Lee May 27, 1863: Lee ponders pushing north

[CMWinkler]

May 27, 1863: Lee ponders pushing north


May. 27, 2013 - 12:15PM |
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A cannon is seen on during events at the Gettysburg National Military Park in Pennsylvania in 2011. (Karen Bleier/AFP via Getty Images)


By Jon Anderson
Staff writer

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Military Times has learned that the top Confederate brass is considering a summer offensive into Union-held territory.
Sources close to Gen. Robert E. Lee say the rebel commander may soon deploy his Army of Northern Virginia into western Maryland or even southern Pennsylvania in the coming weeks.
"With any luck we'll soon be drinking fresh coffee in Carlisle, or better yet their beer," quipped one Southern sergeant with a twinkle in his eye as he glanced to the north.
"I'd just like to get my hands on some of them good boots I hear they make up there," laughed another rebel soldier as he poked a toe from one of the gaping holes in his tattered footwear.
Spring has already brought with it a season of defeat for the Union Army.
Buoyed by his crushing defeat of the Union's attack on Fredricksburg late last year, Lee and his legions have been making short work of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln's hopes of securing Virginia for the North.
Just last month, Lee's troops trounced Gen. "Fighting Joe" Hooker's Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Despite being outnumbered 2 to 1, Lee's victory there is already hailed by some as his "perfect battle."

For the rest: http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130527/NEWS/305270014/May-27-1863-Lee-ponders-pushing-north

 

[ole]

Lee was already planning to head north. Chancellorsville gave him permission to do it. Unfortunately, he lost too many officers. Given some interim brushup, he might have been better prepared for such a major move to bring the AotP into a decisive battle.

 

[leftyhunter]

Playing devils advocate Lee could not wait until the Fall because with every passing month the Union Army grows from conscription , immigration and last but not least the new USCT. Best to strike while the Union Army still is demoralized and Lincoln has not yet replaced a shattered Mr. F.J. Hooker.
Leftyhunter

 

[101combatvet]

Lee was already planning to head north. Chancellorsville gave him permission to do it. Unfortunately, he lost too many officers. Given some interim brushup, he might have been better prepared for such a major move to bring the AotP into a decisive battle.

His interests in the north can be traced back to the fall of 1862 or perhaps even earlier.

 

[OpnCoronet]

...and it he didn't keep active in a major operation, there was a very real chance he would have to reinforce confederate operations in the faltering West(or worse, Lee might have to go too)

 

[ole]

His interests in the north can be traced back to the fall of 1862 or perhaps even earlier.

Yep. Lee knew early on that his only chance at winning the war was to find a place to smash the AotP. He almost did it at Chancellorsville. He was looking for a place to do that in Pennsylvania, but he didn't count on doing it at Gettysburg. He was at a disadvantage. He did try. And that was the beginning of the end for the AoNV.

 

[Freddy]

Did Lee have to invade the North again? Could he have just waited for the Yankees to attack him again and defeat them again fighting defensively. Up to July 3, 1863 his only real defeats were Antietam and Gettysburg, both offensive operations for the AoNV. Could he have held off the Yankees long enough for the 1864 election and Lincoln being defeated at the ballot box leading to a possible peace treaty between the USA and CSA?

 

[rhp6033]

Did Lee have to invade the North again? Could he have just waited for the Yankees to attack him again and defeat them again fighting defensively. Up to July 3, 1863 his only real defeats were Antietam and Gettysburg, both offensive operations for the AoNV. Could he have held off the Yankees long enough for the 1864 election and Lincoln being defeated at the ballot box leading to a possible peace treaty between the USA and CSA?

Lee did the math - every day the Confederacy grew weaker, and the north stronger. After thevictory at Chancellorsville, there was no better time to take one more chance at destroying a good portion of the AoP.

Lee could no longer stay on the line of the Rapidan - the area was foraged out, and the horses and mules were being sent away long distances to find forage. The next natural defensive line to fall back to was the North Anna line, quite a distance backwards and closer to Richmond. Also, the area between the Rapidan and the Potomac was fertile ground, who's crops would go into Union storehouses (rather than Confederate) if he didn't lure them somewhere else, and the area between the North Anna river and the Rapidan was just as valuable.

What probably sealed the decision in Lee's mind was the pressure from the Confederate Congress to "do something" to relieve Pemberton at Vicksburg. If Lee remained passive on the Rapidan, he would probably have been ordered to send a good portion of his army to join Johnston and relieve Vicksburg. But he knew it was a fool's errand - they couldn't possibly arrive in time to do any good, and he wouldn't be left with enough men to defend northern Virginia, with the result being that Richmond would fall.

So he couldn't fall back, he couldn't stay where he was, so his only option was to go forward.

 

[Freddy]

Lee did the math - every day the Confederacy grew weaker, and the north stronger. After thevictory at Chancellorsville, there was no better time to take one more chance at destroying a good portion of the AoP.

Lee could no longer stay on the line of the Rapidan - the area was foraged out, and the horses and mules were being sent away long distances to find forage. The next natural defensive line to fall back to was the North Anna line, quite a distance backwards and closer to Richmond. Also, the area between the Rapidan and the Potomac was fertile ground, who's crops would go into Union storehouses (rather than Confederate) if he didn't lure them somewhere else, and the area between the North Anna river and the Rapidan was just as valuable.

What probably sealed the decision in Lee's mind was the pressure from the Confederate Congress to "do something" to relieve Pemberton at Vicksburg. If Lee remained passive on the Rapidan, he would probably have been ordered to send a good portion of his army to join Johnston and relieve Vicksburg. But he knew it was a fool's errand - they couldn't possibly arrive in time to do any good, and he wouldn't be left with enough men to defend northern Virginia, with the result being that Richmond would fall.

So he couldn't fall back, he couldn't stay where he was, so his only option was to go forward.

But how realistic was that option? Could he have defeated the AoP on their home turf? History shows he lost, but could he have won at Gettysburg? Lee's desperation charge on July 3rd was a suicide assault just as the Federal assault at Fredericksburg. Even Stuart's Cavalry rear attack was soundly defeated by Gregg and Custer. Soldiers fight harder when defending what they believe are their homes and families. Lee knew that and what you pointed out about his option of staying put. It looks like Lee did not have much chance either way, but went with what may have been a long shot but with a chance to win.

 

[jgoodguy]

But how realistic was that option? Could he have defeated the AoP on their home turf? History shows he lost, but could he have won at Gettysburg? Lee's desperation charge on July 3rd was a suicide assault just as the Federal assault at Fredericksburg. Even Stuart's Cavalry rear attack was soundly defeated by Gregg and Custer. Soldiers fight harder when defending what they believe are their homes and families. Lee knew that and what you pointed out about his option of staying put. It looks like Lee did not have much chance either way, but went with what may have been a long shot but with a chance to win.

He had no option. Stay and lose his army through lack of supplies and units sent West or roll the dice.

 

[Freddy]

He had no option. Stay and lose his army through lack of supplies and units sent West or roll the dice.

Then Lee loses at Gettysburg and his worse nightmare, Grant, arrives and Lee is left with his defensive option that he decided against in 1863, but it is a year later and his army is in even worse shape.

 

[jgoodguy]

Then Lee loses at Gettysburg and his worse nightmare, Grant, arrives and Lee is left with his defensive option that he decided against in 1863, but it is a year later and his army is in even worse shape.

Yep, but he had to roll the dice and rolled them once too often.

 

[ole]

Lee was always sitting on the edge of FUBAR or SNAFU.

I have to take my hat off when he rides by, because he was so badly served and outnumbered and, until he met Grant, had flummoxed the Army of the Potomac. He was one helluva general.

 

[damYankee]

Gettysburg was not Lee's goal was it? His intended goal was Harrisburg Pennsylvania. IMO the whole idea was a terrible blunder, he had options and he choose to operate beyond his interior lines and he paid the price.
Lee lost 15% of his force at Chancellorsville, the army he lead to Gettysburg were a mix of tired and tattered veterans and green recruits, he had lost Jackson. This was not the same army he lead so successfully before.
The other thing that strikes me about Gettysburg, unlike previous battles, Lee did not exploit weak points, he went right into the middle of the Union lines, he had no chance of turning the enemy with Picketts Charge, it out of charector for him.
When taken into context of what the South was facing at that time, IMO, holding Vicksburg and securing Tennessee and the heart of Dixie, with everything going on through out the South, Gettysburg seems tombe a poor choice, Longstreet and other Southern Generals suggested a strike on Cincinnati to pull Grant away from Vickburg, but Lee and Davis nixed it.
The out come was, Vickburg was lost, Gettysburg was a debacle and the rest is history.

 

[BillO]

Gettysburg was not Lee's goal was it? His intended goal was Harrisburg Pennsylvania. IMO the whole idea was a terrible blunder, he had options and he choose to operate beyond his interior lines and he paid the price.
Lee lost 15% of his force at Chancellorsville, the army he lead to Gettysburg were a mix of tired and tattered veterans and green recruits, he had lost Jackson. This was not the same army he lead so successfully before.
The other thing that strikes me about Gettysburg, unlike previous battles, Lee did not exploit weak points, he went right into the middle of the Union lines, he had no chance of turning the enemy with Picketts Charge, it out of charector for him.
When taken into context of what the South was facing at that time, IMO, holding Vicksburg and securing Tennessee and the heart of Dixie, with everything going on through out the South, Gettysburg seems tombe a poor choice, Longstreet and other Southern Generals suggested a strike on Cincinnati to pull Grant away from Vickburg, but Lee and Davis nixed it.
The out come was, Vickburg was lost, Gettysburg was a debacle and the rest is history.

Gettysburg was a defeat but a debacle? IMO Gettysburg wasn't seen at the time as the most important thing in the world. That came later. IMO Vicksburg was a worse blow to the south.

 

[OpnCoronet]

IMO the whole idea was a terrible blunder, he had options and he choose to operate beyond his interior lines and he paid the price.
.

With foreknowledge of actual events, the decision was indeed a blunder. But without that foreknowledge, all Lee knew were past events and those events strongly indicated that he and his army could outmarch, out maneuver and outfight the AoP and any of its commanders.
The events leading to his decision and the campaign itself were known post battle, but not before. As I said, up until events transpired that contradicted Lee's suppositions, they seemed correct, based upon past experience.

 

[rhp6033]

Then Lee loses at Gettysburg and his worse nightmare, Grant, arrives and Lee is left with his defensive option that he decided against in 1863, but it is a year later and his army is in even worse shape.

Grant doesn't arrive until about eight months after Gettysburg, in March 1864. In the meantime, Meade is in charge of the AoP, without a "General of all Union Armies" camping with him, as occured after Grant arrived.

When Lee heard that Hooker had been replaced by Meade, Lee said that Mead "would not make any mistakes". This was not good news for Lee, as he had always relied upon the mistakes of previous commanders of the AoP, allowing him to pounce on them shortly after the mistakes occured.

 

[damYankee]

One of the critics of Lee, and Davis for that matter, is that they seldom looked past the interest of Virginia, perhaps it was the general condition of each of the members of the Confederacy, and their ultimate undoing.
My choice of "debacle" was not made in haste, July 1863 was the turning point. Sure it is easy to look at history in the past tense and see mistakes. However, that is why history is studied.
In most of these discussions the comparison of Lee and his Union counterparts will arise, IMO Lee meet his match at Gettysburg, but Lee was not behaving like the Lee of past battles. I don't know why.
But to me the obvious comparison of all the Generals one glaring difference appears. Grant was the only Civil War general that had a grand strategy that encompassed the entire army in a grand and coordinated plan.
The difference between a great tactician and a great strategist is one takes the whole picture into consideration, the other just sees what's in front of him.
Lee was a great leader. It ability to keep fighting after Gettysburg is a testimony of his ability to inspire his men. But it seems to me that after he resigned his union commission till the end of his life his main concern was Virginia, not the Confederacy. He was not alone, most Confederates shared this view, the native state was more important then the whole of a nation...that is not a good plan to win a grand war.

 

[damYankee]

With foreknowledge of actual events, the decision was indeed a blunder. But without that foreknowledge, all Lee knew were past events and those events strongly indicated that he and his army could outmarch, out maneuver and outfight the AoP and any of its commanders.
The events leading to his decision and the campaign itself were known post battle, but not before. As I said, up until events transpired that contradicted Lee's suppositions, they seemed correct, based upon past experience.

So he didn't know Vicksburg was under siege? He was unaware that the Union had taken New Orleans and was about to take control of the Mississippi? Or that Tennessee was being invaded?
If that is what happened then I think Lee and Davis were over the heads.

 

[damYankee]

Gettysburg was a defeat but a debacle? IMO Gettysburg wasn't seen at the time as the most important thing in the world. That came later. IMO Vicksburg was a worse blow to the south.

It is my understanding that Gettysburg was widely reported in the south, north and in Europe as a major defeat, and the end of any hope for European support of the CSA.