Meade at Gettysburg:

[breckod]

Hypothetically…under similar questioning.

Buford would almost certainly have been friendly to Meade in his testimony. He was a War Democrat from Kentucky and no friend to either the Radical Republicans on the Committee or what he saw as political interference with the army.

Had he survived his illness though, Buford was slated to go west and command the Army of the Cumberland's cavalry, so he might not have been available for testimony.

 

[Valen]

I don't know of any modern, world-class biography available on Meade. Boy, I would love to read one at some point.

Jen Murray has been writing one for the last few years.

 

[EHParks]

The term "meeting engagement" is often used to describe what happened at Gettysburg even though Meade had knowledge by then of the general location of Lee's forces. More properly perhaps, Meade was seeking to conduct a "reconnaissance in force" to "develop" the enemy's strength and dispositions with Buford's cavalry and Reynold's I Corps. Contrary to Lee's instructions about not engaging the enemy until the ANV was concentrated, it was Hill and Heth's reckless movement to engage elements of the AotP that raised the stakes at Gettysburg.

My big "what-if" post about Gettysburg would be: What if (all things being equal with Stuart gone etc.) Lee had made Gettysburg a main objective to control those road networks from the beginning?

I know that there was discussion of where and when to concentrate his forces when necessary during the campaign and Gettysburg was discussed along with others, ut none were settled on at the time. The need to move three Corps whilst foraging on a broad front all across the great valley west of the mountains at the same time and be ready to feint and force the AotP to engage him on his terms placed a real burden of compromise on the General as he rolled the dice. Right up until the 28th of June when he learned the Union had moved with more alacrity to thwart him than they had previously.

So while Lee had a good understanding of the roads thanks to excellent mapping and intelligence beforehand, he seems to have had less appreciation for the natural defensive topography east of South Mountain that forms a reverser arc of hills and ridges in a northward crescent from Emmitsburg to Dillsburg and that includes Gettysburg as the center.

Keeping Gettysburg when they had it would have met Lee's needs better than the movements and feints toward Harrisburg by Imboden and later Ewell.

 

[jackt62]

My big "what-if" post about Gettysburg would be: What if (all things being equal with Stuart gone etc.) Lee had made Gettysburg a main objective to control those road networks from the beginning?

This "what-if" needs to be examined in the context of understanding Lee's goals in undertaking the Pennsylvania campaign. In order to accomplish some of the most important ones (seek food and forage, upset northern morale, derange Union offensive action in Virginia), Lee would of necessity, need to keep his army's movements fluid and unpredictable. The campaign itself was predicated on being carried out as a raid, with swift jabs in and out of northern territory. Staking out the elevated defensive positions around Gettysburg might have been good policy if all Lee wanted to do was to wait for an inevitable Union assault (a plan of action that Longstreet advocated although not necessarily at that place). But the highly developed road networks that made Gettysburg desirable could also speed the arrival of Union forces which, rather than conduct a forlorn assault, could essentially surround and cutoff the ANV's fragile supply chain and leave that army withering on the vine. Time was not on Lee's side and he knew it.

 

[EHParks]

This "what-if" needs to be examined in the context of understanding Lee's goals in undertaking the Pennsylvania campaign. In order to accomplish some of the most important ones (seek food and forage, upset northern morale, derange Union offensive action in Virginia), Lee would of necessity, need to keep his army's movements fluid and unpredictable. The campaign itself was predicated on being carried out as a raid, with swift jabs in and out of northern territory. Staking out the elevated defensive positions around Gettysburg might have been good policy if all Lee wanted to do was to wait for an inevitable Union assault (a plan of action that Longstreet advocated although not necessarily at that place). But the highly developed road networks that made Gettysburg desirable could also speed the arrival of Union forces which, rather than conduct a forlorn assault, could essentially surround and cutoff the ANV's fragile supply chain and leave that army withering on the vine. Time was not on Lee's side and he knew it.

I probably didn't explain it well, which usually happens when I post half thought out scenarios. If Lee meant his post-war justifications for the Pennsylvania incursion, namely that of disrupting the Union Army's summer campaign and then defeating it to politically "win" the war as his main goal, with the gathering of excess supplies being secondary, then I believe he needed a better, clearer plan than the one he implemented. And, he needed to have been ready to cut those supply trains off when he needed to use the cavalry that he did have in their proper role rather than use them and Pickett as glorified security guards while awaiting Stuart's delayed return.

This was no mere "raid" (although I characterized it as such in the past I've since changed my mind). The Army of Northern Virginia wanted a fight, desperately needed a fight, but when it came it was Meade dictating the field it was fought on.

I completely agree Lee needed to be "fluid and unpredictable". By controlling the passes inside that arc I describe and concentrating his forces on those interior lines in strategic locations along it, Lee can still threaten any of the targets he supposedly did by using Gettysburg as a protected hub, transferring troops where needed faster than Meade can concentrate against him, not necessarily having to be where the fight takes place.

 

[gc45]

Meade's Pipe Creek Plan was I have say, brilliant in that he had been ordered to take command of the army on June 27th, just 4-5 days before the battle. He did what he was asked and that was to protect two large cities at all cost, and also attack the enemy if possible; quite a feat all things considered like no logistics, no communications, poor supplies and halve an army with no shoes! Meade had little time really, to straighten out another Commanders misdirection, form up his new command into a fighting machine with good leadership, and quickly get men in the field to disrupt the enemy making them take pause rather than allowing further movement closer to Washington. Meade did these things in very short order and ran Lee's army back to the south and away from northern cities. Meade was a good commander who upon arriving at the battlefield made what I think were quick but calculated decisions with good leadership. The video was helpful in understanding Meade's orders from Lincoln, and he certainly responded well and in a very short time frame. I have even more respect for Meade now and with a clearer picture of just what Lincoln had given him, a mess from incompetent commanders before him. Also, have always felt Lincoln was in the wrong about Meade after the battle concerning the pursuit of Lee's army, another story for sure.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

His emphasis on the Pipe Creek Plan is a big one. IMO, the evidence suggests that it was a contingency plan, a fall-back position, and not Plan A.

I think Pipe Creek is significant for reasons other than what are unusually debated i.e. Meade's willingness to fight at Gettysburg.

1. It demonstrates the kind of battle Meade was interested in fighting in July 1863.

2. Assuming it was primarily a contingency plan, I think the fact that it ended up being irrelevant and was soon used as political ammunition against Meade caused him to sour on the idea of contingency plans.

Jeffrey William Hunt's excellent series about the post-Gettysburg campaigns in 1863 show Meade seemingly without contingency plans, slow to figure out how to operate against Lee.

 

[Scott Brown]

His emphasis on the Pipe Creek Plan is a big one. IMO, the evidence suggests that it was a contingency plan, a fall-back position, and not Plan A.

Ryan

Agreed, Ryan.

The Pipe Creek line doesn't get mentioned once in the June 30 message traffic. What Meade does talk about repeatedly is concentrating and fighting Lee wherever Lee concentrates.

And, as articulated in a message to Pleasonton (and written by Seth Williams) in 27/3/421, "[Meade's] instructions require him to cover Baltimore and Washington, while his objective point is the army under Lee. To be able to find if [Lee's] army is divided, and to concentrate upon any detached portion of it, without departing from the instructions which govern him, would be a great object."

So, he is moving forward, trying to ascertain where Lee is going to concentrate, looking for opportunities , and keeping his options open, while adhering to his instructions.

But then something changed. Both Stanton (27/1/69) and Halleck (27/3/427) forwarded that June 30 11:30 pm message from Haupt about Ewell falling back from Harrisburg and Lee apparently concentrating at or near Chambersburg, which Meade would have seen in Taneytown in the very early hours of July 1. As Meade said in a message to Halleck (12 noon July 1 27/1/70) "The news proves my advance has answered its purpose." I believe that Haupt message was the impetus for the PCC. Now Meade was concerned that Lee was going to concentrate quicker than he could, and the PCC was a contingency plan to make sure his own army wasn't defeated in piecemeal fashion.

 

[Drew]

I turned off the video after about seven minutes when the 21st century college professor said, "we won."

Who TF is "we?" They're all dead. No one running his mouth today is part of "we."

Anyway, I respect General Meade's memory and would love a full biography that included the Overland Campaign and not just Gettysburg.

Hope springs eternal.

 

[Belfoured]

The term "meeting engagement" is often used to describe what happened at Gettysburg even though Meade had knowledge by then of the general location of Lee's forces. More properly perhaps, Meade was seeking to conduct a "reconnaissance in force" to "develop" the enemy's strength and dispositions with Buford's cavalry and Reynold's I Corps. Contrary to Lee's instructions about not engaging the enemy until the ANV was concentrated, it was Hill and Heth's reckless movement to engage elements of the AotP that raised the stakes at Gettysburg.

Troy Harmon's recent book All Roads Led to Gettysburg has an interesting take on the conventional wisdom that describes the battle as a "meeting engagement".

 

[Scott Brown]

I turned off the video after about seven minutes when the 21st century college professor said, "we won."

Who TF is "we?" They're all dead. No one running his mouth today is part of "we."

Anyway, I respect General Meade's memory and would love a full biography that included the Overland Campaign and not just Gettysburg.

Hope springs eternal.

A 'bio' probably isn't going to give you the detail/analysis you are looking for, but - as already noted above - Jen Murray is working on one. The last I heard it had a fall 2023 release date, but I haven't heard anything recently.

Eric Wittenberg has put together a Meade book as well, which should be released later this year. The summer/fall campaign after Gettysburg, as well as the JCCW hearings, are fully examined. I had a chance to review the original manuscript a few years ago, which I thought was excellent.

Both of these books will be favorable treatments, which in my opinion is the correct interpretation based on the full record.

As for modern Meade/Eastern Theater studies, Rick Sauers came out with one in 2003; Ethan Rafuse came out with one the same year; and John Selby came out with one in 2018. All included Overland Campaign coverage.

 

[Drew]

@Scott Brown, last I heard, Rod Andrew Jr. was working on a Meade biography. He did one on Wade Hampton that's really good.

Hope he's able to deliver on Meade.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Looking forward to the Meade biography by Jen Murray that may be released within the year!

Jennifer M. Murray - Oklahoma State University

cas.okstate.edu

 

[jackt62]

Troy Harmon's recent book All Roads Led to Gettysburg has an interesting take on the conventional wisdom that describes the battle as a "meeting engagement".

I have that one on my reading list.

 

[CowCavalry]

Meade was much more willing to fight Lee (when Lee was at cross purposes and dispersed across Pennsylvania) than Robert E. Lee considered as to his supposed statements about Meade's "cautious" character.

Lee's opinion of Meade, as I recall, can be summed up by what he said when he learned that Hooker had been replaced with Meade, was to the effect of "he will make no mistake in our front, and if we make one in his, he will whip us".