The Peninsula Campaign: Barnard's "Lessons Learned"

[67th Tigers]

In fact, the weather seriously disrupted the rebel attack at Seven Pines. Whilst DH Hill's movement was seriously slowed, especially the brigade that had to wade through the White Oak, worse was that the bridge of Gillie's Creek was washed away. In the scheme of maneouvre, Huger and Longstreet had to cross this bridge, Huger first. In fact Longstreet got there first and improvised a gang-plank that allowed the infantry to move over one by one in single file. The artillery could not cross.

Longstreet refused to yield to Huger, but offered to send 2 brigades (Anderson and Wilcox) towards DH Hill instead. Thus, instead of 13 brigades mounting a dawn attack, six brigades would be mounting an attack ca. 1300 or later. This was due to the weather. Johnston's orders and absence exacerbated the situation, but it was one created by the weather.

Thus, the weather was a major factor in disrupting the rebel attack. There is an argument to be made, and I agree with it, that if Casey and Keyes had been moderately competent then DH Hill's attack would have broken before Casey. All Casey needed to do was hunker down in his defences and repel the attacks. Instead they came out of them and charged.

 

[Belfoured]

In fact, the weather seriously disrupted the rebel attack at Seven Pines. Whilst DH Hill's movement was seriously slowed, especially the brigade that had to wade through the White Oak, worse was that the bridge of Gillie's Creek was washed away. In the scheme of maneouvre, Huger and Longstreet had to cross this bridge, Huger first. In fact Longstreet got there first and improvised a gang-plank that allowed the infantry to move over one by one in single file. The artillery could not cross.

Longstreet refused to yield to Huger, but offered to send 2 brigades (Anderson and Wilcox) towards DH Hill instead. Thus, instead of 13 brigades mounting a dawn attack, six brigades would be mounting an attack ca. 1300 or later. This was due to the weather. Johnston's orders and absence exacerbated the situation, but it was one created by the weather.

Thus, the weather was a major factor in disrupting the rebel attack. There is an argument to be made, and I agree with it, that if Casey and Keyes had been moderately competent then DH Hill's attack would have broken before Casey. All Casey needed to do was hunker down in his defences and repel the attacks. Instead they came out of them and charged.

More spin. The three hour delay resulted from Longstreet unilaterally deciding to alter Johnston's orders that he take the Nine Mile Road (with no crossing) and instead taking the Williamsburg Road that was assigned to Huger, and then getting into a dispute with Huger at the crossing, resulting in a two-division pile up. As Hooker pointed out in his report the roads were "heavy" but not an obstacle until he encountered the tide of refugees from Casey's Division. The Confederate reports are remarkably devoid of any reference to being unable to make the attack because of the condition of the roads. Even with the delay Johnston caught McClellan with his pants down. You, predictably, place the blame on Casey and Keyes, despite the fact that leading up to the battle McClellan explicitly made Keyes subject to Heintzelman and was literally and personally approving Heintzelman's dispositions. The bottom line is that Johnston was not intimidated by the "frightful" roads that caused paralysis by McClellan.

 

[67th Tigers]

The three hour delay resulted from Longstreet unilaterally deciding to alter Johnston's orders that he take the Nine Mile Road

Why did he do this? Maybe Sears says something that...

"Huger's three brigades had camped for the night along the Richmond lateral road close by Gillies Creek, which they would have to cross to reach the Williamsburg and then the Charles City roads. His orders were to start out "as early in the morning as possible," but by the time he finally woke and got his men down to Gillies Creek, Longstreet's division had already reached there from the Nine Mile Road and was crossing slowly on an improvised bridge over the creek in flood from the previous night's storm. Huger's orders did not tell him the battle would only open after he relieved D. H. Hill's brigade out on the Charles City Road so that it might join Hill for the attack on the Federal center—Huger in fact only learned there was to be a battle when he talked to Longstreet that morning—and in any event Longstreet claimed (falsely) that he was the senior general of the two and refused to relinquish the right-of-way at the crossing.

The scene took on the look of comic opera. Hour after hour the fuming Huger waited while Longstreet's column inched its way across the creek, and then, once on the Williamsburg Road, Longstreet politely had his men step aside so that Huger's following troops might pass them. It was now 10:00 A.M., and rather than striking at the Yankees over three roads in three parallel columns, the three divisions under Longstreet were now all crowded onto a single road—and were a good four hours behind schedule. All the while General Johnston, watch in hand, was trying to find out what had happened to his battle."

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign . Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.

(with no crossing)

Really?

 

[Belfoured]

Why did he do this? Maybe Sears says something that...

"Huger's three brigades had camped for the night along the Richmond lateral road close by Gillies Creek, which they would have to cross to reach the Williamsburg and then the Charles City roads. His orders were to start out "as early in the morning as possible," but by the time he finally woke and got his men down to Gillies Creek, Longstreet's division had already reached there from the Nine Mile Road and was crossing slowly on an improvised bridge over the creek in flood from the previous night's storm. Huger's orders did not tell him the battle would only open after he relieved D. H. Hill's brigade out on the Charles City Road so that it might join Hill for the attack on the Federal center—Huger in fact only learned there was to be a battle when he talked to Longstreet that morning—and in any event Longstreet claimed (falsely) that he was the senior general of the two and refused to relinquish the right-of-way at the crossing.

The scene took on the look of comic opera. Hour after hour the fuming Huger waited while Longstreet's column inched its way across the creek, and then, once on the Williamsburg Road, Longstreet politely had his men step aside so that Huger's following troops might pass them. It was now 10:00 A.M., and rather than striking at the Yankees over three roads in three parallel columns, the three divisions under Longstreet were now all crowded onto a single road—and were a good four hours behind schedule. All the while General Johnston, watch in hand, was trying to find out what had happened to his battle."

Sears, Stephen W.. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign . Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Kindle Edition.




Really?

You seem confused. Try harder. Longstreet was ordered to advance by the Nine Mile Road, not by the Williamsburg Road. Huger was supposed to advance by the latter. Longstreet decided on his own to cut over to the Williamsburg Road from the Nine Mile Road and when Huger got there he found Longstreet in his way. The resulting disagreement and the two division pileup caused the problem. While it's intriguing to see you referring to Sears as an authority, he appears to be saying the same thing.

Meanwhile, and as expected, "crickets" on the absence of references in the Confederate reports to being unable to get to the battlefield because of the "frightful" condition of the roads. Likewise, "crickets" on Hooker's report that the condition of the roads did not prevent him from responding to the debacle unfolding with Casey's division.

 

[67th Tigers]

You seem confused.

It's a direct quote from Sears who, unlike you, is aware that the columns had to cross Gillie's Creek, which was washed out.

I would suggest that Sears, Newton (who says the same) and me are not confused, and you are simply unaware of the existence of this water feature, and the impediment to movement that it was.

 

[Belfoured]

It's a direct quote from Sears who, unlike you, is aware that the columns had to cross Gillie's Creek, which was washed out.

I would suggest that Sears, Newton (who says the same) and me are not confused, and you are simply unaware of the existence of this water feature, and the impediment to movement that it was.

Who is unaware of the existence of that feature? The columns had to cross Gillies Creek because both divisions were using the Williamsburg Road. You, on the other hand, are clearly and puzzlingly unaware of the location of Gillies Creek. It was below and parallel to the Nine Mile Road. That road didn't cross Gillies Creek. Had Longstreet followed his orders he wouldn't have crossed Gillies Creek. Instead, he decided on his own to head over to the Williamsburg Road, which was already assigned to Huger. Making things worse, he got there first. That creek had to be bridged but - as Sears points out - it was. The problem is that Huger now had to wait until Longstreet crossed, and then Longstreet pulled over to allow Huger to pass him and take the lead, and then the road ended up with three divisions crammed onto it. It wasn't an autobahn. That's how the attack got delayed for three hours.

You've apparently shocked yourself enough by citing Sears that you've lost the ability to read for comprehension.

 

[67th Tigers]

Let us remember what Barnard wrote to Fox on 11th May, 1862 (emphasis in original):

When we arrived before Yorktown, the defensive lines were essentially completed. We have seen them working much since then, but it has been in auxiliaries. It is quite possible (though no mortal could at once say so) that an attack the first day might have succeeded. But how were we qualified to make it, —a part of Heintzelman's Corps had got up, with some Artillery, —Keyes was foundered in the swamps on our left, and, of the rest of the Army part were trying to get over roads impassable till our own labor corduroyed them, and a part was yet unlanded. The project of an assault was mere hare-brained folly—to cast the fate of the
Army (and of the country) upon a slim chance. On the other hand, the method of siege operations against Yorktown was a perfect certainty. I never hesitated or doubted a moment, and, though I was disappointed, I was not surprised, on the morning of the 4th of May, to learn that the enemy had evacuated. I knew that he could not hold 6 hours after we opened fire and only hoped that he did not know what a fire would be opened upon him.

It seems his judgment corresponded with mine exactly and he took the course, to him inevitable, —he evacuated. What has been the result of one month's Campaign there? We have taken Norfolk—destroyed the Merrimac—opened the York and James Rivers —
captured the lines of Yorktown and 100 pieces nearly of Artillery (counting those from everywhere in the Peninsula and Gloucester) and are within 40 miles of Richmond with an enemy utterly demoralized and staking his all—if he does fight—upon a battle, for which
he has abandoned everything to raise a formidable force.

I do not mean that we are not likely to encounter formidable resistance between us and Richmond— I think quite likely we are, that we are to meet everything a desperate enemy can muster to oppose us and led into battle by men who feel that they are casting their last throw of the dice.

I sent, three days ago, an official report to Gen. Totten, of the siege of Yorktown with an accurate plan of the fortifications of that place and of Gloucester, and a description of the lines across the isthmus. I really think that a competent military authority ought to express an opinion as to these defences, that the public and administration may really know what we have had to encounter.

I have had occasion during what has happened to know and appreciate the foresight with which Gen. McClellan has provided for the contingencies of this campaign. To him personally is due—more than to any of his subordinates—the triumphant success of the
siege operations of Yorktown.

This Army which he has organized, surpasses all my expectations. It exhibits the discipline and order of Regulars and has shown that its fighting qualities are equal to its discipline.

I believe that no other man in the U. S. would have accomplished in ''organizing victory" (i.e. preparing and disciplining armies—providing the material — and in exercising for a long time, as he did, a powerful influence over the general operations) what McClellan
has and that to him more than to any man is due the triumphant results which the last 3 months have produced.

The Secretary of War saw fit to sneer at this expression ''organizing victory"—says that God alone can give victory. Most true—would that every man in this Army was impressed with that sentiment, and would go forth to battle with the truth and feeling at his heart,
that with Him the Hosts of men are but as dust which He scatters whither He will—that he who trusts in an "arm of flesh" is doomed, sooner or later to defeat. But God has told us that it is not by miracles but by human means that He achieves results, and it is through human means and human actors—and that it is through men like Carnot—or Wellington or Napoleon—that He "organizes victory."

 

[Belfoured]

Let us remember what Barnard wrote to Fox on 11th May, 1862 (emphasis in original):

When we arrived before Yorktown, the defensive lines were essentially completed. We have seen them working much since then, but it has been in auxiliaries. It is quite possible (though no mortal could at once say so) that an attack the first day might have succeeded. But how were we qualified to make it, —a part of Heintzelman's Corps had got up, with some Artillery, —Keyes was foundered in the swamps on our left, and, of the rest of the Army part were trying to get over roads impassable till our own labor corduroyed them, and a part was yet unlanded. The project of an assault was mere hare-brained folly—to cast the fate of the
Army (and of the country) upon a slim chance. On the other hand, the method of siege operations against Yorktown was a perfect certainty. I never hesitated or doubted a moment, and, though I was disappointed, I was not surprised, on the morning of the 4th of May, to learn that the enemy had evacuated. I knew that he could not hold 6 hours after we opened fire and only hoped that he did not know what a fire would be opened upon him.

It seems his judgment corresponded with mine exactly and he took the course, to him inevitable, —he evacuated. What has been the result of one month's Campaign there? We have taken Norfolk—destroyed the Merrimac—opened the York and James Rivers —
captured the lines of Yorktown and 100 pieces nearly of Artillery (counting those from everywhere in the Peninsula and Gloucester) and are within 40 miles of Richmond with an enemy utterly demoralized and staking his all—if he does fight—upon a battle, for which
he has abandoned everything to raise a formidable force.

I do not mean that we are not likely to encounter formidable resistance between us and Richmond— I think quite likely we are, that we are to meet everything a desperate enemy can muster to oppose us and led into battle by men who feel that they are casting their last throw of the dice.

I sent, three days ago, an official report to Gen. Totten, of the siege of Yorktown with an accurate plan of the fortifications of that place and of Gloucester, and a description of the lines across the isthmus. I really think that a competent military authority ought to express an opinion as to these defences, that the public and administration may really know what we have had to encounter.

I have had occasion during what has happened to know and appreciate the foresight with which Gen. McClellan has provided for the contingencies of this campaign. To him personally is due—more than to any of his subordinates—the triumphant success of the
siege operations of Yorktown.

This Army which he has organized, surpasses all my expectations. It exhibits the discipline and order of Regulars and has shown that its fighting qualities are equal to its discipline.

I believe that no other man in the U. S. would have accomplished in ''organizing victory" (i.e. preparing and disciplining armies—providing the material — and in exercising for a long time, as he did, a powerful influence over the general operations) what McClellan
has and that to him more than to any man is due the triumphant results which the last 3 months have produced.

The Secretary of War saw fit to sneer at this expression ''organizing victory"—says that God alone can give victory. Most true—would that every man in this Army was impressed with that sentiment, and would go forth to battle with the truth and feeling at his heart,
that with Him the Hosts of men are but as dust which He scatters whither He will—that he who trusts in an "arm of flesh" is doomed, sooner or later to defeat. But God has told us that it is not by miracles but by human means that He achieves results, and it is through human means and human actors—and that it is through men like Carnot—or Wellington or Napoleon—that He "organizes victory."

Well, to quote Captain Miller in SPR, "we have crossed some strange boundary here. The world has taken a turn for the surreal". In one thread we today have a poster declaring himself a "world expert". In this one we're being given a quote which asserts that McClellan was an agent of God. I suppose the "glass half full" is that McClellan is accompanied by the likes of mere mortals such as Wellington and Naploeon.

All righty then ....