Lee May 27, 1863: Lee ponders pushing north

[OpnCoronet]

We will never know will we, as he failed the first part of the plan which was a "signal victory in PA" , which sort of puts the whole debate about the plan to bed.
He knew he could not conduct long term operations in Pa. It was going to be a hit and run operation, there was no way he could stay away from Richmond for very long. A strike toward Vicksburg stood a much better chance of drawing Grant away from Vicksburg.

Certainly correct that, in fact, we do not know(as Lee did not) what the effects of a successful Gettysburg Campaign would have had on events in the West(or the war itself), but, as shown, the odds seem to have been carefully calculated and accurately assessed, in ref. to previous experience( all that Lee had to go on in projecting future events)
Many on this thread are assuming that Lee's prime mission was a glorified raid, but logic and reason, based on Lee's previous campaigns, argues that he hunting bigger game than supplies and wagons, i.e., the AoP.
If he came looking for a showdown fight with the Main Union army in the East, he would need every mand and gun he could scrape up; not so with a raid where rapidity of movement was of prime importance and avoidance of major collisions with the enemy.
The area had been mapped by Lee beforehand and although surprised by the closeness of the AoP, if he was there to meet and defeat the AoP in the general area he had mapped, then Gettysburg was as good a place as any. From previous experience, having the AoP in static defense, would hold no terrors for Lee or his army.

 

[jgoodguy]

He was "off his game' at G'burg. He had boldly moved, but there he kinda fumbled. Meade was not a Hooker, Burnside or McClellan. Meade didn't present any mistakes of which he could be trumped on. (Yeah, a clumsy sentence, but you know what I mean.)

Much has been said about the PPT charge, but the only way it makes sense is that messing up the Union army was the only way he could extricate his remaining army without realizing serious pursuit.

IMHO at least part of Lee's brilliance was the quality of Union generals he faced. OTOH the same can be said of Grant.

 

[damYankee]

Certainly correct that, in fact, we do not know(as Lee did not) what the effects of a successful Gettysburg Campaign would have had on events in the West(or the war itself), but, as shown, the odds seem to have been carefully calculated and accurately assessed, in ref. to previous experience( all that Lee had to go on in projecting future events)
Many on this thread are assuming that Lee's prime mission was a glorified raid, but logic and reason, based on Lee's previous campaigns, argues that he hunting bigger game than supplies and wagons, i.e., the AoP.
If he came looking for a showdown fight with the Main Union army in the East, he would need every mand and gun he could scrape up; not so with a raid where rapidity of movement was of prime importance and avoidance of major collisions with the enemy.
The area had been mapped by Lee beforehand and although surprised by the closeness of the AoP, if he was there to meet and defeat the AoP in the general area he had mapped, then Gettysburg was as good a place as any. From previous experience, having the AoP in static defense, would hold no terrors for Lee or his army.

You are correct of course, Lee wanted a big show down, and he got it...a three day slugfest, and he was out done by Meade and the Union Army at Gettysburg.
The whole plan of one big victory is flawed, it has never worked.

 

[OpnCoronet]

[quote="damYankee, post: 651464, member: 5303
The whole plan of one big victory is flawed, it has never worked.[/quote]


Not so sure how flawed. No plan contains answers for the inponderables of action, how can you plan for losing your most truusted source of accurate intelligence? Do you plan on the assumption that your senior commanders will not obey your orders or if so, question them? etc., They were not the result of flawed planning but, flawed humans nature


P.S. that was the problem with McClellan, he was always planning for the inponderables and thus never really acted with decision.

 

[damYankee]

[quote="damYankee, post: 651464, member: 5303
The whole plan of one big victory is flawed, it has never worked.

Not so sure how flawed. No plan contains answers for the inponderables of action, how can you plan for losing your most truusted source of accurate intelligence? Do you plan on the assumption that your senior commanders will not obey your orders or if so, question them? etc., They were not the result of flawed planning but, flawed humans nature



P.S. that was the problem with McClellan, he was always planning for the inponderables and thus never really acted with decision.[/quote]

If it was not flawed I would think it would have had a much different outcome. At Shilo things didn't go well for Grant, certainly not the way he had planned. He reacted to the situation. Just as Lee had done so successfully in past situations. Lee had things go bad before and he was able to adjust his plan to the changing situation, pulling victory out of what should have been defeat.
As far as the "Big Victory" plan goes, when has that worked?
Did it work in the American Revolution? No, it was a long drawn out war, with many skirmishes and battles. Did it work for Napolean? Not in the long run, and he had some spectacular victories.
Did it work for the Germans in WWI or WWII? Nope. December 1941 thru mid 1942 the Japanese enjoyed victory one after the other, how did that turn out?
The Korean War? Both sides enjoyed many large victories. Vietnam,,,ah yes, how many big victories did we have?
The biggest lie in history has been the old adage, we will be home by Christmas, the war will be over in a month. Victory in war has many fathers but defeat is a red headed stepchild. We can blame everyone other then the guy who planned it and led it, if you wish.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Grant's problem was A.S. Johnston and his army. Lee's problem was getting his corps commanders to perform as he expected; apples and oranges.
We know Now, that a Big Victory was probabely beyond the capabilities of CW armies, but Lee did not know that Then and neither did Grant. Lee's previous victories were sterile of strategic importance, each battle got bigger and more costly, exactly the kind of war Lee believed he needed to avoid, if possible, not play into. A Big Victory Plan was exactly what was called for.
That the plan failed was not the result of faulty planning, but faulty execution by both Lee and his corps commanders.

 

[damYankee]

Grant's problem was A.S. Johnston and his army. Lee's problem was getting his corps commanders to perform as he expected; apples and oranges.
We know Now, that a Big Victory was probabely beyond the capabilities of CW armies, but Lee did not know that Then and neither did Grant. Lee's previous victories were sterile of strategic importance, each battle got bigger and more costly, exactly the kind of war Lee believed he needed to avoid, if possible, not play into. A Big Victory Plan was exactly what was called for.
That the plan failed was not the result of faulty planning, but faulty execution by both Lee and his corps commanders.

Actually Grant, Sherman and Longstreet predicted in 1861, a long bloody conflict. Longstreet has been criticized for being overly cautious, but Lee stated that once Longstreet was prepared he was a good a leader as he had. One thing I noticed in many battles the Confederates didn't start the attack until late in the day. It was not just Longstreet.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Actually Grant, Sherman and Longstreet predicted in 1861, a long bloody conflict. Longstreet has been criticized for being overly cautious, but Lee stated that once Longstreet was prepared he was a good a leader as he had. One thing I noticed in many battles the Confederates didn't start the attack until late in the day. It was not just Longstreet.

I am not so sure that is true, but coordinating movements to time was a problem for most CW armies. Something that Lee should have been aware of after almost three years of battles and on the concentrated area of the actual battlefield, he had, IMO, the opportunity to at least have tried to enforce his will on faltering or disaffected (or maybe distracted is a better word) corps commanders. i.e., insisting they follow his original plans at the appointed time, whaatever their wishes or misgivings.