Notwithstanding the favorable results obtained, I would have preferred a different method of attack, as already indicated, but I soon saw that entanglement, by the force of circumstances narrated, was unavoidable, and determined to make the best fight possible.
General Fitz Leewas always in the right place, and contributed his usual conspicuous share to the success of the day. Both he and the gallant First Virginia begged me, after the hot encounter, to allow them to take the enemy's battery, but I doubted the practicability of the ground for such a purpose.
During this day's operations I held such a position as not only to render
Ewell's left entirely secure, where the firing of my command, mistaken for that of the enemy, caused some apprehension, but commanded a view of the routes leading to the enemy's rear. Had the enemy's main body been dislodged, as was confidently hoped and expected, I was in precisely the right position to discover it, and improve the opportunity. I watched keenly and anxiously the indications in his rear for that purpose; while in the attack which I intended, (which was forestalled by our troops being exposed to view,) his cavalry would have separated from the main body, and gave promise of solid results and advantages. After dark I directed a withdrawal to the
Yorkroad, as our position was so far advanced as to make it hazardous at night, on account of the proximity of the enemy's infantry.
During the night of the 3d of July, the commanding general withdrew the main body to the ridges west of
Gettysburg, and sent word to me to that effect, but his messenger missed me. I repaired to his headquarters during the latter part of the night, and received instructions as to the new line, and sent, in compliance therewith, a brigade (
Fitz Lee's) to
Cashtownto protect our trains congregated there. My cavalry and artillery were somewhat jeopardized before I got back to my command by the enemy's having occupied our late ground before my command could be notified of the change. None, however, were either lost or captured.
During the 4th, which was quite rainy, written instructions were received from the commanding general as to the order of march back to the Potomac.
[
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It appears, then, according to his own narrative, that
General Stuart moved his command and
W. I. F. Lee's secretly through the woods to a position, "
and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear." Did he accomplish his object
Stuartfurther says: "My plan was to employ the enemy in front with sharpshooters, and move a command of cavalry upon their left flank from a position lately held by me." But in the next sentence, he proceeds to state the reasons why this plan was not successful, and further on in the report he squarely acknowledges his failure:
Notwithstanding the favorable results obtained, I would have preferred a different mode of attack, as already indicated, but I soon saw that entanglement by the force of circumstances narrated, was unavoidable, and determined to make the best fight possible. ... Had the enemy's main body been dislodged, as was confidently hoped and expected, I was in precisely the right position to discover it and improve the opportunity. I watched keenly and anxiously the indications in his rear for that purpose; while in the attack which I intended, which was forestalled by our troops being exposed to view, his cavalry would have separated from the main body, and gave promise of solid results and advantages. After dark I directed a withdrawal * * * My cavalry and artillery were somewhat jeopardized before I got back to my command by the enemy's having occupied our late ground.
A nice discrimination is not required to detect throughout
Stuart's report a desire to explain why his attack upon
Gregg was unsuccessful. First, his column
debouched into the open ground, and gave notice of his intended attack to his enemy; next, the rout of
Jenkins' Brigade caused a like movement to those on the left; then the impetuosity of the First Virginia carried them too far, and their horses failed under it, and finally, a withdrawal to the
York road was directed by
Stuart, because his advanced position was hazardous on account of the proximity of the enemy's infantry. The two reports are harmonious in that one (
Gregg's) claims to have successfully resisted an attack, and the other (
Stuart's) admits that he was not successful in his operations against the right and rear of the Union line. The reports seem to conflict somewhat in their statements regarding the result of the charges made by certain contending regiments, but an analysis of the statements made by each, will go far toward harmonizing them, and the truth may easily be eliminated. It should be borne in mind that it is a weakness of human nature to cover up our failures, as far as possible, and to set forth our successes prominently. Especially is this true when we feel and know that everything has been done to insure success that a more than ordinary prudence, ability, and bravery could dictate. [
533]
There can be but one opinion of the fighting qualities of
General Stuart's command at
Gettysburg. Those who opposed his attempt to reach the rear of the Union lines, have every reason to remember the valor and intrepidity of his troopers. But in
Gregg, he had "a Roland for his
Oliver," and in a fair fight, in an open field, with no surprise on the one side or the other, he was, in plain language, simply defeated in all that he undertook to accomplish-and the more one seeks for the truth on this subject the more certainly must he come to this conclusion. I was not aware, until I had read
Major McClellan's article, before alluded to, that there had been a claim to a victory over
Gregg, at
Gettysburg, made by
Stuart. The results of the battle were so overwhelmingly on the side of
Gregg, it would seem, that the blindest prejudice alone could construe the victory to his opponent.
Stuart describes the charge of one of
W. H. F. Lee's regiments and a portion of
Fitz Lee's command, including the First Virginia Cavalry, as very successful-"the enemy's masses vanished before them like grain before the scythe;" but he adds, "their impetuosity carried them too far," "their horses, already jaded," "failed under it." "The First North Carolina Cavalry and Jeff Davis Legion were sent to their support, and gradually this hand-to-hand fighting involved the greater portion of the command," etc. Here is a half hidden acknowledgment that after the first charge, which
Gregg admits was not successfully met by the Seventh Michigan Regiment, the attacking column was obliged to retire before the charge of the First Michigan Regiment. The difference between the reports of the two commanders here being that
Stuart mentions the repulse in the mildest language, while
Greggwrites of it in glowing terms: "The advantage gained in this charge was soon wrested from the enemy by the gallant charge of the First Michigan Cavalry of the same brigade. This regiment drove the enemy back to his starting point."
There remains only to consider the statement made by each general that his opponent was in the end obliged to withdraw.
Gregg says: "Defeated at every point, the enemy withdrew to his left." "Heavy skirmishing was still maintained by the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry with the enemy, and was continued until nightfall." "The enemy retired his columns behind his artillery, and at dark withdrew from his former position;" and on this subject
Stuart writes: "Gradually this hand-to-hand fighting involved the greater portion of the command, till the enemy was driven from the field, which was now raked by their artillery, posted about three-quarters [
534] of a mile off." "Our own artillery commanding the same ground, no more hand-to-hand fighting occurred, but the wounded were removed, and the prisoners (a large number) taken to the rear."
Stuart's artillery commanding the same ground as
Gregg's, no more hand-to-hand fighting occurred; in other words,
Stuart's forces were withdrawn from the attack, the attempt to carry
Gregg's position having utterly failed. These words admit of no other construction.
Stuart's was the attacking force. If
Gregg had been driven from the field, why did not
Stuart carry out his confessedly intended plan, and march to the rear of the Federal line of battle? The sentence which follows the statement that no more hand-to-hand fighting occurred, "but the wounded were removed and the prisoners taken to the rear," is a
quasi confession that we were repulsed, but we succeeded in removing our prisoners and wounded. So that, even in these apparently opposite statements, we find sufficient in
Stuart's report to prove the correctness of
Gregg's.
Bringing the