Longstreet Let Them Come!

War Horse

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Those were the words of Lt Gen. James Longstreet following the repulse of the Pickett. Pettigrew, Trimble Charge.

"General Pickett, finding the battle broken, while the enemy was still reinforcing, called the troops off. There was no indication of panic. The broken files marched back in steady step. The effort was nobly made, and failed from blows that could not be fended. Some of the files were cut off from retreat by fire that swept the field in their rear. Officers of my staff, sent forward with orders, came back with their saddles and bridles in their arms. Latrobe's horse was twice shot. Looking confidently for advance of enemy through our open field, I rode the line of batteries, resolved to hold it until the last gun was lost. As I rode, the shells screaming over my head and ploughing the ground under my horse, an involuntary appeal went up that one of them might take me from the scenes of such awful responsibility; but the storm to be met left no time to think of one's self. The battery officers were prepared to meet the crisis------no move had been made for leaving the field. My old acquaintances of Sharpsburg experience, Captain Miller, was walking up and down behind his guns, smoking his pipe, directing his fire over the heads of our men as fast as they were inside of the danger-line; the other officers equally firm and ready to defend to the last. A body of skirmishers put out from the enemy's lines and advanced some distance, but the batteries opened severe fire and drove it back. Our men passed the batteries in quiet walk and would rally, I knew when they reached the ridge from which they stared."

Many believe that the Confederates were whooped following the Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble Charge. The Union failed to put the final nail in the coffin by not making an immediate and aggressive counter attack. According to James Longstreet the Confederates were ready and eagerly awaiting a foolish charge by the Union. It would have been disastrous. The Union would have had to cross the same open ground the Confederates failed to cross. Despite popular opinion the batteries were still well armed with enough ammunition to fend off a counter attack even after the massive display of artillery that had never before been witnessed on earth.

Prudence proved best and the inevitable that would have surly happened following a haphazardos effort by the Union army was avoided, Preserving Gettysburg as the unprecedented Union victory we know today.

The correct call was to not counter attack at Gettysburg.

Source: From Manassas to Appomattox. Page 394 and 395
 
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ccording to James Longstreet the Confederates were ready and eagerly awaiting a foolish charge by the Union. It would have been disastrous. The Union would have had to cross the same open ground the Confederates failed to cross

Oh my, what a miserable tactician I would have made! Would you believe that I never thought of that?? Really, I did not!! Until this morning I was wondering why the final crush of a Union counter attack never came (and my only comfort is that I'm in the best of companies if Longstreet thought so, too!)

Despite popular opinion the batteries were still well armed with enough ammunition to fend off a counter attack even after the massive display of artillery that had never before been witnessed on earth

If that is true, what does it say about Edward Porter Alexander? If I remember correctly, he told Pickett to advance now very soon or else Alexanders guns would not be able to support the attack. And from what I have read up to now, the supply train was placed too far away to be of any help.
So, and I hope this is no deviation, we must ask, why Alexander made Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble think that their assault must be made so quickly. I think Alexander was not one to panic easily. Does the source that despite popular opinion says there was still enough ammunition for the guns give any reason why Alexander said that fateful “now or never“ (not his words, though, but something to the effect)? He sure was a much better tactician than me...
Or is that again a scene blurred by the description in the novel “Killer Angels“ and the movie 'Gettysburg“. As @Bee has frequently cautioned the ones like me, who came from that direction to study the Civil War, that masterfully written novel and the powerful scenes in the movie might have impregnated us with a false “knowledge“. Alexanders memoirs still await me, but I know that you, @War Horse have already read them. So, do you remember what he had to say about that moment and the immediate aftermath of battle?

One more personal remark on the OP: it always tears me apart to read of these suicidal thoughts of officers on both sides after a defeat. A few days ago we had a Trivia question around a quote by O.O. Howard, saying that after Chancellorsville he sought every chance to get killed in battle - now you quote Longstreet saying the same and from what I learned researching for Trivia (which often is not trivial at all!) it was a frequent reaction among officers on both sides (and maybe food for another thread). Tragic, and I hope not too many succeeded in fulfilling that wish (and of course your thread about the suicidal ride of Richard Garnett comes to mind once more).

Thank you @War Horse, and my compliments! Again you made us look at a seemingly well known situation from a different angle. I will be very interested to read what our Gettysburg experts will reply!
 
The Union would have had to cross the same open ground the Confederates failed to cross. Despite popular opinion the batteries were still well armed with enough ammunition to fend off a counter attack even after the massive display of artillery that had never before been witnessed on earth.

Prudence proved best and the inevitable that would have surly happened following a haphazardos effort by the Union army was avoided, Preserving Gettysburg as the unprecedented Union victory we know today.

The correct called was to not counter attack at Gettysburg.

The last time I posted my "dissertation" listing my reasons why I agreed with the above statement, I was confronted fairly aggressively about Meade using VI Corps which was in reserve and still fresh, in a counter-attack. I did some rooting around on the seemingly impossible feat of VI Corps marching 38 miles in 17 hours to get to Gettysburg by the 2 July...and I wondered just how "fresh" they were after that march? An excellent discussion on this march is here.

What say you @War Horse when confronted with the use of VI Corps to counter attack after Pickett's Charge?
 
The last time I posted my "dissertation" listing my reasons why I agreed with the above statement, I was confronted fairly aggressively about Meade using VI Corps which was in reserve and still fresh, in a counter-attack. I did some rooting around on the seemingly impossible feat of VI Corps marching 38 miles in 17 hours to get to Gettysburg by the 2 July...and I wondered just how "fresh" they were after that march? An excellent discussion on this march is here.

What say you @War Horse when confronted with the use of VI Corps to counter attack after Pickett's Charge?
You may recall that last September a certain renowned person (I'll whisper it ... Eric W) was going to kick me out of his car for suggesting that VI Corps could have easily gone in and finished off the Confederates. :smile:
 
Oh my, what a miserable tactician I would have made! Would you believe that I never thought of that?? Really, I did not!! Until this morning I was wondering why the final crush of a Union counter attack never came (and my only comfort is that I'm in the best of companies if Longstreet thought so, too!)



If that is true, what does it say about Edward Porter Alexander? If I remember correctly, he told Pickett to advance now very soon or else Alexanders guns would not be able to support the attack. And from what I have read up to now, the supply train was placed too far away to be of any help.
So, and I hope this is no deviation, we must ask, why Alexander made Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble think that their assault must be made so quickly. I think Alexander was not one to panic easily. Does the source that despite popular opinion says there was still enough ammunition for the guns give any reason why Alexander said that fateful “now or never“ (not his words, though, but something to the effect)? He sure was a much better tactician than me...
Or is that again a scene blurred by the description in the novel “Killer Angels“ and the movie 'Gettysburg“. As @Bee has frequently cautioned the ones like me, who came from that direction to study the Civil War, that masterfully written novel and the powerful scenes in the movie might have impregnated us with a false “knowledge“. Alexanders memoirs still await me, but I know that you, @War Horse have already read them. So, do you remember what he had to say about that moment and the immediate aftermath of battle?

One more personal remark on the OP: it always tears me apart to read of these suicidal thoughts of officers on both sides after a defeat. A few days ago we had a Trivia question around a quote by O.O. Howard, saying that after Chancellorsville he sought every chance to get killed in battle - now you quote Longstreet saying the same and from what I learned researching for Trivia (which often is not trivial at all!) it was a frequent reaction among officers on both sides (and maybe food for another thread). Tragic, and I hope not too many succeeded in fulfilling that wish (and of course your thread about the suicidal ride of Richard Garnett comes to mind once more).

Thank you @War Horse, and my compliments! Again you made us look at a seemingly well known situation from a different angle. I will be very interested to read what our Gettysburg experts will reply!
I think you have to remember his words. "Go now or I fear we will not have the ammunition to properly support your attack"
 
The last time I posted my "dissertation" listing my reasons why I agreed with the above statement, I was confronted fairly aggressively about Meade using VI Corps which was in reserve and still fresh, in a counter-attack. I did some rooting around on the seemingly impossible feat of VI Corps marching 38 miles in 17 hours to get to Gettysburg by the 2 July...and I wondered just how "fresh" they were after that march? An excellent discussion on this march is here.

What say you @War Horse when confronted with the use of VI Corps to counter attack after Pickett's Charge?
That was Meades intentions. However leadership was all but annihilated. The orders were given but the ranks took to long in assembling and the opportunity lost. Perhaps for the best.
 
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I think you have to remember his words. "Go now or I fear we will not have the ammunition to properly support your attack"

Yes, I do remember these words ... that's why I'm wondering whether a Union counter attack could have been repulsed by Confederate artillery. I always thought it would have been pretty easy to come after the defeated Confederate troups and finish what was left of Alexander's artillery. But okay, I also never thought of the Union troups being tired and footsore. It probably would have been difficult to muster the bravado for a counter attack.
 
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When and where was the kilpatrick cavalry attack after Pickett's Charge?
"As the attack failed, General Kilpatrick put his cavalry brigade under General Farnsworth on the charge through the infantry detachment in rear of my right division. The regiments of G.T. Anderson's brigade had been posted at points in rear as guards against cavalry, and the First Texas, Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama, and Bachman's and Reilly's batteries were looking for that adventure. Farnsworth had a rough ride over rocks and stone fences, but bore on in spite of all, cutting and slashing when he could get at the skirmishers or detachments. He made a gallant ride along the rear of our right, but was obligated to come under the infantry and artillery fire at several points. He fell, pierced, it is said, by five mortal wounds. Calls for him to surrender were made, but the cavalry were not riding for that. The command lost heavily but claimed captives equal to their loss. Kilpatrick's mistake was in not putting Farnsworth in on Merritt's left, were he would have had an open ride, and made more trouble than was ever made by a cavalry brigade."

From Manassas to Appomattox Pg 396

Kilpatrick was doing what he unfortunately did best. Ordering good men to their deaths.
 
You may recall that last September a certain renowned person (I'll whisper it ... Eric W) was going to kick me out of his car for suggesting that VI Corps could have easily gone in and finished off the Confederates. :smile:

First laugh of the day--> @PeterT

You were fortunate that I was holding onto you arm so that you did not fall out!!!
 
Yes, I do remember these words ... that's why I'm wondering whether a Union counter attack could have been repulsed by Confederate artillery. I always thought it would have been pretty easy to come after the defeated Confederate troups and finish what was left of Alexander's artillery. But okay, I also never thought of the Union troups being tired and footsore. It probably would have been difficult to muster the bravado for a counter attack.
Longstreet felt that had the cavalry been deployed correctly and not as Kilpatrick had done and followed up by a large infantry advance immediately following Pickett's repulse they did stand a chance of success. Remember a large infantry force, 15000 men just failed the same charge in reverse.
 
You may recall that last September a certain renowned person (I'll whisper it ... Eric W) was going to kick me out of his car for suggesting that VI Corps could have easily gone in and finished off the Confederates. :smile:
I do remember. It was really disturbing that we were travelling at 50+ MPH at the time. Goodness we almost lost you that day!
 
I have always thought of Meade's reluctance to counter-attack after Pickett's charge, and his reluctance to attack Lee after Lee's retreat from Gettysburg.....................As the old saying goes.............

“A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,”

IMHO...........Meade saw no reason to be greedy and jeopardize what was won............Sorta like winning $100,000 lottery and spending it all on trying to win a million, only to end up broke.

Meade had his victory, the victory the North needed. It is possible had he countered-attacked or attacked Lee during his retreat, the Northern victory could have been neutralized and that could have possibly paid dividends to the Confederacy over seas (Britain/France).

Anyways that my 2 cent's worth.................lol

Respectfully,
William
2 Cents Worth.jpg
 
Yes, I do remember these words ... that's why I'm wondering whether a Union counter attack could have been repulsed by Confederate artillery. I always thought it would have been pretty easy to come after the defeated Confederate troups and finish what was left of Alexander's artillery. But okay, I also never thought of the Union troups being tired and footsore. It probably would have been difficult to muster the bravado for a counter attack.


Also we have to remember.................Alexander and Longstreet knew the artillery was short on ammo, but did Meade and the AotP?................another reason that probably could have played into not counter-attacking.


Respectfully,
William
Cannonballs.jpg
 
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I also wonder about the impact of battle and the human nervous system on the decision to not counterattack.

Psychologically and physically, the men of the AOP were prepared to repel an attack. If any situation contributed to high adrenaline and a fight/flight/freeze response, the PPT charge would do the trick!

After fighting off the assault, the men would've probably "crashed" quickly and felt exhausted, no doubt aided by the temperature. They would have been in lousy physical condition to even move from A to B, much less attack over that distance of open ground.

Of course, psychologically it's also a challenge to rapidly shift from a mindset of survive-this-attack to let's-go-get-them. I wish I could remember what writer addressed that issue, but I tend to agree with it. It must take a great deal of flexibility to move from one tactical response to another.

Just my two cents,
Adam
 
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