Longstreet Longstreet was right.

[AThompson]

Instead of debating who had the better plan at Gettysburg, ( Lee or Longstreet )
Put yourself in Lee's boots on July 1 through 3,. Look at the positions of the Union forces, study the terrain, what would you do?

Exactly. Not only that, but take a road map without most, if any, topographical features, no ability to get a bird's-eye view, and rely only on what you can see and what others have told you they can see, and then commit to moving thousands of soldiers from one spot to another. That's going to take time. And then you get to do that all over again when the situation you planned on changes. That's a nutshell version of the battle (or really any battle). Sometimes your plans, and reactions to changing circumstances work. Sometimes they don't. And sometimes risks pay off, and sometimes they don't. If they pay off, you're a hero and if they don't, the plan was always dumb. (I think the intellectual exercises about who would do what are very beneficial - I think we just need to remember they got one shot at it, couldn't hit "restart", and didn't have the benefit of knowing how it was going to play our or how the other side would react). ***Disclaimer - that's not to say the generals never made objectively bad decisions with the information they had. I just think they should get the benefit of any doubts.

 

[Pete Longstreet]

Instead of debating who had the better plan at Gettysburg, ( Lee or Longstreet )
Put yourself in Lee's boots on July 1 through 3,. Look at the positions of the Union forces, study the terrain, what would you do?

What would I do... not make Pickett's charge.

 

[wausaubob]

What would I do... not make Pickett's charge.

Keep the army as whole as possible. Start moving back to Virginia, and start leaking to the Richmond press, that the attempt having been made, and having failed, it was time to deal with reality.

 

[Pete Longstreet]

What would I do... not make Pickett's charge.

Keep the army as whole as possible. Start moving back to Virginia, and start leaking to the Richmond press, that the attempt having been made, and having failed, it was time to deal with reality.

If Lee listened to Longstreet and called off the charge... are you suggesting the AnV continue it's northern invasion after the leaks were sent to the press? Or start heading south again?

 

[wausaubob]

If Lee listened to Longstreet and called off the charge... are you suggesting the AnV continue it's northern invasion after the leaks were sent to the press? Or start heading south again?

With a less damaged army he should have been able to get back to Virginia. The Confederacy had a much stronger case to delay abolition with some type of New Jersey plan if the Ar of No. Va. was intact. Missouri might have been willing to enact immediate emancipation. We don't know, because it wasn't attempted.
But once Grant captured Vicksburg and the Port Hudson garrison surrendered, the involuntary movement of slaves to what was then the SW would have ended. Slavery was done, at that point, and even the Confederacy could not save it.

 

[wausaubob]

Sadly, once the Confederate army is forced to concentrate, it has to fight or start retreating. It can no longer spread out to forage human provisions, and the army mules and horses are going to eat up the grass very quickly.

 

[damYankee]

IMHO, Lee should have listened to Longstreet before leaving Richmond, and never advanced into Pennsylvania.

 

[wausaubob]

IMHO, Lee should have listened to Longstreet before leaving Richmond, and never advanced into Pennsylvania.

Audacity had been effective for the Confederates in the past. But Lee refused to recognize that Meade was going to revert back to McClellan's methods and the US Army was going to be very dense, with its flanks hard to reach and hard to turn. Lee tried it on the 2nd day and that should have been evidence that General Lee was risking a 2nd Antietam.
I still think he wanted the fighting to end that week, one way or the other.

 

[Scott1967]

Jacksons death caused an in-balance within the inner circles of the AoNv , Before Jacksons death Lee had sound advice from the aggressive Jackson and the defensive Longstreet with Jacksons passing two new generals joined that council Hill and Ewell both of whom tended to try and stay on the good side of Lee and didn't want to rock the boat so to speak.

At Gettysburg we see Lee exert his authority to the fullest and Longstreet sway over Lee diminished this in my view was caused by the aggressive nature of Hill and Ewell who would have pressed Lee no doubt into offensive actions maybe swaying Lee to stay and fight the battle , Truth be told I have no doubt Jackson would have favoured Longstreet's plan of moving round the Federals after day 1 and set up in a position of strength rather than attack head on.

I think what it comes down too is that Hill and Ewell were not good enough generals to see what Longstreet wanted to do and I think Jackson was , I also think Lee combined with Hill and Ewell meant that any councils of war would side with Lee regardless of the plan this proving fatal at Gettysburg.

Was Longstreet right well hindsight is a wonderful thing but yes he was absolutely right in wanting to disengage and move round the Federals but Lee was having none of it and at this point he was virtually a god to the men and senior officers like Hill and Ewell , I don't think Jackson or Longstreet viewed Lee in the same way.

My opinion of course.

 

[Cornpone and Molasses]

What would I do... not make Pickett's charge.

R.E.L. had choices. I don't think Hood had as many when he ordered a similar costly frontal assault against another strongly fortified postion at Franklin.

 

[Irishtom29]

Jacksons death caused an in-balance within the inner circles of the AoNv , Before Jacksons death Lee had sound advice from the aggressive Jackson and the defensive Longstreet with Jacksons passing two new generals joined that council...

Who's this "defensive Longstreet" guy?

 

[Johhny Quest]

While perusing the Longstreet Museum website, at the bottom of the page it referenced how Longstreet made 3 mistakes that denied him his place in Southern Posterity. I'm just focusing on numbers 1 & 2.

Number 1: "He argued with Lee at Gettysburg".

Number 2 (which I found most interesting): "He was right".

The article makes a valid point.

Was Longstreet right? And Lee wrong?

If Longstreet...Says So, It is Most Likely Not True

I think the REAL Longstreet is hidden from us by a curtain of time and "interpretations" but if you can penetrate the screen you'll find a man who was not very likable and not even very intelligent.

You could start with this video and it will drop other names of sources you can pursue.

Even though KILLER ANGELS portrayed him as a likeable, wise, solid figure, totally un-appreciated by Lee, the reality is that Longstreet was often argumentative, often criticized and often disagreed with Lee. Gettysburg was not the first nor would it be the last time his personality got in the way of loyalty.

As far as whether he was "right" there is really no sense in asking that question since Longstreet had nothing more than a very hazy concept about "sliding to the right." Missing was his concept of reconnaissance ahead of this move . . . or even whether the exhausted cavalry was able to penetrate through Yankee lines and operate in open ground, screening a Confederate move towards Washington.

Also missing was his concept of how the Confederate Army was to be supplied in such a move. What would be the Line Of Communications? What roads would the Trains use? How would the Army defend its Trains from a Union envelopment?

The wagon train of just one Confederate corps occupied 12-15 miles of road. As one study I saw described it, had the trains all been on the same road heading north, they would have occupied one-third of the distance between Staunton, VA and Gettysburg. During the concentration at Gettysburg, the three Corps Trains and the Army's Reserve Train (itself 15-20 miles long) crowded into the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike interfering with troop movement.

At the end of the first day, the Trains grew even larger as casualties poured in.

So any movement south towards Washington had to resolve the issue of how to deploy and protect the Trains and how to keep the roads back to Virginia open.

Personally . . . I think it would have been impossible for the Confederates to move towards Washington after July 1st.

Amateurs think Tactics, professionals think Logistics. Lee was a professional. In many ways . . . Longstreet was an amateur.

 

[Cavalier]

If I remember correctly Longstreet relieved McLaws after Knoxville for "want of confidence in the plans the general commanding thought proper to adopt", or words to that effect.

If so, it seems to me anyway, that when the shoe was on the other foot "Old Pete" expected cooperation from his subordinates. Other may disagree of course, but I find that kinda ironic.

John

 

[Scott1967]

Who's this "defensive Longstreet" guy?

Haha well at least he was more defensive than Jackson but yeah he could be aggressive and was in some battles but his own doctrine was to conduct a defensive war.

But duly noted Tom good spot.

 

[Scott1967]

Even though KILLER ANGELS portrayed him as a likeable, wise, solid figure, totally un-appreciated by Lee, the reality is that Longstreet was often argumentative, often criticized and often disagreed with Lee. Gettysburg was not the first nor would it be the last time his personality got in the way of loyalty.

He said she said tit for tat , Many of Longstreet's critics came from the lost cause era willing to drag anything up that would excuse the gracious Lee from his botched Gettysburg campaign and yes Lee did botch it.

You could blame Longstreet all you want for that second day but in the end it comes down to Lee letting his cavalry do what they want instead of screening and reconnaissance of that said flank of the Union army.

Lee was fighting a blind battle he didn't even know where the Union line ended but he expected 19k men to march on roads 3 abreast undetected by the Union sat on elevated ground using a communication system that could tell them exactly what was happing.

As far as I'm aware Sam Johnson made the reconnaissance at 5 am it was estimated that it would take 4 hours to get those divisions to where they needed to go but didn't take into account the time it would take to organize those divisions in marching order and it didn't take into account the Union being sat on those hills which he reported as empty.

By the time of 1630 it was a pointless exercise the Union knew what was coming (except Sickles of course) and Longstreet resigned himself to losing some of the best men in the CSA army on a pointless attack to try and find the end of the Union line but it could have been a lot worse if Longstreet had followed Lees orders to the letter and attacked along the Emmitsburg Road.

Longstreet of course had his flaws and the plan to disengage and move around the Federals was vague to say the least but it would have kept the army intact and by placing themselves between the capitol and the Union army they could pick ground of their own choosing to conduct a defensive battle knowing the pressure would be on Meade to attack from Washington so in theory it was a sound military move.

And lets not forget the Union army has been mauled on the first day with both the first and eleventh corps taking huge casualties so their own wounded would have been just as much as a hindrance as the confederate wounded.

Which ever way you want to cut it it comes down to Lee and Stuart if your looking for blame not Longstreet.

My opinion of course.

 

[Irishtom29]

Longstreet did more damage to the United States than any other corps commander of the rebellion, yet is accused of disloyalty to the rebellion?

But yeah, I think his wanting to move around the Federal left was not practical. I think Lee was in a pickle no matter what; I think he should have started back to Virginia after his failure on the second day of the battle. Easy for me to say, eh?

 

[damYankee]

If Longstreet...Says So, It is Most Likely Not True

I think the REAL Longstreet is hidden from us by a curtain of time and "interpretations" but if you can penetrate the screen you'll find a man who was not very likable and not even very intelligent.

You could start with this video and it will drop other names of sources you can pursue.

Even though KILLER ANGELS portrayed him as a likeable, wise, solid figure, totally un-appreciated by Lee, the reality is that Longstreet was often argumentative, often criticized and often disagreed with Lee. Gettysburg was not the first nor would it be the last time his personality got in the way of loyalty.

As far as whether he was "right" there is really no sense in asking that question since Longstreet had nothing more than a very hazy concept about "sliding to the right." Missing was his concept of reconnaissance ahead of this move . . . or even whether the exhausted cavalry was able to penetrate through Yankee lines and operate in open ground, screening a Confederate move towards Washington.

Also missing was his concept of how the Confederate Army was to be supplied in such a move. What would be the Line Of Communications? What roads would the Trains use? How would the Army defend its Trains from a Union envelopment?

The wagon train of just one Confederate corps occupied 12-15 miles of road. As one study I saw described it, had the trains all been on the same road heading north, they would have occupied one-third of the distance between Staunton, VA and Gettysburg. During the concentration at Gettysburg, the three Corps Trains and the Army's Reserve Train (itself 15-20 miles long) crowded into the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike interfering with troop movement.

At the end of the first day, the Trains grew even larger as casualties poured in.

So any movement south towards Washington had to resolve the issue of how to deploy and protect the Trains and how to keep the roads back to Virginia open.

Personally . . . I think it would have been impossible for the Confederates to move towards Washington after July 1st.

Amateurs think Tactics, professionals think Logistics. Lee was a professional. In many ways . . . Longstreet was an amateur.

Lee's ANV didn't have the logistics to operate outside of its lines of communication when Lee and Davis were planning the campaign that would result in the Battle of Gettysburg,
Longstreet opposed the plan from the beginning because the ANV would be beyond its supply line and without the possibility of resupply in case of a prolonged battle.
So who was the rank amateur? The guy who looked at the situation of 1863, seeing Grant take control of the Mississippi river system, and decided the best way to take the pressure off Vicksburg was to attack Harrisburg and take on the AoP on its own soil without logistical support or means of reinforcements, or the guy who argued that the best way to help Vicksburg was to send troops to Tennessee,.
Lee had his reasons for his actions, he knew the best, or only hope the South could win was to undermine the support of the Northern population, and destroy the AoP. Lee suffered many frustrations with his subordinates, Longstreet was a minor one.
Lee planned to meet the Union with all of his forces ready, thinking Meade would do like the AoP commander's before him, throw his forces piecemeal at Lee's entire force, on terrain Lee chose.
By July 2, the opposite was shaping up. The North had the choi e ground, it's forces were concentrated, Lee's armies were spread out, some, many in fact had not yet made their way to Gettysburg, some were caught up in a quagmire of foot traffic clogging the few roads available to them to March to the battlefield.
Lee is the sole person responsible for the defeat at Gettysburg.

 

[wausaubob]

He said she said tit for tat , Many of Longstreet's critics came from the lost cause era willing to drag anything up that would excuse the gracious Lee from his botched Gettysburg campaign and yes Lee did botch it.

You could blame Longstreet all you want for that second day but in the end it comes down to Lee letting his cavalry do what they want instead of screening and reconnaissance of that said flank of the Union army.

Lee was fighting a blind battle he didn't even know where the Union line ended but he expected 19k men to march on roads 3 abreast undetected by the Union sat on elevated ground using a communication system that could tell them exactly what was happing.

As far as I'm aware Sam Johnson made the reconnaissance at 5 am it was estimated that it would take 4 hours to get those divisions to where they needed to go but didn't take into account the time it would take to organize those divisions in marching order and it didn't take into account the Union being sat on those hills which he reported as empty.

By the time of 1630 it was a pointless exercise the Union knew what was coming (except Sickles of course) and Longstreet resigned himself to losing some of the best men in the CSA army on a pointless attack to try and find the end of the Union line but it could have been a lot worse if Longstreet had followed Lees orders to the letter and attacked along the Emmitsburg Road.

Longstreet of course had his flaws and the plan to disengage and move around the Federals was vague to say the least but it would have kept the army intact and by placing themselves between the capitol and the Union army they could pick ground of their own choosing to conduct a defensive battle knowing the pressure would be on Meade to attack from Washington so in theory it was a sound military move.

And lets not forget the Union army has been mauled on the first day with both the first and eleventh corps taking huge casualties so their own wounded would have been just as much as a hindrance as the confederate wounded.

Which ever way you want to cut it it comes down to Lee and Stuart if your looking for blame not Longstreet.

My opinion of course.

When you invade enemy territory there are civilian eyes everywhere. The lessons of western Virginia were forgotten.

 

[bayonet]

Longstreet was right. I say Lee should of went North and captured Harrisburg a major embarrassment to the North. Although not Washington DC it would still be the fall of a major State Capitol. Forcing the Yanks to attack or seek peace. You have to stand in "The High Water Mark" position and look out into that Field and be shocked at WTH was Lee thinking. He forgot what he did to the Yanks 8 months earlier and repeated their mistake.

 

[AThompson]

Longstreet did more damage to the United States than any other corps commander of the rebellion, yet is accused of disloyalty to the rebellion?

But yeah, I think his wanting to move around the Federal left was not practical. I think Lee was in a pickle no matter what; I think he should have started back to Virginia after his failure on the second day of the battle. Easy for me to say, eh?

I agree that Lee was in quite a pickle, though he really couldn't have known that on the evening of July 1. It was more of a gradual thing (like saying "I'll be 10 minutes late" and then 10 minutes later, saying it again, and then again, and all of a sudden you're an hour late - though you didn't know you'd be an hour late at first).

Also, a lot of Confederates considered July 2 a victory. Lee wasn't necessarily looking to end the battle with Longstreet's attack (though I'm sure he would have been fine if it did!) - it was a vital part of a three-part movement, but not the only piece.

I'm not a person to blame Longstreet, but I don't think the attack started anywhere near the time it was intended. There are a lot of reasons for that, and the more plausible ones don't involve Longstreet being grumpy (and Lee certainly knew where to find him if he had any complaints).

There are enough letters home that indicate Confederates saw July 2 as a general victory, just not a complete one. That prompted Day 3, which was decidedly not a victory. (If only they had seen the movie first!)

So while I do agree Lee was in a tough spot on the morning of July 2, straddling the town, I think he could have gotten out of it. I also completely agree with you on Longstreet: the best three hours of fighting . . .