long before Lincoln started making quips about how he had a glorified clerk instead of a general-in-chief.

Being Lincolns and Stanton's general in chief is pretty much the same job as being Davis sec. of war. If the boss will only let you be a clerk then just be the best clerk you can be.

 

[Pat Answer]

Being Lincolns and Stanton's general in chief is pretty much the same job as being Davis sec. of war. If the boss will only let you be a clerk then just be the best clerk you can be.

Good point. In Halleck's favor is his consistency at what he perceived to be his role. Including IIRC threatening to resign once when asked to overstep it. His competent handling of a mountain of unseen military administrative matters is certainly under-appreciated.

 

[diane]

Good point. In Halleck's favor is his consistency at what he perceived to be his role. Including IIRC threatening to resign once when asked to overstep it. His competent handling of a mountain of unseen military administrative matters is certainly under-appreciated.

I think that was exactly Halleck's best service to the Lincoln administration. And, he did a good job of snagging nasty little personnel matters and disgruntled generals and unhappy this or that so that Lincoln didn't have to worry about it. Lincoln didn't often underestimate people, though, and even if he thought Halleck was basically a clerk, he knew a good one when he saw one.

 

[Old Bay]

I think that was exactly Halleck's best service to the Lincoln administration. And, he did a good job of snagging nasty little personnel matters and disgruntled generals and unhappy this or that so that Lincoln didn't have to worry about it. Lincoln didn't often underestimate people, though, and even if he thought Halleck was basically a clerk, he knew a good one when he saw one.

Logistics wins wars. It's not fancy, but you want someone good at that job in that position. So for that reason I think Halleck is rated about right.

 

[suzenatale]

True, though Chamberlain's regiment faced another regiment while Ireland's regiment faced at least a brigade. Also, Ireland's boys fought constantly for more than two hours.

Well fortunately us ladies factor in personality, not just size.
Anyway the thread is about generals. So your going to have to argue Warren v Greene, or talk about events after Petersburg.

 

[James N.]

Didn't the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps form the Twentieth Corps?

R

Yes; that was a "brain f**t", I'm afraid! No doubt I was thinking IV Corps in connection with Howard slaughtering it at Pickett's Mill. Of course Hooker didn't do any better with XX Corps at New Hope Church but at least he did a lot better at Kolb's Farm a few days later; here's his headquarters at the latter place:

Expired Image Removed

 

[JPWalton]

Halleck had his role. Despite the way Halleck had tried to throw him under a bus, Grant kept him. That says a lot.

Yet reading some of these comments, it's very clear to me that some of things people attribute to Halleck were actually the work of Alonzo Thomas, Montgomery Meigs, Joseph Totten, Joseph Taylor and others who served in high staff positions during the war.

Let's be frank about this: Henry Halleck was no George C. Marshall.

That said, this thread is "most overrated general." If Halleck was ever overrated, that ended within months of his arrival in Washington. Right now, I would say the general opinion history holds of him is a fair one.

 

[James N.]

By putting Forrest at the top of his list and then mentioning Chamberlain at all, Gallagher is showing himself to be full of sh*te. Up to his eyeballs, in fact.

Forrest was one of the best cavalry generals of the war. Period. In terms of raiding and fighting, he was undeniably the best. Others certainly surpassed him in intelligence collecting and providing army security, but those are only two jobs in the cavalry roster.

As lionized as Chamberlain is, no one rates him past the jobs he actually carried out. He is admired as a heroic figure, not as a brilliant strategist. In those terms, let's face it, where someone does something is every bit as important as what he actually does.

Jesus! Reading that article has me so boiling it has actually taken Gallagher down several notches in my estimation. I was thinking of picking up his book about Chancellorsville, but now I don't think I will!

Even if you allow for the fact the short article was written by Gallagher, it's still an online magazine article and nothing scholarly so it must have readily identifiable "characters". If he said, for example, that Gideon Pillow, John Floyd, and Leonidas Polk were terrible commanders, most readers' reaction would be who were they? And so it has to be populated with easily recognizable names like Forrest and Chamberlain to grab the interest of modern readers. Better in this case I think to blame the medium rather than its author.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Even if you allow for the fact the short article was written by Gallagher, it's still an online magazine article and nothing scholarly so it must have readily identifiable "characters". If he said, for example, that Gideon Pillow, John Floyd, and Leonidas Polk were terrible commanders, most readers' reaction would be who were they? And so it has to be populated with easily recognizable names like Forrest and Chamberlain to grab the interest of modern readers. Better in this case I think to blame the medium rather than its author.

If one has to ask "who were they" then they aren't overrated -- since to be overrated implies a high rating, which implies recognition.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Halleck had his role. Despite the way Halleck had tried to throw him under a bus, Grant kept him.

Did Grant have a choice?

 

[James N.]

Reliable information of the enemy's position or movements, which is absolutely necessary to the commander of an army to successfully conduct a campaign, must be largely furnished by the cavalry. The duty of the cavalry when an engagement is imminent is specially imperative—to keep in touch with the enemy and observe and carefully note, with time of day or night, every slightest indication and report it promptly to the commander of the army. On the march, cavalry forms in advance, flank and rear guards and supplies escorts, couriers and guides. Cavalry should extend well away from the main body on the march like antennae to mask its movements and to discover any movement of the enemy.

Cavalry should never hug the army on the march, especially in a thickly wooded country, because the horses being restricted to the roads, the slightest obstacle in advance is liable to cause a blockade against the march of infantry...
- William W. Averrell, taken from http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=2147

To transfer Averrell's ideas and comments to another subject brought up in this thread, they're certainly an indictment against the way Sheridan handled his cavalry in the Wilderness and explains why Meade was so furious with him!

 

[cash]

Well fortunately us ladies factor in personality, not just size.
Anyway the thread is about generals. So your going to have to argue Warren v Greene, or talk about events after Petersburg.

Since General Chamberlain's main claim to fame is what he did as Colonel Chamberlain at Gettysburg, I'd say this qualifies, at least tangentially, as on topic.

 

[suzenatale]

Since General Chamberlain's main claim to fame is what he did as Colonel Chamberlain at Gettysburg, I'd say this qualifies, at least tangentially, as on topic.

I'd like to think it was the surrender.

 

[Billy Yank]

Here are excerpts from an article on page 36 of the April 2011 edition of the "Civil War Times," entitled, "The Butcher's Bill" by Edward H. Bonekemper III, the author of "Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher: The Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War." Mr. Bonekemper is an instructor at Muhlenburg College located in Allentown, PA.

Robert E. Lee by the numbers: Seven Days, Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Chantilly, Harpers Ferry, Crampton's Gap/South Mountain, Antietam/Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Kelly's Ford, Chancellorsville, Brandy Station, Winchester, Aldie/Middleburg/Upperville, Hanover, Gettysburg, Retreat from Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, Kelly's Ford & Rappahannock Stn., Mine Run, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Cold Harbor, Petersburg Assaults, Petersburg Siege/Campaign, Appomattox Campaign.

Totals (killed, wounded, missing/captured) - Union Casualties - 240,322 Confederate Casualties - 208,922

Ulysses S. Grant by the numbers: Belmont, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Iuka, Corinth/Hatchie River, Vicksburg Campaign, Return to Jackson, Chattanooga, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Cold Harbor, Petersburg Assaults, Petersburg Siege/Campaign, Appomattox

Totals (killed, wounded, missing/captured) - Union Casualties - 153,642 Confederate Casualties - 190,760
"The result of Lee's strategic and tactical aggression was that, within a single theater and in command of a single losing army, Lee saw his army suffer 209,000 casualties - losses the South could not afford. Lee's single army suffered 55,000 more casualties than the four armies commanded by Grant in three theaters - all theaters where his armies were victorious. If a single statistic was indicative of the war's outcome, it was Robert E. Lee's army incurring those 209,000 casualties. On the positive side, Lee did impose 240,000 casualties on his foes, for a plus 31,000 margin.

Grant, on the other hand, was able to capture Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Vicksburg (with their defending armies); save a trapped Union army at, and drive a Confederate army into Georgia away from Chattanooga; and come east to defeat Lee and finish the war in less than a year - all while incurring a reasonable 154,000 casualties. By imposing 191,000 casualties on his opponents, Grant achieved a plus 37,000 margin. Considering the breadth and depth of Grant's successes in a necessarily offensive mode, even a negative 37,000 margin would have been expected and militarily acceptable. What he achieved with his tolerable losses was amazing."

"Lee had greater casualties both in percentages and real numbers: An average of 20 percent of his troops were killed or wounded in his major campaigns, a total of more that 121,000 (far more than any other Civil War general). "

 

[Pat Answer]

Yet reading some of these comments, it's very clear to me that some of things people attribute to Halleck were actually the work of Alonzo Thomas, Montgomery Meigs, Joseph Totten, Joseph Taylor and others who served in high staff positions during the war.

Yes, that's fair.

 

[Pat Answer]

Here are excerpts from an article on page 36 of the April 2011 edition of the "Civil War Times," entitled, "The Butcher's Bill" by Edward H. Bonekemper III, the author of "Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher: The Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War." Mr. Bonekemper is an instructor at Muhlenburg College located in Allentown, PA.

Robert E. Lee by the numbers: Seven Days, Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Chantilly, Harpers Ferry, Crampton's Gap/South Mountain, Antietam/Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Kelly's Ford, Chancellorsville, Brandy Station, Winchester, Aldie/Middleburg/Upperville, Hanover, Gettysburg, Retreat from Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, Kelly's Ford & Rappahannock Stn., Mine Run, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Cold Harbor, Petersburg Assaults, Petersburg Siege/Campaign, Appomattox Campaign.

Totals (killed, wounded, missing/captured) - Union Casualties - 240,322 Confederate Casualties - 208,922

Ulysses S. Grant by the numbers: Belmont, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Iuka, Corinth/Hatchie River, Vicksburg Campaign, Return to Jackson, Chattanooga, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Cold Harbor, Petersburg Assaults, Petersburg Siege/Campaign, Appomattox

Totals (killed, wounded, missing/captured) - Union Casualties - 153,642 Confederate Casualties - 190,760
"The result of Lee's strategic and tactical aggression was that, within a single theater and in command of a single losing army, Lee saw his army suffer 209,000 casualties - losses the South could not afford. Lee's single army suffered 55,000 more casualties than the four armies commanded by Grant in three theaters - all theaters where his armies were victorious. If a single statistic was indicative of the war's outcome, it was Robert E. Lee's army incurring those 209,000 casualties. On the positive side, Lee did impose 240,000 casualties on his foes, for a plus 31,000 margin.

Grant, on the other hand, was able to capture Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Vicksburg (with their defending armies); save a trapped Union army at, and drive a Confederate army into Georgia away from Chattanooga; and come east to defeat Lee and finish the war in less than a year - all while incurring a reasonable 154,000 casualties. By imposing 191,000 casualties on his opponents, Grant achieved a plus 37,000 margin. Considering the breadth and depth of Grant's successes in a necessarily offensive mode, even a negative 37,000 margin would have been expected and militarily acceptable. What he achieved with his tolerable losses was amazing."

"Lee had greater casualties both in percentages and real numbers: An average of 20 percent of his troops were killed or wounded in his major campaigns, a total of more that 121,000 (far more than any other Civil War general). "

There are ways to read these numbers, of course. But this is what I meant earlier about these two being head and shoulders above the rest in strategic importance overall...

 

[cash]

I'd like to think it was the surrender.

So Chamberlain would like everyone to think. It's proof that no event is so small and insignificant, such as being available when everyone else wanted to get out of town, that it can't be blown completely out of proportion and made to seem like it was the event of the century.

 

[suzenatale]

So Chamberlain would like everyone to think. It's proof that no event is so small and insignificant, such as being available when everyone else wanted to get out of town, that it can't be blown completely out of proportion and made to seem like it was the event of the century.

No you're right, I don't know why anyone would care about the surrender. Might as well take that house down and use it as scrap lumber... again.

Oh no, national park service. *facepalm* I could handle cash, but really, you had to use a photo of Edwin Stoughton the "I can make a much better Brigadier in five minutes, but the horses cost a hundred and twenty-five dollars apiece" guy and say it's Chamberlain.
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/civil_war_series/6/sec7.htm
Now that just hurts.

 

[Elennsar]

The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston: Embracing His Services In the Armies Of The United States, The Republic of Texas, And the Confederate States. Page 424.

So a biography by his son that goes into absolutely no detail of what Tilghman supposedly said in that message.

Without any intent of casting aspersions on you - I think you've demonstrated a reasonable argument throughout this - I do not consider that convincing.

Agree (hindsight is a wonderful thing) but Johnston was too busy dealing with the fundamental problem concerning the Western theatre - how to squeeze arms and men out of a disinterested Richmond and uncooperative State Governors. During this time Johnston was also coordinating aggressive feints in Eastern Kentucky to delay a Union invasion of Tennessee, trying to prevent Buell's massive army from advancing on Bowling Green, and trying to defend three rivers in western Kentucky/Tennessee with scant resources. I don't think a Lee or a Grant could have done any better than Johnston.

I do. A Lee or Grant would have gotten on the cases of these men.

And the issue of "scant resources" keeps coming up as if that removes him from his role of making sure of how they're used. If I was a general with resources as Johnston's, I'd like to think that I would try harder to ensure my subordinates aren't spreading them too thin.

Winfield Scott accused him of insubordination during the Mexican War. In July 1861, Polk ordered Pillow to abandon his planned invasion of Missouri, but Pillow went ahead with preparations as if Polk had not suspended the offensive. Pillow styled himself "Commander of the Army of Liberation." That's pretty insubordinate.

Sure. But it is as insubordinate?

I mean, I think we both agree that the best thing that could have been done was to hang both of them. But I'm not sure Pillow undermined Polk's plans (given Polk's even more ridiculous neglect of Fort Donelson etc. than Johnston, who at least has the excuse of being ill informed by his subordinates and having to face multiple problems) to the extent Bragg was undermined by Polk.

Can we agree that its extremely telling that this argument is 'which of them did worse" rather than "Polk had good points Pillow didn't" or vice-versa?

Since given that almost anyone else would get someone noting they had good qualities, I'm kind of shocked Polk even in this discussion between us isn't.

Beauregard stayed at the rear but had less of an idea of what was going on than Johnston. Shiloh was a disorganised bush bash - no one had control. Plus it was Johnston's first battle - he did pretty well considering its magnitude. Lee, Jackson, and Grant's first battles were small affairs and they performed relatively poorly. Johnston would have learnt much from his Shiloh experience and gone on to greater things.

He did pretty well if you want to treat his role as a division commander, like he did. He did pretty abysmally at doing anything to make more than a disorganized bush bash out of it, which while it might have challenged anyone is not something he even attempted to address. If corps and divisions went off in ways wholly unrelated to the plan, that didn't even get to his attention, let alone to efforts to correct.

I frankly do not see where he would learn anything about commanding an army in regards to the whole force from this even if we give him full credit for what he did in the actions he did do. It simply did not address that.

Beauregard's lack of effectiveness I don't think has much to say in its defense. Unlike Johnston, he (well, technically Jordan) wrote the plan that was supposedly going to be used. Johnston getting involved directly, if at a lower level than his rank suggests, at least addressed some parts of tactical execution, if not the bigger problems.

True, though Chamberlain's regiment faced another regiment while Ireland's regiment faced at least a brigade. Also, Ireland's boys fought constantly for more than two hours.

More like two regiments, from my reading, but still. Much longer odds for Ireland.

And I'm going to add that Ireland's position was a lot more likely to - had he failed - lead to disaster than Chamberlain's.

LRT firmly in Confederate hands might have meant something, but that's neither here nor there. But the Confederates were a lot further from being able to keep it firmly in their hands even if Vincent's brigade was swept away like cattle than they were of Culp's Hill had Greene's brigade been swept away.[/QUOTE]

 

[cash]

LRT firmly in Confederate hands might have meant something, but that's neither here nor there. But the Confederates were a lot further from being able to keep it firmly in their hands even if Vincent's brigade was swept away like cattle than they were of Culp's Hill had Greene's brigade been swept away.

LRT in confederate hands, let's think about where the VI Corps is by the time the fighting on LRT is done. I would maintain it would be in confederate hands for maybe a half hour before the VI Corps pushes them right back off.