Lee May 27, 1863: Lee ponders pushing north

[OpnCoronet]

So he didn't know Vicksburg was under siege? He was unaware that the Union had taken New Orleans and was about to take control of the Mississippi? Or that Tennessee was being invaded?
If that is what happened then I think Lee and Davis were over the heads.

It was more a question of his not knowing that he would lose Stuart at a critical hour, that all of his corps commanders would not perform as expected(by Lee), nor that Meade and the AoP would perform outside his(Lee's) previous experience.
His expectation of a signal victory in Pa. cancelling, if not preventing, a defeat in other dept's, was unrealized by his unexpected(by him) defeat. But who is to say that expectation would not have been realized if he had won?
From out position in the future, it is obvious that Lee was overconfident and too concerned with Va. but it was not obvious at the time.

 

[ole]

It was more a question of his not knowing that he would lose Stuart at a critical hour, that all of his corps commanders would not perform as expected(by Lee), nor that Meade and the AoP would perform outside his(Lee's) previous experience.
His expectation of a signal victory in Pa. cancelling, if not preventing, a defeat in other dept's, was unrealized by his unexpected(by him) defeat. But who is to say that expectation would not have been realized if he had won?
From out position in the future, it is obvious that Lee was overconfident and too concerned with Va. but it was not obvious at the time.

All true, but too concerned with VA? With Richmond gone, the Confederacy evaporates. With a government on the move, logistics (poor as they were) would be impossible.

DC could have fallen and the government would simply move to Philly or NYC and continue to function. With Richmond gone, where would be the seat of the Confederate Government? Back to Montgomery? Atlanta? Charleston? Charlotte?

 

[jgoodguy]

All true, but too concerned with VA? With Richmond gone, the Confederacy evaporates. With a government on the move, logistics (poor as they were) would be impossible.

DC could have fallen and the government would simply move to Philly or NYC and continue to function. With Richmond gone, where would be the seat of the Confederate Government? Back to Montgomery? Atlanta? Charleston? Charlotte?

IMHO the CSA would not be viable without VA from the get go.

 

[favedave]

Had Lee stuck to the original plan of briefly occupying Harrisburg, he would have far better served the Confederacy that fateful July 4th weekend in 1863. The pressure Grant was applying on Pemberton's besieged forces in Vicksburg called for a bold action, perhaps even two working in tandem if Vicksburg was to be held. Loading up the ANV on every available piece of rolling stock and shipping them southwest to Mississippi to come in behind Grant's troops was Davis' response to the crisis. He reasoned the victory at Chancellorsville almost guaranteed the Army of the Potomac would not be launching any new offensives in the near future. Lee did not like this suggestion one bit. To draw Grant's forces away from Vicksburg he proposed what amounted to a gigantic raid into Pennsylvania. If the ANV could pull it off, the Army of the Potomac would be forced to chase the Confederates from pillar to post, spliting their forces into penny packets which the ANV could dispatch on ground of Lee's choosing. To get the ball rolling, Lee sent JEB Stuart's cavalry on a ride all the way around the Union Forces stationed in Washington, Maryland and into eastern Pennsylvania. Stuart's charge was to determine the deployment of the Army of the Potomac and other Union commands, disrupt telegraph communications coming into Washington and the other major places in the Delmarva peninsula, and scavenge as many military stores as they could carry away, then meet up with Lee as the ANV approached Harrisburg. The job here was to scare the heck out of the Federal Government, causing Congress to demand the return of Union Troops sufficient to protect the capitals of the nation, Pennsylvania and Maryland. The embarrassment of a free ranging Confederate Army roaming at will in Union territory was also figured into the possible formal recognition of the CSA by Britain (and therefore everybody else). The invasion, beginning with Stuart's ride came too late to save Vicksburg. Lee was right on that score. Nothing short of putting a bullet into Grant's head was going change the city's fate. But Stuart's ride-around accomplished exactly what Lee hoped it would. Congressmen went into a panic and demanded immediate action. Hooker, who suggested a counter stroke into Virginia while Lee was in Pennsylvania, was booted and Meade brought into command the AoP. Troops of calvary were dispatched in all directions to find Stuart, and then when it was learned Lee was on the march, the ANV. Had Lee called Gettysburg off at the conclusion of the first day, he would have contined north to Harrisburg and met up with Stuart. Together they could have found a battlefield that favored the ANV to take out the spearhead units of the AoP as they arrived, with a back door and an exit strategy when too many forces were brought to bare. Whether they took Harrisburg or Annapolis was irrelivant, as long as the casualties for the Confederates were low and they managaged to escape back into Virginia relatively intact, the damage to the Union's morale and the high casualties the ANV could inflict on the AoP from fighting only on ground of Lee's chosing would have been devastating.

 

[damYankee]

Had Lee stuck to the original plan of briefly occupying Harrisburg, he would have far better served the Confederacy that fateful July 4th weekend in 1863. The pressure Grant was applying on Pemberton's besieged forces in Vicksburg called for a bold action, perhaps even two working in tandem if Vicksburg was to be held. Loading up the ANV on every available piece of rolling stock and shipping them southwest to Mississippi to come in behind Grant's troops was Davis' response to the crisis. He reasoned the victory at Chancellorsville almost guaranteed the Army of the Potomac would not be launching any new offensives in the near future. Lee did not like this suggestion one bit. To draw Grant's forces away from Vicksburg he proposed what amounted to a gigantic raid into Pennsylvania. If the ANV could pull it off, the Army of the Potomac would be forced to chase the Confederates from pillar to post, spliting their forces into penny packets which the ANV could dispatch on ground of Lee's choosing. To get the ball rolling, Lee sent JEB Stuart's cavalry on a ride all the way around the Union Forces stationed in Washington, Maryland and into eastern Pennsylvania. Stuart's charge was to determine the deployment of the Army of the Potomac and other Union commands, disrupt telegraph communications coming into Washington and the other major places in the Delmarva peninsula, and scavenge as many military stores as they could carry away, then meet up with Lee as the ANV approached Harrisburg. The job here was to scare the heck out of the Federal Government, causing Congress to demand the return of Union Troops sufficient to protect the capitals of the nation, Pennsylvania and Maryland. The embarrassment of a free ranging Confederate Army roaming at will in Union territory was also figured into the possible formal recognition of the CSA by Britain (and therefore everybody else). The invasion, beginning with Stuart's ride came too late to save Vicksburg. Lee was right on that score. Nothing short of putting a bullet into Grant's head was going change the city's fate. But Stuart's ride-around accomplished exactly what Lee hoped it would. Congressmen went into a panic and demanded immediate action. Hooker, who suggested a counter stroke into Virginia while Lee was in Pennsylvania, was booted and Meade brought into command the AoP. Troops of calvary were dispatched in all directions to find Stuart, and then when it was learned Lee was on the march, the ANV. Had Lee called Gettysburg off at the conclusion of the first day, he would have contined north to Harrisburg and met up with Stuart. Together they could have found a battlefield that favored the ANV to take out the spearhead units of the AoP as they arrived, with a back door and an exit strategy when too many forces were brought to bare. Whether they took Harrisburg or Annapolis was irrelivant, as long as the casualties for the Confederates were low and they managaged to escape back into Virginia relatively intact, the damage to the Union's morale and the high casualties the ANV could inflict on the AoP from fighting only on ground of Lee's chosing would have been devastating.

Indeed, this was the flawed plan Lee and Davis came up with. It failed totally. At Gettysburg Lee decided that he would go straight at the Union and defeat it. Perhaps..just perhaps, he became over confident in himself and under estimated the will of the Union to stand and fight. In any case, not one goal was achieved.

 

[damYankee]

IMHO the CSA would not be viable without VA from the get go.

It would seem that the CSA didn't fare to well without the rest of it either....

 

[ole]

Indeed, this was the flawed plan Lee and Davis came up with. It failed totally. At Gettysburg Lee decided that he would go straight at the Union and defeat it. Perhaps..just perhaps, he became over confident in himself and under estimated the will of the Union to stand and fight. In any case, not one goal was achieved.

And this is what we are talking about, DY. His plans made sense, when in the planning stage. He could go north, meet the AotP on ground of his choosing, kick the tar out of it, relieve Virginia and bring home the spoils.

I reminds me of "A Bridge Too Far." Much too ambitious, with too many variables.

But Lee was a risk taker. He had won all the battles he had fought, and usually because he did things that weren't in the books. His luck and genious had run out in late June, 1863, His plans came apart and his chutzpah magic didn't work. And he lost one.

From that point on, he was backpedalling and trying to save what he had left. And then came Grant who was nothing like anyone Lee had ever whupped. Then it became defensive.

 

[damYankee]

And this is what we are talking about, DY. His plans made sense, when in the planning stage. He could go north, meet the AotP on ground of his choosing, kick the tar out of it, relieve Virginia and bring home the spoils.

I reminds me of "A Bridge Too Far." Much too ambitious, with too many variables.

But Lee was a risk taker. He had won all the battles he had fought, and usually because he did things that weren't in the books. His luck and genious had run out in late June, 1863, His plans came apart and his chutzpah magic didn't work. And he lost one.

From that point on, he was backpedalling and trying to save what he had left. And then came Grant who was nothing like anyone Lee had ever whupped. Then it became defensive.

All plans look good at the beginning. The fact is he didn't meet the Union on the field of his choice, Gettysburg was not his choice, in the past battles he won because he exploited the errors of his opponents, which were many. He also had many good field commanders that were loss by the time of Gettysburg.
But at Gettysburg, he did not take advantage of the enemy errors as aggressively as he had before, we can give some blame to Longstreet, but IMO it is misplaced.

 

[OpnCoronet]

So he didn't know Vicksburg was under siege? He was unaware that the Union had taken New Orleans and was about to take control of the Mississippi? Or that Tennessee was being invaded?
If that is what happened then I think Lee and Davis were over the heads.

Who is to say, that Lee's supposition that a signal victory in Pa. would upset or delay Union strategy in the West was not correct?


P.S. Obviously Lee did not forsee the signal victory being Meade's.

 

[ErnieMac]

All plans look good at the beginning. The fact is he didn't meet the Union on the field of his choice, Gettysburg was not his choice, in the past battles he won because he exploited the errors of his opponents, which were many. He also had many good field commanders that were loss by the time of Gettysburg.
But at Gettysburg, he did not take advantage of the enemy errors as aggressively as he had before, we can give some blame to Longstreet, but IMO it is misplaced.

A quick question - how many battlefields after the Seven Days campaign were of Lee's choosing? IMO for the most part he was reacting to circumstances brought about by his subordinates or the AoP.

 

[damYankee]

Who is to say, that Lee's supposition that a signal victory in Pa. would upset or delay Union strategy in the West was not correct?


P.S. Obviously Lee did not forsee the signal victory being Meade's.

We will never know will we, as he failed the first part of the plan which was a "signal victory in PA" , which sort of puts the whole debate about the plan to bed.
He knew he could not conduct long term operations in Pa. It was going to be a hit and run operation, there was no way he could stay away from Richmond for very long. A strike toward Vicksburg stood a much better chance of drawing Grant away from Vicksburg.

 

[damYankee]

A quick question - how many battlefields after the Seven Days campaign were of Lee's choosing? IMO for the most part he was reacting to circumstances brought about by his subordinates or the AoP.

1862 was much different then 1863, but Lee was fighting from interior lines during the Seven Days Campaign, reacting to the movement of the Union.
Gettysburg rested on Lees shoulders, it was his plan, he was confident that he could carry out a sweep through Penn. gather food, and forage, collect "rain away slaves", and retreat back to Virginia.
What's wrong with the picture?
Right off the bat there was one bug flaw.....July is when crops are in the ground, harvest time is in the Fall, therefore the main forage that would be available to him would be livestock, but grains? Potatoes? Ana wheat? Not a chance.

 

[Old_Glory]

and his worse nightmare, Grant,

I think Grant's army was his worst nightmare, not Grant himself.

 

[ErnieMac]

1862 was much different then 1863, but Lee was fighting from interior lines during the Seven Days Campaign, reacting to the movement of the Union.
Gettysburg rested on Lees shoulders, it was his plan, he was confident that he could carry out a sweep through Penn. gather food, and forage, collect "rain away slaves", and retreat back to Virginia.

I agree with you. My intent was to point out that Lee rarely had a battlefield of his own choosing. He generally adapted to circumstances as presented to him and won to his credit. At Gettysburg he was not successful, and that was also his responsibilty. The fact that he failed is not to be diminished by the notion that he did not select the field of battle

 

[ErnieMac]

I think Grant's army was his worst nightmare, not Grant himself.

It was the same army, different commander.

 

[ole]

1862 was much different then 1863, but Lee was fighting from interior lines during the Seven Days Campaign, reacting to the movement of the Union.
Gettysburg rested on Lees shoulders, it was his plan, he was confident that he could carry out a sweep through Penn. gather food, and forage, collect "rain away slaves", and retreat back to Virginia.
What's wrong with the picture?
Right off the bat there was one bug flaw.....July is when crops are in the ground, harvest time is in the Fall, therefore the main forage that would be available to him would be livestock, but grains? Potatoes? Ana wheat? Not a chance.

Agree and mildly disagree.

First. One of his expressed desires was to involve the Federals on their own ground so the farmers in Virginia could get their fields planted and hopefully harvested. (Well, at least one of the stated excuses for not sending troops to bail out Vicksburg.)

Second, the country he was invading did have plenty of able farmers whose barns and granaries and cellars still had last year's yield. The larders still had butter, eggs, poultry, smoked meats, beeves, carrots, taters, sauerkraut and all kinds of things that Virginia didn't have.

A story has been bandied about that Lee was not at his best because the rich food upset his tummy. Hey, it's possible.

The farmer sold surplus, not what he would need to survive until the next harvest. He had forage and fodder for his animals and children. Chances are his wife had a barrel of flour and a goodly amount of salt and sugar. Take a few bags of grain to the closest miller and you have flour.

In any event, the farmer had the wherewithal to survive until the next harvest. That wherewithal was what Lee didn't have.

In that sense, it was logical to feed his army off the largesse dangling in front of him in Pennsylvania. What doesn't make sense is that his army couldn't collect ammunition off the civilians, and his wagon trains were stretched thin.

There is a parallel here, and I will risk being off topic, with Sherman's March. No problem with feeding his army. But a pitched battle was to be avoided because a resupply of ammo was hinky.

Again, a bridge too far.

 

[damYankee]

A bridge too far it is!

 

[damYankee]

I agree with you. My intent was to point out that Lee rarely had a battlefield of his own choosing. He generally adapted to circumstances as presented to him and won to his credit. At Gettysburg he was not successful, and that was also his responsibilty. The fact that he failed is not to be diminished by the notion that he did not select the field of battle

I wouldn't disagree with your point, I was addressing ole's post about Lee picking the battlefield, which was Harrisburg, not Gettysburg, but what seems out of character for Lee at Gettysburg was Pickets Charge.
To me it seems that Lee was not thinking like Lee.

 

[ole]

A bridge too far it is!

At the time, it was a desperate move. Sometimes the magic works; sometimes it doesn't.

I can't find it in my heart to say that the try was boneheaded. There were doggone few options available. And Lee only quit once.

 

[ole]

I wouldn't disagree with your point, I was addressing ole's post about Lee picking the battlefield, which was Harrisburg, not Gettysburg, but what seems out of character for Lee at Gettysburg was Pickets Charge.
To me it seems that Lee was not thinking like Lee.

He was "off his game' at G'burg. He had boldly moved, but there he kinda fumbled. Meade was not a Hooker, Burnside or McClellan. Meade didn't present any mistakes of which he could be trumped on. (Yeah, a clumsy sentence, but you know what I mean.)

Much has been said about the PPT charge, but the only way it makes sense is that messing up the Union army was the only way he could extricate his remaining army without realizing serious pursuit.