Longstreet's Planned Reverse Attack on July 3rd

It Longstreet's self-serving OR ... after the battle... He leaves out what actually happens that morning with him and Lee and the late arrival of Pickett to the field. He did coin a new term " Reverse Attack"... I will not argue Lee should have done anything but to attack on day two and three... but he did... It is nothing but self-serving words of Longstreet's nothing more...
 
I think his odds would have been better, but on July 2nd I personally feel the blunder by Sickles may have truly hampered Longstreet more then we all think. Sickles disobeyed orders but by doing so he put his Corp in Longstreet's path and Longstreet wasn't expecting anyone there. The recon on that part of the field was done very early on the morning of July 2nd and the report to Lee was no Union soldiers were in that are to include the round tops.
 
It Longstreet's self-serving OR ... after the battle... He leaves out what actually happens that morning with him and Lee and the late arrival of Pickett to the field. He did coin a new term " Reverse Attack"... I will not argue Lee should have done anything but to attack on day two and three... but he did... It is nothing but self-serving words of Longstreet's nothing more...
They were so close on both days that I think Lee felt the Union was gonna break. His goal was to destroy the Union army not just win a battle.
 
They were so close on both days

I agree Lee was real close one day one if he had only taken the hill... but on day two was awash a draw at best... He should have moved on day two when he saw the Union position and was ready for a fight. I do not see why Lee failed to account for the Unions strong position. I can only figure he thought he was fighting General Joe Hooker and thought he could break his spirit again... I can not remember when Lee learned of Meade taking command... Lee knew Meade well they played chess together many times so he knew he would fight...
 
They were close to breaking part of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge on the 2nd. Ambrose Wright's Georgia Brigade broke through but that break through wasn't exploited. As far as Culps Hill the Confederates just didn't know where they were. They were closer to Baltimore Pike then they realized again what if they had known that the battle may have ended July 2nd. It's easy for us isn't it to Monday Morning Quarterback we basically know what happened and how close it was to turning the other way.
 
@Rick Richter. @Henry Hunt To my mind Longstreet's plans for an attack around big round top, and his issuing orders to implement them without consulting Lee are not within the legitimate limits of a subordinates officers discretion. It seems we will have to agree to disagree about that. I appreciate all your comments in any case. They gave me a lot to think about. I guess, like Henry Hunt indicated above, when it comes to weather or not Longstreet received orders to attack on the morning of the 3rd. you have to choose who you want to believe. Thanks
 
I tend to believe he was supposed to attack early in the day. Lee commented after the war in private that if he could have just got his Corp commanders to attack in coordination things would have been different. Why would he order Ewell to make a demonstration on the left if he didn't plan to attack the right or center the same time? Ewell also stated after the battle that it was his understanding that the attacks we're supposed to start at 10 am. Another indication of this is the Park Service Ranger walk I watched on You Tube that stated Kemper and Garrnet's Brigades were brought forward of the tree line where they laid in the sun and in some cases suffering from heat stroke waiting all day to attack doesn't make sense. There are accounts of men actually vomiting from expose to the sun and heat.
 
Lee commented after the war in private that if he could have just got his Corp commanders to attack in coordination things would have been different.
Interesting. Can you share your source? My understanding is that post-war Lee did not comment on Gettysburg (or most other battles).
 
Interesting. Can you share your source? My understanding is that post-war Lee did not comment on Gettysburg (or most other battles).
Believe it was the Robert E. Lee Ranger Walk Program at Gettysburg. I watched so many I'm not sure. There is one Seminary Ridge Day 1. You can find them on You Tube I believe the rangers name is Atkinson. It was a statement he made in private according to the ranger.
 
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The "late arrival of Pickett" was on July 2, 1863.
Greywolf's question was regarding July 2. Do you think that Longstreet's attack would have been successful if he would have had Pickett up that day?
A what if:
If Longstreet had Picketts men up and could have extended the Confederate right on day 2, would that have been enough to overlap and break the federal left?

Looked through my books a bit. Glenn Tucker in Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg (pg 70) voiced the opinion that Pickett, though arriving late in the day and tired, should have been sent in on July 2nd. This he thinks might have been enough to overpower Meade.
 
Even Douglas Southall Freeman rejected the matter of Longstreet's disobeying Lee's order for a dawn attack because the testimony of Lee's staff was too strong against that point!

General Longstreet asked four of Lee's wartime staff about this accusation and all four insisted Lee had never said anything to them about any July 2 dawn attack. Clearly Jubal Early's accusation was false. Early was the sole witness to this supposed statement of Lee's. General Lee and Robert Rodes were both dead. And Dick Ewell was on his deathbed. He passed away a few days after Early's accusation.
 
The "late arrival of Pickett" was on July 2, 1863.

No... Lee wanted Pickett to be there by the early morning of the 3rd but Longstreet did not stress that to Pickett or sent the order late to Pickett. Pickett arrives late to the field on July 3rd... Like I have to remind everyone if Pickett had been on the field on the early morning of the 3rd there most likely would not have been Pickett charge but another push to roll up the Union left...
 
Pickett arrives late to the field on July 3rd...
Sources differ as to whether Picket's men arrived in the evening of July 2 or the early morning of July 3, 1863:
"Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning [July 3, 1863]."
<Report of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia. JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].>
"Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2nd...." <Lee, as quoted in Walter H. Taylor, Four Years With General Lee. (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1878), p. 102.>
At any rate, Pickett's brigades had most certainly arrived by the time Lee and Longstreet conferred on the morning of July 3, 1863 and while Alexander was making final location of his guns, which he had put in place well before dawn. Alexander points out that "Pickett's men were in the woods behind my line of guns, resting, I believe, & eating." <Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 253.>
 
Believe it was the Robert E. Lee Ranger Walk Program at Gettysburg. I watched so many I'm not sure. There is one Seminary Ridge Day 1. You can find them on You Tube I believe the rangers name is Atkinson. It was a statement he made in private according to the ranger.
Thanks for your response! Great, I'll find it!
 
I think his odds would have been better, but on July 2nd I personally feel the blunder by Sickles may have truly hampered Longstreet more then we all think. Sickles disobeyed orders but by doing so he put his Corp in Longstreet's path and Longstreet wasn't expecting anyone there. The recon on that part of the field was done very early on the morning of July 2nd and the report to Lee was no Union soldiers were in that are to include the round tops.
I agree that by being in the wrong place, Sickles actually confused Longstreet's attack. Whether that disastrous decision was enough to actually affect the outcome is a matter of debate. That certainly was Sickles' claim. Interestingly, after the war, they both adopted that conclusion (whether an honest assessment or simply convenient reinforcement of their controversial decisions is another matter....)
 
A what if:
If Longstreet had Picketts men up and could have extended the Confederate right on day 2, would that have been enough to overlap and break the federal left?
McLaws thought so. He contended that the assault on day 2 should have included Pickett. But Pickett couldn't reasonably have been expected to get there - his division had just arrived at Marsh Creek the afternoon of the 2nd.
"If Pickett's division had been with mine following it, I believe that Round Top could have been captured from my side and we could have established ourselves there. But if Longstreet was waiting for Pickett, he was not allowed to wait long enough, because General Lee did not think the enemy's left was occupied so strongly as it was, even at that late hour, and was not made aware of the great natural strength of the enemy's position. If General Longstreet had taken the responsibility to report that the positions in his front were naturally so strong and were so strongly occupied that his force could not accomplish the important results that were expected, and insisted on a delay until his whole force was concentrated and a more thorough examination made, I do not think the battle would have been fought at all, but that General Lee would have maneuvered to force an attack upon himself." [Lafayette McLaws, "The Battle of Gettysburg," a paper presented before the Georgia Historical Society, January 7, 1878.]

Of course, that would have only been potentially successful if Pickett was nearby enough to join on Day 2 and he wasn't. The longer the delay, the more reinforcements arrived and the stronger the Union left became. Since Pickett wasn't there yet, then to await Pickett, as McLaws suggests, would have delayed the assault until the Union Sixth corps had arrived and been there, in force. McLaws and Hood did some good execution against two corps, but who knows how it might have turned out with Longstreet's corps up against three entire Union corps? Or would it have been four? Either way, not good.

The charge as it was made on July 3rd simply makes no sense without Anderson or McLaws following up the attack.
Regarding day 3 and McLaws being able to actively participate or assist in Pickett's Charge, you really need to read what McLaws says about it in that excerpt I suggested the other day. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/view-of-picketts-charge-maj-gen-lafayette-mclaws-on-july-3.159910/

McLaws was 1/2 mile from Pickett's right, with a strong reinforced enemy in his front. I'm no tactician and even I can understand what that means. Had McLaws abandoned his position (holding the front of the now reinforced Union left) to join Pickett, then this would have surely been exploited by the Union forces in his front. The Union left in his front would have come forward and enveloped the Confederate right. His and Hood's divisions would have been rolled up. With no force remaining on their left to prevent it, the Union center would have followed up after a failed assault on the center. Game over for the entire ANV.
 
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Sources differ as to whether Picket's men arrived in the evening of July 2 or the early morning of July 3, 1863:
Just to clarify, I believe that Pickett arrived near the battlefield (Marsh Creek) on the afternoon of July 2. He joined the rest of Longstreet's corps on the battlefield the morning of July 3.
 
The idea of a morning attack comes from the memoirs of Porter Alexander and Walter Taylor. They as you noted are anti-Longstreet partisans, you can either chose to believe them or not.
I would not call either man "anti-Longstreet partisans". Both were friends of Longstreet and maintained cordial relations after the war. Although both mentioned a "morning attack", neither used that to blame Longstreet for the failure of the assault on July 3, 1863.
Taylor's narrative follows Lee's OR, emphasizing how the surprise engagement of Ewell with XII Corps had necessitated a change in plans. Clearly, Taylor was more interested in relating what happened, not in what might have happened or in placing blame.
General Lee then had a conference with General Longstreet, and the mode of attack and the troops to make it were thoroughly debated. I was present and understood the arrangement to be that General Longstreet would endeavor to force the enemy's lines in his front. That front was held by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided to reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the centre.​
<Walter H. Taylor, Four Years With General Lee. (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1878), p. 103>
Alexander had a litany of reasons for the defeat, but nothing blaming Longstreet. His greatest criticism was aimed at Ewell.
<Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) pp. 280-283.>
 
Regarding day 3 and McLaws being able to actively participate or assist in Pickett's Charge, you really need to read what McLaws says about it in that excerpt I suggested the other day. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/view-of-picketts-charge-maj-gen-lafayette-mclaws-on-july-3.159910/

McLaws was 1/2 mile from Pickett's right, with a strong reinforced enemy in his front. I'm no tactician and even I can understand what that means. Had McLaws abandoned his position (holding the front of the now reinforced Union left) to join Pickett, then this would have surely been exploited by the Union forces in his front. The Union left in his front would have come forward and enveloped the Confederate right. His and Hood's divisions would have been rolled up. With no force remaining on their left to prevent it, the Union center would have followed up after a failed assault on the center. Game over for the entire ANV.

Thanks! Rereading that with this context provides a good explanation from McLaws perspective. It outlines the significant dangers moving McClaws or Hood would have entailed. However, Lee was rolling the dice and every division needed to be sent in for any chance of victory despite the danger of a flank attack.

As Walter Taylor discussed with Longstreet in a post war letter "My recollection is distinct that all of your divisions were to take part in the assault, and I can never understand why Hood and McLaws were never ordered forward" and Longstreet replied "I can only say that General Lee gave no orders for placing the divisions of McLaws and Hood in the column of attack on that day. I cannot, therefore, have any explanation to make at this time why these divisions were not in the column."[1] Judging by this both Taylor-Longstreet seem confused as to what happened as they both thought Lee wanted everything sent in.

[1] Walter Taylor, Four Years With General Lee. (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1878), p. 109.
https://archive.org/details/fouryearswithge00tayl/page/108

EDIT: Though in retrospect they shouldn't have made the assault at all. Without McLaws and Anderson it won't work and as you outlined its far too dangerous to pull McLaws from his front.
 
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