Mill Springs

[1SGDan]

The 10th Indiana and the 4th Kentucky were stationed at a forward camp the remainder of the Union force was located with Thomas at Logan's Crossroads. The same cavalry messengers that warned Manson of the approach also sped word to Thomas. As these early actions were going on the troops there were being roused and rushed forward. More to come in next installment.

 

[1SGDan]

"A Succession of Blunder from the Beginning."

Attempting to benefit from his early advantage in numbers Zollicoffer arrayed his troops into a battle line. The 19th and 25th Tennessee were ordered to the left of the 15th Mississippi and the 20th Tennessee to the right. The movements were made more difficult by the wooded terrain and the relative inexperience of the troops involved. Some telling remarks in the history of the 19th Tennessee help explain the difficulty.

"Our brigade was never drilled or put in line of battle by anyone until the morning of the memorable battle…They were willing and ready but not prepared…"

The delays allowed the 10th Indiana to retire to gather more ammunition while the 4th Kentucky, supported by Wolford's dismounted troopers fell into line on their left. The advance of the 19th Tennessee brought the opposing regiments to within 40 yards of each other. The swirl of action and the low hanging smoke of battle created confusion. Zollicoffer apparently mistook the newly arrived 4th Kentucky for one of his own regiments. Riding forward hoping to prevent a friendly fire incident Zollicoffer appeared in the midst of the Union regiment. A flurry of gunfire killed Zollicoffer. Brigade command fell to Colonel Cummings of the 19th Tennessee. The loss of their leader and the resulting confusion came at the worst possible time for the Confederates. Heavy Union reinforcements were arriving. The 9th Ohio and 2nd Minnesota extended the line on the right while the 1st and 2nd East Tennessee along with the 12th Kentucky fell in on the left. Arriving on the scene with these reinforcements BG George Thomas took command of the Union efforts.

As the troop strengths equaled a hard fought battle developed in the center. The 2nd Minnesota also had trouble with the poor visibility.

"The rain had now ceased but the air was loaded with mist and smoke, and the underbrush in our part of the field was so thick that a man was hardly visible a musket's length away."

Nevertheless, they marched toward the enemy that was "dimly seen through the mist some twenty or thirty rods distant." Their progress was stalled by a rail fence where they made a surprise discovery. The other side of the fence was occupied by the 15th Mississippi. Colonel McCook's report stated that the fighting "was at first almost hand to hand, the enemy and the 2nd Minnesota were poking their guns through the same fence." The 15th Mississippi and a portion of the 20th Tennessee responded to the surprise arrival of the enemy with clubbed muskets and cane knives. The intervening fence prevented either side from moving forward and a deadly stalemate ensued.

The situation on the right was different. After a short period of inconclusive fighting the 9th Ohio was ordered to a bayonet charge. They struck the 25th Tennessee and turned the flank of the Confederate line. The collapse in this portion of the field signaled the complete rout of the Confederate forces. The 19th Tennessee reported that even on the right the 16th Alabama and 29th Tennessee could not stem the tide of panic that gripped the Confederates.

"The whole line now gave way and left the field in wild confusion and disorder."

The victorious Federals paused to reform their regiments and resupplied ammunition before taking up the pursuit. The fleeing enemy left behind their artillery, weapons, and wounded as they headed for their entrenchments at Beech Grove. The 10th Indiana reported:

"It became evident that they had made a perfect stampede, wagon loads of blankets, haversacks filled with provisions were left strewn along the road for miles. As we had started without breakfast we made a hearty meal from theirs."

What was left of Crittenden's command huddled in their fortifications awaiting the inevitable attack from the pursuing Union troops. But the attack did not come. Not daring a night assault Thomas decided on a daylight attack on the 20th. Crittenden, however, had a different plan. Under the cover of darkness the steamboat Noble Ellis shuttled his troops to the safety of the southern shore of the Cumberland River. The little steamer was then torched and set adrift. Lacking a timely means to cross the river the pursuit of Crittenden was given up. The campaign for Mill Springs was over.

 

[1SGDan]

A
Logan Cross Roads, Pulaski Co., Kentucky

Jan. 22, 1862

In relation to the battle, we were to post ourselves by companies on suitable points (being only three
companies in number) between our camp and the engagement, to act as camp guard simply, while the
other regiments were doing some of the best fighting ever done by volunteers, yet I cannot dismiss this
subject without making mention more fully of the part they acted in bringing about these important
results. Our army was brought here by a circuitous road, through an unsettled part of the country – the
large Government wagons heavily loaded would cut the roads down so that they were impassable after
the first two or three regiments had passed. We acted as sappers and miners (which is our proper rank
when not engaged in special service out of that line as mechanics and engineers) having as well, picks,
shovels and spades, as mechanical tools. We cut new roads, fixed and repaired old ones, built crossings,
where it would otherwise be impossible to pass at all, which must have amounted to several miles; we
pushed wagons through the mud with our hands, and held them up in deep ruts and on steep hillsides.
As mechanics, we repaired wagons when broken, shod horses and mules when needed and only got
through on Saturday, by leaving some of our heaviest loads behind.

During the night, unknown to us, Zollicoffer left his fortifications and marched against us, driving in our
pickets – as I wrote you – at day break Sunday morning. He intended to meet and capture us on the
road, or, to say the least, take us before we were prepared for him, and march north or westward. But
we were at our destination, our army together, and prepared, though poorly, to receive him. Some of
our men were over fatigued, but no one regrets it, for in proportion as we suffered others were relieved,
and it evidently tended to the accomplishment of the desired result. During the action, we occupied a
position which other forces must have occupied, thereby detracting from the available force of the army
in the field. -- Finally, many, I might say nearly all of us, were anxious to participate more directly in the
action, but we had sworn to obey the orders of officers appointed over us, the first duty of a soldier, and
this fixed our position. Arriving at our place on Saturday, we pitched our tents, gathered evergreen
boughs from the scattering cedars to keep us off the mud, wet and weary, we picked our meal and lay
down, anticipating at least a day or two of rest. At day-dawn in the morning, while in the act of rising,
the alarm was given, we flew to arms, and immediately took our position, not even snatching a mouthful
from our lank-sided haversacks. -- Lastly, while great praise is due to the brave men who fought and
bled on the field of battle, and who seemed to care for nothing, not even death, but victory, I claim a
proportionate share, not for myself, but for the brave fellows with whom I am associated.

Yours ever,

Morgan Parker

Co F 1st Michigan Engineers


letter describing the 1st Michigan engineer actions at Mill Springs:

 

[CW3O]

"...our men were over fatigued, but no one regrets it, for in proportion as we suffered others were relieved,
and it evidently tended to the accomplishment of the desired result."

I can think of no better endorsement of a combat support operation.

 

[1SGDan]

"...our men were over fatigued, but no one regrets it, for in proportion as we suffered others were relieved,
and it evidently tended to the accomplishment of the desired result."

I can think of no better endorsement of a combat support operation.

I Agree but also like this.

I claim a proportionate share, not for myself, but for the brave fellows with whom I am associated.

Selfless and team oriented.

 

[1SGDan]

Conclusion and Assessment

The Confederate incursion to Mill Springs, Kentucky failed for four very important reasons that should have been fairly obvious. Successful military operations have their foundation in some basic principles; at least four of these principles were violated by the Confederate leaders.

1. Well trained disciplined troops – Nearly all the troops involved at Mill Springs were lacking adequate training. As the attacking force the Confederates had the extra burden of command and control of moving combat elements. As evidenced by the remarks made by the 19th Tennessee the training level of these troops was barely up to the level of rudimentary. They simply were not up to the task assigned to them.

2. Strong logistical support – Equipment wise the Confederate attackers were not adequately supplied. Many carried antiquated or inappropriate weapons. Weapons that will not fire are hardly the stuff of successful military operations. From the 19th Tennessee:

"Many of the men had the old flintlock guns which were, in this rain, utterly useless. The writer saw two or three of the boys break their guns over the fence after several attempts to fire them."

Again they were unprepared for the task at hand.

3. Strong Leadership – Although Zollicoffer was well liked by his soldiers he was a military novice. His over aggressiveness placed them in a poor tactical position. When ordered to move back to the south side of the river he dismissed the order as impractical.

Crittenden committed an even more egregious error when he ordered the spoiling attack on Mill Springs based on an assumption. Those reinforcements that he thought impossible for the Federals to gather were already at Mill Springs waiting for the attack.

4. Strategic Focus - All military operations should have a clear end goal. Crittenden's independent, isolated command had little chance of accomplishing anything other than drawing the enemy forces to him. He lacked the combat power to accomplish what was asked. If the Confederate forces in Kentucky were intended to consolidate then Crittenden should have been reinforced or he should have continued on to Bowling Green to link with the forces there. Remaining alone and isolated at Beech Grove served nothing.

In the final analysis the Confederate leadership here put the cart before the horse.Their goals far exceeded what should have been expected from the level of preparation of the troops and leaders available.

 

[1SGDan]

Bibliography

Books

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion; Vol 4 & 7

Army of the Heartland – The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862; Thomas Connelly

Days of Glory – The Army of the Cumberland 1861-1865; Larry Daniel

History of the Army of the Cumberland; Thomas Van Horne

History of the Tenth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry; James Birney Shaw

Old Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment CSA – June 1861-April 1865; William Johnson Worsham

History of the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment Volunteer Infantry CSA; William McMurray, Deering Roberts, Ralph Neal

My Brave Mechanics- The First Michigan Engineers and Their Civil War; Mark Hoffman

History of the Thirty-Third Indiana Volunteer Infantry; John McBride

"History of the Seventeenth regiment, First brigade, Third division, Fourteenth corps, Army of the Cumberland, war of the rebellion", C. T. DeVelling

A Hard Trip: A History of the 15th Mississippi Infantry; Ben Wynne

Story of a regiment; being a narrative of the services of the Second regiment Minnesota veteran volunteer infantry in the Civil War; Judson Bishop

The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry; Sergeant E. Tarrant

Articles

Disaster on the Cumberland; Geoffrey Walden, The articles can be found at"

//www.millsprings.net/index.php/2013-10-01-18-24-22/battle-of-mill-springs

Internet Resources

http://www.wildcatbattlefield.org/battlefield.html

 

[CW3O]

"Crittenden committed an even more egregious error when he ordered the spoiling attack on Mill Springs based on an assumption."

Confederate failure to properly recon the objective was the root cause of this problem.


In my analysis niether side had a bad plan, the Confederate thought to attack a split force was not a bad one. The Union plan to consolidate was also a good one. Local defensive measure with the three lines established for the Union Cavalry and Infantry was good and allowed an excellent delaying action. In the end neither side executed that well but the Union commanders reacted slightly better and had the advantage of being on the defense.

Early teething troubles in troop training, equipment and leadership are common in all wars.

 

[1SGDan]

"Crittenden committed an even more egregious error when he ordered the spoiling attack on Mill Springs based on an assumption."

Confederate failure to properly recon the objective was the root cause of this problem.


In my analysis niether side had a bad plan, the Confederate thought to attack a split force was not a bad one. The Union plan to consolidate was also a good one. Local defensive measure with the three lines established for the Union Cavalry and Infantry was good and allowed an excellent delaying action. In the end neither side executed that well but the Union commanders reacted slightly better and had the advantage of being on the defense.

Early teething troubles in troop training, equipment and leadership are common in all wars.

I have to agree neither side had a bad plan. A spoiling attack conducted under the conditions that Crittenden supposed to be true with well trained and disciplined troops had the potential to be a campaign winner. Unfortunately he had no such troops and his assumption proved false. End result was resounding failure.

 

[1SGDan]

End Battle map

 

[1SGDan]

bumped for anniversary

 

[Buckeye Bill]

Wonderful thread!

Bill

 

[donna]

So glad you bumped this thread. Excellent.

 

[USS ALASKA]

University of Tennessee, Knoxville
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
5-1997

Black Sabbath : the Battle of Mill Springs
Kevin George Mason

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Copyright © Kevin George Mason. 1997 All rights reserved

ABSTRACT
This is the story of a battle called Mill Springs by the North and Fishing Creek by the South. It occurred in eastern Kentucky on Sunday, January 19, 1862, in a heavy rain. Confederate forces, poorly led and armed, marched through the night to meet Union forces sent to drive them out of Kentucky. In the four-hour battle the Southerners would not only lose the charismatic General Felix Zollicoffer but also lose their first major battle of the Civil War. Their organization was so disrupted that they abandoned vast quantities of equipment in their effort to cross the Cumberland River. Once on the other side some units disintegrated and returned to their homes. The North, however, missed a window of opportunity to invade East Tennessee in the wake of the battle. The region's Confederate forces had just suffered a devastating defeat and had ceased to be an effective fighting force. In the chaos that followed, the North had golden opportunity to sever the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad line and cut off the Confederate forces in the Eastern Theater from the vast manufacturing and agricultural of Tennessee. An invasion of East Tennessee would have also liberated the sizeable number of Unionists there from Confederate control. This would have fit President Abraham Lincoln's and General George McClellan's strategy. Instead, General Don Carlos Buell chose to enter Tennessee to the west by way of the Mississippi and Cumberland Rivers, using General Ulysses Grant's forces as a spearhead. The events of the battle foreshadowed other actions that would occur in the Western Theater during the war. These include Confederate problems with command and supply, the future actions of Union General George H. Thomas and the star-crossed actions of the Army of Tennessee of which many of the Confederate units would soon join. Most importantly, the missed opportunity could have sharply shortened the bloody war.

https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12255&context=utk_gradthes

Because of copyright, please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[JTkentucky12th]

I sure have enjoyed reading all of this. My kinfolk come from Crab Orchard KY, where one of the posts talks about the turnpike ending. I've got ancestors both sides, and, if I recall correctly, my direct 4 great g father was present at Mill Springs with the 12th KY (U.S.)