Most Overrated General?

[Elennsar]

Apology accepted. As Robert E. Lee said, "let us speak of this no more."

As Eric said, so do I.

 

[7th Mississippi Infantry]

I got to say P.G.T. Beauregard.

He is known as the officer that ordered the firing on Fort Sumter as the start of his career,

He often gets the praise for First Manassas, when it was really Stonewall Jackson and Joseph E Johnston who saved the day, Johnston especially for utilizing railroads to send confederate reinforcements.

Then he losses at the battle of Shiloh

he does a fine job defending South Carolina and Petersburg, but does not do much to really win any decisive victories for the South.

I'm not saying he is a bad general, but he's not the greatest.

I agree 100 %.

Beauregard was my first thought as well.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

The best advice I can give you is to read my friend Dave Powell's book, Failure in the Saddle. You will get all the detail you could possibly want with respect to the lack of ability as a cavalryman.

http://www.amazon.com/Failure-Saddle-Confederate-Chickamauga-Campaign/dp/1932714871/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406148862&sr=8-1&keywords=failure in the saddle

As to getting whipped, all of his major victories were against rank incompetents. Try Tupelo, for instance, where Ben Grierson was in command, or Selma, where he got thrashed by Wilson.

I actually read Mr. Powell's book about a year ago, and if memory serves he was not quite as critical of Forrest as you are. I thought the main thrust of the book was that at that point in his career Forrest was not suited to working within a highly organized command structure, but that Forrest nevertheless had more than average skills.
As far as racking up victories against weak opponents, the same could be said of Grant and probably many other generals.
I appreciate and respect your comments on Hampton and Averill; I will try to read further on the subject.

 

[diane]

Egad. This is why Forrest has his own little spot on the forum... Well, I'm glad everybody settled to everybody's satisfaction! Thanks, gentlemen.

 

[damYankee]

Word around the hen house is Col. Sanders was a butcher...... ;-)

 

[rbasin]

For my 2 cents worth, see this post from the Civil War Trust on Henry Halleck :

http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/biographies/henry-w-halleck.html

Being maybe the only big fan of Halleck, who overrated Halleck?

 

[diane]

Being maybe the only big fan of Halleck, who overrated Halleck?

That's one problem poor old Henry will never have, isn't it? But...he was a general and so is fair game! Now that you've put me onto some interesting research, I believe Halleck was pretty good and served very well where he was - aiding Lincoln. He sure did field a lot of stuff, particularly squabbles, that would have landed on Lincoln's desk - took a load off. Bragg unloaded a lot onto Davis' desk!

 

[cash]

I love Chamberlain and what he did at Little Round Top will make his name immortal as long as men remember the Civil War. But his historical reputation stems largely from writing a masterful memoir, which appealed to Michael Shaara and Ken Burns and made his very well known.

If we really thought about it, I'm sure we could come up with two dozen other colonels and brigadier generals who performed feats just as heroic and important as that of Chamberlain at Little Round Top but get nowhere near the same recognition and credit. George Greene at Culp's Hill comes to mind.

And even more, David Ireland at Culp's Hill. He was also a regimental commander on the flank. He faced worse odds than Chamberlain, fought much longer than the 20th Maine fought, and also had a bayonet charge.

 

[Elennsar]

And even more, David Ireland at Culp's Hill. He was also a regimental commander on the flank. He faced worse odds than Chamberlain, fought much longer than the 20th Maine fought, and also had a bayonet charge.

But without meaning to take any well earned credit away from Colonel Ireland, Ireland had the benefit of breastworks on top of any advantages of the hill, and fighting at night (bad for both sides but hellaciously bad for Edward Johnson coordinating his forces effectively), Chamberlain did not have either.

Still. He and Greene deserve a high place on the unsung but more than competent men of the war.

 

[ole]

Most and least. A guaranteed quarrel, but interesting. It's kinda like comparing Attila and Hitler. Or FDR and Churchill. Patton and Rommel.

Someone's opinion is getting stepped on.

I'll comment on anyone, but I will stay miles away from who was best and worst. It's subjective and improvable.

 

[Saruman]

And he did nothing productive to address this (underlined).

It is not his fault that - for example - Gilmer was a whiny little pest, but it is his fault that he did not keep track of what Gilmer was doing and whether or not it was actually what he instructed.

There's "not micromanaging" and then there's just complete failure to supervise at all.

Johnston had a myriad of problems to contend with. He couldn't be everywhere at once. Tilghmann sent Johnston an encouraging account of the progress of the fortifications at Henry and Donelson on Dec 28th and Johnston assumed that Tilghmann was telling the truth, and rightly so. Johnston faced many pressures and was doing his best to find enough men and arms for the entire Kentucky/Tennessee line.

And even if Johnston had mistrusted Tilghmann and visited the Forts, what could he have done? Their proper construction required a large amount of labour. The troops worked very reluctantly, if at all - the work was considered beneath them at this early stage of the war, and the slave owners hired their negroes sparingly and grudgingly, and were continually demanding their return. These were systemic failures that no Southern commander could have overcome to any great degree of success.

Let's see, the guy who disobeys my orders on multiple occasions and actively attempts to sabotage my authority, or the physical coward.

Assuming that I really can't shoot both or myself - I still prefer the coward. It's a choice of evils, though.

Pillow was just as disobedient and sabotaging as Polk, but with the added dimension of cowardice.

But neither the plans or what overall direction existed for the battle were Johnston's, so his determination to strike counts for little more than the equivalent of a vote in favor at a council of war.

The terrain at Shiloh prohibited any overall direction or high level strategic insight. Shiloh was a brawl between soldiers. Johnston was more influential than most of the Southern commanders due to his presence, charisma, and gritty determination. He personally inspired the troops and lead them to the points where they were most needed.

 

[frontrank2]

Being maybe the only big fan of Halleck, who overrated Halleck?

I think he was overrated by the Lincoln administration.

 

[suzenatale]

Nowhere near smart enough to disagree with Gary Gallagher, so much so I cannot think of a comparable distance reference. But ewwww, Suze is going to get him for putting Chamberlain on the list.

I was just skimming the thread so I could punch the first person that said Chamberlain.

 

[Elennsar]

Johnston had a myriad of problems to contend with. He couldn't be everywhere at once. Tilghmann sent Johnston an encouraging account of the progress of the fortifications at Henry and Donelson on Dec 28th and Johnston assumed that Tilghmann was telling the truth, and rightly so. Johnston faced many pressures and was doing his best to find enough men and arms for the entire Kentucky/Tennessee line.

And even if Johnston had mistrusted Tilghmann and visited the Forts, what could he have done? Their proper construction required a large amount of labour. The troops worked very reluctantly, if at all - the work was considered beneath them at this early stage of the war, and the slave owners hired their negroes sparingly and grudgingly, and were continually demanding their return. These were systemic failures that no Southern commander could have overcome to any great degree of success.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Donelson;rgn=full text;idno=waro0007;didno=waro0007;view=image;seq=0735 - Tilghman to Johnston, November 19th.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o0007&q1=Donelson&view=image&seq=739&size=100 and on the 29th.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o0007&q1=Donelson&view=image&seq=747&size=100 - on December 2nd.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Donelson;rgn=full text;idno=waro0110;didno=waro0110;view=image;seq=0241 - on December16th.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o0110&q1=Donelson&view=image&seq=247&size=100 - Tilghman to Davis on the 28th.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Donelson;rgn=full text;idno=waro0007;didno=waro0007;view=image;seq=0833 to Johnston on January 2nd, where he reports "favorable progress in all matters connected with the command" - but the previous month hardly suggests that everything is going well up to that point, and his message on the 28th to Davis hardly suggests that he would have sent Johnston a favorable report on that date. If you can show where this statement is from I would greatly appreciate it and gladly withdraw said statement.

But to answer your question:
He could have directed the available labor to focus on those forts instead of letting by sheer neglect Joseph Dixon - supposedly assigned to work on Donelson - divide "his time and energy, as well as the available manual labor, between Donelson, Line Island, and a third position at Ingram's Shoals, farther downriver." (per Connelly, Army of the Heartland, page 83). Same with keeping Gilmer focused. He could also have addressed the issue of responsibility so that something like the dispute between Gilmer and Tilghman over the obstruction of the Cumberland would not have wasted time and effort (and ideally avoided having the work itself occur - it might or might not be a good idea on its own merits but it spreads the supply of labor too thing considering how many projects are being devised.).

Any Southern commanders would have only been able to do so much with what was available, but a Southern commander as great as Johnston is made out to be would have been able to do more than the actual Sidney Johnston managed.

Pillow was just as disobedient and sabotaging as Polk, but with the added dimension of cowardice.

What would you compare to Polk's behavior in Kentucky here (to name one of many examples)?

"Bragg had ordered an attack, yet Polk did not even tell him that the troops had gone on the defensive nor even that a council of war had been called. The evidence appears that Polk was unsrue of what was in his fornt. Yet he failed to inform Bragg even of the things he was sure, such as the decision to adopt the defensive-offensive. Moreover, if Polk did believe the main Federal body was before him, as he later claimed, then his failure to inform Bragg was inexcusable." (page 261, same source as before)

The terrain at Shiloh prohibited any overall direction or high level strategic insight. Shiloh was a brawl between soldiers. Johnston was more influential than most of the Southern commanders due to his presence, charisma, and gritty determination. He personally inspired the troops and lead them to the points where they were most needed.

The problems of terrain is a reason for more effort to manage the big picture, not ensuring that there is absolutely no overall oversight to what's going on and each commander (down even below the corps to some degree) was doing their own thing.

The waste of men and time around the Hornet's Nest was something a commander who was keeping tabs on the overall situation could have addressed, instead of allowing it to develop without intervening, to name one significant area.

What good is it for the army commander to lead regiments into position when divisions and corps are not in position thanks to the lack of direction and overall leadership providing what guidance could be delivered?

 

[Elennsar]

I was just skimming the thread so I could punch the first person that said Chamberlain.

At the risk of being punched:

I think Chamberlain being given more credit than is due (and there's a tendency to do that) is a matter of playing up how vital his excellence was, but I have no desire (Even without the risk of being punched) to play down that excellence itself.

 

[rbasin]

I think he was overrated by the Lincoln administration.

You're awesome, but Lincoln over-rated Halleck? Undercut, yes, but over-rate? No

 

[JerseyBart]

I was just skimming the thread so I could punch the first person that said Chamberlain.

Oh, so you're a violent troll...just kidding.

 

[Saruman]

to Johnston on January 2nd, where he reports "favorable progress in all matters connected with the command" - but the previous month hardly suggests that everything is going well up to that point, and his message on the 28th to Davis hardly suggests that he would have sent Johnston a favorable report on that date. If you can show where this statement is from I would greatly appreciate it and gladly withdraw said statement.

The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston: Embracing His Services In the Armies Of The United States, The Republic of Texas, And the Confederate States. Page 424.

But to answer your question: He could have directed the available labor to focus on those forts instead of letting by sheer neglect Joseph Dixon - supposedly assigned to work on Donelson - divide "his time and energy, as well as the available manual labor, between Donelson, Line Island, and a third position at Ingram's Shoals, farther downriver." (per Connelly, Army of the Heartland, page 83). Same with keeping Gilmer focused. He could also have addressed the issue of responsibility so that something like the dispute between Gilmer and Tilghman over the obstruction of the Cumberland would not have wasted time and effort (and ideally avoided having the work itself occur - it might or might not be a good idea on its own merits but it spreads the supply of labor too thing considering how many projects are being devised.).

Any Southern commanders would have only been able to do so much with what was available, but a Southern commander as great as Johnston is made out to be would have been able to do more than the actual Sidney Johnston managed.

Agree (hindsight is a wonderful thing) but Johnston was too busy dealing with the fundamental problem concerning the Western theatre - how to squeeze arms and men out of a disinterested Richmond and uncooperative State Governors. During this time Johnston was also coordinating aggressive feints in Eastern Kentucky to delay a Union invasion of Tennessee, trying to prevent Buell's massive army from advancing on Bowling Green, and trying to defend three rivers in western Kentucky/Tennessee with scant resources. I don't think a Lee or a Grant could have done any better than Johnston.

What would you compare to Polk's behavior in Kentucky here (to name one of many examples)?

Winfield Scott accused him of insubordination during the Mexican War. In July 1861, Polk ordered Pillow to abandon his planned invasion of Missouri, but Pillow went ahead with preparations as if Polk had not suspended the offensive. Pillow styled himself "Commander of the Army of Liberation." That's pretty insubordinate.

The problems of terrain is a reason for more effort to manage the big picture, not ensuring that there is absolutely no overall oversight to what's going on and each commander (down even below the corps to some degree) was doing their own thing.

The waste of men and time around the Hornet's Nest was something a commander who was keeping tabs on the overall situation could have addressed, instead of allowing it to develop without intervening, to name one significant area.

What good is it for the army commander to lead regiments into position when divisions and corps are not in position thanks to the lack of direction and overall leadership providing what guidance could be delivered?

Beauregard stayed at the rear but had less of an idea of what was going on than Johnston. Shiloh was a disorganised bush bash - no one had control. Plus it was Johnston's first battle - he did pretty well considering its magnitude. Lee, Jackson, and Grant's first battles were small affairs and they performed relatively poorly. Johnston would have learnt much from his Shiloh experience and gone on to greater things.

 

[cash]

But without meaning to take any well earned credit away from Colonel Ireland, Ireland had the benefit of breastworks on top of any advantages of the hill, and fighting at night (bad for both sides but hellaciously bad for Edward Johnson coordinating his forces effectively), Chamberlain did not have either.

Still. He and Greene deserve a high place on the unsung but more than competent men of the war.

True, though Chamberlain's regiment faced another regiment while Ireland's regiment faced at least a brigade. Also, Ireland's boys fought constantly for more than two hours.

 

[JPWalton]

Naw. They thought he was the bee's knees at first, but it wasn't long before Lincoln started making quips about how he had a glorified clerk instead of a general-in-chief.

I think he was overrated by the Lincoln administration.