Most Overrated General?

[Saruman]

So a biography by his son that goes into absolutely no detail of what Tilghman supposedly said in that message. Without any intent of casting aspersions on you - I think you've demonstrated a reasonable argument throughout this - I do not consider that convincing.

His son may have had access to Johnston's personal papers/correspondence so its not implausible that such a report exists. Tilghman's report of Jan 2nd was positive, so its not a big stretch to suggest that a report sent on Dec 28th (if it exists) was also positive. That's less than a week in time difference.

Can we agree that its extremely telling that this argument is 'which of them did worse" rather than "Polk had good points Pillow didn't" or vice-versa?

Agree that both were terrible. At least Bragg only had to contend with Polk and Hardee. Johnston had Polk, Hardee, Pillow, and Floyd! Plus Bragg is partially responsible for his subordinates' disloyalty. Calling Polk a "worthless old woman" in the company of other generals is not likely to win you the support of the Bishop and his cronies.

I frankly do not see where he would learn anything about commanding an army in regards to the whole force from this even if we give him full credit for what he did in the actions he did do. It simply did not address that.

An offensive action involving 44,000 inexperienced, untrained, undisciplined, poorly led, poorly armed, and poorly equipped soldiers on muddy and wooded terrain is extremely difficult to conduct. Johnston should get credit for making anything happen at all. Bragg called the army an "armed mob." I am certain Johnston would have learned from the experience and developed as an army commander. Even if we can't be sure that Johnston would have been a great commander, we can definitely say that he was a great man of high character, unblemished honour, charisma, warmth, and kindness on a personal level.

IMO, he was the best commander of the Confederate western armies.

He was willing to take risks and bold offensives (unlike Joe Johnston and Pemberton), he was communicative and on friendly terms with Davis (unlike Joe Johnston and Beauregard), he was adored by his soldiers (unlike Bragg and Pemberton, and to some extent Hood), he commanded the respect of his subordinates by virtue of his seniority and good nature (unlike Bragg, Hood, Pemberton and Van Dorn), he put the cause before his own ego (unlike Joe Johnston, Hood, Van Dorn and Beauregard), and he never tried to shirk the blame for setbacks on his subordinates (unlike Bragg and Hood).

 

[Elennsar]

LRT in confederate hands, let's think about where the VI Corps is by the time the fighting on LRT is done. I would maintain it would be in confederate hands for maybe a half hour before the VI Corps pushes them right back off.

Thus the point about being further from being firmly in Confederate hands than (had Greene's brigade heen pushed off) Culp's Hill was.

Ireland and Greene don't have any support of that size coming until long after they've either won or lost the position, regardless of the merits of LRT vs. Culp's Hill as a problem.

 

[Elennsar]

His son may have had access to Johnston's personal papers/correspondence so its not implausible that such a report exists. Tilghman's report of Jan 2nd was positive, so its not a big stretch to suggest that a report sent on Dec 28th (if it exists) was also positive. That's less than a week in time difference.

Except that from the reports we do know he sent it is very unlikely that he sent something on the 28th that was positive when every report for a month up to that point and his message to Davis on the 28th are "We need more help. Badly."

So sure its possible that some report exists in Johnston's personal papers/correspondence, but the information we have of the messages from Tilghman we do have does not suggest Tilghman would have such confidence on the 28th.

Agree that both were terrible. At least Bragg only had to contend with Polk and Hardee. Johnston had Polk, Hardee, Pillow, and Floyd! Plus Bragg is partially responsible for his subordinates' disloyalty. Calling Polk a "worthless old woman" in the company of other generals is not likely to win you the support of the Bishop and his cronies.

Hardee at least at this point (for Johnston, I mean) seems to have been at least semi-cooperative, or at least not actively mutinous.

And could you show where Bragg said that? I'm not saying he didn't - Bragg certainly said such things about his subordinates - but I want to see where and when if possible.

An offensive action involving 44,000 inexperienced, untrained, undisciplined, poorly led, poorly armed, and poorly equipped soldiers on muddy and wooded terrain is extremely difficult to conduct. Johnston should get credit for making anything happen at all. Bragg called the army an "armed mob." I am certain Johnston would have learned from the experience and developed as an army commander. Even if we can't be sure that Johnston would have been a great commander, we can definitely say that he was a great man of high character, unblemished honour, charisma, warmth, and kindness on a personal level.

Except that as far as the army was concerned, the only thing he made happen was that it got into a bloody and difficult battle. Anything about what it did as an army in that battle happened regardless of Johnston's personal involvement in regiment level affairs, not because of any skills that if he had lived would have been invaluable.

And the fact that his army is "untrained, undisciplined, and poorly lead" (though not the other three) rests firmly on his shoulders for at least a fair portion of that force (The part that has been under his command for months). Not his and his alone, but he sets the tone as its commander. He has options about who commands what and how the army is organized as an army (as opposed to a collection of regiments with no structure above that level). Is his control absolute? No. But there's a difference between the organization of the (to use the name its most famous under) Army of Tennessee in April 1862 and the Army of Northern Virginia in April of 1862 that is within his control.

IMO, he was the best commander of the Confederate western armies.

He was willing to take risks and bold offensives (unlike Joe Johnston and Pemberton), he was communicative and on friendly terms with Davis (unlike Joe Johnston and Beauregard), he was adored by his soldiers (unlike Bragg and Pemberton, and to some extent Hood), he commanded the respect of his subordinates by virtue of his seniority and good nature (unlike Bragg, Hood, Pemberton and Van Dorn), he put the cause before his own ego (unlike Joe Johnston, Hood, Van Dorn and Beauregard), and he never tried to shirk the blame for setbacks on his subordinates (unlike Bragg and Hood).

1) Sure.
2) Friendly terms, yes. Communicative - given the impression Richmond had of Johnston's strength I don't see how they could have gotten that from a Johnston effectively and regularly communicating his needs/wants. Even allowing for Richmond having an unrealistic view of things at times, given the relationship between Sidney and Davis the reasons why that came up for the other Johnston shouldn't be present - Davis would be inclined to trust Sidney Johnston.
3) Sure.
4) Polk did not act as if he had any respect for Johnston. Neither did Gilmer, although I blame that in both cases on both of them being the sort of person who anyone would have been better off without, their failure here shows strikingly how little Johnston was able (for whatever reasons) to get them to do what he wanted instead of them doing their own thing. And while they were, to put it mildly, difficult to work with, his jobs needs him to be good at this in order to be a success in reality, whatever his potential on paper.
4) Sure.
5) Given that Bragg's setbacks happened in a certain amount because of the failures of his subordinates, I have a certain amount (only to a point, but nonetheless) of sympathy for him blaming them for the AoT's failures. Holding subordinates accountable for their actions is part of generalship too. Simply "It's all my fault." is manly, and sometimes more accurate than not (something Bragg seems to have missed), but the other half cannot be completely ignored.


But most importantly - all of these, while admirable qualities, do not actually lead to him producing very much. Johnston's record is one of defeat and failure, and the post-Shiloh AoT was not blessed with resources in any of the areas talked about as something he was short of before Shiloh. So why would he do better with limited resources and broad responsibility later in the year than he had done earlier in the year?

That's not directed just at Sidney Johnston. But whenever someone's failings are excused because of a lack of materials, I have to wonder - no general at any point in the war on the Confederate side except possibly Lee in the Seven Days ever had what could be under normal circumstances be described as "ample resources".

So why is it that we see all of one general of full rank manage to deal with all the reasons that can be offered as impediments to the success of a Confederate commander, and everyone else to a greater or lesser extent falls short?

That answer at some point rests on their shoulders.

I'm willing to cede that Johnston might have learned. There's no way to tell he wouldn't have. But it is possible to judge what he did with what he had in the time he had, and to assume that there was more to him feels like a "this couldn't be all there was" argument.

Davis's "If Sidney Johnston is no general, than we have no general." sounds pithy, and I suspect that was why he said it, but it doesn't actually present any reasons why Johnston is a qualified general. And that's assuming for discussion's sake that saying he was the best of the lot isn't flat out wrong (I certainly wouldn't want to appoint Polk to Johnston's spot.)

 

[NedBaldwin]

.... In July 1861, Polk ordered Pillow to abandon his planned invasion of Missouri, but Pillow went ahead with preparations as if Polk had not suspended the offensive. Pillow styled himself "Commander of the Army of Liberation." That's pretty insubordinate....

I know it has been described that way in some books (Connelly?) but from my reading of the ORs I dont think that is actually the way it happened. Polk ordered Pillow to New Madrid (which was in Missouri) then paused further moves until circumstances allowed even though Polk desired to invade. So I see nothing insubordinate about the name of his command.

 

[Elennsar]

I know it has been described that way in some books (Connelly?) but from my reading of the ORs I dont think that is actually the way it happened. Polk ordered Pillow to New Madrid (which was in Missouri) then paused further moves until circumstances allowed even though Polk desired to invade. So I see nothing insubordinate about the name of his command.

Per Connelly:

"When Polk abandoned (the planned invasion) and ordered Pillow to halt at New Madrid, Pillow protested bitterly. In late July, Pillow went ahead with preparation as if Polk had not suspended the offensive. Pillow styled himself 'commander of the ARmy of Liberation' and hinted that if Polk were a capable leader, he ought to be able to find enough troops to make the move. Polk retorted that he knew his business as department commander better than Pillow did."

And from there we have relations completely break down (as Connelly described it) by the end of the summer. But in and of itself, it sounds like the insubordination is less the name of his command and more about Pillow arguing with the boss on what to do with said command, since the operation is "suspended", not "canceled".

 

[NedBaldwin]

Per Connelly:

"When Polk abandoned (the planned invasion) and ordered Pillow to halt at New Madrid, Pillow protested bitterly. In late July, Pillow went ahead with preparation as if Polk had not suspended the offensive. Pillow styled himself 'commander of the ARmy of Liberation' and hinted that if Polk were a capable leader, he ought to be able to find enough troops to make the move. Polk retorted that he knew his business as department commander better than Pillow did."

And from there we have relations completely break down (as Connelly described it) by the end of the summer. But in and of itself, it sounds like the insubordination is less the name of his command and more about Pillow arguing with the boss on what to do with said command, since the operation is "suspended", not "canceled".

They definitely argued during August about what to do. But it seems silly to critique Pillow for naming his force what he did or for going ahead with preparations for an invasion that Polk wrote "will move forward as soon as circumstances will allow." [Polk to Walker, July 28 1861, OR Series 1 - Volume 3 p617] In Connelly I find it curious what the pages in the OR cited in the footnote for that paragraph quoted have to do with what is in that paragraph. But we digress as neither Pillow nor Polk are overrated in any way.

 

[Elennsar]

They definitely argued during August about what to do. But it seems silly to critique Pillow for naming his force what he did or for going ahead with preparations for an invasion that Polk wrote "will move forward as soon as circumstances will allow." [Polk to Walker, July 28 1861, OR Series 1 - Volume 3 p617] In Connelly I find it curious what the pages in the OR cited in the footnote for that paragraph quoted have to do with what is in that paragraph. But we digress as neither Pillow nor Polk are overrated in any way.

Sufficient to say, that either of them were allowed an moment of independence from close supervision by high command showed a lot of unmeritted trust in both their integrity and their ability to do their jobs.

Which raises a pertinent question on Johnston. Per Saruman, Johnston went to the area "of greatest danger". However, the question has to be asked whether or not Bowling Green actually presented the best place to establish the defensive line for Nashville (supposedly a good part of the purpose of that location instead of another).

 

[Saruman]

And could you show where Bragg said that? I'm not saying he didn't - Bragg certainly said such things about his subordinates - but I want to see where and when if possible.

General Braxton Bragg, CSA. By Samuel J. Martin, page 163.

 

[suzenatale]

I'm not sure we have come to a consensus on how we are ranking people. Is it triumphing with the worst odds? Greatest amount of kills with smallest losses? Percentage of wins over losses? Piles of losses but the best can do attitude? Most cunning? Most ethical? Most christian? Least racist? Fighting for the right side so who cares if you're racist? Kindest to subordinates? Meanest to subordinates? Just crawled out of hell and has a score to settle? Best catch phrase? Best death scene with someone holding a flag behind you while someone else tries to pick you up and sees blood on their hands and that's how they know you are dead? Best death scene that is a complete and total loss with piles of dead bodies around you from your own side while your cold lifeless hands are clutching your flag, pan up to enemy flag being raised cue music?

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

I don't know- ' Most Over Rated ' - no real criteria except overblown legend, that's all, helped by personal ego or hero worship- or BOOKS or all of the above. Self-exculpatory reports seem to have been helpful. Seems to me it'd be the men whose reputations trembled on the edge of an Alp in a thumbnail of a snowball, something tipped it over the edge where it spent the last 150 years picking up speed. Whose is hollow, whose rolled through mud, whose is as clearly pristine on the outside as it remains on the inside? A great test is putting up those for perusal whose names would attract no controversy- Like Buford ( who didn't see that coming? ), Hampton, ( ok, I'm getting obvious with the choices, you know what I mean- and there are a LOT of them ) , Pop Greene, Henry Hunt, maybe not generals who cut swathes through History but make the grade when it counts.

Is it surprising that Lee is in the ' Over Rated' list? Lee himself could not have lived up to his own legend, always seems a little unfair to the guy.

 

[Elennsar]

General Braxton Bragg, CSA. By Samuel J. Martin, page 163.

"
As a disciplinarian he far surpassed any of the senior Confederate generals; but his method and manner were harsh, and he could have won the affections of his troops only by leading them to victory. He furnished a striking illustration of the necessity of a healthy body for a sound intellect. Many years of dyspepsia had made his temper sour and petulant; and he was intolerant to a degree of neglect of duty, or what he esteemed to be such, by his officers. A striking instance of this occurred during my visit. At dinner, surrounded by his numerous staff, I inquired for one of his division commanders, a man widely known and respected, and received this answer: "General ---- is an old woman, utterly worthless." Such a declaration, privately made, would have been serious; but publicly, and certainly to be repeated, it was astonishing." quoted from http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ccwrt_history/talks_text/smith_bragg_quarrel.html

Based on Taylor's story quoted above?

I am remember of Jubal Early's lack of any form of tact and stinginess with praise.

Suzenatale: This is my basis for what ranking someone deserves. I could add other criteria and usually do when speaking of individual examples, but someone has to measure up here to be in the running for "capable". Failing to do so renders it impossible.

Success or lack thereof at accomplishing the purpose of their command (for example, the ANV's job was to defend northern Virginia) compared to other officers in the same or equivalent assignments.

(For subordinate commanders) modified by how well they served in that role towards their chief. Obedience to orders is important. And whether or not you like the boss, being a good subordinate sometimes means swallowing things you'd like to say or not doing things you'd like to do based on his actions or words.

(For army commanders) modified by how well they were able to work with and communicate with their government. The president is going to have concerns and priorities that may or may not perfectly match up with what an ideal military world one would try to do. Generals who acknowledged that and worked within it to the best of their ability get a point here, generals who spent more time quarreling don't.

 

[Elennsar]

I don't know- ' Most Over Rated ' - no real criteria except overblown legend, that's all, helped by personal ego or hero worship- or BOOKS or all of the above. Self-exculpatory reports seem to have been helpful. Seems to me it'd be the men whose reputations trembled on the edge of an Alp in a thumbnail of a snowball, something tipped it over the edge where it spent the last 150 years picking up speed. Whose is hollow, whose rolled through mud, whose is as clearly pristine on the outside as it remains on the inside? A great test is putting up those for perusal whose names would attract no controversy- Like Buford ( who didn't see that coming? ), Hampton, ( ok, I'm getting obvious with the choices, you know what I mean- and there are a LOT of them ) , Pop Greene, Henry Hunt, maybe not generals who cut swathes through History but make the grade when it counts.

Buford or Hunt actually would be a perfect example in my book of the true essence of greatness. Both knew their jobs, did them superbly, and don't need anyone making excuses for their failures to justify how it wasn't really their fault that X happened.

That sort of thing shines clear and pure and no reputation (either playing it up or playing it down) can distort it.

Is it surprising that Lee is in the ' Over Rated' list? Lee himself could not have lived up to his own legend, always seems a little unfair to the guy.

Well, Lee is responsible for whether or not the Maryland Campaign and Gettysburg (to name two things) were the best things to do with his army and the best way to do those things. And that's not indisputable.

I think Lee's legend has gotten to the point whatever his true rating is it would be impossible to measure up, so my bone to pick with the man is whether his actual performance was up to the task set by his own strategy - if the ANV was going to be a successful army in the end (instead of ultimately defeated), Lee's actions would be enormously significant in generating that result.

And I think Lee's failures - while not as many as his successes - played a role in it failing to achieve that result.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

To transfer Averrell's ideas and comments to another subject brought up in this thread, they're certainly an indictment against the way Sheridan handled his cavalry in the Wilderness and explains why Meade was so furious with him!

Sheridan was an atrocious cavalry corps commander. He didn't know what he was doing, and he was too pigheaded to take advice from anyone.

 

[diane]

Sheridan was an atrocious cavalry corps commander. He didn't know what he was doing, and he was too pigheaded to take advice from anyone.

Grant had a lot of confidence in Sheridan, despite the fact that he did have better cavalrymen at his disposal, and despite his clashes with Meade and so forth Grant kept him on. Why? I know why Sherman kept him on for the Indian wars - Sheridan's favorite saying was "Smash 'em up!" - I figured it was the same thing Sherman needed Kilpatrick for. He wasn't much, either. I know you don't like Forrest but Sheridan seemed to be allergic to him - always left before the chance of a fight together. (Maybe with somewhat good reason, I'll have to give him that much.) But why did Grant think so highly of him? Morale booster? Aggression? Can't think of much else to recommend him!

 

[cash]

Thus the point about being further from being firmly in Confederate hands than (had Greene's brigade heen pushed off) Culp's Hill was.

Ireland and Greene don't have any support of that size coming until long after they've either won or lost the position, regardless of the merits of LRT vs. Culp's Hill as a problem.

Exactly. If the confederates take LRT, they get pushed off fairly quickly. If they take Culp's Hill, it's arguably a disaster for the Federals.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Grant had a lot of confidence in Sheridan, despite the fact that he did have better cavalrymen at his disposal, and despite his clashes with Meade and so forth Grant kept him on. Why? ...

Grant wasn't the only one. In the summer of 1862 Sheridan was just colonel commanding a cavalry regiment when a letter was sent to Halleck which said "The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotion of Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold." It was signed by Generals Rosecrans, Sullivan, Granger, Elliott and Asboth.

 

[diane]

Grant wasn't the only one. In the summer of 1862 Sheridan was just colonel commanding a cavalry regiment when a letter was sent to Halleck which said "The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotion of Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold." It was signed by Generals Rosecrans, Sullivan, Granger, Elliott and Asboth.

Ah, yes. That's right. He looked pretty good at Stones' River.

 

[Pat Answer]

I don't know- ' Most Over Rated ' - no real criteria except overblown legend, that's all, helped by personal ego or hero worship- or BOOKS or all of the above. Self-exculpatory reports seem to have been helpful. Seems to me it'd be the men whose reputations trembled on the edge of an Alp in a thumbnail of a snowball, something tipped it over the edge where it spent the last 150 years picking up speed. Whose is hollow, whose rolled through mud, whose is as clearly pristine on the outside as it remains on the inside? A great test is putting up those for perusal whose names would attract no controversy- Like Buford ( who didn't see that coming? ), Hampton, ( ok, I'm getting obvious with the choices, you know what I mean- and there are a LOT of them ) , Pop Greene, Henry Hunt, maybe not generals who cut swathes through History but make the grade when it counts.

Is it surprising that Lee is in the ' Over Rated' list? Lee himself could not have lived up to his own legend, always seems a little unfair to the guy.

LOL! Yes, it isn't just a question of "what generals do not deserve the reputations they have today?" but also "on what basis did they get those reputations, who was behind it, and why?" With "history" itself being in the business of constant re-evaluation of always incomplete information (not to say distorted reading of source material) to boot.

 

[Elennsar]

Grant wasn't the only one. In the summer of 1862 Sheridan was just colonel commanding a cavalry regiment when a letter was sent to Halleck which said "The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotion of Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold." It was signed by Generals Rosecrans, Sullivan, Granger, Elliott and Asboth.

But it must be noted when weighing his performance that something ike half the Cavalry Corps (Army of the Potomac) are casualties by August, and the cavalry's work of "scouting, screening etc." has been entirely neglected.

As a colonel he might have been fine, as an infantry division commander he was acceptable at least, but his record commanding a corps of cavalry is at the other end of the spectrum from Old Steadfast and his brethren.

 

[CSA Today]

Here are excerpts from an article on page 36 of the April 2011 edition of the "Civil War Times," entitled, "The Butcher's Bill" by Edward H. Bonekemper III, the author of "Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher: The Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War." Mr. Bonekemper is an instructor at Muhlenburg College located in Allentown, PA.

Robert E. Lee by the numbers: Seven Days, Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Chantilly, Harpers Ferry, Crampton's Gap/South Mountain, Antietam/Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Kelly's Ford, Chancellorsville, Brandy Station, Winchester, Aldie/Middleburg/Upperville, Hanover, Gettysburg, Retreat from Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, Kelly's Ford & Rappahannock Stn., Mine Run, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Cold Harbor, Petersburg Assaults, Petersburg Siege/Campaign, Appomattox Campaign.

Totals (killed, wounded, missing/captured) - Union Casualties - 240,322 Confederate Casualties - 208,922

Ulysses S. Grant by the numbers: Belmont, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Iuka, Corinth/Hatchie River, Vicksburg Campaign, Return to Jackson, Chattanooga, Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, Cold Harbor, Petersburg Assaults, Petersburg Siege/Campaign, Appomattox

Totals (killed, wounded, missing/captured) - Union Casualties - 153,642 Confederate Casualties - 190,760
"The result of Lee's strategic and tactical aggression was that, within a single theater and in command of a single losing army, Lee saw his army suffer 209,000 casualties - losses the South could not afford. Lee's single army suffered 55,000 more casualties than the four armies commanded by Grant in three theaters - all theaters where his armies were victorious. If a single statistic was indicative of the war's outcome, it was Robert E. Lee's army incurring those 209,000 casualties. On the positive side, Lee did impose 240,000 casualties on his foes, for a plus 31,000 margin.

Grant, on the other hand, was able to capture Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Vicksburg (with their defending armies); save a trapped Union army at, and drive a Confederate army into Georgia away from Chattanooga; and come east to defeat Lee and finish the war in less than a year - all while incurring a reasonable 154,000 casualties. By imposing 191,000 casualties on his opponents, Grant achieved a plus 37,000 margin. Considering the breadth and depth of Grant's successes in a necessarily offensive mode, even a negative 37,000 margin would have been expected and militarily acceptable. What he achieved with his tolerable losses was amazing."

"Lee had greater casualties both in percentages and real numbers: An average of 20 percent of his troops were killed or wounded in his major campaigns, a total of more that 121,000 (far more than any other Civil War general). "

Ye gods, Edward Bonekemper as a source? When I first saw your source as being the Civil War Times, I looked somewhat askance at your use of that magazine as a reliable fount of information. I subscribed to the Civil War Times for years until canceling years ago as the articles became more partisan and even bazaar. As I recall, the final straw was a copy with Jefferson Davis on the cover and the question something to the effect is this the most hated man in America? Since cancelling my subscription, I have received requests to renew, I've thought about it from time to time but now subscribe to the Blue and Gray magazine, a magazine I find far more informative about battles, the war in general, and with more credible writers. If the Civil War Times is now relying on the likes of Edward Bonekemper or Alan Nolan for something approaching a semblance of historical accuracy then they have reached rock bottom for credibility as far as I am concerned.

If you have information from mainline historians to make your case then I'll be happy to debate you, but if the best you can offer is Bonekemper or heaven forbid Alan Nolan forget it.