In the modern military, there are programs for institutional examination and introspection to study and learn from actions and operations. The US Army has a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL, located at Ft. Leavenworth since 1985) . What follows is from General Barnard's report in the Official Records. This is the closing section of the report on the Peninsula Campaign. It is his attempt to apply hindsight and discover the "Lessons Learned" from the Peninsula Campaign. This is not about what Barnard thought/promoted/advised during the actual operation. This is what he thought they should have done instead after more than a year of thought.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/1 [S# 12]
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VIRGINIA
March 17-September 2, 1862.(*)
No. 2. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U.S. Army, Chief Engineer of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862.
Washington, January 26, 1863.
GENERAL: In compliance with the request of Major-General McClellan, I make the following report of the engineer operations of the Army of the Potomac executed under my direction as chief engineer of that army from the time of its organization to the date at which it was withdrawn from the James River:
...
Here, perhaps, I might close, but it occurs to me that this paper, purporting to give a history of the operations of engineers from the organization of the Army of the Potomac to the close of its campaign on the Peninsula, can hardly be considered complete without a retrospect, pointing out the mistakes that were made, and thus tracing the causes of its failure to their true sources.
One of the prominent among the causes of the ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the material, yet was about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly-inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. In the Winter 1861-62 Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do. Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it had been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true question was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammeled liberty of action while it was possessed.
When the army did move, a plan was adopted perfectly certain to invite, nay, to compel, interference, and when the army was to go by Annapolis to the Lower Chesapeake I felt confident that one-half would scarcely have embarked before the other half would be ordered back to Washington. The enemy was then at Manassas, and the feint (even if no reality) of an attack on Washington was so obvious, so certain to create a panic which no Executive could resist, that interference with the removal of the mass of the army was certain.
When the enemy had fallen back behind the Rappahannock and destroyed the railroad bridges the circumstances were greatly changed, and there were strong arguments for the line adopted; yet results have proved how many reasons there were to be considered besides the purely military ones which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a line. The facts connected with the withholding of McDowell's corps have been so completely exhibited in the proceedings of the McDowell Court of Inquiry that every one who wishes can form his own judgment. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one of those things resulting from the taking a line of operations which did not itself cover Washington.
At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge, and reduced in numbers by sickness, loss in battle, expiration of period of service, &c., while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion, so nearly throttled. How, then, happened it that the date of the initiation of the campaign of the magnificent Army of the Potomac was the date of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow strong pari passu with the slow progress of its operations?
However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the morale, was on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded, and if we failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors of the siege. Our troops toiled a month in the trenches or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts' content. They are not yet exhausted.
The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors, and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential considerations. Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force; but the battle of Williamsburg, fought as it was without reconnoitering the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blunder which ought not to have happened.
We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought, and we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought till next day, a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary; but if it had been, we could have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered our position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some results might have flowed from it. We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day and Sedgwick's division on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat and perhaps his capture must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.
On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed the Chickahominy and connected with the Navy in the James. We should have had a united army and the co-operation of the Navy, and probably would have been in Richmond in two weeks. The facts that we did not know the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle (as it lay across our direct road to Richmond); that our transports were on the York River, and that the railroad furnished a good means of supply to the army; that we wished to connect with McDowell coming from Fredericksburg, &c., determined our route. In taking it we lost essentially all that was worth going so far to gain, viz, the James River approach and the co-operation of the Navy.
The route chosen, two weeks should not have been spent in traversing the 40 miles from Williamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridge; and the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th and even earlier had measures been pressed to prepare for it.
The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which if not seized do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing.
Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious enough at that time that when the rebels struck a blow at our left wing they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.
After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter there was no longer hope of an increase of force by the junction of his corps. There were no other re-enforcements to look for beyond what we received by the middle of the month of June. The rebel force was known or supposed to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking up of Beauregard's army.
At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place, and, in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or had the fortified lines (thrown up expressly for that object) been held by 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond. As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance, and we fought with 27,000 men, losing the battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own.
In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond actually consumed, there is now no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two points on the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the tete-de-pont at Bottom's Bridge should have been completed, and likewise tétes-de-pont or strong positions prepared to cover the débouchés from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion and concentration on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have occurred.
When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had deprived it of the élan which results from success alone. It was, moreover (as well as our forces elsewhere), sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army from its first low state had risen to be an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had its numbers, indeed, approached to that attributed to it (200,000 men), there is little doubt that a march upon Washington would have speedily followed our withdrawal to the James. From such considerations, as well as those flowing from the results of past operations, I counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering Washington.
Respectfully submitted.
J. G. BARNARD,
Brig. Gen. and late Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac.
General R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.
Last edited:
Bringing the