Mill Springs

[1SGDan]

Prelude

As the country divided itself along sectional lines over the issue of slavery the Border States were placed in the unfortunate position of being caught in the middle. With cultural ties, and slavery, common with the south but economic and political ties to the north these states had a difficult decision to make; join the seceding states or remain loyal to the Union. Kentucky, in particular, was in just such a position. In 1860 the state ranked 9th in population, with roughly 19% comprised of slaves, but was surrounded by three "free" states and at the crossroads of important economic river and rail transportation systems. It was a juicy prize coveted by both sides.

The first pressure for Kentucky to choose a side came just three days after the assault on Fort Sumter. President Lincoln called on the state to raise four regiments of troops to suppress the rebellion of the seceding southern states. Governor Beriah Magoffin, a southern sympathizer, replied with the following:

"I will send not a man nor a dollar for the wicked purpose of subduing my sister southern states."

Although his terse reply implied that Kentucky would support the Confederacy, Magoffin and the state assembly took a different position. On May 20, 1861 Magoffin announced that the state would be neutral in the coming struggle. In the words of the Kentucky senate:

"Kentucky ought, at least, to remain neutral till the end of the controversy; neither hindering the National Government in the exercise of its authority, nor furnishing men, as a State, to either the belligerents; nor asking aid from either to maintain her position."

Early on the neutrality of the state was observed by both sides but each stationed troops near the border. The fragile neutrality held until September 4, 1861 when, in reply to pro-Unionist political successes, MG Leonidas Polk ordered the occupation of Columbus by BG Gideon Johnson Pillow to secure the Mississippi River. Polk's violation of the state's neutrality opened the door for Federal troops to occupy Paducah to guard the mouth of the Tennessee River. Magoffin called for both sides to leave but the General Assembly, now largely Unionist, called for only the Confederates to withdraw. Magoffin vetoed the resolution but was over-ridden. Last minute negotiations and political maneuvering was not enough to save what was, in truth, already gone. The occupation of the state by both sides would plunge Kentucky into war.

 

[1SGDan]

The Road to Wildcat

Having occupied southern Kentucky the opposing armies now had to defend it. The Confederate defensive line, commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston, extended from Columbus on the Mississippi River to the Cumberland Gap in the east. It was a line in name only. In reality it consisted of two badly isolated, understrength, and poorly armed commands. Near Bowling Green, Simon Buckner established Fort DeRussy and began recruiting, training, and constructing fortifications. At the Cumberland Gap, command fell to newspaperman and military novice, Felix Zollicoffer. The distance between the two commands (approximately 200 miles) consisted of rugged mountain terrain that was ill suited for military operations. It offered little in the way of forage and only one major supply route; the Wilderness Road. Under these circumstances the Confederates began their occupation of Kentucky.

The absence of Confederate troops between Bowling Green and the Cumberland Gap allowed pro-Unionist sentiment in the area to grow. Union officials were more than eager to take advantage of this potentially fruitful recruiting ground. Camp Andrew Johnson was established near Barbourville and began organizing recruits for Federal service. An enemy force in this area posed a significant threat to Zollicoffer or Buckner especially if it was united with the force being gathered by George Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson, near Lexington. Such a unified command could strike either isolated Confederate base of operations before they could be reinforced.

According to Thomas Connelly, Zollicoffer had information that Thomas was intending on just such a scenario. He would unite his forces and move on the Cumberland Gap with an eye toward severing the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. With fewer than 4000 fully armed troops on hand Zollicoffer's options to counter the Federal plan were limited. Lacking the ability to make a full throated spoiling attack he resorted to raiding into the area to disrupt enemy intentions. In September he struck at the Union camp at Barbourville with 800 men under Colonel Joel Battle. Many of the Union troops had already departed for the unification with Thomas but Battle caught about 150 foragers by surprise and drove them out of the area. Later Colonel James Rains struck Laurel Bridge scattering the recruits there and capturing their supplies. Another column raided the important salt works at Goose Creek and came away with 200 barrels of salt.

Encouraged by these minor successes Zollicoffer determined to attempt a more ambitious endeavor. In early October he began a march toward London with 5400 troops. The march through the barren country in foul weather strained his movements to a crawl. As progress slowed the detection of his move became more likely. And detected he was. Reports of his approach reached Colonel Theophilus Garrard at Camp Wildcat and he immediately sought help from Thomas. On October 19th Thomas reacted to Garrard's plea by dispatching BG Albin Schoepf's brigade as reinforcements. The march from Camp Dick Robinson to Garrard proved as difficult for the Federals as it had for Zollicoffer. Constant rain turned the last leg of the march into a muddy torment.

"The march was made in the presence of many obstacles. The turnpike ended at Crab Orchard and beyond that point the road traversed a hill country and was difficult to travel. None of the streams were bridged, all of them having to be forded excepting the Rockcastle River, which was provided with a rather insufficient ferry, and from which point the road ascended and wound along the edge of, and under, the lofty castellated crags which had given their name to the river and county."

On October 20th Garrard renewed his plea for help asking that Schoepf "push on for God's sake". An all-night march through horrid conditions brought only half of the 33rd Indiana to Garrard's assistance. They were joined by 250 troopers of the 1st Kentucky (US) that rode in as additional reinforcements. For the first time two considerable enemy forces faced each other in Kentucky.

 

[CW3O]

haven't seen one of your excellent battle studies for awhile, good to see you back at it.

 

[1SGDan]

haven't seen one of your excellent battle studies for awhile, good to see you back at it.

I have been working off and on on a larger project (A Regimental History of the 50th New York Engineers) but have been so busy with work and other distractions that I put it aside and worked this up.

 

[donna]

Excellent post. Always interested in anything about Civil War in Ky.

 

[donna]

Two books I recommend are:

'The Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky" by Stuart W. Sanders and 'The Battle of Wild Cat Mountain" by Kenneth A. Hafendorfer.

Thanks again for this thread.

 

[1SGDan]

Wildcat

The newly reinforced Federal position was well situated for defense in the rugged terrain. They occupied a ridge guarding access to a ford on the Rockcastle River. Any advance by Zollicoffer into central Kentucky would have to pass through them. Although their position afforded them natural strength it also blinded them to the advance of the enemy. To locate Zollicoffer's column the 1st Kentucky Cavalry was detailed to establish a mounted picket . An 18 man force, under LT R.C. Blain, rode forward to "500 yards in front of the infantry." Here Lt Blain made a basic error. Instead of detailing part of his command to provide a two man vidette another 100 yards forward he opted to man the post with himself and his second in command. Their mission was cut short immediately after reaching their assigned position by a small enemy volley. They fell back to the others, who had been wisely assembled into a line by Corporal Speed. There Sergeant Tarrant talked his overeager Lieutenant into retiring into the main line.

The brief skirmish sent the Federal troopers scurrying back to Camp Wildcat with news of Zollicoffer's approach. In preparation for his arrival Garrard set his own 3rd Kentucky Infantry on the crest of Wildcat Mountain and sent the 33rd Indiana and 1st Kentucky Cavalry to occupy a small hill about 800 yards away. Despite the early warning Zollicoffer's troops surprised the Union position there. Barely had the 33rd and 1st* been set into position before two regiments of Tennessee Confederates appeared at the base of the hill.

The Confederate advance made contact with the Federal picket line about 0900. The initial volley killed Private Lewis McFerran thus making him the first Union soldier to die in the fight for Kentucky. As the skirmish line retired into the main body several wounded men were left behind. Adjutant Clerk Alvin May insisted on braving the fire to retrieve them wounded men. He and a handful of other volunteers managed to bring in all the wounded. Also retrieved was McFerran's weapon. A visitor to camp, the father of Sergeant William Chandler, picked up his weapon and joined the fight. The regimental history records that he "used it continuously and effectively throughout the entire engagement."

The Confederate attack was hampered by poor weaponry. Some troops were carrying old flintlock muskets which failed to fire in the wet conditions. Others carried an assortment of squirrel guns and shotguns. Nevertheless, they pushed on nearly breaking the portion of the line held by the dismounted troopers of the 1st Kentucky**. After 90 minutes of close in fighting Colonel Tazwell Newman ordered four companies of his 17th Tennessee to make a bayonet charge into the Union lines.

"After fortification was reached and many of my men had got within the works....not receiving any support, and being nearly destitute of cartridges, I ordered my command to fall back."

The first assault was broken and the Confederates moved back to regroup. The pause allowed four companies of the 17th Ohio to join the defense. In the afternoon a second attack was repulsed and Zollicoffer retreated to consider his options.


*The 33rd had approximately 350 men (Co.'s D, E, G, and I) while the 1st Kentucky dismounted about 250.

** This claim is understandably denied by the regimental history which stated "only two of the First Kentucky left the field."

 

[CW3O]

"Despite the early warning Zollicoffer's troops surprised the Union position"

There appears to be precious little early warning if the 1st Kentucky Cavalry only managed to ride out to "500 yards in front of the infantry" plus the 100 yards for the forward LP/OP before encountering the enemy.

You mention some excellent leadership on the part of some NCOs within the 1st Kentucky Cavalry. When was this unit formed, with Kentucky initially declaring themselves neutral and the governor vehemently denying troops or support for the union where/when did the unit come from? Seems that at least one Cpl and one Sgt had some military experience.

 

[1SGDan]

Despite the declared neutrality units were being recruited in Kentucky from the very start. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was organized in the fall of 1861. Recruits came primarily from the area around Burkesville and Monticello. They were mustered in under the command of Colonel Frank Wolford on October 28th. I am unsure of the military experience of the recruits but as you well know some just fall into leadership naturally.

 

[1SGDan]

Retreat and Reconsideration

The Union forces spent the night fortifying their position, expecting an attack in the morning. Looking at the reinforced position during the evening Zollicoffer opted not to attack.

"I became satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense exposure... I deemed it proper the next day to fall back."

Soundly beaten at Camp Wildcat, Zollicoffer returned to the Cumberland Gap with nothing more to show for his advance than 21 Union prisoners. Despite the closeness of the combat the casualties were relatively light, of the approximately 10,000 men on the field only 78 (25 US and 53 CSA) men were killed or wounded. It was a small victory for the Union forces but it forced Zollicoffer to rethink his strategy.

The growing force of Union troops in eastern Kentucky and his inability to provide an adequate logistical tail in the barren country made another attempt along the same avenue of advance impossible. In fact the possibility of a Federal advance loomed more prominently. Zollicoffer opted to act first. Leaving two regiments to guard the Cumberland Gap, he pulled the remainder of his forces back into Tennessee and began a move westward along the Cumberland Plateau. The 15th Mississippi recorded the march this way:

"We ascended the Cumberland Mountains again, on whose top we traveled for thirty miles, through as lonely and desolate a country as could be found. We passed a residence about every six miles, till we reached Jamestown, the county site of Fentress County, a small cluster of houses in a rocky, barren country, almost destitute of any sign of life, where the winds' only song is a sad requiem of starvation. "

Zollicoffer then turned his forces north. The Confederate column marched through "beautiful and fertile" Monticello, Kentucky before establishing camp on the southern bank of the Cumberland River.

Unhappy with this position Zollicoffer wrote Albert Sidney Johnson that he intended to cross the river and fortify on the north bank. The swollen river posed the only serious obstacle to his plan. He had his men fashion two flatboats and slowly began shuttling his command to Beech Grove. The Federal response to Zollicoffer's move became entangled in the bickering opinions of the commanders responsible. Overall it was feared that Zollicoffer and Breckinridge would unite and seize southeastern Kentucky for the Confederacy by defeating the isolated Federal outposts in the area. New Department of the Ohio commander BG Don Carlos Buell was convinced that Zollicoffer's advance posed no significant threat but subordinate commanders thought differently. Col W. A. Hoskins, of the 12th Kentucky, the only organized force opposing Zollicoffer, plead for reinforcements from the nearest source. Col. Samuel Carter's brigade, two days march away at London. But Carter was under orders from Buell to hold his position and refused to move. Instead Buell dispatched two regiments and a battery, under BG Schoepf from Lebanon and the 1st Kentucky Cavalry to Fishing Creek to support Hoskins. Schoepf's position immediately came under artillery fire but no direct assault was attempted. Another call for reinforcements caused BG George Thomas to send an additional two regiments and a battery toward the troubled area. Buell, however, countermanded the order and cut the relief column in half.

Schoepf, hoping to fully develop the Confederate plan sent CPT Boston Dillon and two companies of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry to scout the river crossing at Grinder's Ferry. To add muscle to the reconnaissance the 17th Ohio Infantry followed them from camp. Dillon stopped his march short at the first sign of danger but did not inform the infantry who stumbled into Zollicoffer's force on the north side of the river.

"Colonel Connell met the rebel pickets, he was thrown from his horse, lost his revolver, and came near being captured."

Completely outnumbered the Buckeyes snuck away under the cover of darkness arriving back at camp about 0400 on December 4th. With this newly acquired intelligence guiding his decision Schoepf moved his brigade back. He also appealed to Carter for help. Fortunately, with a more accurate picture of the situation, this time Carter responded by sending two Tennessee regiments. By December 9th the Thomas and Carter relief columns had reached Schoepf. He could muster approximately 6000 soldiers. Thomas requested permission to send more help but was denied by Buell. The two enemy forces now faced each other each waiting for the other to make a move.

 

[1SGDan]

A New Focus

To this point the campaign in southeastern Kentucky was a malaise of poorly thought out isolated action devoid of strategic initiative. That was about to change. On the Federal side Gen. Buell brought the attention of Washington on himself with an ill-considered letter to President Lincoln. In his remarks he indicated that the relief of east Tennessee was of "little or no importance". This was, of course in direct contravention of Lincoln's desire to aid the Union sympathizers in that area. The presence of a large force of Confederate troops in eastern Kentucky naturally prevented any campaign into eastern Tennessee. Buell's candor appalled McClellan, who took his cue from the President when he ordered Buell to take action to relieve eastern Tennessee. This put Zollicoffer's force squarely in Buell's sight. They must be removed before any movement into Tennessee could be considered. Gen Thomas was ordered to reinforce Schoepf.

On the Confederate side Zollicoffer awaited reinforcement from Knoxville, snug in his entrenchments at Beech Grove. Unfortunately the expected help was suffering problems of their own. Col William Carroll's brigade was largely unarmed. When weapons finally did arrive they were antiquated and unserviceable. Any movement toward Zollicoffer would have to wait until repairs could be affected. By the first week of the New Year two of Carroll's regiments were ready to move. But instead of moving to Zollicoffer they were ordered to Bowling Green by Johnson. When Carroll finally left Knoxville to aid Zollicoffer he had only one poorly armed regiment and a single battery.

While the Federal command focus was narrowing in on the Mill Springs area the Confederate command structure was also changing. BG George Crittenden was assigned command of the District of East Tennessee superseding Zollicoffer. Completely ignorant of the situation in his new command Crittenden left for Richmond to discuss matters with President Jefferson Davis After consultation with Davis, Crittenden returned to Kentucky on January 2nd. By then the tactical conditions at Beech Grove had changed. Union forces were known to be concentrating against Zollicoffer's advance. Crittenden evaluated the situation and decided that the Zollicoffer's position on the north bank of the Cumberland River was untenable. Ordered to move to the south side of the river Zollicoffer refused stating that the move was impractical because of the flooded condition of the river. Both sides were adjusting to the new attention being paid to their operations.

 

[CW3O]

Any chance of a map? I am unfamiliar with this action and the area it took place in.

"Dillon stopped his march short at the first sign of danger but did not inform the infantry.."

Cardinal sin, particularly for cavalry scouts. I suspect many involved in this action were relative newcomers to the ranks and inwxperienced in the military. that being siad, with the fortunate escape of the Ohio infantry the valuable intelligence did get to where it was most needed. and the proper reinforcemetns sent in response.

 

[1SGDan]

The Next Move

Although the Federals now desperately wanted to reinforce Schoepf the weather made a rapid advance impossible. Thomas departed Columbia on New Year's Day in a driving rain with Colonel Mahlon Manson's 2nd Brigade and Colonel Robert McCook's 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division. Accompanying the march was a battalion of 1st Michigan Engineers (Co.'s D, F, and G) under LTC Kinsman Hunton. The addition of this asset proved wise indeed as the column churned the roads into a morass. Once the column left the pike near Columbia the situation worsened. The engineers performed yeomen duty repairing the road, laying two bridges across Russel Creek so that the division wagons could pass, and laying corduroy. When no amount of work could make the existing road passable new bypasses were cut. But despite their best efforts the 65 mile march took 16 days. Exhausted Thomas's column made camp at Logan's Crossroads on January 17th still nine miles from Schoepf's camp. One regiment, an artillery battery, and the engineers remained on the march struggling through the mud. Thomas immediately ordered one of Schoepf's brigades to join him there.

BG S. P. Carter's Brigade*took their turn battling the elements to complete the Federal unification at Logan's Crossroads. The primary obstacle was Fishing Creek, which was swollen by the rain and backwater from the Cumberland River. To get his troops across Carter had a rope stretched across the stream and the men pulled themselves hand over hand across the waist deep water. As Carter's soggy reinforcements arrived so did the trail party of Thomas's column. Thomas now had a little over 5000 men available.

As the weary Federals moved into camp Crittenden called a council of war to decide what action should be taken. Crittenden believed that the weather conditions would prevent Schoepf from uniting with Thomas. The separated commands offered an opportunity to destroy one of them before assistance could be had from the other. Seizing the chance Crittenden decided to attack Thomas before he could be reinforced. There is some evidence that Zollicoffer disagreed with the decision but movement toward the Union position began at midnight. It was now the Confederate's turn to struggle through the miserable conditions. The nine mile all night march was recalled by the 19th Tennessee Infantry this way;

"The night was dark and cold, and the bitter winds drove the sleet and rain in our faces yet on we went, plodding in the gloom and mud to the front and to battle."


*1st East Tennessee, 2nd East Tennessee, 7th Kentucky, and 31st Ohio.

 

[1SGDan]

Any chance of a map? I am unfamiliar with this action and the area it took place in.

Battle maps to follow as appropriate.

"Dillon stopped his march short at the first sign of danger but did not inform the infantry.."

Cardinal sin, particularly for cavalry scouts. I suspect many involved in this action were relative newcomers to the ranks and inexperienced in the military. that being said, with the fortunate escape of the Ohio infantry the valuable intelligence did get to where it was most needed. and the proper reinforcements sent in response.

Inexperience and poor training will play a large part in what happens here. It will be dealt with in the conclusion.

 

[CW3O]

Excellent work by your beloved engineers, but geez, 65 miles in 16 days! 4 miles per day!

Crittenden seems to have accurately judged the difficulties for the Union reinforcing their positions but appears to be slow in making an operational decision. His plan to attack the split force makes good sense but had to be timely to succeed. He returned to his command on 2 January, when did he initiate his plan to attack the split Union Forces? And when did movement commence?

 

[1SGDan]

Excellent work by your beloved engineers, but geez, 65 miles in 16 days! 4 miles per day!

Crittenden seems to have accurately judged the difficulties for the Union reinforcing their positions but appears to be slow in making an operational decision. His plan to attack the split force makes good sense but had to be timely to succeed. He returned to his command on 2 January, when did he initiate his plan to attack the split Union Forces? And when did movement commence?

Patience all will be revealed.

 

[1SGDan]

Early Battle

As the Confederate column plodded north, Union cavalry patrolled the area knowing full well that "danger was brewing." Picket clashes overnight on January 17-18 convinced the Union command to strengthen the defenses around the forward camp of 2nd Brigade. Colonel Mahlon Manson ordered a three layered picket system. Forward most, patrolling well down the Mill Springs Road was a strong mounted party under Sergeant George Thrasher of Co. C, 1st Kentucky Cavalry. Further back Co. K of the 10th Indiana formed the advanced infantry picket. A about a quarter mile behind them was Co. I of the 10th at the primary picket position. The Federal forces were well positioned for early detection of any aggressive Confederate move.

About 0600 Thrasher's patrol made first contact with Zollicoffer's column. While offering what resistance they could messengers were dispatched to warn Manson. As the cavalry was slowly pushed back Federal commanders reacted to the news. Colonel Wolford, of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry, immediately mounted Co. A, under Lieutenant Miller, to ride to the assistance of Sergeant Thrasher. Colonel Manson sent Co. A of the 10th Indiana to strengthen his primary picket line while he organized the remaining seven companies. These early deployments were critical to delaying the Confederate advance.

At the forward positions, Zollicoffer's lead element, the 15th Mississippi Infantry, gradually pushed the Federal troopers back. Lieutenant Miller found that the enemy force was considerable and fell back after losing two men in a brief exchange with infantry well protected behind a fence. Captain Perkins and Co. I offered only brief resistance after the retreating Kentucky troopers passed through their position before retiring into the primary picket line. Three companies of Hoosier infantry now held a blocking position in the road against eight Confederate regiments.

In the Union rear Manson ordered the remaining 10th Indiana, under LTC Kise, forward and placed two batteries of artillery (B & C 1st Ohio Light) into supporting position. He then rushed to the camp of the 4th Kentucky Infantry to speed their move to the front. As there Confederate battle lines were forming the 10th Indiana was facing them alone.

"For an hour and a quarter the regiment fought and no help from the rear."

Stacked on the road the Confederates were in better position to get move more troops into action more quickly. Zollicoffer moved the 19th and 25th Tennessee on to the left flank and began to outflank the 10th's position. Colonel Kise, "finding the enemy likely to get in our rear", and nearly out of ammunition wisely ordered the regiment to fall back. Despite the early warning and an excellent plan the Union position was being challenged by a superior force. The early advantage fell to the Confederates.

 

[ErnieMac]

Glad your back posting.

 

[1SGDan]

 

[CW3O]

Seems a well conceived and well executed delaying action. But a delaying action is only truly effective if the action behind them is also well conceived and well executed. How far back was the main force? The map seems to show a distance which could be easily marched in "an hour and a quarter." Why was only the 4th Kentucky "sped to the front?" Was a main defensive position established for the for the cavalry, 10th Indiana and 4th Kentucky to fall back into?