Map makers and topographic engineers.

A fairly accurate topo map can be made with an alidade and plane table. Did this a few times in my "reenacting career"-

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Lookout Mountain from the porch at Sugar's BBQ on Missionary Ridge.
How would you make a map of what you are seeing?​

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In answer to a private message, "How did they do it?"
The answer was a Civil War GPS in the palm of their hand.



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This modern sighting compass is identical to the ones carried by Civil War soldiers.
Note the flat spots at 3:00 & 9:00 on the case. They allow it to be set on a level surface.

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Notice that the compass is designed to be read in the mirror.
You aim at a point & use the lever visible in the 2:00 position to lock the compass needle in place.
It make it easy to write down the result.

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This is the inclinometer. Note the E on the compass is boxed by the needle indicating 0 degrees.

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Compare the position of the E on the compass face with the position of the pointer in this image.
Notice that the degrees are meant to be read in the mirror.
What this allows you to do is to sight your point & call out the results to a helper who writes them down.

This handy-dandy compass/inclinometer was an essential piece of personal equipment for engineers & artillery officers.

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Fortress Rosecrans outside Murfreesboro TN
The lines with ranges in yards were made using survey instruments.
The intersections of the lines were marked by white poles with little flags on them.
In December 1864 the Washington Artillery went into battery over a mile from Lunette Negley & Battery cruft.
The first round fired by the 20 pound Parrotts struck a caisson.
A rain of accurate fire drove off the CSA artillery before they could fire a shot.
About ten years ago, a cluster of Parrott shells was discovered at that site.
The rain soaked soil had absorbed the impact of the contact fused rounds without setting them off.
An O.E.D. unit from Fort Campbell blew them up in place.

I'd love to see some of your guys demonstrate the use of these instruments. In a way, it reminds of the way that seaborne vessels used triangulation to locate their position using sextants to measure the angles of the sun, moon and planets.
 
Early in the morning of 2 May (0400) Lee met with Jackson (following a meeting the previous night when it had been decided that Jackson would march to flank Hooker, even though Jackson did not have an exact route of march). While Lee and Jackson were talking, Hotchkiss "approached the generals and spread his map on another hardtack box between them …[Hotchkiss] had found the route he had been seeking, and as he spoke "he traced it on the map [I think it is probably this map]: first due west to the furnace, then due south, away from the enemy, along a trail that gradually turned back west to enter the Brock Road, which ran northward to the plank road and the turnpike. However, he explained that the column must not turn north at this point, since that would bring it within sight of a Federal signal station at Fairview, but south again for a short distance to another road leading north and paralleling the Brock Road, which it joined a couple of miles above in some heavy woods just short of its junction with the plank road.
Have you seen this "Mysteries & Conundrums" story by historians at the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park?
Link -> Stonewall Jackson’s Last Map
 
Have you seen this "Mysteries & Conundrums" story by historians at the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park?
Link -> Stonewall Jackson’s Last Map

No, I was not aware of that map. I think it very interesting and my comments follow.
Although I can not judge whether it is "in Jackson’s distinctive hand" I accept their word that it is so.
The article says "An early article about the map asserts it was used by Lee and Jackson at their final bivouac on the night of May 1-2". I do not think it is the case. Foote says that on the night of May 1 when Lee was meeting with Jackson (after Stuart had bought news that "Hooker's right flank was in the air") Lee "kept peering at a map spread on his knees". Although the linked article does not give map dimensions, the fact that it could be pasted into a book indicates it is not large and unlikely to be a map that would be spread out across Lee's knees. Therefore it seems unlikely that it is the map used by Lee and Jackson on that night. My best guess (and that's all it is) is that it is a map quickly drawn by Jackson on that night while looking at Lee's map. At that meeting Jackson announced "My troops will move at 4 o'clock". Of course, Jackson did not move at 4 o'clock because, as mentioned earlier, Hotchkiss arrived that morning with his map.
The article also says "... most tellingly, Tabernacle Church are all marked in Jackson’s hand". I attach little importance to that as a church would be a notable landmark at the time and would be included on most maps of that era, as Hotchkiss and others also did as a matter of course.
I suggest the "squiggly line" over the River was just to show it was a river while the squiggly line over the Brock Road is to indicate the main known road that he was to take that Lee (on the night of May 1) "had traced a fingertip westward along the map [the one spread across his knees] from their present location ... past the front of the enemy position, then northward [i.e. Brock Road] to intersect the turnpike".
Finally, the article says "Tellingly, it does not include the network of roads that would carry him to the Brock Road on May 2". It does not do so because it was only on the morning of May 2 that Hotchkiss arrived with his map and information about those roads. That is also why I think it must have been a map drawn by Jackson during the night of May 1 during his meeting with Lee.

Great stuff. Thanks for bringing it to my attention.
 
.... Finally, the article says "Tellingly, it does not include the network of roads that would carry him to the Brock Road on May 2". It does not do so because it was only on the morning of May 2 that Hotchkiss arrived with his map and information about those roads. That is also why I think it must have been a map drawn by Jackson during the night of May 1 during his meeting with Lee.
Yes, I agree - this map really focuses on the main roads, landmarks, and terrain upon which Jackson was maneuvering his divisions on May 1 during his attack upon Sykes' Division of the Union V Corps [ ABT Map: Chancellorsville, May 1 ]. John Hennessy makes the point, "... it’s also clear the map includes a good deal of information that suggests Jackson used [it] earlier in the campaign". Landmarks that he marked were "places [that] mattered to Jackson on April 30 and May 1."

Jackson may have initially referred to his map on the morning of May 2nd (perhaps the mysterious squiggles and markings were placed by Jackson during his conference with Lee) but the feasibility of the flank attack probably wasn't fully realized until Hotchkiss provided his charts and information.

Hennessy also wrote a detailed description of the May 1, 1863 actions in his ABT article, "The Killing Game"
 
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The claim has been made that the Army of the Cumberland's map printing efforts were so efficient that "one hundred thousand officers were walking around with maps in their pockets".

This article describes a far more restricted distribution:


Specifically, in his report of the 1863 Murfreesboro campaign, Major General Rosecrans paid tribute to the "ability of Capt. W.E. Merrill, engineer, whose successful collection and embodiment of topographical information, rapidly printed by Capt. William C. Margedant's quick process, and distributed to corps and division commanders, has already contributed very greatly to the ease and success of our movements over a country of difficult and hitherto unknown topography."

Before the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign, Capt Merrill himself described "his frantic efforts to get 200 copies of the map printed and distributed to Sherman's commanders."
He further noted "before we struck the enemy, every brigade, division, and corps commander in the three armies had a copy."

While this in no way denigrates the utility and quality of the maps produced by the Army of the Cumberland, it suggests the distribution was far smaller than suggested above. Does anyone have any actual evidence that maps were distributed to every officer in the AoC, or were even available to any officer who requested one?
 
I took 20 to 25 hours of cartography, aerial photo interpretation, photogrammetry, etc. as electives to my geosciences degree. We enjoyed the vantage point offered by aircraft and spy satellite photography. However, we did utilize field exercises where we were dropped off on foot in Mark Twain National Forest and assigned to rough in a topo map from visual observation. It was the mid-70s and almost every skill I acquired was replaced by computers within five years after I graduated. Many of those who completed their degree in the field ended up working at Defense Mapping Agency in St. Louis. I imagine accurate topo mapping was very difficult for those cartographers back in the mid-19th century.
I remember having to survey a small park outside Cape Girardeau when I was minoring in Geology at Southeast Missouri State back in the 60s. Now, after studying and writing about Stephen H. Long I have decided to get back into reenacting and do a Topographical Engineer. Has been interesting so far.
 
The claim has been made that the Army of the Cumberland's map printing efforts were so efficient that "one hundred thousand officers were walking around with maps in their pockets".

This article describes a far more restricted distribution:


Specifically, in his report of the 1863 Murfreesboro campaign, Major General Rosecrans paid tribute to the "ability of Capt. W.E. Merrill, engineer, whose successful collection and embodiment of topographical information, rapidly printed by Capt. William C. Margedant's quick process, and distributed to corps and division commanders, has already contributed very greatly to the ease and success of our movements over a country of difficult and hitherto unknown topography."

Before the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign, Capt Merrill himself described "his frantic efforts to get 200 copies of the map printed and distributed to Sherman's commanders."
He further noted "before we struck the enemy, every brigade, division, and corps commander in the three armies had a copy."

While this in no way denigrates the utility and quality of the maps produced by the Army of the Cumberland, it suggests the distribution was far smaller than suggested above. Does anyone have any actual evidence that maps were distributed to every officer in the AoC, or were even available to any officer who requested one?
Nobody ever said that the A of the C had 100,000 officers. That is, of course an absurdity. 100,000 is roughly the number of officers on bothe sides that relied on maps. So, thst misinformation can be set aside.

As to the remarkable, world class A of the C / Sherman’s army group topographic unit, straw man absurdities are a waste of time.
 
Sirs, may I submit the following...

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Topographical intelligence and the American Civil War.
Author; Nettesheim, Daniel D.

Abstract; This study analyzes the organizational approaches to meet topographical intelligence needs which evolved in the major Federal armies during the Civil War. Research reveals that a topographical problem existed in 1861 which had significant impact on Federal operations early in the war. The primary cause of inadequate military maps was the focus of the Corps of Topographical Engineers from 1816 to 1860. National leaders, as well as many Army generals and the military engineers themselves, supported strong emphasis on civil works and internal improvement. The nature of the war placed a premium on the North's need for maps. The geographic size of the theater and strategies of opposing commanders were key factors in determining the necessary degree of map detail. Three distinct approaches to the map problem emerged. In the East where large-scale maps were most important, little was accomplished by the Army of the Potomac as engineers were horded on the army-level staff and employed without functional distinction. This approach was consistent with precedence and pre-war doctrine. In the West, Grant decentralized his meager engineer assets in the Army of the Tennessee. His directives fostered centralized control and engineer focus on map work during critical phases of his campaigns with favorable results. Only the Army of the Cumberland developed a formal topographical organization extending from army to brigade level. Its system, with specialization as the cornerstone, was clearly superior to those of the other armies. Ironically, the formal merger of the two engineer corps in 1863 masked the system and reasons for its origin and success, many of which transcend the American Civil War.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1978-06-09
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 057970
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date; created 2008-08-27

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

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100,000 is roughly the number of officers on bothe sides that relied on maps.

OK, does anyone have an estimate of the total number of officers who served on both sides during the Civil War?

Does anyone have an estimate of the proportion of officers who, in fact, "relied on maps"?

My own rough estimate:

- An infantry battalion at full strength has three field officers, about three staff officers, and 40 company grade officers. That's 46 officers out of a total strength of about 1000 - or about 4.6%.

- The vast majority of Civil War troops were infantry. If we assume a higher percentage of officers in other branches, and allow a small overall tariff for staff officers, the number should not have exceeded 5% - 7%. Certainly it would not exceed 10%.

- If approximately 2.5 million men served in the Civil War, a very conservative estimate of the maximum number of officers (10%) would be 250,000.

- Now, how many of those "relied on maps" to carry out their daily duties? Company grade officers didn't - a battalion functioned as a unit. Only the field officers (3 of 1000, or 0.3%) would have had any need to consult a map. 0.3% of 2.5 million works out to 7,500 field officers - double that and you still have only 15,000. Nowhere near 100,000.

And that would be battalion level. The question still remains:

Does anyone have actual evidence that maps were distributed below brigade level?
 
Sirs, may I submit the following...

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Topographical intelligence and the American Civil War.
Author; Nettesheim, Daniel D.

Abstract; This study analyzes the organizational approaches to meet topographical intelligence needs which evolved in the major Federal armies during the Civil War. Research reveals that a topographical problem existed in 1861 which had significant impact on Federal operations early in the war. The primary cause of inadequate military maps was the focus of the Corps of Topographical Engineers from 1816 to 1860. National leaders, as well as many Army generals and the military engineers themselves, supported strong emphasis on civil works and internal improvement. The nature of the war placed a premium on the North's need for maps. The geographic size of the theater and strategies of opposing commanders were key factors in determining the necessary degree of map detail. Three distinct approaches to the map problem emerged. In the East where large-scale maps were most important, little was accomplished by the Army of the Potomac as engineers were horded on the army-level staff and employed without functional distinction. This approach was consistent with precedence and pre-war doctrine. In the West, Grant decentralized his meager engineer assets in the Army of the Tennessee. His directives fostered centralized control and engineer focus on map work during critical phases of his campaigns with favorable results. Only the Army of the Cumberland developed a formal topographical organization extending from army to brigade level. Its system, with specialization as the cornerstone, was clearly superior to those of the other armies. Ironically, the formal merger of the two engineer corps in 1863 masked the system and reasons for its origin and success, many of which transcend the American Civil War.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1978-06-09
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 057970
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date; created 2008-08-27

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

This is really interesting. My focus is on the A of the C. I knew that Thomas’ topographic organization was exemplary, I did not realize just how unique it was.
 
I'd love to see some of your guys demonstrate the use of these instruments. In a way, it reminds of the way that seaborne vessels used triangulation to locate their position using sextants to measure the angles of the sun, moon and planets.
The Brunton Compass was patented in 1894 and obviously based on the Civil War sighting compass pictured in post #63. Brunton’s have been improved through the years and are still important in geological and archeological field use.

Below are two pics of my father’s 1926 model, he took it with him to Saudi Arabia in the 30’s when CALCO was mapping the Kingdom in preparation to drilling the first oil well.

B0FC5240-6FCA-4B3F-AD4E-47248F9C7B99.jpeg

6FF803A2-6C39-46CC-8AF9-75A62553130A.jpeg


The plane table and alidade pictured in post #61 is still a simple and reliable way to accurately map an area when a transit is not available. We used the setup several times in Field Geology and summer camp back in the day.
 
I worked for a brief stint in 1982 as an assistant in a company that copied blueprints. In that era 39 years ago it was a remarkably complex machine with an ammonia tank attachment, if I remember correctly. Blueprints were huge, and so the machine.
Lubliner.
In the 70’s I was working for an oil company in Midland, TX. The drafting dept. had of course a blue print machine as you describe which was used for ordinary sized maps. For bigger maps they had what was called a vacuum printer. The original was held flat over the target paper by vacuum on a large clear, flat surface. Intense UV light projected through both sheets for about a minute until a perfect copy was made. It was a very cool machine.
 
Sorry, battlefields...most are highly accurate, some have absolutely no sense of distance and the mapping of it. I'm a huge fan none the less.
The sun maps are definitely a great feat of engineering. Quick, using mainly natural resources, etc.
I've always been intrigued with the maps of the War. From the pros to the "chicken scratchers". I have to admit from using the OR atlas on several western vattlefie
 
Sirs, may I submit the following...

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Topographical intelligence and the American Civil War.
Author; Nettesheim, Daniel D.

Abstract; This study analyzes the organizational approaches to meet topographical intelligence needs which evolved in the major Federal armies during the Civil War. Research reveals that a topographical problem existed in 1861 which had significant impact on Federal operations early in the war. The primary cause of inadequate military maps was the focus of the Corps of Topographical Engineers from 1816 to 1860. National leaders, as well as many Army generals and the military engineers themselves, supported strong emphasis on civil works and internal improvement. The nature of the war placed a premium on the North's need for maps. The geographic size of the theater and strategies of opposing commanders were key factors in determining the necessary degree of map detail. Three distinct approaches to the map problem emerged. In the East where large-scale maps were most important, little was accomplished by the Army of the Potomac as engineers were horded on the army-level staff and employed without functional distinction. This approach was consistent with precedence and pre-war doctrine. In the West, Grant decentralized his meager engineer assets in the Army of the Tennessee. His directives fostered centralized control and engineer focus on map work during critical phases of his campaigns with favorable results. Only the Army of the Cumberland developed a formal topographical organization extending from army to brigade level. Its system, with specialization as the cornerstone, was clearly superior to those of the other armies. Ironically, the formal merger of the two engineer corps in 1863 masked the system and reasons for its origin and success, many of which transcend the American Civil War.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1978-06-09
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 057970
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date; created 2008-08-27

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Great find!
 
Sorry, battlefields...most are highly accurate, some have absolutely no sense of distance and the mapping of it. I'm a huge fan none the less.
We had a going out of business sale on Bell Ave. (North Side close to Stringer's Ridge) of a map store back near 2002 or 3. I was able to purchase the battlefield maps for Chickamauga and Chattanooga as well as the arrangement of statuary for 1 dollar a shot. These are very expensive at the Battlefield Museum. They are beautiful.
Lubliner
 
We had a going out of business sale on Bell Ave. (North Side close to Stringer's Ridge) of a map store back near 2002 or 3. I was able to purchase the battlefield maps for Chickamauga and Chattanooga as well as the arrangement of statuary for 1 dollar a shot. These are very expensive at the Battlefield Museum. They are beautiful.
Lubliner
I think I remember that map store back in the day. I have the OR's maps of Chick/Chatt and a few others. I worked at the Chickamauga visitors center and was very upset when I learned they didn't sell anything close to a good map in the store. They had some good reprints of a map with up to date graphics, but it is the same map in the OR's.
 
I think I remember that map store back in the day. I have the OR's maps of Chick/Chatt and a few others. I worked at the Chickamauga visitors center and was very upset when I learned they didn't sell anything close to a good map in the store. They had some good reprints of a map with up to date graphics, but it is the same map in the OR's.
It may have been my reaction to the lack of maps at the visitor's center that caught my surprise and not the price. I do remember being very much surprised, but with Grumpy's and McKay's accessible, and Novel Idea back then on Frazier, the price of new books was eye-brow raising too. (Not to forget All Books on Broad Street, an incredible collection).
Lubliner.
 
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