longstreet

Also, Lee had hoped the invasion would score a political victory for the Confederacy. The war in the east was not going well for the Union and Northern opposition was growing. Moreover, Lincoln's upcoming reelection was in 1864.
 
And I understand the land was all tore up in virgina and we were running low on supplies for gods sake we were wearing burklack shoes lolz and eating basically raw bacon. And Lee thought gettysburg waould welcome the confederates cause they were not pleased with the yankees controll of there land
 
And I understand the land was all tore up in virgina and we were running low on supplies for gods sake we were wearing burklack shoes lolz and eating basically raw bacon. And Lee thought gettysburg waould welcome the confederates cause they were not pleased with the yankees controll of there land

Why would a Pennsylvania town welcome a Confederate army?

R
 
Also, Lee had hoped the invasion would score a political victory for the Confederacy. The war in the east was not going well for the Union and Northern opposition was growing. Moreover, Lincoln's upcoming reelection was in 1864.
Intel was a huge part of the problem. Stuart's lost messages left Lee blind. Had he have known the approach of the enemy. He would have been the same old Bobby Lee, he would have chosen his ground, entrenched and God help the Yanks. Lack of Intel was as much to blame as anything else.
 
Yes stuart was to busy poseing for the paper and makeing a name for himself and longstreet really hated him for it he should of been telling lee were the yankees were and war horse your completely right
 
Yes stuart was to busy poseing for the paper and makeing a name for himself and longstreet really hated him for it he should of been telling lee were the yankees were and war horse your completely right
It's actually much more complex than that. Killer Angles makes it look that simple. Stuart was operating as instructed however his messeges never reached Lee. We know he sent them because they were received in Richmond. Longstreet along with many other confederate officers did not have knowledge of the lost messages and were understandably upset with Stuart. Longstreet really didn't hate Stuart he valued him for what he was. A fine Cavalry commander. Have a look at Eric Wittenburg's book Plenty of Blame to go Around. It's a very informative read.
 
Yes stuart was to busy poseing for the paper and makeing a name for himself and longstreet really hated him for it he should of been telling lee were the yankees were...

Longstreet wasn't satisfied with Stuart at this time and wasn't the only one. Still he didn't hate him - he had great respect for Stuart and his usual qualities. Longstreet even wrote the initial recommendation for Stuart's promotion to Brigadier in September 61.
 
I will defantlely check out that book and i read more books than the killer angels lolz but that is one of my fav's i will defantlly look into to that casue i'm always looking to learn and thank you guys for all the insight
 
Wow, the "of"s instead of "have"s are really bothersome. Lee should "have" listened to Longstreet, etc.

Anyway, I don't recall anything indicating that Longstreet advised Lee not to leave Virginia. Longstreet advised Lee to fight a defensive battle and suggested that Lee attempt to flank the federals on the right around BRT. Lee's response was something on the order of pointing to the Union center and declaring "the enemy is there and that's where I intend to strike him".
 
Let us also give Lee a little credit here; Longstreet's ideas sound good on paper but putting them into practice was another matter entirely.

First, the idea of slipping around Meade after the battle on the 1st is one fraught with peril. The first problem is you have to finish concentrating the ANV before attempting such a move, and that's just going to give Meade more time to react. Then, you have to deal with the fact that you know that some major portion of the AoP is still to the south of Gettysburg, between you and where Longstreet thinks you should be, and you have very little idea of where exactly it is. After that, you have to execute such a move with Meade standing right in front of you, and hope that he doesn't react to it before you pull it off and catch the army strung out and vulnerable.

Second, let us consider the notion of flanking the Round Tops and getting in Meade's rear. Again, a good idea on paper. But, doing it will delay an already delayed attack even further. It will also open a nice gap on the right of the Confederate line. It also presupposes that Meade will not notice or react to such a movement (and Meade is the guy with the advantage of interior lines this battle). It even further presupposes that there are no large body of Union troops behind the AoP's main line, which would be an incorrect supposition.

Lee made plenty of mistakes at Gettysburg, but turning Longstreet down wasn't one of them in either circumstance.
 
Intel was a huge part of the problem. Stuart's lost messages left Lee blind. Had he have known the approach of the enemy. He would have been the same old Bobby Lee, he would have chosen his ground, entrenched and God help the Yanks. Lack of Intel was as much to blame as anything else.
A problem that Lee had was limited supplies (ie munitions) for a sustained campaign. A solution for this was ultimate victory. Lee decisively defeated the AOP time and again that sent the army reeling. However, the AOP continually returned to fight another day. Logistically, Lee needed a plan to resupply his the ANV if he was able to decisively defeat the AOP before that army regrouped.
 
Let us also give Lee a little credit here; Longstreet's ideas sound good on paper but putting them into practice was another matter entirely.

First, the idea of slipping around Meade after the battle on the 1st is one fraught with peril. The first problem is you have to finish concentrating the ANV before attempting such a move, and that's just going to give Meade more time to react. Then, you have to deal with the fact that you know that some major portion of the AoP is still to the south of Gettysburg, between you and where Longstreet thinks you should be, and you have very little idea of where exactly it is. After that, you have to execute such a move with Meade standing right in front of you, and hope that he doesn't react to it before you pull it off and catch the army strung out and vulnerable.

Second, let us consider the notion of flanking the Round Tops and getting in Meade's rear. Again, a good idea on paper. But, doing it will delay an already delayed attack even further. It will also open a nice gap on the right of the Confederate line. It also presupposes that Meade will not notice or react to such a movement (and Meade is the guy with the advantage of interior lines this battle). It even further presupposes that there are no large body of Union troops behind the AoP's main line, which would be an incorrect supposition.

Lee made plenty of mistakes at Gettysburg, but turning Longstreet down wasn't one of them in either circumstance.
What Longstreet and Lee wanted was to "raid" into PA, gather supplies, consolidate at a good defensive location, and invite Meade to attack the AoNV. But, as we've so often been reminded: The best laid plans o' Mice and Men ....

It all went to hell when Buford broke up the first attack and one or more of Howard's Divisions secured the high ground -- that was the end of it. Lee and Longstreet didn't get to choose the ground.

The CSA would have had to leave on the third day. Out of ammo and out of supples.

Swinging around BRT wasn't a good idea. They'd have to march through the Sixth Corps which would have given Meade a chance to reoccupy the Pipe Creek Line.

There is much more, but the discussion is becoming repetitive.
 
I think a lot of this is also based on what Longstreet wrote well after the war was lost and, if I'm not mistaken, after Lee was dead.

IIRC, Longstreet wrote during the war that he and Lee had agreed that it was supposed to be a tactically defensive, offensive campaign but that limiting his options ahead of time doesn't seem like Lee. What probably happened was that Longstreet proposed this and Lee gave a noncommittal answer which Longstreet interpreted as agreement.

R
 
H
Wow, the "of"s instead of "have"s are really bothersome. Lee should "have" listened to Longstreet, etc.

Anyway, I don't recall anything indicating that Longstreet advised Lee not to leave Virginia. Longstreet advised Lee to fight a defensive battle and suggested that Lee attempt to flank the federals on the right around BRT. Lee's response was something on the order of pointing to the Union center and declaring "the enemy is there and that's where I intend to strike him".
IIRC, Longstreet wrote during the war that he and Lee had agreed that it was supposed to be a tactically defensive, offensive campaign but that limiting his options ahead of time doesn't seem like Lee. What probably happened was that Longstreet proposed this and Lee gave a noncommittal answer which Longstreet interpreted as agreement.

R
with out question.
 

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