Lee's Forgotten Corps Commander

[Bruce Allardice]

I heard from someone who's writing a book on Anderson that Anderson was a heavy drinker.

 

[jackt62]

According to the "Encyclopedia of Confederate Generals;"

"During the retreat to Appomattox, Anderson's corps was overrun at Sayler's Creek on April 6, 1865. Anderson fled on horseback, earning him Lee's censure. General Lee relieved him of his command on April 8. Now a supernumerary, General Anderson headed for home on April 8, one day before Lee surrendered."

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I thought I'd make a thread asking what people's opinions on Richard Anderson are. He was a very competent divisional commander from all I've read, but never showed true greatness as a corps commander. He is seemingly left out of most discussions regarding Lee's lieutenants.

Through the war, thought Richard 'Dick' Anderson developed in his role as an able combat division leader and he emerged in the final year of the conflict as a capable stand-in corps commander for Lee's army.

By accounts, Anderson personally, was extremely pleasant and amiable, meaning he was easy to get along with and likable. These personal qualities enabled him to fit into Lee's senior command structure well. (Cannot recall any noteworthy frictions occurring between him and other commanders).

Anderson had gained extensive military experience in a variety of postings before the start of the Civil War. During the war, prior to 1864, he established a reputation in the field as a competent division commander, firstly during the Peninsula Campaign (while still a B-G), then at Second Bull Rull, Antietam (until wounded and forced from the field) and Chancellorsville. During these engagements thought he displayed firm combat leadership as well as a capacity for higher field command with greater responsibilities attached. (July 2 at Gettysburg, perhaps, was the one notable exception where his exercise of decisive leadership was lacking).

By 1864, thought Anderson had become a suitable candidate for field corps command, at least on a backup basis. When Longstreet was severely wounded in 1864, Anderson took over temporary command of the 1st. Corps in Lee's Army during the Overland Campaign. On this appointment, the usually astutely observant, E. P. Alexander, who had witnessed Anderson's combat leadership performance up until this time, described Anderson as a 'sturdy & reliable fighter'. (see 'Fighting for the Confederacy' at p. 365). Perhaps the pinnacle of Anderson's command career occurred at Spotsylvania, where his prompt arrival on the field and resolute defense conducted there, played a key role in resisting Grant's offensive. After Longstreet's return to his corps command towards the end of the year, Anderson was given command of the newly formed 4th Corps – a small corps comprising just four infantry brigades. However, he assumed command of this corps in severely adverse circumstances where a besieged and dwindling army was already in its death throes, with limited options for maneuverings. Anderson's small corps was routed in the Confederate defeat at Sailor's Creek near the close of the war, resulting in him being left without a command over the last few days of hostilities.

Bottom line. Thought Anderson developed as a capable and solid combat division commander who generally displayed firm and responsible leadership in the field. In my view, he was one of the ANV's best combat division commanders (notwithstanding his performance at Gettysburg). Thought too, that by 1864, Anderson had graduated to become an able substitute corps commander, if needed. But by the time he was elevated to corps command, thought it was too late in the war, for one to properly assess (and fully appreciate) the full extent of his abilities in this senior command role.

 

[Paul Yancey]

This is quoted from Gordon Rhea's The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern.

"Judging from Anderson's performance at Spotsylvania , Lee's initial concern about the South Carolinian's reputed indolence seemed unwarranted. Anderson's march to Spotsylvania had saved the Confederate army. Skeptics may quibble that the dearth of campsites rather than military perspicacity spurred Anderson on, but no one can quarrel with his results. and no one can deny that Anderson exercised commendable discretion once he reached the Block House Bridge, directing troops to Laurel Hill and Spotsylvania to deal with emerging threats. On perceiving that Stuart had a sound grasp of the Laurel Hill front, Anderson appropriately gave him a free hand in deploying 1st Corps troops. Thereafter, Anderson defended Laurel Hill with unflinching steadiness. Longstreet himself could not have done better."

 

[Jim Heen]

Wasn't it General Dick Anderson who chased Grant through the Wilderness by cutting a road for artillery through the trees? I'm fairly certain he succeeded and did a good job keeping the AoTP occupied rather than moving forward unopposed. Seems like he did a good job.

Also, didn't General Anderson play a prominent role in the retreat of the AoNV during the Appomattox campaign?

My impression is that maybe Anderson was just more concerned about doing a good job than he was about engaging in rivalries to make himself look better at the expense of others. I can't recall anybody accusing him of ambitiously gunning for a higher/independent command. I think that he was a bit slow moving, but otherwise dependable.

Sometimes the absence of excessive notierity (good or bad) can be a good thing. I think General Anderson fits that bill.

There's most likely more to him than that, but that is my general impression of Anderson.

In Gordon Rhea's book on Spotsylvania, he notes that it was General Lee who ordered a road cut through the woods from Anderson's lower flank to the Catharpin Road west of Todd's Tavern. Lee was concerned that Grant had the inside track to Spotsylvania Court House along the Brock Road if he moved in that direction. At 7 pm on May 7, Lee ordered Anderson to pull out a little after dark, "march the troops a litle way to the rear and let the men have some sleep" and then continue to Spotsylvania Court House. However, the smoke and stench from the recent fighting was so overpowering, Anderson decided to continue towards the Court House "until I got clear of the fires." Rhea calls this one of the most critical decisions of the campaign as it allowed Anderson to arrive at the Court House just before Warren's V Corps.

Still, there is an issue as to how much credit Anderson gets for this decision. Lee was the one who had the trace cut through the woods and ordered the night march, though had Anderson stopped for a few hours sleep, as directed by Lee, he would have been too late to the Court House. But the reason he decided not to stop was not his concern that Grant might get there first (though that undoubtably played a role) but because the smoke and stench were too overpowering to warrant stopping for sleep as Lee suggested. Of course, this is all set in motion by Lee intiaiting Anderson's night march in anticiaption of a Grant's march. If Lee does not do this, Grant gets to Spotsylvnain first, regardless. But Lee also got a little lucky that Anderson exercised some initiative not to stop and get some sleep but to push on. And for exercizing his discretion, Anderson is to be commended.

 

[Luke Freet]

I thought I'd make a thread asking what people's opinions on Richard Anderson are. He was a very competent divisional commander from all I've read, but never showed true greatness as a corps commander. He is seemingly left out of most discussions regarding Lee's lieutenants.

Anderson got command after Longstreet's wounding on May 6th at the Wilderness. He really did have much time to have an impact on the battle, it appears, with his division being basically split up for various tactical purposes.
His first real moment of command came the next portion of the Overland Campaign, where he started his men's march early to get away from the debris of battle, putting them in position to reinforce Laurel Hill in the nick of time.
Anderson spent much of his time at Spotsylvania holding Laurel Hill, which despite the constant attacks by Warren's V Corps, was the least stressful portion of the battlefield due to the excellent terrain.
His first real low performance as a corps commander was at Bethesda Church, where one of his divisions, Pickett's, was supposed to support Early's attack. This did not occur. Whether this failure was on Pickett or on Anderson I am not well read enough to say. His corps would perform well in the fighting around Cold Harbor.
My knowledge as to Anderson's command around the Petersburg front is hazy, as its an area I have read quite little about in comparison with other campaigns of the year. To my knowledge, Anderson & his corps were mostly operating north of the Appomattox River, with Pickett's Division holding the Howlett Line (Bermuda Hundred) while Kershaw & Field defended around Deep Bottom & Chaffin's Farm nearer to Richmond.
Here is where I'm most knowledgable on Anderson's time as a corps commander, courtesy of Scott Patchan's The Last Battle of Winchester. In August of 1864, Lee decides to seen Anderson with Kerhsaw's Division, plus Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry Division & Wilfred Cutshaw's Artillery Battalion, about 6000 officers & men all put together, to the Shenandoah Valley to support Jubal Early there. However, the command situation is quite awkward, as the two men hold the same dates of rank, yet Anderson believed himself senior (which I am not gonna get into, because it confuses me). And so, Lee basically gave Anderson independence from Early. It does seem Anderson did cooperate with Early when asked, but during his time in the valley, I can't find an instance where the two fought on the same battlefield.
Two days after their arrival, Anderson's men fought Wesley Merritt's cavalry division on Guard Hill. The fighting was done mainly by Fitz Lee's Division, but also with Wofford's Brigade. In the fighting, Lee was repulsed, and Wofford was counterattacked & routed, with Wofford himself being wounded. Wofford lost around 300 killed, wounded and captured, with Fitz Lee losing around 100. The Union forces eventually withdrew, but it was a poor showing on Anderson's part.
His next major engagement was at Berryville, where he had Kershaw attack Crook's Corps. The attack had initial success, but the Union forces reformed and counterattacked, halting the Confederates. Benjamin Humphreys, commanding the Mississippi Brigade, was wounded and disabled. Kershaw lost 220 casualties, in another defeat.
Otherwise, Anderson was mostly doing quiet post duty during the "Mimic War", during Sheridan's cautious first stage. However, Union cavalry on two occasions not only managed to breach rebel lines in Anderson's sector, but also overwhelm and capture large numbers of Confederate pickets. 200 men were lost in this manner, including two Colonels.
Around mid September, Lee ordered Anderson to return to Petersburg with Kershaw & Cutshaw. These forces would later be sent back to Early, but Anderson would remain around Petersburg. In his one time in independent command, Anderson lost at least 800 officers & men, likely 900, and had all but nothing to show for his efforts. Certainly, his small force was too weak to do anything on its own, but considering the activities of Kershaw's Division upon their return to the valley, this can't be the full story.
And so, Anderson returned to Petersburg. In October, when Longstreet returned, Anderson was given command of the new Fourth Corps, made up of men formerly commanded by Beauregard. This two division corps was reduced when Hoke's Division went to North Carolina in December 1864, leaving Anderson with just Bushrod Johnson's Division and the corps artillery.
When Sheridan makes his move for Five Forks, Johnson's Division is reinforced by Pickett. And yet, this force falls under Pickett's command at Five Forks, not Anderson. I don't know why. Once again, this part of the conflict I am not well read on (partly because by this point the situation has become one sided), and so I don't know what the situation was. Maybe Anderson was overseeing a detachment away from the battlefield. Anderson isn't a superstar commander by any stretch, but given Pickett's performance in that battle, I think anyone could have done better.
Anyways, when the retreat begins, Anderson commands Johnson & Pickett, when they fight at Sayler's Creek. Much of these divisions were already weakened at Five Forks, but here they were destroyed by the Union cavalry under Sheridan. Anderson & his two division commanders were then relieved by Lee. Whether this is due to apparent incompetence suspected by Lee or the fact that Anderson's command was now nonexistent, I do not know.
Overall, quite the underwhelming record.

 

[Luke Freet]

Anderson always struck me as the quiet kid. You never hear much about him. He was an extremely effective divisional commander, though that is often left out. I think the only blemish of his career is Saylor's Creek.

Anderson's record as a division commander was quite mixed. His worst performance in that regard was at Gettysburg, where his brigades went in piecemeal while he allegedly sat in the rear and picnicked with his staff. I've read he performed well at Second Manassas. That said, he never had a real big moment as a division commander, more often one of his brigades on detached service would perform well supporting another unit. He was lucky to have a solid roster of brigade commanders under him (Mahone, Wright, Wilcox).
I'd say his biggest blemish comes in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864. Lost around 800 officers & men, 200 of which were captured on picket lines, with two defeats under his belt being all he could show for it.

 

[Elliot Crumblemuffin]

In Gordon Rhea's book on Spotsylvania, he notes that it was General Lee who ordered a road cut through the woods from Andersein's lower flank to the Catharpin Road west of Todd's Tavern. Lee was concerned that Grant had the inside track to Spotsylvania Court House along the Brock Road if he moved in that direction. At 7 pm on May 7, Lee ordered Anderson to pull out a little after dark, "march the troops a litle way to the rear and let the men have some sleep" and then continue to Spotsylvania Court House. However, the smoke and stench from the recent fighting was so overpowering, Anderson decided to continue towards the Court House "until I got clear of the fires." Rhea calls this one of the most critical decisions of the campaign as it allowed Anderson to arrive at the Court House just before Warren's V Corps.

Still, there is an issue as to how much credit Anderson gets for this decision. Lee was the one who had the trace cut through the woods and ordered the night march, though had Anderson stopped for a few hours sleep, as directed by Lee, he would have been too late to the Court House. But the reason he decided not to stop was not his concern that Grant might get there first (though that undoubtably played a role) but because the smoke and stench were too overpowering to warrant stopping for sleep as Lee suggested. Of course, this is all set in motion by Lee intiaiting Anderson's night march in anticiaption of a Grant's march. If Lee does not do this, Grant gets to Spotsylvnain first, regardless. But Lee also got a little lucky that Anderson exercised some initiative not to stop and get some sleep but to push on. And for exercizing his discretion, Anderson is to be commended.

Thank you for the reply! The whole episode appears to be an instance where lower-echelon initiative created an advantageous situation (even if it was a "happy" accident) for the AoNV.

 

[rpkennedy]

In Gordon Rhea's book on Spotsylvania, he notes that it was General Lee who ordered a road cut through the woods from Andersein's lower flank to the Catharpin Road west of Todd's Tavern. Lee was concerned that Grant had the inside track to Spotsylvania Court House along the Brock Road if he moved in that direction. At 7 pm on May 7, Lee ordered Anderson to pull out a little after dark, "march the troops a litle way to the rear and let the men have some sleep" and then continue to Spotsylvania Court House. However, the smoke and stench from the recent fighting was so overpowering, Anderson decided to continue towards the Court House "until I got clear of the fires." Rhea calls this one of the most critical decisions of the campaign as it allowed Anderson to arrive at the Court House just before Warren's V Corps.

Still, there is an issue as to how much credit Anderson gets for this decision. Lee was the one who had the trace cut through the woods and ordered the night march, though had Anderson stopped for a few hours sleep, as directed by Lee, he would have been too late to the Court House. But the reason he decided not to stop was not his concern that Grant might get there first (though that undoubtably played a role) but because the smoke and stench were too overpowering to warrant stopping for sleep as Lee suggested. Of course, this is all set in motion by Lee intiaiting Anderson's night march in anticiaption of a Grant's march. If Lee does not do this, Grant gets to Spotsylvnain first, regardless. But Lee also got a little lucky that Anderson exercised some initiative not to stop and get some sleep but to push on. And for exercizing his discretion, Anderson is to be commended.

If seniority worked in the CS Army like it did in the US Army, Anderson would have been senior due to their respective ranks as major generals. I'll be honest though, I'm not certain if it worked that way or not.

Ryan

 

[Nathan Stuart]

As I previously mentioned, thought 'Fighting Dick' Anderson showed the leadership qualities of initiative, decisiveness and a willingness to accept extra responsibilities in several of the engagements he was involved. (These were key components in his competency as a division commander in the field).

Apart from Anderson's obvious leadership qualities, thought Anderson could have been considered for a corps command earlier, purely on health fitness grounds alone. Given the maladies suffered by Ewell and A. P. Hill (Ewell became physically exhausted and experienced episodes of mental paralysis at times; Hill was frequently sick and absent from the field), especially during the latter half of war, thought 'Fighting Dick' might have been a better prospect for corps command before 1864. After recovering from his Antietam thigh wound, Anderson returned to active duty in Dec. '62 and managed to remain relatively healthy (compared to Ewell and Hill) and fit for command until the end of the war. Realize it's easy to be wise in hindsight, though.

Following Jackson's death, Anderson missed out on an opportunity to be promoted to corps command in the AONV. Ewell was promoted to L-G and appointed as Jackson's successor to head Second Corps. The next day, Hill was appointed to the same rank to lead the newly added Third Corps in Lee's restructured army. Additionally, both Ewell and Hill held seniority of rank over Anderson (by their dates of appointment to M-G). But at the time, Lee did seriously consider appointing Anderson (or Hood) as Jackson's successor. On May 20, '63, Lee wrote to Davis, …"R. H. Anderson and J. B. Hood are also capital officers. They are improving, too, and will make good corps commanders, if necessary."… ('OR': Vol. XXV, Part 2, at p. 811). Essentially, Lee was saying here that Anderson and Hood were both competent, but not yet ready for corps command. Further interpreted these comments to mean, both would make suitable substitute/stand-in corps commanders if the opportunity arose (which were the circumstances of Anderson's later appointment to corps command, after Longstreet's wounding in early 1864).

Interestingly (I thought), in the reorganization of Lee's Army immediately prior to Gettysburg, Anderson's brigades were transferred from Longstreet's first corps to the newly formed third Corps, under an unfamiliar new commander, Hill. (Did this have any implications for Anderson's performance at Gettysburg?).

 

[Longstreet2022]

Anderson missed Appomattox by one day. His command was wiped out at Saylor's Creek so he became a commander without any command. Lee sent him home.Or is that an oversimplification?

Yes that is an over Simplification Anderson was a above average Division commander many say however his subordinates were very good as well and contribute to that a lot. He did very bad day 2 of Gettysburg. He did get to Spotsylvania first but with the special rode Lee had built that would have been really hard to do. The worse thing that Anderson did was at Saylors Creek he was in charge of the rear guard and the Union attack was not well thought out had Anerson actually performed well there they very well could have won that battle and badly damages the union Army. Instead he was directly responsible for losing about 35#% of the remaining Army of Norther Virginia. Anderson would have served the Army better staying as a Division Commander. Much like AP Hill he was a FAR better Division Commander than he was a corps leader. Those are two very different jobs that require two completely different personas. Though I still think that if he would have been in charge at five Forks instead of the idiot Picket that would not have been a disaster.

 

[rpkennedy]

Yes that is an over Simplification Anderson was a above average Division commander many say however his subordinates were very good as well and contribute to that a lot. He did very bad day 2 of Gettysburg. He did get to Spotsylvania first but with the special rode Lee had built that would have been really hard to do. The worse thing that Anderson did was at Saylors Creek he was in charge of the rear guard and the Union attack was not well thought out had Anerson actually performed well there they very well could have won that battle and badly damages the union Army. Instead he was directly responsible for losing about 35#% of the remaining Army of Norther Virginia. Anderson would have served the Army better staying as a Division Commander. Much like AP Hill he was a FAR better Division Commander than he was a corps leader. Those are two very different jobs that require two completely different personas. Though I still think that if he would have been in charge at five Forks instead of the idiot Picket that would not have been a disaster.

I think calling Anderson an above-average division commander is giving him a lot of credit. Having spent the last year and half reading about the campaigns in the Eastern Theater, I've come to some harsher conclusions about Anderson's leadership than I had going in. There were many more below average performances than above average ones. Anderson was blessed with excellent brigade commanders (Wilcox, Posey, Mahone, Wright, etc.) and that covered for a lot of his errors. Probably the best description of Anderson's leadership that I could find was something along the lines of capable but lazy.

Ryan

 

[SWS]

I've seen it written Anderson lost a great offensive opportunity at Cold Harbor on 1 June 1864, both in the morning and early afternoon. And I've never seen it explained why he couldn't exercise command over Field and Hoke during the Hare's Hill assault on 24 June, although, considering Anderson's previous failure to properly coordinate an attack at Cold Harbor, it probably would've changed nothing anyway.

Overall I think someone as stolid and apparently lacking in talent or inclination to independently manage an offensive battle of divisions as Anderson being the one to succeed Longstreet during the most critical campaign of the War is just one of Confederacy's many tragedies.