Mac and Pope

[MikeyB]

What was the plan for McClellan and the AotP w/ respect to Pope and the AoV? Once the units were consolidated, did Lincoln intend for the AotP to continue to operate as a separate army, under the command of Pope? Were they two separate but equal army commands that Halleck had to coordinate with Mac mantaining control of the AoTP? Was the AotP supposed to fold into AoV, in which case what was Mac's job?

2nd Bull run kind of blew this all up but what was in fact the command plan?

 

[RedRover]

What was the plan for McClellan and the AotP w/ respect to Pope and the AoV? Once the units were consolidated, did Lincoln intend for the AotP to continue to operate as a separate army, under the command of Pope? Were they two separate but equal army commands that Halleck had to coordinate with Mac mantaining control of the AoTP? Was the AotP supposed to fold into AoV, in which case what was Mac's job?

2nd Bull run kind of blew this all up but what was in fact the command plan?

Evidently the President had ordered the forward movement of the Army of the Potomac on the 22nd of February and it didn't move. Then gave it ten days to move from March 1, and it eventually was advanced upon Manassas, as the Confederates withdrew toward Richmond, etc. According to Secretary of the Treasury S.P. Chase the President etc. preferred Mac just march upon Richmond. But he preferred the movement upon Richmond from the Peninsula... so this was allowed and the Army of the Potomac moved thence accordingly, and approached Richmond from the east side during March through early June.

General Pope was appointed commander of the "Army of Virginia" organized from June 26. The forces included were rather widely scattered, and Pope moved to reorganize and consolidate his movable force along the Rapidan, etc. Pope notes of his general instructions...

This army, consequently, commenced organization etc. the day after the commencement of the Seven Days battles near Richmond.


Secretary Chase says that after McClellan's retreat from Richmond toward Harrison's landing commenced, and his messages warning of potentially having to capitulate with his army, etc., there was some discussion about relieving him of command of the Army of the Potomac, which Chase says he and Secretary of War Stanton pressed, and perhaps giving Pope command of the Army of the Potomac. The President instead appointed Gen. Halleck as General-in-chief over all, to attempt to keep things in hand. Chase says Halleck informed him in this period that he would keep a handle on McClellan to avoid disaster...

Chase:

Anyways, Pope's army commenced operations in a manner to threaten Richmond, while Halleck had discussions with McClellan about advancing again from Harrison's landing. Ultimately McClellan wouldn't move without large reinforcement. So the Army of the Potomac was ordered by water to Aquia Creek, and from there to reinforce and support Pope. There was in the meantime the Battle of Cedar Mountain, and then Pope's army held a line along the Rappahannock after the 18th of August, during which General Halleck hoped movement of enough of McClellan's troops to unite with Pope might give great advantage. Halleck stated:

In the latter case, were McClellan retained in command of part of the Army of the Potomac, separate from Pope's army, it would likely have been under a general command by Halleck perhaps. But I suspect from the comments by Secretary Chase and some others, that had Pope's operations proved even moderately successful, Pope might have have ended up in command of the combined armies.

But, with McClellan's army arriving about Aquia Creek, etc., it was ordered to detach to reinforce Pope, etc. ultimately ca. 40,000 troops who didn't make it to Pope's army in time to forestall disaster. General Halleck himself ended up in a three or four day tangle with Mac about forwarding more troops toward Pope at Manassas. McClellan finally sending a notice direct to the President that all troops should be retained about Washington, and Pope left to get out of his own "scrape." Nicolay and Hay (vol. 6, p. 23) said the President, particularly after Pope's defeat within hours of the last, was rather outraged personally by it.

Secretary Chase says the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac thus only came together by Pope's defeat and withdrawal to Washington... rather than in the field, supporting a success by Pope...

Secretary Chase says, even after Pope's defeat, he would have preferred that in the emergency the President shelf McClellan, and perhaps keep Pope. But the President did the opposite, and gave McClellan general command over all on the 2nd of September. Lincoln's secretaries Nicolay and Hay say that Pope wasn't considered incompetent, but his declarations to the troops had been impolitic, and certainly his fresh defeat didn't inspire the troops with confidence. Also that Lincoln felt any other general commanding the Army of the Potomac might not be seconded or supported as they should have been, in any case. Lincoln:

Hay and Nicolay, also noted that the President was also aware, that in the midst of the disasters and emergency of the hour, and struggles in recruiting, etc., General McClellan was a favorite of the opposition to the administration, which would encourage his success as much as it might crow of Pope's failure.

Lincoln was evidently pleased with the burst of activity by McClellan distinct from his recent inaction and arguments...

It was Pope who was snubbed this week. When he applied for clarification of his orders on September 5, General Halleck replied...

McClellan's resulting campaign against Lee's movement into Maryland was generally successful. McClellan, on a march of ten days, reorganizing troops from different armies, (Army of the Potomac, Army of Virginia, and defenses of Washington, Burnside's command, and the Kanawha Division, etc.) before the actions resulting in the Battle of Antietam. I.W. Heysinger observing...

The Report of Major-General Pope...

Report of Major-General John Pope

www.google.com

George Gordon's history of the Army of Virginia...

History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia, Under John Pope ...

www.google.com

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Lincoln probably wanted Halleck to lead the combined armies. I don't believe he had any interest in doing so.

Halleck told McClellan that he would be in command once armies joined together.

 

[RedRover]

Lincoln probably wanted Halleck to lead the combined armies. I don't believe he had any interest in doing so.

Halleck told McClellan that he would be in command once armies joined together.

Halleck did tell him that. August 7, Halleck to McClellan:

McClellan didn't particularly believe him apparently.

And by the 20th of August McClellan was personally satisfied that he was on the outs...

Secretary of the Navy Welles observed of the situation that he didn't think McClellan's continued command was assured, particularly after producing his manifesto on the conduct of the war, which he presented to the President, rather than advancing again against Richmond, etc. from Harrison's landing:

Treasury Secretary Chase says amidst these issues, By September 1, Halleck was in general command, with Pope commanding the Army of Virginia and the large part of the Army of the Potomac forwarded to it in the field by that day; McClellan to retain command of the remnant of the Army of the Potomac...

The portions of the Army of the Potomac attached to Pope, or proceeding forward to him, by then included most of it.

Even after McClellan was entrusted with the combined forces in the aftermath of the disaster to Pope's army on September 2, President Lincoln informed his concerned cabinet the situation safe given Halleck's authority to jettison McClellan when it became necessary. From Treasury Secretary Chase's notes on that date:

Navy Secretary Welles says of the President's reliance on Halleck's authority to replace McClellan when required:

For example, on September 3, the day after McClellan was given command of the troops drawing in about Washington, Lincoln's order to reorganize from them a force to take the field against Lee's army was directed to General Halleck (with the expectation of course of being seconded by McClellan)...

The original of the above was in President Lincoln's handwriting, signed by the Secretary of War.

General McClellan of course commanding the army actually sent forth for active service... leading to the Battle of Antietam.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

McClellan was assigned to command the Washington defenses and, as the above order indicates, to organize the field army for active operations in Maryland. However, it was not certain that McClellan was to lead the army after Lee. Burnside was offered command on September 5 and declined.

 

[RedRover]

McClellan was assigned to command the Washington defenses and, as the above order indicates, to organize the field army for active operations in Maryland. However, it was not certain that McClellan was to lead the army after Lee. Burnside was offered command on September 5 and declined.

Indeed. Throughout the period of our discussion, the Secretary of War, etc., was evidently looking about for someone, anyone, both willing and able to take responsibility and replace McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac. General Hitchcock recorded he was approached about taking command of the Army of the Potomac while it was yet on the Peninsula, and though, per his diary, personally convinced of the emergency given some of McClellan's behavior and ideas, declined as he was too old and sick for an active command. According to Lincoln's secretaries, Nicolay and Hay (vol. 6, p. 24), Hitchcock had also observed that whoever replaced Mac would not be well seconded by his senior officers, and the troops generally.

President Lincoln, evidently, was not sanguine that McClellan's command in the field after September 2 would lead to decisive results, but enjoined to his cabinet, etc., that he supposed McClellan, if spurred on by Halleck, etc., might actually "hurt" Lee's army before the close of the campaign in Maryland...

Antietam filled that bill, and was a victory besides. Ultimately, Mac's replacement was required, and Burnside was ordered to assume command of the Army...

 

[Saphroneth]

So far as I can tell, McClellan was originally told that he'd command the combined army upon the removal of the AoP back to northern Virginia, but this changed by the time he actually got there.

I suspect the plan was basically to give Pope a very big army and then conduct the overland campaign that Lincoln always wanted. Whether Pope knew this is actually an interesting question because as Daoust points out Pope had every means to ask for 6th Corps earlier than he actually had need of it, and did not; he also didn't retire behind the Bull Run to combine the armies between the 29th and 30th August, despite being aware it was an option. He may have wanted to avoid sharing the glory he thought was to come.

 

[Saphroneth]

Secretary of the Navy Welles observed of the situation that he didn't think McClellan's continued command was assured, particularly after producing his manifesto on the conduct of the war, which he presented to the President, rather than advancing again against Richmond, etc. from Harrison's landing:

Something I should note in this connection is that (while I think Welles might not necessarily have known this, and possibly Lincoln didn't remember it) McClellan had actually sought and obtained permission from Lincoln to write a letter about things that were not strictly military but which related to the conduct of the war; this became the Harrisons Landing letter.

There's also the weirdness with respect to advancing from Harrisons Landing which is that McClellan's latest instructions from Lincoln were actually to wait for reinforcement, those reinforcements being Burnside's force (which never arrived). In fact, and relevantly to the point about Burnside which you made later, it is my understanding that everyone in McClellan's high command structure was under the impression (because Burnside had said so) that he was due to arrive on the 21st July.
The reason Burnside hadn't arrived prior to that point is that he was told not to join McClellan until directed to (from Washington).

Instead Burnside was summoned to Washington and offered AoP command, which he refused.


Like I say, I think it's possible here that Lincoln forgot he'd explicitly given McClellan permission for the Harrisons Landing letter, or that he forgot that he'd told McClellan to wait for reinforcement before advancing (specifically McClellan's preference was to move on Petersburg) but it does look like attempts to replace McClellan with Someone Else are a key feature; if you consider the formation of the Army of Virginia to be another of these then it goes back prior to the Seven Days.

 

[RedRover]

I suspect the plan was basically to give Pope a very big army and then conduct the overland campaign that Lincoln always wanted. Whether Pope knew this is actually an interesting question because as Daoust points out Pope had every means to ask for 6th Corps earlier than he actually had need of it, and did not;

Apparently aware. On the 21st of August Gen. Pope was indeed informed by Halleck's HQ that he would be reinforced as the Army of the Potomac units came up...

he also didn't retire behind the Bull Run to combine the armies between the 29th and 30th August, despite being aware it was an option. He may have wanted to avoid sharing the glory he thought was to come.

As early the 22nd of August Gen. Halleck was encouraging Pope to attack where he saw an opportunity...

Pope was again instructed on the 26th to attack once he found Lee's army...

On the same date, Franklin's sixth corps got its marching orders to join Pope... but for various reasons it did not join Pope's army until after the battle...

Here's a basic rundown of the time line on General Franklin's Sixth Corps, which the Administration and General-in-Chief Halleck desired to have joined with General Pope's Army before the battle...

Anyways, here's a sample of Pope's orders from Halleck by the close of the 27th... keep line with Washington open, troops from the AoP etc. expected to come out to by it, etc.

Something I should note in this connection is that (while I think Welles might not necessarily have known this, and possibly Lincoln didn't remember it) McClellan had actually sought and obtained permission from Lincoln to write a letter about things that were not strictly military but which related to the conduct of the war; this became the Harrisons Landing letter.

My understanding is that Lincoln was not particularly offended about Mac giving him the Harrison's landing letter; just thanked him and put it in his pocket, etc. The President's secretaries Hay and Nicolay thought he was more alarmed at McClellan's particular views about his military situation.

General McClellan reported the same...

Hay and Nicolay say Lincoln was actually offended some at Mac's lack of enthusiasm relative to pressing reinforcements to Pope before battle at Second Manassas was joined...

There's also the weirdness with respect to advancing from Harrisons Landing which is that McClellan's latest instructions from Lincoln were actually to wait for reinforcement, those reinforcements being Burnside's force (which never arrived). In fact, and relevantly to the point about Burnside which you made later, it is my understanding that everyone in McClellan's high command structure was under the impression (because Burnside had said so) that he was due to arrive on the 21st July.
The reason Burnside hadn't arrived prior to that point is that he was told not to join McClellan until directed to (from Washington).

Instead Burnside was summoned to Washington and offered AoP command, which he refused.

Mac commanded the Army of the Potomac. He had stepped down from the position of General-in-chief to command it in person on the Peninsula. He therefore had no authority to give orders to Burnside in North Carolina, or anyone outside of the Army of the Potomac particularly. Lincoln noted in a speech in August the McClellan had every right to call for such reinforcements as he thought necessary, and the Secretary of War to provide him just as many as he, the President saw fit.

J.R. Hay says President Lincoln was aware of "staff talk" in the Army which could commence with rumors and end with disobedience where it created confusion among the officers. Burnside had his orders. McClellan had his orders. Pope had his orders. But there is only one commander-in-chief, and he decides what the orders are, but he relies upon the generals to carry them out somehow.

Case in point, before the Seven Day's battle about Richmond erupted Gen. Burnside was evidently planning a movement inland, I think to Goldsboro, but got orders to proceed to the James River at the close of June. Several thousand troops were embarked, but about July 2 General Burnside was apparently informed, by "staff talk" rumors, through Col. Hawkins, that McClellan had taken Richmond after heavy fighting. So he presumed it necessary to delay his departure, presuming he would shortly receive notice to debark and continue operations toward Goldsboro. Veterans recalled...

By the 5th however, after McClellan was whipped and re-established at Harrison's landing, Gen. Burnside informed the War Dept. that he had received information of McClellan's defeat and withdrawal to the James River. A large part of his forces were then carried to Newport News, VA, within supporting distance of McClellan's army, and formed into the Ninth Army Corps. It moved to Aquia Creek in the first days of August. Even if it had joined Mac at Harrison's it was only ca. 10,000 strong, and Mac wanted at the least double that number to renew an offensive.

General Halleck assumed the general-in-chiefdom on July 11 to get the Army under some control, and to find out if McClellan would make an advance from Harrison's landing, otherwise to remove the troops...

So the above fixes August 3 as the date that the Administration and Army was certain General McClellan was never going to make a forward movement from Harrison's landing, as he was then ordered to abandon it and carry the army by water to Aquia Creek to promote operations between Washington and Richmond.

August 4, Gen. McClellan once notified that he was to withdraw the army responded with alarm...

Halleck responded that it would not be rescinded, so he aught to get moving. And asked why he hadn't already sent off his sick, which had previously been ordered some days before the withdrawal order...

Did the fate of the Union hang of McClellan retaining his toe-hold perimeter on the Peninsula at Harrison's landing after August 4, 1862? The Government apparently didn't think so. It thought it was more important to put those troops in the field of battle developing in front of Washington.

Like I say, I think it's possible here that Lincoln forgot he'd explicitly given McClellan permission for the Harrisons Landing letter, or that he forgot that he'd told McClellan to wait for reinforcement before advancing (specifically McClellan's preference was to move on Petersburg) but it does look like attempts to replace McClellan with Someone Else are a key feature; if you consider the formation of the Army of Virginia to be another of these then it goes back prior to the Seven Days.

Lincoln probably only cared about the Harrison's landing letter, to the extent it offended his cabinet, many of whom felt McClellan had to go months before it was written.
In the post-Antietam period dealing with General McClellan was again contentious in the common manner. Hay notes in his diary the President stated he had come to suspect, fairly or not, that Mac just really didn't want to "hurt" the rebs enough.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hay and Nicolay say Lincoln was actually offended some at Mac's lack of enthusiasm relative to pressing reinforcements to Pope before battle at Second Manassas was joined...

Which would be a weird reason to slow-walk reinforcements to McClellan on the Peninsula or try and replace him with Burnside, as that hadn't happened yet!

So the above fixes August 3 as the date that the Administration and Army was certain General McClellan was never going to make a forward movement from Harrison's landing, as he was then ordered to abandon it and carry the army by water to Aquia Creek to promote operations between Washington and Richmond.

Which is also strange, because Halleck relates that he asked McClellan if McClellan would advance with just Burnside and McClellan replied in the affirmative, but it's also the case as of early August that the Union is recruiting and mustering in 300,000 more troops. If there is ever a time the Union can afford to wait a bit and massively reinforce a strong position, it is then.

Halleck responded that it would not be rescinded, so he aught to get moving. And asked why he hadn't already sent off his sick, which had previously been ordered some days before the withdrawal order...

Did the fate of the Union hang of McClellan retaining his toe-hold perimeter on the Peninsula at Harrison's landing after August 4, 1862? The Government apparently didn't think so. It thought it was more important to put those troops in the field of battle developing in front of Washington.

Yes, Halleck didn't realize how long it would take to remove the sick, expecting it to have been done within a day. It took a week and a half.


As for the fate of the Union, and the field of battle developing in front of Washington, I think this assessment misses an important point - which is that Lee is totally unable to safely send most of his army away from Richmond (to actually go to the "field of battle developing in front of Washington") until McClellan is actually gone from the Peninsula.

Had McClellan not been recalled, there would have been no Northern Virginia campaign.

 

[67th Tigers]

A short timeline of the evacuation of Harrison's Landing:

30th July-4th August: All the transports are busy transporting exchanged prisoners from City Point to the north, and Confederate prisoners back to City Point.
5th August: There are no transports are Harrison's.
6th August: The sick start being loaded as the first transports return. Halleck issues an order that "You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside at Aquia Creek."
10th August: Pontoons arrive from Ft Monroe to bridge the Chickahominy for the withdrawal.
7th-11th August: The sick are being loaded at the Long Wharf onto transports as they come in. The 1st NY Cavalry, 6 (ISTR) batteries and a brigade of infantry (2nd brigade, Pennsylvania Reserves) are being loaded at Westover Wharf. The convoy from Westover for Burnside departs on the 11th.
11th-14th August: The stores and heavy equipment are loaded onto transports at Westover Wharf. The depot is abandoned on the 15th, with the rearguard leaving on the last ships.
14th August: Half of the 3rd Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserves, embarks from Coggin's Point. Pontoon bridge over the Chickahominy complete. Army ordered to move. The corps will leave on
15th-16th August: Second half of 3rd brigade and all of 1st brigade, PA Reserves embark from Coggin's point. They will be trapped at Fort Monroe by a storm until the 19th.
15th-16th August: 2nd brigade, PA Reserves, part of the reserve artillery, 1st NY Cavalry and the siege arty are disembarked at Aquia.
16-17th: First half of 2nd Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserves disembarks at Aquia
20th: Second half of 3rd Brigade and all of 1st brigade, Pennsylvania Reserves, reaches Aquia
21st: Morell's Division disembarks at Aquia
22nd: Sykes' ditto, and Kearny's Division disembarks at Alexandria
23rd: Hooker's Division disembarks at Alexandria
24th: - (Franklin was scheduled to be landing this day, but he delayed his march)
25th: Slocum's Division disembarks at Alexandria
26th: Smith's Division disembarks at Alexandria
27th: 2nd Corps starts disembarking at Aquia, but is ordered back on ship and to Alexandria
28th: 2nd Corps disembarks at Alexandria
29th - 1st September: Couch's Division is disembarked at Alexandria in packets
31st - 2nd September: Pleasonton's cavalry brigade disembarks at Washington
4th - 8th: Averell's cavalry brigade plus the 6th Pa Cavalry disembarks at Washington
Then the hospitals followed by the wagon trains were embarked and sent.


As to Halleck's 26th August, events were:

Situation late 26th - Halleck had ordered Franklin forward for the 27th and then rescinded the order. Franklin, Smith and Slocum are all in Washington, leaving Hancock in command at Alexandria. McClellan is at Aquia Landing, where Sumner's 2nd Corps is landing and Burnside is with Cox's division. He is under orders not to do anything. Hancock arranges with a small force of infantry to move to the Bull Run Bridge starting 0400 27th. McClellan boards a steamer heading to Alexandria that night.

On the 27th Taylor's expedition departs on time and runs straight into AP Hill's division. They are smashed.

McClellan reports by telegraph he has arrived at 0800. McClellan starts sending regular updates, sending over a dozen despatches on the 27th. His intent to push 6th Corps forward without transport or artillery is nixed when he hears of Taylor's destruction. The situation has clarified that there is a strong enemy force between him and Pope, and McClellan asks Halleck for an order. Halleck buckled under the pressure, and in the evening send to McClellan "I have no time for details. You will therefore, as ranking general in the field, direct as you deem best; but at present orders for Pope's army should go through me."

Given that McClellan can't get a straight answer from Halleck, he boards the steamer Ariel. Arriving in Washington he goes to Halleck's house, gets him out of bed at 1 a.m. on the 28th, and has a conversation with him. Him and a few staff spend the morning of the 28th chasing down the missing corps and division commanders of 6th Corps, and securing transport for 6th Corps. Parts of 12th Corps' trains were found sitting in Washington but Halleck had ignored requests for them to be moved. McClellan gets them moving to Alexandria, along with 2 squadrons of cavalry he found. McClellan returns to Alexandria in the after, Franklin et al. in tow and reports his arrival at 1610 hrs. Halleck replies and states Sumner, Cox and Taylor should be put into the defences. No mention of the disposition of the remaining 5 bdes of 6th Corps is made, and so McClellan orders them to advance at 0600 the next morning.

Situation late 28th - Sumner's corps, Cox's division and Taylor's bde is under orders to move into the Washington defences. Two sqns of cavalry are coming down, and Banks' supply train is heading to Alexandria. The remainder of 6th Corps is under orders to move forward at dawn.

On the 29th Franklin advances as proposed. McClellan sends several telegrams to Halleck asking how far they should advance. Lincoln asks McClellan directly what they should do. McClellan frankly replies that either Pope should fight his way back to them, or they should push everything to get to him. Lincoln sends at 1610 a message endorsing option 2, which officially became the policy finally.

Meanwhile at 1448 hrs Halleck clarified that Franklin's movement was only a recce; "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Annandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax".

There is anger at Washington that Baldy Smith stopped at Annandale (Franklin was still at Alexandria, sorting out his logistcs). McClellan stepped in and took the blame. It is well understood that McClellan protected Franklin, and in 1864 when the idea of calling Franklin to command was mooted Halleck told Grant: "Genl. Franklin would not give satisfaction. The President ordered him to be tried for negligence & disobedience of orders when here before, but Genl McClellan assumed the responsibility of his repeated delays in obeying orders."

McClellan had already ordered the advance to resume at 0600 next morning before Halleck contacted him. They did. They reach Centreville on the afternoon of the 30th to find Pope has already broken. McClellan forms the available forces into a line along the Cub Run, which halts Jackson's pursuit. Once Pope's army linked up with the 6th and 2nd Corps, as per Halleck's orders they transfer to Pope's command leaving McClellan with no forces.

 

[RedRover]

Which is also strange, because Halleck relates that he asked McClellan if McClellan would advance with just Burnside and McClellan replied in the affirmative, but it's also the case as of early August that the Union is recruiting and mustering in 300,000 more troops. If there is ever a time the Union can afford to wait a bit and massively reinforce a strong position, it is then.

How many reinforcements might have been received before Mac would have been convinced to attack? Nobody knows.
Some said Secretary of War Stanton didn't think even McClellan knew...

Halleck informed McClellan on August 6 that his claims that his renewed advance toward Richmond required large reinforcements was taken seriously. Since there were not going to be large reinforcements, his troops would have to come out of there to act in northern Virginia...

Yes, Halleck didn't realize how long it would take to remove the sick, expecting it to have been done within a day. It took a week and a half.


As for the fate of the Union, and the field of battle developing in front of Washington, I think this assessment misses an important point - which is that Lee is totally unable to safely send most of his army away from Richmond (to actually go to the "field of battle developing in front of Washington") until McClellan is actually gone from the Peninsula.

Had McClellan not been recalled, there would have been no Northern Virginia campaign.

The campaign in northern Virginia was already underway while McClellan was yet on the Peninsula, and in some strength. In mid-July Jackson, and later A.P. Hill's division, were already sent from Richmond toward Gordonsville, and on August 2 Pope crossed the Rapidan and seized Orange Court House, the day before the orders to McClellan to pack up and leave Harrison's landing. The Battle of Cedar Mountain between Jackson and Pope's troops was joined on the 9th of August, four days before Lee marched Longstreet away from McClellan's front west towards Gordonsville. Lee himself passing through Richmond on the 15th.

On the 14th McClellan notified Halleck of intelligence of a large part of Lee's army being sent off. Halleck responded that since he was not threatened in front, he should get moving quicker to get the army off, etc.

Ergo Lee certainly was able to send the bulk of his army away from Richmond while significant US forces were yet on the Peninsula.

Jeff Davis credited Lee with great daring, and noted that, rather unlike McClellan, Lee declined to calculate odds, re-calculate, etc.

 

[Saphroneth]

How many reinforcements might have been received before Mac would have been convinced to attack? Nobody knows.

Well, he'd originally been promised 41,000 reinforcements by Lincoln, but this diminished to just Burnside's corps, Lincoln giving (incorrect) numbers to explain why this wasn't possible. McClellan was waiting for Burnside (for good reason, as without Burnside he would genuinely have been outnumbered - Lee had been substantially reinforced since the Seven Days, by about the equivalent of a two-division corps) but also argued that more reinforcements would help; McClellan was correct in that more reinforcements would have helped, and he was also correct (and Lincoln wrong) that more reinforcements were available.

When Halleck visited, McClellan argued in favour of going after Petersburg, which was McClellan's plan that Halleck vetoed. Halleck had come to consider whether to reinforce McClellan, but admitted at the time that he hadn't checked what was available before coming to see McClellan - that's why he could only promise Burnside's corps. Note that as of the meeting Burnside's arrival to reinforce McClellan was already about a week late.

Faced not with his preferred plan (to cross and attack the poorly defended Petersburg) but with a direct attack on Richmond, and with Halleck only able to promise Burnside's corps, McClellan said that there was a chance of success and he was willing to try it.

After this point McClellan sends a letter in which he suggests more reinforcements be sent to him in addition to Burnside, but doesn't say he won't attack unless reinforced. In context this is because Halleck had said he didn't know what was available because he hadn't checked yet, so McClellan is asking him to check please. Halleck responds to this (I think fairly reasonable) request by cancelling the whole thing and deciding to withdraw McClellan.

(Indeed, Burnside is promised to McClellan on July 26 and ordered to Aquia by August 1.)


McClellan, not knowing this yet, starts preparing to attack Richmond. When he gets the order to leave the Peninsula he's actually advanced back onto Malvern Hill; note that he is not told he's not getting Burnside until after the recall order arrives. There is no point when McClellan is told "attack with what you've got or leave the Peninsula"; there is, however, a point when McClellan is moving on Richmond despite his promised reinforcements not having arrived yet.

The campaign in northern Virginia was already underway while McClellan was yet on the Peninsula, and in some strength. In mid-July Jackson, and later A.P. Hill's division, were already sent from Richmond toward Gordonsville, and on August 2 Pope crossed the Rapidan and seized Orange Court House, the day before the orders to McClellan to pack up and leave Harrison's landing. The Battle of Cedar Mountain between Jackson and Pope's troops was joined on the 9th of August, four days before Lee marched Longstreet away from McClellan's front west towards Gordonsville. Lee himself passing through Richmond on the 15th.

On the 14th McClellan notified Halleck of intelligence of a large part of Lee's army being sent off. Halleck responded that since he was not threatened in front, he should get moving quicker to get the army off, etc.

Ergo Lee certainly was able to send the bulk of his army away from Richmond while significant US forces were yet on the Peninsula.

But that's because Lee confirmed that McClellan was leaving - that's why he sent Longstreet north. McClellan had gone to Halleck to plead for permission to attack Richmond, a thing Pope was also asking Halleck to get McClellan to do.



We know that Lee changed his mind because as late as the 7th August Lee says he can't spare any troops to reinforce Jackson, and AP Hill had been sent to Jackson (specifically to Madison Court House, but no further) on condition that AP Hill be able to come back down to reinforce Richmond if McClellan attacks; Lee is worried about McClellan attacking Richmond until a point where McClellan has already been under orders to leave for a week. I rather suspect that by that point Lee knew McClellan was probably going to leave and that is what enables the reinforcements.



It just strikes me as a bit weird that you can say that nobody knows how many reinforcements it would have taken to convince McClellan to attack. The entire Peninsular campaign was conducted with McClellan having two divisions fewer troops than he'd originally been slated to have; he conducted the entire campaign at a resource deficit compared to what he was supposed to have.






But what I also want to point out here is that Halleck's plan is strategically incoherent. He advances Pope towards Gordonsville, into a vulnerable position, in order to draw off troops to make McClellan's evacuation easier, while also hoping that McClellan's evacuation can be completed secretly before Lee realizes it's happening; he wants to give up a position near Richmond in favour of consolidating the Union armies to fight back down to Richmond, to avoid delay, but as a consequence he wants all this done so quickly that it happens before the new levies come into service. Once the new levies come into service Halleck could reinforce Pope and McClellan with about 40,000 troops each.

His concern about Pope being vulnerable is such that he advances Pope's army into Jackson's operational range, thus making it easier for Lee to attack it; he wants to speed things up by moving the army back towards Washington and starting over; at no point that I can discern does he actually evaluate whether reinforcements can be had elsewhere for the Army of the Potomac. He's brought in to be an expert for Lincoln and Stanton to lean on, but declines to second-guess their (I should stress, badly numerically incorrect) count of how many troops there are outside McClellan's army or how many troops are needed to defend Washington.

 

[RedRover]

McClellan, not knowing this yet, starts preparing to attack Richmond. When he gets the order to leave the Peninsula he's actually advanced back onto Malvern Hill; note that he is not told he's not getting Burnside until after the recall order arrives. There is no point when McClellan is told "attack with what you've got or leave the Peninsula"; there is, however, a point when McClellan is moving on Richmond despite his promised reinforcements not having arrived yet.

Halleck informed McClellan in late July that Pope was reporting intelligence of troops from Richmond moving in his front. Halleck told McClellan to feel free to press in his front toward Richmond, to see if the Confederates were weakened (for example, perhaps they were so weakened that McClellan wouldn't need the much debated reinforcements to strike at it with success). The same day, Halleck noted Mac should evacuate his sick and wounded, so he could move in any direction (including potentially Richmond)...

There's McClellan's chance to advance upon a potentially less heavily defended Richmond in force to see what would happen.

McClellan said he'd make some advances on August 1. First attempt by Hooker to move on Malvern Hill to press the Confederates failed on the 2nd for lack of good guides, etc. etc. The orders came from Washington to embark from the Peninsula on the 3rd. Then on the 4th Gen. Hooker and Sedgewick and about 15,000 troops were advanced to Malvern Hill and secured it against light resistance. But even then, at 1 PM on the 5th, McClellan stated he should be given reinforcements on the Peninsula, so he could move forward toward Richmond from Malvern Hill...

McClellan also informed his chief of staff, Gen. Marcy he wasn't going to press forward unless he received reinforcements...

In other words, McClellan was not going to advance on Richmond. He couldn't beat Lee unless he was reinforced. He seemed quite certain of that. So he was communicating, basically, Richmond was still too heavily defended for his army. So the withdrawal orders stood, as Halleck responded:

General Hooker remained on Malvern for but a short time and when Lee sent a large force opposite to offer battle McClellan ordered him to withdraw on the evening of August 6, to avoid a general battle.

But that's because Lee confirmed that McClellan was leaving - that's why he sent Longstreet north. McClellan had gone to Halleck to plead for permission to attack Richmond, a thing Pope was also asking Halleck to get McClellan to do.

As noted above, McClellan wasn't pleading to attack Richmond. He clearly had permission to do so. He was pleading for reinforcements.

We know that Lee changed his mind because as late as the 7th August Lee says he can't spare any troops to reinforce Jackson, and AP Hill had been sent to Jackson (specifically to Madison Court House, but no further) on condition that AP Hill be able to come back down to reinforce Richmond if McClellan attacks; Lee is worried about McClellan attacking Richmond until a point where McClellan has already been under orders to leave for a week. I rather suspect that by that point Lee knew McClellan was probably going to leave and that is what enables the reinforcements.

On August 6 Lee was busy setting up for the Second Battle of Malvern Hill, which didn't come off because McClellan ordered Hooker to withdraw from his advanced position...

From Col. Marshall of General Lee's staff... They understood that McClellan wouldn't hazard anything unless reinforced, in spite of the strength of his army...

On the Union side, I don't see any orders requiring General McClellan to decline to defend his army's advanced positions at Malvern Hill, etc. on August 5-7. Especially considering he only moved forward thence after his withdrawal orders. Nor did he have orders not to reinforce Hooker there and engage in a general battle with Lee. That was McClellan's decision.

For example, at the time, on the evening of the 6th, he notified Halleck that if Hooker couldn't get out of Malvern as Lee approached, he would be constrained to march the balance of the army to his relief, as in fight it out with General Lee there...

But as noted Hooker got out, and no battle came off.

Ultimately, Lee was going to have another battle, and when it wasn't at Second Malvern Hill in early August on the Peninsula, or anywhere on the Peninsula, he moved and had it at Second Manassas later that month in Northern Virginia.

It just strikes me as a bit weird that you can say that nobody knows how many reinforcements it would have taken to convince McClellan to attack. The entire Peninsular campaign was conducted with McClellan having two divisions fewer troops than he'd originally been slated to have; he conducted the entire campaign at a resource deficit compared to what he was supposed to have.

McClellan's army was only supposed to have as many troops as the War Department felt it should have. Just like any of its armies or departments.

McClellan didn't know how many he was supposed to have. He kept adding to the tally, and calculating the deficit as a national calamity. He was apparently incapable of stopping himself on this point.

He played the same tired process over again after Antietam. So he apparently couldn't help it. Said he should wait to move the army until new recruits filled up the old regiments to his liking, etc. etc. Back-pedals, etc.

So it was evident that ultimately, McClellan just didn't want to be in command any more, to take the risks, to deal with his superiors, or even a potentially superior enemy.

In 1863 Navy Secretary Welles noted the President and Cabinet had a laugh over the comic poem "Fable for Strategists" by Mr. Newell in the Orpheus C. Kerr comics; where Jupiter (the President) charges a monkey (McClellan) to whip an Anaconda (the Confederates); But the monkey demands Jupiter lengthen his tail to be as long as the Anaconda... and when he gets bogged down by its weight, calls for more tail, as if needed to extricate himself... and ultimately the the Anaconda gets away, etc.

The fable ends with Jupiter discharging the monkey, who would complain, not about the snake, but the gods that encouraged him and gave him the means to battle it...

But what I also want to point out here is that Halleck's plan is strategically incoherent. He advances Pope towards Gordonsville, into a vulnerable position, in order to draw off troops to make McClellan's evacuation easier, while also hoping that McClellan's evacuation can be completed secretly before Lee realizes it's happening; he wants to give up a position near Richmond in favour of consolidating the Union armies to fight back down to Richmond, to avoid delay, but as a consequence he wants all this done so quickly that it happens before the new levies come into service. Once the new levies come into service Halleck could reinforce Pope and McClellan with about 40,000 troops each.

McClellan dangled Hooker out on a limb at Malvern Hill on August 5-6. One of the unpleasantries of war is that somebody takes great risks. It was never McClellan, in spite of his personal integrity and bravery. Gen. F.W. Palfrey, post-war, in his history of Antietam and Fredericksburg, admitted that in 1862 he was among the foremost enthusiasts and defenders of Mac, but he ultimately admitted his former commander's conceptions of his role rendered him a non-entity on the battlefield, where he was wanted.

The thing which apparently was obvious to many in the Lincoln administration, which they knew was probably obvious to General Lee, was that McClellan was whipped and he wasn't going to attack anything. And another thing obvious to the Lincoln administration was that General Lee wasn't whipped, and was unlikely to wait for new Union armies to be organized against him to enter the field before he attacked something.

How whipped was McClellan after the seven days? In this period McClellan was lecturing the Secretary of War about how he hurt his feelings... on the 4th of July...

Then on the 7th of July when the President visited, he provided the commander-in-chief with a manifesto on the war aims and policy of the Government, etc.

And subsequently, on August 1 lecturing General Halleck, the General-in-chief of the Army about slavery...

The President was very patient, and apparently aware General McClellan, an officer of great merit, had a strange reaction to stress which manifested in his official correspondence and an overwhelming despondency. Halleck said he would do what he could to keep Gen. McClellan's nose to the military grindstone.

Meanwhile Pope was the man on hand, at that hour, willing to meet the Victorious forces of Lee with some degree of boldness.

His concern about Pope being vulnerable is such that he advances Pope's army into Jackson's operational range, thus making it easier for Lee to attack it; he wants to speed things up by moving the army back towards Washington and starting over; at no point that I can discern does he actually evaluate whether reinforcements can be had elsewhere for the Army of the Potomac.

Halleck was to try to concentrate the divided army, which evidently could not cooperate simultaneously against Lee's otherwise. Second Manassas proved disastrous, and alarming. But at least McClellan was out of the bag at Harrison's landing, and the divided army was united in its immediate aftermath, when Pope retreated to Washington.

This might have been what saved Halleck, in spite of McClellan's earlier personal view (expressed August 4) that Halleck was certain to finish himself off by the end of August. But in any case, the President still had faith that if McClellan wouldn't fight, he could inspire the Army of the Potomac to do so. And Halleck was necessary to get what good work out of McClellan could be had.

He's brought in to be an expert for Lincoln and Stanton to lean on, but declines to second-guess their (I should stress, badly numerically incorrect) count of how many troops there are outside McClellan's army or how many troops are needed to defend Washington.

Halleck was necessary to keep McClellan from manifesting his bad ideas, and lack of interest in anything but reinforcements, even at the expense of the country. On September 11, 1862 McClellan demanded more reinforcements from Halleck, even if it allowed the Confederates to capture Washington, so long as his army was reinforced!

General Halleck, of course, declined to surrender Washington to the mercy of the Confederates to guarantee McClellan wouldn't be defeated. He'd just have to take his chances like everybody else.

 

[67th Tigers]

The 31st July, McClellan was busy occupying Coggins Point. Lee interpreted this as the vanguard of a movement on Petersburg.

Then, McClellan started to make a general movement north of the James, as Halleck instructed, it was delayed by poor guides. It wasn't just Hooker moving to Malvern Hill. Hooker and the cavalry formed the vanguard, and a bunch of divisions were under orders. Essentially, McClellan was advancing the whole army except a force securing his base. However, just as they were getting moving, Halleck's order to retreat back to Washington was received. The movement was thus cancelled.

McClellan considered a lunge later, actually issuing the warning orders on the 10th August, but another message from Halleck nixed that as well...

 

[Saphroneth]

Halleck was necessary to keep McClellan from manifesting his bad ideas, and lack of interest in anything but reinforcements, even at the expense of the country. On September 11, 1862 McClellan demanded more reinforcements from Halleck, even if it allowed the Confederates to capture Washington, so long as his army was reinforced!

General Halleck, of course, declined to surrender Washington to the mercy of the Confederates to guarantee McClellan wouldn't be defeated. He'd just have to take his chances like everybody else.

This is in the context of Halleck holding 70,000 troops in Washington because of Halleck's worries about a whole other Confederate army that might pounce on Washington. That's why the first part of the paragraph applies.

In other words, McClellan was not going to advance on Richmond. He couldn't beat Lee unless he was reinforced. He seemed quite certain of that. So he was communicating, basically, Richmond was still too heavily defended for his army. So the withdrawal orders stood, as Halleck responded:

Based on what? Remember, McClellan had been told Burnside was coming. Look at the timings:

Halleck informed McClellan in late July that Pope was reporting intelligence of troops from Richmond moving in his front. Halleck told McClellan to feel free to press in his front toward Richmond, to see if the Confederates were weakened (for example, perhaps they were so weakened that McClellan wouldn't need the much debated reinforcements to strike at it with success). The same day, Halleck noted Mac should evacuate his sick and wounded, so he could move in any direction (including potentially Richmond)...

There's McClellan's chance to advance upon a potentially less heavily defended Richmond in force to see what would happen.

McClellan said he'd make some advances on August 1. First attempt by Hooker to move on Malvern Hill to press the Confederates failed on the 2nd for lack of good guides, etc. etc. The orders came from Washington to embark from the Peninsula on the 3rd. Then on the 4th Gen. Hooker and Sedgewick and about 15,000 troops were advanced to Malvern Hill and secured it against light resistance. But even then, at 1 PM on the 5th, McClellan stated he should be given reinforcements on the Peninsula, so he could move forward toward Richmond from Malvern Hill...

McClellan also informed his chief of staff, Gen. Marcy he wasn't going to press forward unless he received reinforcements...

In other words, McClellan was not going to advance on Richmond. He couldn't beat Lee unless he was reinforced. He seemed quite certain of that. So he was communicating, basically, Richmond was still too heavily defended for his army. So the withdrawal orders stood, as Halleck responded:

General Hooker remained on Malvern for but a short time and when Lee sent a large force opposite to offer battle McClellan ordered him to withdraw on the evening of August 6, to avoid a general battle.

Halleck sends a message to McClellan on July 30 saying to press Richmond to see if it's under threat. This reaches McClellan on August 1st; McClellan responds by saying he'll do that. The first attempt (overnight on the 2nd - that is, about a day's time to set the army moving) fails because the division gets lost. McClellan occupies Coggins Point on the 3rd to prevent further Confederate bombardments and reoccupies Malvern on the night of the 4th.

Also on the 4th is when Halleck's order to McClellan to leave the Peninsula arrives; it was sent prior to that (specifically, 7:45 PM on the 3rd). The withdrawal order begins:

So look at the timings here. Halleck's order to McClellan to leave the Peninsula is written on August 3rd; therefore, for Halleck to not order McClellan to leave the Peninsula, McClellan must have done something by the time the order was written that would not only change Halleck's mind, but Halleck has to hear about it.

The order to make a reconnaisance arrived with McClellan on August 1st. Had McClellan got his army moving immediately (that is, instantly, which is totally unrealistic for a large army) he could have reached the Richmond forts by the end of the day on the 2nd (some marching on the 1st, more marching on the 2nd - it is too far to march in one day).

A message sent reporting this movement might reach Halleck in time that Halleck might change his mind about withdrawing McClellan.

A movement started on the 2nd, however, would not reach Richmond until the 3rd, and at that point it's too late - Halleck cannot hear about the results of the recce before he decides on the withdrawal, because messages were clearly taking between 6 hours and 2 days to go one way.


That's what's going on here. The delay in the messages going back and forth means that the OODA loop Halleck is dealing with is several days longer than he is expecting - McClellan has, in fact, been sending him messages, but you can't move a large army instantly and Halleck doesn't seem to be properly factoring in the time delay that this distance imposes. (The cause of the problem is mostly that the telegraph line is out of order - a message from Halleck to McClellan gets telegraphed to the Eastern Shore of the Chesapeake, but then has to travel by sea to the James and up the James river.)

 

[RedRover]

This is in the context of Halleck holding 70,000 troops in Washington because of Halleck's worries about a whole other Confederate army that might pounce on Washington. That's why the first part of the paragraph applies.

Based on what? Remember, McClellan had been told Burnside was coming. Look at the timings:

Halleck sends a message to McClellan on July 30 saying to press Richmond to see if it's under threat. This reaches McClellan on August 1st; McClellan responds by saying he'll do that. The first attempt (overnight on the 2nd - that is, about a day's time to set the army moving) fails because the division gets lost. McClellan occupies Coggins Point on the 3rd to prevent further Confederate bombardments and reoccupies Malvern on the night of the 4th.

McClellan had Lee's army just outside of his lines. He could have had a battle any time he wanted, in real time, and it didn't require any telegrams.
Mac's mindset in his official correspondence was firmly fixed upon troops not in his army and never in his army. Such troops being, by McClellan's calculations the key to McClellan's success on the Peninsula, the point made to Washington was there could be no success on the Peninsula.

The 31st July, McClellan was busy occupying Coggins Point. Lee interpreted this as the vanguard of a movement on Petersburg.

Then, McClellan started to make a general movement north of the James, as Halleck instructed, it was delayed by poor guides. It wasn't just Hooker moving to Malvern Hill. Hooker and the cavalry formed the vanguard, and a bunch of divisions were under orders. Essentially, McClellan was advancing the whole army except a force securing his base. However, just as they were getting moving, Halleck's order to retreat back to Washington was received. The movement was thus cancelled.

McClellan was clear he cancelled the movement because Washington wouldn't send him reinforcements; and because Lee was willing to fight a battle on the 7th of August.

McClellan considered a lunge later, actually issuing the warning orders on the 10th August, but another message from Halleck nixed that as well...

General McClellan's headquarters cancelled the movement.

If McClellan wasn't going to fight on the Peninsula, he had to get on the boats and get to where he would be doing some fighting. Halleck had already communicated that since Mac wasn't attacking Richmond and its defenders (the singular purpose of placing his army on the Peninsula), the Confederates were massing on Pope, so he should get moving to reinforce Pope as he already had standing orders to do...

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan had Lee's army just outside of his lines. He could have had a battle any time he wanted, in real time, and it didn't require any telegrams.

He did not. Lee's army was back around Richmond, not directly besieging McClellan at Harrisons Landing. The two sides are some distance apart.

As I noted, McClellan was expecting that he'd advance once Burnside showed up, and Burnside doesn't show up. McClellan makes an offensive movement anyway, but Halleck's insistence on withdrawal means that to do sustain it would be in defiance of orders.

General McClellan's headquarters cancelled the movement.

Sorry, how do you imagine this works? If Halleck's message means a movement can't take place any more, then McClellan has to pass that on to his troops.

If McClellan wasn't going to fight on the Peninsula, he had to get on the boats and get to where he would be doing some fighting. Halleck had already communicated that since Mac wasn't attacking Richmond and its defenders (the singular purpose of placing his army on the Peninsula), the Confederates were massing on Pope, so he should get moving to reinforce Pope as he already had standing orders to do...

Yes, this message is why the offensive movement is cancelled. But notice that while McClellan had standing orders to reinforce Pope, he also had standing orders to send off his sick and that hadn't finished yet.

On the matter specifically of the movement from Harrisons Landing, would you be able to elaborate on an error you think exists in McClellan's conduct of this movement? That is, if he did things in the wrong order or was slower than he should have been?

 

[RedRover]

He did not. Lee's army was back around Richmond.

Lee moved upon Malvern Hill, etc. on August 6-7 in direct response to McClellan's coming out of his lines at Harrison's landing. But more to the point, since Lee's army was generally back around Richmond otherwise, before August 3, why wasn't McClellan too?

McClellan just said it was because no one would reinforce him. In other words he knew he would have a battle as soon as he threatened to approach Richmond... any time.

Sorry, how do you imagine this works? If Halleck's message means a movement can't take place any more, then McClellan has to pass that on to his troops.

When did Halleck positively ORDER McClellan not to advance upon Richmond? Never. McClellan's the one constantly reporting it was impossible without an enormous and impossible reinforcement. His superiors had to believe him, of course, while they trusted him with the command on the ground.

Yes, this message is why the offensive movement is cancelled. But notice that while McClellan had standing orders to reinforce Pope, he also had standing orders to send off his sick and that hadn't finished yet.

On the matter specifically of the movement from Harrisons Landing, would you be able to elaborate on an error you think exists in McClellan's conduct of this movement? That is, if he did things in the wrong order or was slower than he should have been?

I don't think McClellan made any significant errors in his movement from Harrisons' landing to Aquia. He was following orders. It was the only thing that worked out in the whole Peninsular fiasco ultimately. It was an incredible logistical effort.

Nor were his superiors disappointed as to his manner of carrying out those orders, as large forces arrived at Aquia Creek in time to potentially aid Pope's army. It was only after landing the troops at Aquia that inexcusable errors occurred, according to General-in-Chief Halleck's official report...

Notice that in the above, McClellan, who was in command of all those corps, was described not at all, viz. was a non-entity.
He got his shot at redemption in the Antietam campaign. But once the smoke cleared he got the sulks again which proved the same after a victory at Antietam as it was from a defeat at the Seven days in the Peninsula, so he had to go away.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan had Lee's army just outside of his lines. He could have had a battle any time he wanted, in real time, and it didn't require any telegrams.
Mac's mindset in his official correspondence was firmly fixed upon troops not in his army and never in his army. Such troops being, by McClellan's calculations the key to McClellan's success on the Peninsula, the point made to Washington was there could be no success on the Peninsula.

No, he didn't. Lee had adopted a central position where he could respond to any developing threats. On 8th July he issued marching orders thus:

1. Jackson (divisions of Jackson, Ewell and Whitting) to the Mechanicsville Turnpike, north of Richmond
2. Longstreet (divisions of RH Anderson and AP Hill) to Cornelius Creek, which is SE of Richmond
3. DH Hill to the Williamsburg Road (i.e. to the defences E of Richmond)
4. Huger to Falling Creek, "south" (actually west) of the James and S of Richmond
5. Holmes' command, with Ransom's bde, to Drewry's Bluff
6. McLaws' division (i.e. Magruder's corps of 6 bdes) to Gillis Creek, in the Richmond defences
7. HQ to the Dabb House.

Lee's army was thus disposed of in a semi-circle around Richmond, close to Richmond. It was positioned to be able to react to a threat from any direction, including Pope coming from the north, an approach by McClellan from the east, or McClellan crossing the river and approaching from the south.

On 12th July Lee received a message from Maj Cornelius Boyle (Provost-Marshal of the post of Gordonsville, a position which included intelligence in ACW armies) that the Federals had occupied Culpeper Ct Hse, 27 miles N of Gordonsville. This threatened an advance to Gordonsville and the severing of the VCRR. The next day Lee ordered Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, plus the Laurel cavalry brigade, detached to Louisa Ct Hse to be in a position to move to the defence of Gordonsville, or back to Richmond as necessary. At Louisa Ct Hse Jackson was situated also to move to block an Federal moves from Fredericksburg.

On 18th July Lee received two new pieces of information. First the "large force" at Fredericksburg had marched to Orange Ct Hse, a mere 8 miles north of Gordonsville and across the Rapidan. (Note: This was not true, only cavalry was at Orange Ct Hse.) Stuart reported another force assembling at Winchester, at the top of the Shenandoah. Lee approved Jackson's suggest that Jackson shift west to Gordonsville now the threat from Fredericksburg had abated, sending some cavalry to cover Hanover Ct Hse.

On the 23rd July Lee's chief concern remained McClellan whose "daily demonstrations to deceive us or test our strength" prompted him to replaced Holmes with DH Hill, and to order Longstreet's wing reinforced and moved forward to New Market. After a few letters which make clear McClellan was his prime concern, on 27th July Lee orders AP Hill with 7 brigades (his own division plus Starke's bde) to temporarily reinforce Jackson and that Jackson should "Cache your troops as much as possible till you strike your blow and be prepared to return to me when done.… I will endeavor to keep General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly executed."

The dates for the movements of individual brigades were:

Night 28th - Branch
29th - Field
(a gap Thomas would fit into?)
30th - Pender (with AP Hill)
31st- Starke
31st or 1st - Gregg
1st - Archer
2nd - AP Hill's grand division has detrained completely at Gordonsville

When McClellan advanced to Malvern Hill in early August Lee led the divisions of Longstreet, McLaws, Ripley (DH Hill's old division), Evans (Whitting's old division plus Evans) and DR Jones to oppose them; 16 brigades of infantry. RH Anderson was at Drewry's Bluff and DH Hill commanded Holmes' old force opposite McClellan.

On the 5th August, Stuart reported Burnside was at Fredericksburg with 16,000 men (i.e. his own force and King's division). On the same day McClellan's movement to Malvern Hill triggered Lee to move his whole available force to Glendale to block him. He had 15 brigades with him (plus 3 at Drewry's Bluff that could reinforce him). Lee wrote of the affair on the 9th:

"I was called to Malvern Hill by its occupation by the enemy. On reaching there Wednesday afternoon after a dreadful hot march for our men, I found the enemy in position & in the same lines they occupied Tuesday the 1st​ July & apparently in the same strength, drawn up, infantry, cavalry & artillery in battle array. I thought they were going to fight the battle over again. We got in position by dark & rested till 3 next morning. On moving up we found they had slipped through our fingers during the night leaving in our hands some forty or fifty prisoners & a few dead on the field, the result of the skirmish the previous evening. They took refuge within their lines & we took another hot march to our camp."

Lee was fully prepared to refight Malvern Hill, and we know how that would have gone...

Then, Jackson asked for more reinforcements, and Lee replied on 7th August that because of McClellan's aggressive movement he could not spare any, and Jackson should operate without any expectation of reinforcement. However, on the 8th, with intelligence of a withdrawal from Malvern, Lee sent Hood's 2 brigades to Hanover Junction.

On the 9th August, Lee decided he could risk send Longstreet with his own grand division, Evans's brigade and DR Jones' division to Gordonsville. This was interrupted a little on the 12th, when McClellan advanced a small force to Malvern Hill, but his planned general movement was cancelled.

On the 14th, scouts report Porter's 5th Corps disappeared from Harrison's.* Lee was now utterly certain McClellan's army was being withdrawn, and makes the decision to send Anderson's division north and to go himself. Lee himself took the 0400 train on the 15th.

Brigade embarkation was:

10th - Pickett
11th - Kemper, Wilcox
12th - Pryor, Featherston
13th - Toombs' and GT Anderson (D.R. Jones' division)
14th-15th - Jenkins, Evans and Drayton
16th - Armistead
17th - Mahone and Wright

Lee himself did not leave from confroting McClellan until the 15th. He was by then certain McClellan's army was withdrawing. He left McLaws' and DH Hill's divisions (i.e. 9 brigades) on the left bank of the James just in case. A significant force was left in Petersburg in case McClellan suddenly appeared there.

On the 19th Lee received intelligence that there was a large force at Aquia, and asked for troops to be moved to Hanover Junction to guard against that. DH Hill's division were moved there. It was the 27th before Lee ordered DH Hill and McLaws, reinforced by Walker from Petersburg, to move north.

Although Lee decided to strike Pope and then return,** whilst McClellan was still at Harrison's he left 18 brigades (i.e. the equivalent of 6 normal divisions) facing McClellan. This would give Lee an golden opportunity to strike McClellan if he'd shipped his forces directly away from Harrison's.

* The 5th Corps and the Pennsylvania Reserves were not holding part of the perimeter, but were general reserves. The 3rd Corps had Roland's Mill Pond and were thus not holding much perimeter. The 6th Corps held the Everlington Heights, and the 2nd and 4th Corps held the perimeter in the direction of Malvern Hill. The reason the 3rd and 5th Corps went first is that their removal doesn't collapse the perimeter. However, it now has no reserves. Removing another corps will collapse the perimeter.

** Jackson's original force was 7 brigades. AP Hill brought another 7. Longstreet had 10 to total 24. This left 18 brigades facing McClellan, with Hood's 2 divisions at Hanover Junction. Lee's mobile force is the size of ca. 15 Federal divisions, and he decided to strike Pope with around half his force. This, of course, gave McClellan an opportunity to attack that he wanted to take, but Halleck forbade it.