Longstreet Longstreet was right.

[Irishtom29]

Longstreet was right. I say Lee should of went North and captured Harrisburg a major embarrassment to the North. Although not Washington DC it would still be the fall of a major State Capitol. Forcing the Yanks to attack or seek peace. You have to stand in "The High Water Mark" position and look out into that Field and be shocked at WTH was Lee thinking. He forgot what he did to the Yanks 8 months earlier and repeated their mistake.

Why would the fall of Harrisburg force the United States to seek peace? Did the falls of Nashville and New Orleans force the rebels to seek peace? Never minding the east, why would the Old Northwest, with its armies successful in Mississippi and Tennessee lose the will to fight?

You think Meade would dance to Lee's tune but one thing actual events showed was that Meade resisted political pressure and did what he thought correct. And the rapid movement north of Meade's army took the initiative from Lee; it was Lee who was forced to react.

Looking at the map it appears that if Lee concentrated at Harrisburg there he would be on the wrong side of the river and Meade could sit on Lee's line of communication and supply and force Lee to attack.

 

[damYankee]

This short (30 min.) Presentation sheds light on Lee's thought process and how JEB Stuart really set the stage for the Union victory at Gettysburg

 

[wausaubob]

The Johnston and Longstreet theory was not only tactical, but it was also strategic. If the Confederate armies were intact, and there were continual negotiations, the Confederacy might get some type of reprieve or delay. If the Confederacy waited until the armies completely collapsed, they get nothing.
The Confederates did not negotiate in good faith. The armies collapsed and the US and the Republican party concentrated on expanding westward for the next 20 years.

 

[wausaubob]

The experience of western Virginia should have instructed the Confederates. If the concept of abolition was accepted and the process started, Lincoln, as well as Seward and Senator Sumner were willing to accept that it might take time to make the change.

 

[Tony Z]

After Lee's surrender, the south needed someone to blame and Longstreet fit the bill perfectly. He had disagreed w/Lee about multiples items at Gettysburg, though we don't know the exact sort of communication that was to occur in that slice of time and if Lee had sought opinions. Also, Longstreet's post war actions set him up perfectly.

Longstreet had lost 3 children during the war and that had to mentally work on him, contributing to a blunt persona. Personally, Longstreet is one of my favorite generals of the Civil War. I think he was a soldier's soldier and though he would follow orders, in his position to Lee, he felt compelled to offer his opinions.

 

[Johhny Quest]

He said she said tit for tat , Many of Longstreet's critics came from the lost cause era willing to drag anything up that would excuse the gracious Lee from his botched Gettysburg campaign and yes Lee did botch it.

<snip>

Longstreet of course had his flaws and the plan to disengage and move around the Federals was vague to say the least but it would have kept the army intact and by placing themselves between the capitol and the Union army they could pick ground of their own choosing to conduct a defensive battle knowing the pressure would be on Meade to attack from Washington so in theory it was a sound military move.

And lets not forget the Union army has been mauled on the first day with both the first and eleventh corps taking huge casualties so their own wounded would have been just as much as a hindrance as the confederate wounded.

Which ever way you want to cut it it comes down to Lee and Stuart if your looking for blame not Longstreet.

My opinion of course.

1) Hi, thanks for the response. Yes, a lot of his critics came post-war . . . but there were also many critics during the war. We have letters and diaries from the war years, we have newspaper articles and so on. We also have records of the pre-war years going all the way back to West Point and all these appear to show a very difficult personality. Interestingly, Longstreet did not keep personal memoirs and most of his papers were lost in a fire in the 1880s so it's very hard to look into the heart of the man as he saw himself.

2) Longstreet was a rookie. In April 1861, Longstreet was a paymaster in the US Army. Six months later, he was a Major General in the Confederate Army. Four months after that, three children died of scarlet fever and one son almost died. Longstreet became very withdrawn after that and remained so during the war. Within four months of the death of his children came the Peninsula Campaign and Longstreet was commanding almost half of Lee's army.

At Gettysburg, Longstreet's children had been dead 15 months and he was still grieving. He had been commanding large units in the field for about a year. You could contrast this with, let's say, Napoleon who received his first truly independent command 11 years after becoming an officer and who spent those eleven years learning his craft and commanding increasingly larger units.

3) As far as "the move to the right" I think we can tell a lot by doing two things:

Go here https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/ATLAS_OR_GETTYSBURG_CAMPAIGN_MAP.jpg to see a map of the Gettysburg Campaign area. Go here to see a map of troop movement during the Gettysburg Campaign. http://www.bio.brandeis.edu/classes/hist150b/campaign.jpg

Put the two together and you can see the difficulty Lee had in bringing beans & bullets north . . . . which is why so much emphasis was placed on foraging. His Line Of Communications was on the west side of mountains and rivers with few west to east roads. But Longstreet was contemplating maneuvering on the east side of those mountains and rivers.

I think the only way to do that would have been for Lee to keep his right flank hugging the mountains and essentially move from one west-east highway to the next. But . . . . this would place the Union Army to his front (south), east (left flank) and behind him (north). He would literally have been surrounded on three sides as he moved south/south-east.

4) Finally . . . and adding to the "move to the right" discussion . . . . the invasion of Pennsylvania was a RAID . . . not a full-blown invasion. Lee's official report of six months later stated very limited objectives:

To draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line.
To take the initiative away from the enemy and disrupt any defensive plan General Joseph Hooker might have had for the rest of the summer.
To drive Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley.
To draw Union forces away from other theaters to reinforce Hooker.
To take the armies out of war-ravaged Virginia and to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the rich agricultural countryside of Pennsylvania.

So the idea of maneuvering towards Washington and engaging in a defensive battle (Longstreet's vision) doesn't appear to even had been on Lee's radar . . . which is why his logistical plan never included provisions to do so.

 

[AThompson]

Why would the fall of Harrisburg force the United States to seek peace? Did the falls of Nashville and New Orleans force the rebels to seek peace? Never minding the east, why would the Old Northwest, with its armies successful in Mississippi and Tennessee lose the will to fight?

You think Meade would dance to Lee's tune but one thing actual events showed was that Meade resisted political pressure and did what he thought correct. And the rapid movement north of Meade's army took the initiative from Lee; it was Lee who was forced to react.

Looking at the map it appears that if Lee concentrated at Harrisburg there he would be on the wrong side of the river and Meade could sit on Lee's line of communication and supply and force Lee to attack.

I think the Confederate and US governments were different in the sense that the Confederacy really just had to survive, and it could do that without New Orleans or Nashville (or even Richmond). Just like the Continental Army was able to survive without New York or Philadelphia (there are other parallels and also important places where the analogy doesn't work as well). The political situation in the north was different - militarily, there is little that Lee occupying Harrisburg would accomplish, since he couldn't really stay there.

But politically, I think it makes a big difference (we'll never know how much, since it didn't happen). The fall of a northern city doesn't happen in a vacuum and with no political effect. And since it's politics that determines much that happens in the military, that scenario could have a major effect on the military situation. (There's no telling if a Confederate victory on northern soil causes anti-war political sentiments or if it unites the two sides of the aisle like the firing on Ft. Sumter did - but something happens if Harrisburg falls).

 

[Georgia Sixth]

I think hindsight shows that Longstreet was right about the unlikelyhood of the Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble charge succeeding. I think that Lee was poorly informed about the positioing of the AOP and that had a bearing on his judgment. I don't think the road system to the south and east of Gettysburg would support Longstreet's suggestion of a flanking move that way. The result....both were wrong.

Seems to me that Lee was correct that on Day Three, he had two options: attack or retreat. His army was not positioned for defense. In fact, it was positioned so that if the initiative went to Meade, it could well be disastrous for the confederates. Longstreet's idea would have separated the two wings of Lee's army even more, which would be highly risky with no possibility of surprise.

So Lee was left to choose between two unappealing options. Wanting to weaken the northern cause as much as possible, he attempted to make the most of the moment by keeping the initiative and attacking. Had his cannonade been more effective, had Ewell attacked Culp's Hill as planned at the same time as Longstreet's attack, who knows? If it worked, Lee probably would've taken Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, but the Army of the Potomac would not have been destroyed, just forced to retreat. Still, that might have been enough to fatally impact Lincoln's reelection, invigorate anti-war groups, or trigger a European power to recognize the CSA. But that's a lot of if's, and the Fates just weren't rolling the dice in Lee's favor at this battle.

 

[Belfoured]

I think the Confederate and US governments were different in the sense that the Confederacy really just had to survive, and it could do that without New Orleans or Nashville (or even Richmond). Just like the Continental Army was able to survive without New York or Philadelphia (there are other parallels and also important places where the analogy doesn't work as well). The political situation in the north was different - militarily, there is little that Lee occupying Harrisburg would accomplish, since he couldn't really stay there.

But politically, I think it makes a big difference (we'll never know how much, since it didn't happen). The fall of a northern city doesn't happen in a vacuum and with no political effect. And since it's politics that determines much that happens in the military, that scenario could have a major effect on the military situation. (There's no telling if a Confederate victory on northern soil causes anti-war political sentiments or if it unites the two sides of the aisle like the firing on Ft. Sumter did - but something happens if Harrisburg falls).

That, of course, ignores the impact of Vicksburg falling. I also think you over-estimate the impact of Harrisburg "falling". As you implicitly acknowledge, it's one thing to stage what in effect is a raid (think Ross and Cockburn in August 1814) and quite another to capture and hold a target. The impacts of the former, even politically, would be much less in even the political realm than the latter. In addition, Harrisburg obviously was not Washington, D.C.

 

[atlantis]

Longstreet did not act honorably with regard to Huger after seven pines failure. Longstreet was derelict in carrying out the attack order at Gettysburg and should have been relieved of his command for not throwing in all his Corp for the attack. Pickett did breach the union line and if supported by the whole Corp the union position may have broke.

 

[AThompson]

That, of course, ignores the impact of Vicksburg falling. I also think you over-estimate the impact of Harrisburg "falling". As you implicitly acknowledge, it's one thing to stage what in effect is a raid (think Ross and Cockburn in August 1814) and quite another to capture and hold a target. The impacts of the former, even politically, would be much less in even the political realm than the latter. In addition, Harrisburg obviously was not Washington, D.C.

I don't disagree that "fall" wasn't the right word - there's no way Lee holds that city.

I would disagree that it ignores Vicksburg falling, though. Vicksburg is a major accomplishment, both militarily and politically. But human psychology comes into play here more than I think we credit it from this far distant: it's one thing to capture an opponent's city two thousand miles away and quite another to have the Army of Northern Virginia marching with impunity through a very important northern state like Pennsylvania. Fear has always been a bigger motivator than the prospect of success, so even with the fall of Vicksburg, Lee marching around PA unchecked has to have major implications one way or another.

 

[wausaubob]

That, of course, ignores the impact of Vicksburg falling. I also think you over-estimate the impact of Harrisburg "falling". As you implicitly acknowledge, it's one thing to stage what in effect is a raid (think Ross and Cockburn in August 1814) and quite another to capture and hold a target. The impacts of the former, even politically, would be much less in even the political realm than the latter. In addition, Harrisburg obviously was not Washington, D.C.

That, of course, ignores the impact of Vicksburg falling. I also think you over-estimate the impact of Harrisburg "falling". As you implicitly acknowledge, it's one thing to stage what in effect is a raid (think Ross and Cockburn in August 1814) and quite another to capture and hold a target. The impacts of the former, even politically, would be much less in even the political realm than the latter. In addition, Harrisburg obviously was not Washington, D.C.

Suppose General Lee does make it to Harrisburg. Does the US administration then bring Grant, McPherson and Ord east after Vicksburg falls, and rotate them back to the James River where they start occupying the railroad that lead south and west out of Petersburg?

 

[Pete Longstreet]

If Longstreet...Says So, It is Most Likely Not True

I think the REAL Longstreet is hidden from us by a curtain of time and "interpretations" but if you can penetrate the screen you'll find a man who was not very likable and not even very intelligent.

You could start with this video and it will drop other names of sources you can pursue.

Even though KILLER ANGELS portrayed him as a likeable, wise, solid figure, totally un-appreciated by Lee, the reality is that Longstreet was often argumentative, often criticized and often disagreed with Lee. Gettysburg was not the first nor would it be the last time his personality got in the way of loyalty.

As far as whether he was "right" there is really no sense in asking that question since Longstreet had nothing more than a very hazy concept about "sliding to the right." Missing was his concept of reconnaissance ahead of this move . . . or even whether the exhausted cavalry was able to penetrate through Yankee lines and operate in open ground, screening a Confederate move towards Washington.

Also missing was his concept of how the Confederate Army was to be supplied in such a move. What would be the Line Of Communications? What roads would the Trains use? How would the Army defend its Trains from a Union envelopment?

The wagon train of just one Confederate corps occupied 12-15 miles of road. As one study I saw described it, had the trains all been on the same road heading north, they would have occupied one-third of the distance between Staunton, VA and Gettysburg. During the concentration at Gettysburg, the three Corps Trains and the Army's Reserve Train (itself 15-20 miles long) crowded into the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike interfering with troop movement.

At the end of the first day, the Trains grew even larger as casualties poured in.

So any movement south towards Washington had to resolve the issue of how to deploy and protect the Trains and how to keep the roads back to Virginia open.

Personally . . . I think it would have been impossible for the Confederates to move towards Washington after July 1st.

Amateurs think Tactics, professionals think Logistics. Lee was a professional. In many ways . . . Longstreet was an amateur.

I've actually watched that video. The narrator bases a lot of what he says on the writings of Robert Krick, who is not a fan of Longstreet. The narrator evens pronounces Krick's name wrong... although interesting to watch, it appeared very Lost Cause to me. That video was posted in another Longstreet thread and took some heat from other CWT members.

 

[damYankee]

Longstreet did not act honorably with regard to Huger after seven pines failure. Longstreet was derelict in carrying out the attack order at Gettysburg and should have been relieved of his command for not throwing in all his Corp for the attack. Pickett did breach the union line and if supported by the whole Corp the union position may have broke.

Lee disagreed with this position

 

[damYankee]

Suppose General Lee does make it to Harrisburg. Does the US administration then bring Grant, McPherson and Ord east after Vicksburg falls, and rotate them back to the James River where they start occupying the railroad that lead south and west out of Petersburg?

Lee never intended to occupy Harrisburg, or defend it, his plan was to gather as much livestock and food goods as possible, draw the AoP toward him, and fight on land of his choosing.
In Lee's past experience with the AoP the Union forces were sent into battle piecemeal. Even when McClellan had numerical superiority, he never used it, Hooker, Burnside, all failed to use the numerical advantage to defeat Lee, he believed that with his smaller force concentrated in a situation with superior terrain, he could defeat, by that he meant to wipe out the AoP,
This would end popular support of the north and force Lincoln or his successor to negotiate a peace.
But Lee allowed his forces to spread out while foraging, he lost contact with Stuart, and Gettysburg was not where he planned to engage.
The irony is that Lee allowed himself to be caught in the very trap he envisioned for the Union.
The Union held the high ground, the Union was concentrated, the Confederates were spread out, and Lee sent his forces piecemeal into the meat grinder.
It was a complete role reversal. And Longstreet saw what was happening.
Fact is Lee had options even on the 2nd, and 3rd. He choose the worst possible place to send Pickett. The center of the Union line where Pickett's men would be subjected to artillery and small arms fire from front and both flanks,
Why didn't Lee attack the curve in the Union line?
Why didn't he order his troops to fallback to Seminary Ridge on the night of the 1st build breast works and consolidate his forces, and force the Union to advance a across the open fields? ( like Cold Harbor)
Or, just slip away that first night, thereby robbing the AoP of a victory?
This was his big chance, he abandoned his original plan, and every tactic that had served him well for 3 years, and his men paid the price.

 

[Scott1967]

It was a complete role reversal. And Longstreet saw what was happening.
Fact is Lee had options even on the 2nd, and 3rd. He choose the worst possible place to send Pickett. The center of the Union line where Pickett's men would be subjected to artillery and small arms fire from front and both flanks,

Absolutely spot on.

Just add Lee really had no idea the strength of the Union centre he was sending in a hail Mary on the presumption that both flanks had been attacked therefore the centre must be weak due to the Union reinforcing those flanks.

Longstreet must have been Livid with Lee after all not 6 months since he had seen at first hand what concentrated artillery and men behind stone walls could do at Fredericksburg , Lee was also there but failed to grasp the irony unlike Longstreet.

We often say hindsight is a wonderful thing but i dont think you needed it on that 3rd day even armchair generals shudder at the thought of that useless charge by an army that could ill afford such losses of men.

The whole point of Lee's invasion was to re-stock his army and take pressure off other theatres of war but if the chance arose to fight the federals on ground that favoured the defensive pressuring the Union to attack because Washington would hounding Hooker to get rid of Lee from Northern soil.

This I presume was Longstreet's take on it as well you can understand how angry he must have felt after all those hard fought victories the AoNv had achieved and then to see two new corps commanders come into the inner council both of them yes men to Lee must have tipped him over the edge at some point.

I remember reading the Letters Lee sent to Longstreet after his wounding in the battle of the Wilderness in them Lee states for Longstreet not to rush back until he feels ready , I cant help but feel did Lee really want him back at all.

 

[Pete Longstreet]

If I remember correctly Longstreet relieved McLaws after Knoxville for "want of confidence in the plans the general commanding thought proper to adopt", or words to that effect.

If so, it seems to me anyway, that when the shoe was on the other foot "Old Pete" expected cooperation from his subordinates. Other may disagree of course, but I find that kinda ironic.

John

You are correct. Longstreet later acknowledged he did McLaws an injustice. This is the response from Longstreet's staff to Mclaws:

Headquarters Near Bean's Station,
December 17th, 1863.

Major-General McLaws,
Confederate States Army

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, asking for the particular reason for the issue of the order relieving you from duty with this army.

In reply I am directed to say that throughout the campaign on which we are engaged, you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops under your command.

Under these circumstances the commanding general has felt that the interest of the public service would be advanced by your separation from him, and as he could not himself leave, he decided upon the issue of the order which you have received.

I have the honor to be, general, with great respect,

G.M. Sorrel
Lieut-Col. And Assistant-Adjutant-General

 

[bayonet]

Why would the fall of Harrisburg force the United States to seek peace? Did the falls of Nashville and New Orleans force the rebels to seek peace? Never minding the east, why would the Old Northwest, with its armies successful in Mississippi and Tennessee lose the will to fight?

You think Meade would dance to Lee's tune but one thing actual events showed was that Meade resisted political pressure and did what he thought correct. And the rapid movement north of Meade's army took the initiative from Lee; it was Lee who was forced to react.

Looking at the map it appears that if Lee concentrated at Harrisburg there he would be on the wrong side of the river and Meade could sit on Lee's line of communication and supply and force Lee to attack.

Wait what??!! Your comparing Apples to Oranges. The South keep fighting on regardless of losing a State Capitol(s). The North now experiencing an invasion might of felt different on losing a major State Capitol due to Northern attitude towards the War at this point. The Draft Riots in the North occurred the same month as Gettysburg in July 1863. Pressure for Meade to attack Lee would of been immense instead of it ending the other way around. "Supply" you say! Harrisburg would of been packed with Supplies of food and other essentials for Lee's Army. Was that not one of Lee's intention to invade the North to supply his Army in Pennsylvania packed rich of the needs for his Army. Plus force the North to negotiate a peace. Although Harrisburg was not Lee's goal it still may have led to the North seeking a peace settlement. But I guess we will never know, but we do know what did happen!

 

[Irishtom29]

Wait what??!!....But I guess we will never know, but we do know what did happen!

Yes, we do!!!

 

[damYankee]

As Iron Mike once said
, everyone has a plan till you punch them in the nose.