Longstreet's Planned Reverse Attack on July 3rd

[OpnCoronet]

Longstreet's Planned Reverse Attack on July 3rd

"On the the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the attack on my right, with the view of passing around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. This would have been a slow process, but I think not very difficult. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were given, the commanding general joined me and ordered.... the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position on Cemetery Hill." [1]
[1] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol XXVII, pt 2, 359.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077728255&view=1up&seq=1

It is my understanding that after the battle on Day 2, Lee wanted to have Longstreet's corps make the assault on the Union center on Day 3, but that Longstreet protested that his force was too closely engaged with the Union Left and would almost surely draw a counter-attack if he tried to move his corps away, and, surisingly to me, Lee, once again compromised, and built an ersatz corps from d varios units from different corps', built around Pickett's fresh Div. under Longstreet's command.

Longstreet seems to have been against any offensive assaults, all during Lee's invasion of Pa., and at least remained consistent in this opposition. Preferring, instated, on locating a strong defensive position and luring Meade to the attack. Given this, it always seemed unlikely that Longstreet would favor another attackk on, what surely, by now, must be a united AoP. I am sure, that given only those two options, e would have chosen a reverseflank attack to the frontal assault of Lee, buut, as noted, I find it unlikely that he would have favored either on Day 3.

I have read other suggestions to the effect, that a Pickett's Charge, on Day 3, was necessary, even if the chance of success was small. That if the attack failed it would still set the AoP back on its heels and allow, a better chance for confederate retrreat. I tend to agree with this, in that it served a double purpose, that Lee would favor, in the light of the posiition the failures on Days 1 and 2 had left him on Day 3, i.e., a reasonable gamble to retrieve success from 2 days of failure, and, at the same time, a necessary tactical gambit, to covern a retreat, if it failed.

 

[ivanj05]

It is my understanding that after the battle on Day 2, Lee wanted to have Longstreet's corps make the assault on the Union center on Day 3, but that Longstreet protested that his force was too closely engaged with the Union Left and would almost surely draw a counter-attack if he tried to move his corps away, and, surisingly to me, Lee, once again compromised, and built an ersatz corps from d varios units from different corps', built around Pickett's fresh Div. under Longstreet's command.

Longstreet seems to have been against any offensive assaults, all during Lee's invasion of Pa., and at least remained consistent in this opposition. Preferring, instated, on locating a strong defensive position and luring Meade to the attack. Given this, it always seemed unlikely that Longstreet would favor another attackk on, what surely, by now, must be a united AoP. I am sure, that given only those two options, e would have chosen a reverseflank attack to the frontal assault of Lee, buut, as noted, I find it unlikely that he would have favored either on Day 3.

I have read other suggestions to the effect, that a Pickett's Charge, on Day 3, was necessary, even if the chance of success was small. That if the attack failed it would still set the AoP back on its heels and allow, a better chance for confederate retrreat. I tend to agree with this, in that it served a double purpose, that Lee would favor, in the light of the posiition the failures on Days 1 and 2 had left him on Day 3, i.e., a reasonable gamble to retrieve success from 2 days of failure, and, at the same time, a necessary tactical gambit, to covern a retreat, if it failed.

But did Lee really look at the July 1-2 as two days of failure?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

But did Lee really look at the July 1-2 as two days of failure?

No, I don't believe so. Lee believed he was on the brink of victory, which is why Pickett's Charge made sense to him.

 

[OpnCoronet]

But did Lee really look at the July 1-2 as two days of failure?

He obviously did not consiider the day lost, Yet or he would not have made a demonstration, to quuell any Union thoughts of a counter attack, with a whole corps sized force. But. Two days of hard fought battle, with no decision, would have to be worrying.

As previously noted, I believe, from intial reports on Days i and 2, without confirmation from a missing Stuart, I think Lee would make decisions based upon previous experience against the AoP amd. tjhat, I think, would lead him to conclude that he was facing only a portion of the AoP(2 maybe 3 corps at best).

I he were correct in his estimate, Lee had a golden opportunity to destroy the AoP in detail .... If he move quuickly and efficiently.

By the third day, the chance to meet and destroy the AoP in detail, was probably gone, but, Lee still had the initiative, and, I believe, the same confidence that drove Lee, to invade Pa. with the complete reoganizaion of ANV still in progress while on the march, was the same confidence that led himm to try one more time for the total victory he was always seeking, i.e., As Lee confessed later to Davis, he had had overwheming confidence that if properly positioned and led, Lee did not really believe that the men in the ranks of the ANV, could not be stopped, no matter any other deficiiencies, including that of leadership.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I he were correct in his estimate, Lee had a golden opportunity to destroy the AoP in detail .... If he move quuickly and efficiently.

Agreed. I think Lee was caught by surprise by how quickly and effectively Meade was able to concentrate the Army of the Potomac. Lee expected to strike on July 2 before Meade did so.

Hunt makes a comment about this in one of his B & L articles.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Agreed. I think Lee was caught by surprise by how quickly and effectively Meade was able to concentrate the Army of the Potomac. Lee expected to strike on July 2 before Meade did so.
Hunt makes a comment about this in one of his B & L articles.

I agree with the comment of a writer wo said, that the AoP never moved so fast so far, in its existence, except, possibly, during its pursuit of the ANV to appomatox. Certainly Lee never experienced anything like it, until Gettysburg