Longstreet's Planned Reverse Attack on July 3rd

[Henry Hunt]

I.>

Alright fair enough, they do seem more level headed than Pendelton and Early.

 

[Henry Hunt]

@lelliott19 I also came across this, it might interest you. Recounts a conversation on July 3rd between McLaws and one of Lee's staff officers. Really shows the level of confusion on July 3rd:
https://books.google.com/books?id=EHZ9dD_5k7UC&pg=PA431&dq=last+chance+lee&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAmt-hx9vjAhXrmuAKHbn3AVwQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q="why," answered johnston&f=false

 

[lelliott19]

Lee was rolling the dice and every division needed to be sent in for any chance of victory despite the danger of a flank attack.

It wouldn't have just resulted in a flank attack on Hood and McLaws - the Union numbers in their front were overwhelming. There were three Union corps (Third, Fifth, and Sixth) in front of two Confederate divisions (Hood and McLaws.) It would have rolled up the entire Confederate line - beyond Hood & McLaws and on to Pickett et al. Since those were already engaged in front and not doing well, the attack on their flank would have been even more devastating that what occurred. The roll up would have easily continued beyond. Possibly resulting in the whole ANV captured en-mass. At least Longstreet's and Hill's. Maybe some of Ewell's could have escaped?

EDIT TO ADD: Just saw your edit but will leave this here anyway in case it might help others fully understand the situation.

Judging by this both Taylor-Longstreet seem confused as to what happened as they both thought Lee wanted everything sent in.

Longstreet couldn't have been confused as to why McLaws and Hood didn't join. He hadn't sent any orders to McLaws prior to Pickett's charge. You really just have to read the McLaws' piece. I know its long, but you really cant debate this topic without it.

Just one more spoiler from the piece: Longstreet never even told McLaws an attack was planned on July 3. McLaws had no idea until he saw the cannon assembling behind him. Then he saw some of his subordinates looking in the direction and watched it unfold. His men were resting on the field - skirmishing now and then to entertain the very strong reinforced Union left. Hood was similarly holding his line. Neither McLaws or Hood was even told.....that the attack was to take place; where it was to take place; what to do in case Pickett's attack failed; or how to respond if it was successful.

 

[Henry Hunt]

Longstreet couldn't have been confused as to why McLaws and Hood didn't join. He hadn't sent any orders to McLaws prior to Pickett's charge. You really just have to read the McLaws' piece. I know its long, but you really cant debate this topic without it.

Just one more spoiler from the piece: Longstreet never even told McLaws an attack was planned on July 3. McLaws had no idea until he saw the cannon assembling behind him. Then he saw some of his subordinates looking in the direction and watched it unfold. His men were resting on the field - skirmishing now and then to entertain the very strong reinforced Union left. Hood was similarly holding his line. Neither McLaws or Hood was even told.....that the attack was to take place; where it was to take place; what to do in case Pickett's attack failed; or how to respond if it was successful.

McLaws you are right could not move without orders from Longstreet but Longstreet had to get the orders in the first place. I think Taylor was confused why Longstreet never got orders to use McLaws-Hood. All of Lee's staff Taylor, Venable and Johnston believe Lee wanted to use McLaws-Hood. It seems like the three of them believe Longstreet was given, perhaps verbal rather than written ?, orders to use those divisions. However Longstreet clearly wasn't given anything. Convoluted.

 

[Henry Hunt]

Continuing, my main question is why Lee's staff officers Johnston, Venable, Johnston were so shocked that McLaws-Hood didn't advance. They had been at Lee's side the whole battle and should have been aware of everything. Further why don't they know that Longstreet didn't issue McLaws orders and was Longstreet actually supposed to have?
https://books.google.com/books?id=EHZ9dD_5k7UC&pg=PA431&dq=last+chance+lee&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAmt-hx9vjAhXrmuAKHbn3AVwQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q="why," answered johnston&f=false

 

[rpkennedy]

Greywolf's question was regarding July 2. Do you think that Longstreet's attack would have been successful if he would have had Pickett up that day?

My apologies to all. I misread @Greywolf's post.

Ryan

 

[Cavalier]

@Henry Hunt. In regards to your post #40 above. I thought that Lee initially wanted Hood and McLaws divisions to participate in the charge but Longstreet thought, probably correctly, that they had sustained too many losses in their engagement on the 2nd to be effective, and when he pointed that out to Lee, Lee agreed. In his discussion with Taylor, (via letter), that you posted above, Longstreet claims not too know why the two divisions were not included in the charge. Weather or not my information about Longstreet and Lee agreeing to leave Hood and McLaws divisions out of the attack is accurate, it still seems more than a little odd that the officer in charge of the attack, Longstreet, has no idea why they did not participate.

 

[5fish]

At any rate, Pickett's brigades had most certainly arrived by the time Lee and Longstreet conferred on the morning of July 3, 1863

Here is one of those overlooked items of day two... Frist, Lee hides at his headquarters and does not go out during or after the fighting... the second Lee does not meet with his Corps commanders at the end of Day 2 fighting... (odd) How could Lee plan day 3 correctly...?

Lee planned a continuation of his July 2 battle plan for July 3, with the troops launching their attacks from the positions gained that day. The only alteration was to be the addition of Major General George E. Pickett's Division, of Longstreet's Corps, which had not yet been engaged. The major drawback to Lee's plan was his failure to meet personally with his three corps commanders on the evening of July 2 to ensure that they understood his intentions and their role in the coming battle. Longstreet also admitted that contrary to his usual practice of meeting with Lee he only sent a message on the July 2 action. It is not clear what, if any, orders Longstreet may have received on that evening. Without formal orders from Lee, Longstreet probably felt Lee's previous directions were vague enough for him to use his discretion in execution. Given this seeming lack of communication, it is hard to see how Lee hoped to achieve his "proper concert of action." In any event, Lee's plan for July 3 was disrupted by the actions of the Army of the Potomac. As dawn approached at around 4:30 A.M., the Union Twelfth Corps artillery in the Culp's Hill area opened fire on Johnson's men in preparation of a planned Union counter-attack. This action forced Ewell to launch his attack with Johnson's Division before the rest of the army was ready. Half an hour after the attack started, and while Johnson was heavily engaged and unable to withdraw, Ewell received word that Longstreet would not be able to attack until at least 10:00 A.M. By then it would be too late for Ewell who was hard-pressed and forced to cease his attacks by approximately 11:00 A.M.

Link: http://scienceviews.com/parks/longstreet.html

The info below is short on the fact Lee visited Longstreet expecting Pickett to be there and ready to continue the attack on the union left... The site chooses to use the attack on Clups Hill to redirect Lee's actions... The attack was late in the morning because Pickett was still arriving on the field... It was not Clups Hill what causes the change in the attack was Pickett and Longstreet not ready to continue the attack on the union left...

Just after Longstreet issued orders for a flank march, or while he was in the process, he was joined by Lee who countermanded this major change in Lee's battle plans. Due to the circumstances at Culp's Hill, Lee was forced to rethink his plan of action on July 3. Shortly after cancelling Longstreet's proposed flank move, Lee met with Longstreet, Hill, and Major General Henry Heth. Lee's staff- Colonel A. L. Long, Major Charles S. Venable, and possibly Colonel Walter Taylor also attended. Lee proposed using Longstreet's entire corps to attack the Union center but Longstreet objected that Hood and McLaws,

 

[WJC]

Given this seeming lack of communication, it is hard to see how Lee hoped to achieve his "proper concert of action."

While I generally admire Lee's military prowess, throughout the conflict glaring defects in his ability to communicate arise. His Staff was too small for the task he had, he seldom wrote out his orders, and his orders were generally vague.
He was most fortunate that he had intelligent, aggressive subordinates in Jackson and Longstreet to flesh out his orders and implement them with success.

 

[FZ11]

Agree. No matter how one sorts it out, Lee can't take Cemetary Hill/Ridge and hold it on July 3. Meade has more troops,interior lines, better artillery. and the advantage of a Defensive position.

 

[MBuehner]

Agree. No matter how one sorts it out, Lee can't take Cemetary Hill/Ridge and hold it on July 3. Meade has more troops,interior lines, better artillery. and the advantage of a Defensive position.

I think this is more or less correct. No attack on July 3rd was likely to succeed in winning the battle. Meade had a magnificent position and his largest corp hadnt even been bloodied.

I feel like there is too much attention paid to individual geographic positions. I actually think Lee might have taken Cemetery Hill, certainly on the 2nd but also on the 3rd. Like Alexander said, it was the most vulnerable point in the line. But so what? The conventional wisdom is the Union line would then be untenable. In reality, Lee holding the hill would probably be untenable (it was commanded by East Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill) and it wasnt nearly as defensible against a counterattack coming from the south and east as it was from attack from the west and north.

You could make a similar argument for LRT- would it really have decisively changed the battle had Law taken it the afternoon of the 2nd? I question that. Dragging enough guns up that wooded rocky hill all the way from Emmitsburg Road over night was simply not going to happen. Without a bunch of rifled artillery, it wasnt all the useful of a feature in commanding Cemetery Ridge. Sure, it could potentially be a jumping off point for Pickett on the 3rd, but again, the entire 5th and 6th corps were right there.

I imagine if Longstreet had failed to take the high ground in the Peach Orchard on the 2nd, we would all be lamenting how that artillery platform was in fact the key piece of ground that would have guaranteed a victory.

These things just become truisms. The fact is there was lots of 'good ground' in the vicinity of Gettysburg (the notion the Cemetery Hill was the last good piece of defensible terrain in the area is utter nonsense, all the terrain south and east is similar for miles and miles). If Little Round Top or Culps Hill wasn't 'the one that got away', some other terrain feature would have been. It was the road system that made Gettysburg special, and once all the divisions had arrived, that didnt matter as much aside from Meade having several good roads well in his rear to draw supplies from. Hood capturing the Tanneytown Road forcing Meade to withdraw is another myth. Meade was drawing his supplies from the Baltimore Pike that the 6th Corp had just marched up and was literally camped on. Lee couldnt have cut Meades supply lines aside from totally surrounding him somehow.

 

[surveyorjames]

In what way? Lee's instructions were to continue the fight on the right but didn't specify how that was supposed to happen. Longstreet, having seen marginal success in frontal assaults the previous day and having seen heavy reinforcements arrive on the south end of the field, didn't want to take that path. While I agree that Longstreet knew that this was not what Lee intended, Lee's vague orders gave Longstreet the discretion to think about a move to the right.

Ryan

I could not disagree more. Lee's plan for the third day had to be revised three times to accommodate Longstreet who did as much as he could from the onset of the campaign right up to the moment Pickett was ordered forward to undermine the campaign. Lee did not realize how far off the page Longstreet was; he needed Longstreet's troops, he did not need Longstreet.

Sincerely,

Jim Whitehead

 

[WJC]

I could not disagree more. Lee's plan for the third day had to be revised three times to accommodate Longstreet who did as much as he could from the onset of the campaign right up to the moment Pickett was ordered forward to undermine the campaign. Lee did not realize how far off the page Longstreet was; he needed Longstreet's troops, he did not need Longstreet.

Sincerely,

Jim Whitehead

I don't know what you researched to come to this conclusion, but it is not supported by credible evidence. Further, it assumes Lee was unfit for command: that he could not properly evaluate his subordinates and was incapable of correcting problems that arose in his command structure. From everything I've read by and about Lee, if he thought any of his subordinates was 'undermining' his campaign, he would have swiftly removed them.
Instead, Longstreet remained his most trusted subordinate and a friend after the war.

 

[WJC]

You could make a similar argument for LRT- would it really have decisively changed the battle had Law taken it the afternoon of the 2nd?

Holding Little Round Top was certainly important to the U. S. victory, even if greatly exaggerated over the years. The success in holding Culp's Hill was far more important: had it fell, Meade's positions could not have been held.

 

[Henry Hunt]

The success in holding Culp's Hill was far more important: had it fell, Meade's positions could not have been held.

Great point here, Meade stated similar in his post war letters.

 

[rpkennedy]

I could not disagree more. Lee's plan for the third day had to be revised three times to accommodate Longstreet who did as much as he could from the onset of the campaign right up to the moment Pickett was ordered forward to undermine the campaign. Lee did not realize how far off the page Longstreet was; he needed Longstreet's troops, he did not need Longstreet.

Sincerely,

Jim Whitehead

We'll have to agree to disagree. While Longstreet is not above reproach, he did not attempt to undermine the campaign. On July 2, he attempted to carry out Lee's orders to the letter, almost certainly too much but he was sulking a bit. And Lee absolutely needed Longstreet. After Jackson's death, Lee had no one on whom he could rely (with the exception of Stuart, on whom he depended in a different way).

Ryan

 

[MBuehner]

Holding Little Round Top was certainly important to the U. S. victory, even if greatly exaggerated over the years. The success in holding Culp's Hill was far more important: had it fell, Meade's positions could not have been held.

Agreed, Culps Hill was far more important. But even if it fell, I don't know that Meade wouldn't have simply fallen back a mile or less and formed another line. Assuming he didn't fall back on the far stronger Pipe Creek line. Lee needed to break up Meades army somehow, and once it was concentrated, I don't know how that was possible.

 

[W117Monte]

Interesting. Can you share your source? My understanding is that post-war Lee did not comment on Gettysburg (or most other battles).

I'm pretty sure Gary Gallagher says this also in one of his Darden University Leadership Ride videos on youtube. The gist of it was when Lee was president at W&L that someone would go talk to him about the war and then go and write everything down that they had just talked about without Lee's knowledge. There are three separate courses, 5 classes each that are recorded and im not sure which one he says it. Here is a link to the first video.

 

[WJC]

I'm pretty sure Gary Gallagher says this also in one of his Darden University Leadership Ride videos on youtube. The gist of it was when Lee was president at W&L that someone would go talk to him about the war and then go and write everything down that they had just talked about without Lee's knowledge. There are three separate courses, 5 classes each that are recorded and im not sure which one he says it. Here is a link to the first video.

Thanks for your response.
Yes, there are reports from visitors to Lee about conversations on various battles. As second-hand information, they need to be considered with some skepticism.
After the war, Lee refused to discuss or write about his battles, even to correct obvious errors. To my knowledge, there were just two times when he broke his silence.
The first was a private letter to Thomas J. Jackson's widow meant to comfort her by showing that newspaper criticism of her husband was unjustified.
The second was in response to an article by R. L. Dabney, The Life and Campaigns of Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, in Southern Review, claiming that the flank attack was solely Jackson's idea.
Lee disputed the writer's claim that Jackson's movements were, "independent of the general plan of operations and undertaken at his suggestion and on his responsibility." He continued, "I have the greatest reluctance to do anything that might be considered detracting from his [Jackson's] well-deserved fame.... Every movement of an army must be well considered and properly ordered, and everyone who knew General Jackson must know that he was too good a soldier to violate this fundamental principle." Lee took responsibility for the flank attack, saying, "There is no question as to who was responsible for the operation of the Confederates, or to whom any failure would have been charged."
For the full text of the letter see Armistead L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (New York: J. M. Stoddart, 1886), pp. 253-254.

 

[David H.]

I'm pretty sure Gary Gallagher says this also in one of his Darden University Leadership Ride videos on youtube. The gist of it was when Lee was president at W&L that someone would go talk to him about the war and then go and write everything down that they had just talked about without Lee's knowledge. There are three separate courses, 5 classes each that are recorded and im not sure which one he says it. Here is a link to the first video.

Meanwhile this is a great lecture by Gary Gallagher - interesting and informative.