Lesson unlearned

[Dave Wilma]

I just finished a recent book on World War I which included an interesting point: The war did not turn against Germany until 1917 when the Allies got serious about the blockade of Continental Europe. Supplies and materiel flowed into Germany through the Netherlands and other neutrals almost unimpeded. Indeed, U.S. consular officials helped U.S. businesses get their products across frontiers into Germany. Had the British studied their history they would have seen how critical the Union blockade of the Confederacy using a fraction of the manpower and expense of the land campaign.

On the other side, the German General Staff ignored the knowledge gained in 1861-65 because the Americans were not "professional soldiers." For example, the Germans overestimated the capacity of their armies of foot soldiers and horse-drawn artillery and supply trains to cover ground.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

The true effects of naval blockades appear to be both subtle and also substantially mixed in with other efforts, so it's hard to get a good read on their overall effectiveness. I have some books on my Amazon Wish List that treat blockade in a more theoretical manner... but that's some ways down the pike.

 

[leftyhunter]

Professor Williams in his book"The South Bitterly Divided" makes the argument the blockade was ineffective due to the huge amount of graft in the Union forces. Prof Williams cites Union river gunboats loaded down with southern cotton being smuggled to Union buyers.
A broad general question is what really made the Anaconda plan work? Or put another way what percentage of the Anaconda plan worked due to USN blockade vs the Union Army capturing major ports?
Leftyhunter

 

[Carronade]

Cotton going north didn't necessary translate into profits or useful goods returned to the growers or the Confederacy - a lot of it was simply confiscated. During expeditions like the Red River the gunboat fleet was known to stake their claim by stencilling USN on cotton bales already marked CSA; this led to army wags nicknaming them the Cotton Stealing Association of the US Navy

Still it's a valid point that there was a lot of actual trade across the lines, with profits made on both sides; and I've also read that it helped prolong the war.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I read something recently (might have been in Philip Myers' Caution and Cooperation) that Lincoln and Seward were prepared to tolerate (unofficially) a certain amount of across-the-lines trading, particularly for cotton; the reason being that it was one way to get at least some cotton to Britain and France and relieve the pressure for intervention. I'm dubious of that argument, but it's probably worth a further look. This would not have pleased the local commanders attempting to enforce a blockade, of course.

 

[Carronade]

The British were not unaware of the value of blockade; it was a key element of their strategy in the Napoleonic and other wars, including when they fought us. Imposing a blockade was one of their first moves in 1914, and it included foodstuffs along with conventional contraband. While it is hard to quantify, the German diet deteriorated progressively throughout the war, including the "turnip winter" of 1916-17. Loss of nitrate imports not only reduced the supply of fertilizer, it might have curtailed munitions production if not for the recently invented Haber-Bosch process for fixing nitrogen from the atmosphere.

 

[ole]

Professor Williams in his book"The South Bitterly Divided" makes the argument the blockade was ineffective due to the huge amount of graft in the Union forces. Prof Williams cites Union river gunboats loaded down with southern cotton being smuggled to Union buyers.
A broad general question is what really made the Anaconda plan work? Or put another way what percentage of the Anaconda plan worked due to USN blockade vs the Union Army capturing major ports?
Leftyhunter

One result of the blockade was limiting the imports to smaller, faster ships and forcing them to land where facilities and transportation were inadequate.

 

[Dave Wilma]

We might distinguish the various aspects of the blockade. The CSA had its own blockade to keep cotton off the market and bring European powers into the war on its side. That strategy did not involve the U.S. Navy.

The next aspect is the blockade of strategic materials into the Confederacy. Slow to start and never total, it did prevent the importation of really heavy items like locomotives and steel and materiel the Rebs could not make (but could steal) for themselves. This is the blockade that would have instructed Allied strategy during The Great War.

The riverine and inter coastal smuggling of cotton to the North might have reaped some profits for the Southern planters, but I'm willing to bet their income as down. Who paid for the corruption of this underground traffic? Not the Northern mill owners I would suspect. Does anyone have cotton prices at the mills pre and post 1861? I'm willing to bet any increases did not go to the planters.

 

[Dave Wilma]

The British were not unaware of the value of blockade; it was a key element of their strategy in the Napoleonic and other wars, including when they fought us. Imposing a blockade was one of their first moves in 1914, and it included foodstuffs along with conventional contraband. While it is hard to quantify, the German diet deteriorated progressively throughout the war, including the "turnip winter" of 1916-17. Loss of nitrate imports not only reduced the supply of fertilizer, it might have curtailed munitions production if not for the recently invented Haber-Bosch process for fixing nitrogen from the atmosphere.

The British declared a blockade, but didn't do much with it. They dithered for three years worrying that they would offend the neutral Dutch and the enterprising Americans. (my source is Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914) Yes, Germans went undernourished, but the German Army got strategic materials and Americans got rich. So rich that the German debt to the U.S. was a significant factor in the Roosevelt Administration's reluctance to object to the Nazi treatment of Jews.

 

[ole]

The "illicit" trade in cotton kept the northern mills rolling. To do otherwise would have been quite foolish. Confiscating and selling cotton to millers was a grand contribution to the coffers dedicated to prosecuting the war.

 

[JeffBrooks]

I think the most important achievement of the blockade was to contribute to the runaway inflation in the Confederacy. This made life increasingly difficult for the civilian populations, which, in turn, sapped the morale of the soldiers on the front, destabilized the armies, and eventually resulted in large-scale desertion.

 

[Rebforever]

I think the most important achievement of the blockade was to contribute to the runaway inflation in the Confederacy. This made life increasingly difficult for the civilian populations, which, in turn, sapped the morale of the soldiers on the front, destabilized the armies, and eventually resulted in large-scale desertion.

Morale was bad? Hmmm. Show me where that comes from. Like letters from soldiers, maybe?

 

[johan_steele]

Morale was bad? Hmmm. Show me where that comes from. Like letters from soldiers, maybe?

When did the CS resort to conscription and mandatory enlistment extensions? That can be attributed to a loss of morale for those the CS depended upon. Add in vast swaths of CS territory under US control, bread riots and such... morale among the civilian populace was not high.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Again, part of the challenge in evaluating the blockade's effectiveness is that there are very few things you can point to and say, "This happened because of the blockade," because in almost every case there are other influences at work as well. Morale is one of those things. The knowledge of the blockade affected some people more than the reality of it did, some the other way around, some didn't feel particularly bothered or affected by it, while others were devastated.

I still like the way Craig L. Symonds opened a discussion of the blockade on CSPAN/Book TV by highlighting the contradictions involved in its study. Apologies for perhaps not getting the wording quite right, but any inaccuracies are due to my memory and not to Symonds' scholarship: "Eighty percent of attempts to run the blockade were successful. Eighty percent of blockade runners were eventually caught. These are both true statements."

 

[Rebforever]

When did the CS resort to conscription and mandatory enlistment extensions? That can be attributed to a loss of morale for those the CS depended upon. Add in vast swaths of CS territory under US control, bread riots and such... morale among the civilian populace was not high.

Northern Conscription was also demoralizing. Same for both sections. I agree with you on the civilian population
but the soldiers were still ready to fight.

 

[CSA Today]

Northern Conscription was also demoralizing. Same for both sections. I agree with you on the civilian population
but the soldiers were still ready to fight.

You are so right.

What I always though remarkable was despite the fact that union enlistments (including conscription) would approximately equal or exceed the total white male population of the Confederate states the Lincoln government had to resort to conscription only after a year the CSA. And yeah, conscription/draft laws were unpopular in the 1860s – they were also unpopular in the 1960s. And yeah, there was the Richmond bread riot but not the draft riots that occurred in the North—it wasn't just New York. And yes, desertions hurt the Confederate war effort, but Confederate desertion was never as extensive as for the Northern forces despite all the privations in the South.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Bottom line: Conscription was unpopular on both sides of the Mason-Dixon... not too surprising.

I really don't think there's a strong enough causal link to list conscription, etc., as an effect of the blockade. Maybe there was some influence somewhere, but it would be extremely tough to prove.

 

[thomas aagaard]

During wwi Denmark traded with both Germany and Britain, with the (unofficial) acceptance of both of them.


About blockades.
The moment you declare it and have ships lying of the enemies ports it is effective, in the sense that it is legal and most neutral shipping will not risk running it. This forced the blockaded part to rely on its own shipping.

Problem is offcause when the ship just go to a neutral country (like Holland). During the Napoleonic wars Denmark ended up fighting Brittan because of the question about the rights of neutral shipping.
I guess the Brits didn't want to risk Holland joining The germans.

 

[leftyhunter]

Again, part of the challenge in evaluating the blockade's effectiveness is that there are very few things you can point to and say, "This happened because of the blockade," because in almost every case there are other influences at work as well. Morale is one of those things. The knowledge of the blockade affected some people more than the reality of it did, some the other way around, some didn't feel particularly bothered or affected by it, while others were devastated.

I still like the way Craig L. Symonds opened a discussion of the blockade on CSPAN/Book TV by highlighting the contradictions involved in its study. Apologies for perhaps not getting the wording quite right, but any inaccuracies are due to my memory and not to Symonds' scholarship: "Eighty percent of attempts to run the blockade were successful. Eighty percent of blockade runners were eventually caught. These are both true statements."

I could see the above statement being true. If a smuggler just does one run he has an 80% chance of not getting caught. However if greed sets in and apparently it did yes over time the blockade runner would get caught. To make it worse the more ports the Union captured the more US naval ships could concentrate on the other ports.
Question if a blockade runner is caught what kind of punishment could the captain and crew receive? If the blockade runners are not US citizens could they even be punished? What was the territorial seas limit during the CW?
Leftyhunter

 

[JeffBrooks]

The fact that the majority of efforts to run the blockade were successful obscures the reality of the blockade's effectiveness. First, blockade runners have to be sleek and fast, and hence cannot carry as much cargo as a regular vessel. Second, the number of total ships coming into Southern ports was greatly lessened because large numbers of people didn't want to go to the trouble of trying to run the blockade. Third (and this is an underrated point), the existence of the blockade made insurance rates go much higher, which cut into the profits of the merchants trying to conduct trade between Britain and the South. All of these factors combined to inflict heavy, and eventually crippling, economic pain on the people of the Confederacy in the form of mass inflation.