Meade at Gettysburg:

[Nathan Towne]

Just watched this. I will definitely have to get a copy now. There were definitely always subjects which interested me more than the Gettysburg campaign, but I am looking forward to reading this book.

 

[infomanpa]

It's a good book. Gave me some details that I couldn't find, elsewhere.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I don't know of any modern, world-class biography available on Meade. Boy, I would love to read one at some point.

 

[Scott Brown]

Pennypacker holds up well, in my humble opinion. The thing that sets Kent apart from everyone else, though, is his command of all things logistics.

 

[JerryD]

Sounds like an interesting read. I always thought a good book idea would compare and contrast the leadership of Lee and Meade at Gettysburg, as they followed almost diametrically opposed paths. Lee was almost absent from the battle after he had given his orders, as if he was merely a bystander, while Meade was all over the battlefield and actively engaged in addressing situations as they arose. I've always felt that a less involved commander for the Union might have lost Gettysburg and Meade does not get enough credit for his singular contributions to victory.

 

[rpkennedy]

It is an interesting book to read, although I disagree with some of Brown's arguments and conclusions. There is a Meade biography in the works, IIRC, but I don't think it'll be out for a couple more years.

Ryan

 

[Nathan Towne]

It is an interesting book to read, although I disagree with some of Brown's arguments and conclusions. There is a Meade biography in the works, IIRC, but I don't think it'll be out for a couple more years.

Ryan

What are a couple of big ones which come to mind?

 

[121st PA Vols]

Nathan and JerryD.
I think you guys and others will enjoy Brown's work on Meade. I read it a month ago. Its pro Meade....presenting interesting opinions as all Brown's efforts do. Thankfully he (and others) worked hard dispelling notions of Lee and Meade stumbling upon each other as tho they were bumbling amateurs. These were highly trained West Point grads (Prof. DH Mahan/Clausewitz impact, influence) with good maps and Brown drives this home in my view.
Meade then sought out Lee and goes into detail of the importance of his Left Wing, pushing the Left forward (while guarding his left rear....Emmittsburg) and employing Buford so effectively through in part his close relationship/friendship with Reynolds. Who best to have so situated on the left of the army, accidental or not. Brown as always is an easy read.

 

[rpkennedy]

What are a couple of big ones which come to mind?

His emphasis on the Pipe Creek Plan is a big one. IMO, the evidence suggests that it was a contingency plan, a fall-back position, and not Plan A.

Ryan

 

[121st PA Vols]

His emphasis on the Pipe Creek Plan is a big one. IMO, the evidence suggests that it was a contingency plan, a fall-back position, and not Plan A.

Ryan

It is a big one! And when in such proximity that Meade ordered Reynolds forward to "develop" Lee, falling back seems a contradiction and awkward.
With Meade as astute as anyone of such station, he was cognizant of the dangers and implications a retrograde movement would present militarily and politically.

 

[rpkennedy]

It is a big one! And when in such proximity that Meade ordered Reynolds forward to "develop" Lee, falling back seems a contradiction and awkward.
With Meade as astute as anyone of such station, he was cognizant of the dangers and implications a retrograde movement would present militarily and politically.

And a retrograde of 30-odd miles. To my mind, that makes no sense and the Pipe Creek plan was a just in case plan should things go badly.

Ryan

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Evidently this Pipe Creek deal is one of the oldest and most hashed out controversies of the war. Where exactly does the controversy around Meade's planning originate? The "Circular" would seem to indicate, at least to this novice, that Meade had no intention of teeing it up in Pennsylvania. As I understand it Meade's decision to stick it out didn't occur until very late on July 2nd. Wasn't it at this point that "Plan A" became the backup? Seems like Meade was masterful at quickly adapting to enemy movement, or lack there of.

 

[jackt62]

It's hard to understand why there should be any controversy about Meade and the Pipe Creek plan. As the newly promoted army commander at a critical moment when Confederate forces were on a northward march somewhere and Washington was as usual demanding its security be assured, Meade was doing exactly what a good general in his situation should do; understand the disposition of his forces, collect information on the whereabouts of the enemy, develop a plan to protect his rear while simultaneously confronting the enemy, and consider a secondary (or fallback) defensive position (Pipe Creek) in case of dire need.

 

[rpkennedy]

Evidently this Pipe Creek deal is one of the oldest and most hashed out controversies of the war. Where exactly does the controversy around Meade's planning originate? The "Circular" would seem to indicate, at least to this novice, that Meade had no intention of teeing it up in Pennsylvania. As I understand it Meade's decision to stick it out didn't occur until very late on July 2nd. Wasn't it at this point that "Plan A" became the backup? Seems like Meade was masterful at quickly adapting to enemy movement, or lack there of.

Meade had the Pipe Creek line laid out seemingly as a precaution because, even as late as the evening of July 1, he wasn't entirely certain how he wanted to proceed even though he was directing all troops towards Gettysburg. But, if nothing else, Meade was an excellent engineer and as with many engineers, he kept a contingency plan in case something went wrong. But when he arrived at the field, rode around some, and spoke to his officers, he made the decision to stay and fight it out.

IMO, Meade was never wedded to any particular plan of action and remained flexible in order to respond to whatever situation arose. Pipe Creek was just one of the options.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

It's hard to understand why there should be any controversy about Meade and the Pipe Creek plan. As the newly promoted army commander at a critical moment when Confederate forces were on a northward march somewhere and Washington was as usual demanding its security be assured, Meade was doing exactly what a good general in his situation should do; understand the disposition of his forces, collect information on the whereabouts of the enemy, develop a plan to protect his rear while simultaneously confronting the enemy, and consider a secondary (or fallback) defensive position (Pipe Creek) in case of dire need.

The existence of the Pipe Creek plan was used as a cudgel against Meade by his political opponents to argue that he didn't want to fight at Gettysburg and that he was willing to retreat on July 2, using the council of war to show that only his subordinates' determination to stay kept him there. Sickles, Doubleday, Butterfield, and Pleasonton all made these kinds of arguments in front of the Congressional Committee on the Coduct of the War.

Ryan

 

[Johnny Shafto]

The existence of the Pipe Creek plan was used as a cudgel against Meade by his political opponents to argue that he didn't want to fight at Gettysburg and that he was willing to retreat on July 2, using the council of war to show that only his subordinates' determination to stay kept him there. Sickles, Doubleday, Butterfield, and Pleasonton all made these kinds of arguments in front of the Congressional Committee on the Coduct of the War.

Ryan

Thanks Ryan. At least I'm beginning to understand the controversy and I thank you for the lesson. I must say this seems to smack of political sour grapes. I see a commander who positions his army in a strategically excellent defensive position, aware that his capital must be protected, yet close enough to respond if his cavalry needs support. Eventually, after a tough day, his forces assume another strong defensive position and his officers are confident in their lines. In contrast to his counterpart Meade listens and reacts in support. It could be argued that if not for the Pipe Creek defense Gettysburg would have turned out much differently. I would be curious as to General Buford's respond to a Congressional Committee.

 

[rpkennedy]

Thanks Ryan. At least I'm beginning to understand the controversy and I thank you for the lesson. I must say this seems to smack of political sour grapes. I see a commander who positions his army in a strategically excellent defensive position, aware that his capital must be protected, yet close enough to respond if his cavalry needs support. Eventually, after a tough day, his forces assume another strong defensive position and his officers are confident in their lines. In contrast to his counterpart Meade listens and reacts in support. It could be argued that if not for the Pipe Creek defense Gettysburg would have turned out much differently. I would be curious as to General Buford's respond to a Congressional Committee.

By the time all this was going on, Buford had died and so was unable to respond. Meade did testify but was not nearly as politically connected as his critics.

Ryan

 

[EHParks]

I've been mulling over the fact that although the battle of Gettysburg is characterized in military science terms a "meeting engagement" between two armies, it's not wholly true for Meade and Buford. They knew for the greater part where Lee's forces were on June 30th, thanks in no small part to the militia cavalry units, who, disparaged and beaten up by Lee's men, still managed to collect vital information about numbers and dispositions. Buford and his men fought a text-book delaying action from pre-selected positions and videttes knowing that Meade was much more willing to fight Lee (when Lee was at cross purposes and dispersed across Pennsylvania) than Robert E. Lee considered as to his supposed statements about Meade's "cautious" character.

Pipe Creek was a prudent planning option, as was a withdrawal of his Army from Gettysburg should it have been necessary but I have always had the sense that Meade's war council was more defensive minded than he was and that they would later admit, he seems to have seriously considered if he had the advantage to attack while assessing his strength vs. the Army of N. VA after the day one battle.

Considering Longstreet's and Stuart's absences that night, plus the knowledge that the Confederates had taken significant combat effectiveness losses in at least one of Lee's Corps plus Lee's awkward dispositions in and around the town make that idea not as unfounded as it seems. Lee's right flank was wide open on Marsh creek well into the early morning of July 2nd until Longstreet strengthened and reconnoitered it.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

By the time all this was going on, Buford had died and so was unable to respond. Meade did testify but was not nearly as politically connected as his critics.

Ryan

Hypothetically…under similar questioning.

 

[jackt62]

I've been mulling over the fact that although the battle of Gettysburg is characterized in military science terms a "meeting engagement" between two armies, it's not wholly true for Meade and Buford. They knew for the greater part where Lee's forces were on June 30th, thanks in no small part to the militia cavalry units, who, disparaged and beaten up by Lee's men, still managed to collect vital information about numbers and dispositions.

The term "meeting engagement" is often used to describe what happened at Gettysburg even though Meade had knowledge by then of the general location of Lee's forces. More properly perhaps, Meade was seeking to conduct a "reconnaissance in force" to "develop" the enemy's strength and dispositions with Buford's cavalry and Reynold's I Corps. Contrary to Lee's instructions about not engaging the enemy until the ANV was concentrated, it was Hill and Heth's reckless movement to engage elements of the AotP that raised the stakes at Gettysburg.