Lee trapped at Williamsport

[jenersea]

After Gettysburg when Lee was holed up in Williamsport due to the flooding of the Potomac River. My question is why weren't the 10,000 Union Troops posted at Harpers Ferry not brought up River opposite Williamsport and used to pin down Lee from the Virginia side? Why weren't they used to destroy any bridges that the Conferderates tried to build and then shell Lee's Army in Williamsport. I don't see how Lee could have prevented the Union forces from doing so due to the flooding of the River. I know there were some Confederate Cavalry on the Virginia side, but nothing that should have prevented 10,000 men from opposing the River crossing. I know there was a Cavalry raid to destroy one of the Pontoon bridges, but much more could have been done.

 

[mwalker6043]

I found this on https://www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/harpers-ferry.html
The Federal garrison at nearby Winchester was swept out of town in the face of Lee's advancing army, streaming into the Harpers Ferry defenses. Brigadier General Daniel Tyler, commander of the Harpers Ferry garrison, scoffed that "demoralized troops…from Winchester, are not the troops to defend [Harpers Ferry]," and determined to remove his garrison to the commanding position on Maryland Heights.There Tyler planned to make his stand should the Confederates once again bear down on Harpers Ferry. While some Confederate troops did occupy the lower town, Robert E. Lee would bypass the Harpers Ferry garrison during this second invasion, instead moving into south central Pennsylvania.

Tyler's garrison remained on Maryland Heights until June 29, when he was ordered to move to nearby Frederick to cover the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Following the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Maryland Heights was again reoccupied. Aiming to prevent the retreating Army of Northern Virginia from crossing at Harpers Ferry, the B&O Bridge was once again destroyed. The Confederates instead skirted Harpers Ferry, crossing the Potomac upstream at Williamsport. A temporary pontoon bridge was thrown across the Potomac and three corps of the Army of the Potomac crossed there, pursuing the Confederates south. For some Federal troops it was their first time back in Harpers Ferry since the previous year. One Pennsylvania chaplain recalled Harpers Ferry as "so romantically, so vividly, so beautifully, so strongly situated – so full of sad memories to us who spent our first weeks of military life there, were there initiated in its hardships and suffering, and there lost so many beloved friends." The same chaplain "thanked God that we were not again required to stay at that unhealthy and unpleasant place."

 

[jenersea]

Looks like the same thing that always happened. Forces pulled to defend Washington against an attack. It just seems to me that those forces could have prevented Lee from getting away at Williamsport. Meade was pursuing Lee South shielding Washington as he advanced. Lee just wanted to get back to Virginia, he had no intentions of attacking Washington or Baltimore after Gettysburg. He just wanted to get back to the safety of Virginia.

 

[Poorlaggedman]

You could ask a lot of questions but I think part of the reason that they couldn't be stopped was because of how fast they moved and how fast they rebuilt the pontoon bridges. There's a delay on information so it's not seamless to make and transmit command decisions. Any troops moving up to block a crossing would be opposed by other forces that they wouldn't necessarily know what to make of. You could end up with a situation where they move to block but bumble into 30,000 of Lee's veterans already across. Rather than such a risky move the more prudent decision is to hope Lee would take another day or two to pull new pontoon bridges out of thin air.

Maybe the federals could have gone upstream and dumped all sorts of cumbersome trash into the river to break up the pontoon bridges like the Austrians did to Napoleon's makeshift bridges during the battle of Aspern. The noose would have been tightened eventually but Lee moved too fast and his engineers improvised in the situation exceptionally well.

More would have been done if more time had been had. You also have to figure the water level was starting to lower so that some of the Confederates waded across. The combination of rapid movement and changing water levels could be a deadly one for a force thinking about trying that.

 

[jenersea]

Harpers Ferry sent out Cavalry to destroy Lee's pontoon bridges that were there. They had almost a week to move into position on the Virginia side. No way could Lee move 30,000 across during the flooding.

 

[Poorlaggedman]

Harpers Ferry sent out Cavalry to destroy Lee's pontoon bridges that were there. They had almost a week to move into position on the Virginia side. No way could Lee move 30,000 across during the flooding.

My point is that nobody expected him to get across as fast as he did. It proves a capacity to move faster than expected

It seems extraordinarily difficult to get beyond hindsight and existing dogma, just like with Antietam. Nobody is sitting with satellite images saying, "Oh, the main Confederate army is just now reaching the Potomac" or "Oh, look, they just today started construction of pontoon bridges and not 3 days ago, so we have time to deploy" or "They only have XX,000 effective troops and no relief force is coming from Virginia."

They didn't have a week to know that Lee was for sure headed back into Virginia, at the exact same spot he crossed over the first time. I suppose the easiest way to more seriously answer the OP's question is to dive into what the Harper's Ferry garrison knew and when did they know it. When are they even conscious of this intelligence? Is there a one, two, three day delay? You can't just spread 10,000 troops in single file to block a crossing, you have to protect your own rear, you have to protect Harper's Ferry. How do you know Lee's not crossing somewhere else? How do you know for sure Stuart didn't cross somewhere else (like he did the first time)? One cavalry detachment starts harassing your rear area and the next thing you know you're the next John Pope dismissing a large force of the enemy as something else. You can't operate effectively with that number of unknown variables. You try blocking Lee at Falling Waters and a whole Corps might just wade across at Williamsport (like they did), swing around, and completely wreck you and drive you away from your supply base worse than the battle of Winchester. Heck, maybe if they had have tried to have blocked the crossing that could have been exactly what happened. Meanwhile the Army of the Potomac tries futile and bloody probes of the earthworks defending the crossing point since the Confederates are still in them and not across yet. What a different end to the campaign.

Put one of the AoP's corps on the Virginia side of the Potomac and it's now in danger. You put a garrison there and it's probably worse and commanded by who? Milroy?

The end results of the different battles and tactical situations are the result of enormous amounts of changing factors, you can only stray a little bit from the reality of what those were and be realistic without opening a huge can of worms and taking the time to measure each one of those worms four different ways to draw any conclusions.

The cost-benefit of the movement to try and block them is not without extreme danger. Just like attacking Lee's defensive lines September 18th, 1862. Just like attacking his lines outside Falling Waters July 13th. Both could (and the last definitely would) have been huge disasters.

 

[WScott]

Like Napoleon, Lee may have lost the Battle, he didn't lose the war. Lee was not the kind of general that would just sit back and wait to see what Meade was going to do, Lee was always looking at where he was and what he could do, defensively or offensively.
The Union held Harpers Ferry but they did not know if or where Confederate troops were located, other that Williamsport Md. Protection of Washington DC was always the top priority and I doubt that Halleck or Meade were willing to take unnecessary chances.

 

[jepridgen]

There were a lot of factors that played into the actions or lack thereof by Union forces. Some of it was just Meade's lack of experience running an army. He'd been commander for a period measured in days at Gettysburg. I'd recommend reading the book Lee Is Trapped & Must Be Taken. It focuses in detail on the period from July 4th until Lee crossed the river.

It was really a complex series of good and bad decisions with probably some oversights that in general combined resulted in a potential strategic defeat for the ANV.

 

[Scott Brown]

There were a lot of factors that played into the actions or lack thereof by Union forces. Some of it was just Meade's lack of experience running an army. He'd been commander for a period measured in days at Gettysburg. I'd recommend reading the book Lee Is Trapped & Must Be Taken. It focuses in detail on the period from July 4th until Lee crossed the river.

It was really a complex series of good and bad decisions with probably some oversights that in general combined resulted in a potential strategic defeat for the ANV.

I recommend Lee is Trapped also, but caveat emptor. I disagree with the author's main premise, which was that Meade wanted to get Lee back over the Potomac without another fight. The trick is to look at this stuff in real time and understand what Meade knew and when. In my opinion, Tom and Rick could have done a much better job of that, but relied instead on hindsight. Study the message traffic!

 

[Scott Brown]

As for the original question, since Tyler was ordered to Frederick, and French - after destroying the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters and occupying the South Mountain gaps in accordance with Meade's orders - joined the AoP, it seems to me that Kelley's forces were in a much better position to achieve those objectives. Halleck urged him to no avail.

 

[jepridgen]

I recommend Lee is Trapped also, but caveat emptor. I disagree with the author's main premise, which was that Meade wanted to get Lee back over the Potomac without another fight. The trick is to look at this stuff in real time and understand what Meade knew and when. In my opinion, Tom and Rick could have done a much better job of that, but relied instead on hindsight. Study the message traffic!

That's a good point. It is easy to look at a map and say "oh look they just need to push these units there and there, and it's over for Lee" without remembering he only had a map showing his side. Meade had only been in command like two weeks or so as well, and he was probably completely mentally exhausted as well.

 

[OpnCoronet]

After Gettysburg when Lee was holed up in Williamsport due to the flooding of the Potomac River. My question is why weren't the 10,000 Union Troops posted at Harpers Ferry not brought up River opposite Williamsport and used to pin down Lee from the Virginia side? Why weren't they used to destroy any bridges that the Conferderates tried to build and then shell Lee's Army in Williamsport. I don't see how Lee could have prevented the Union forces from doing so due to the flooding of the River. I know there were some Confederate Cavalry on the Virginia side, but nothing that should have prevented 10,000 men from opposing the River crossing. I know there was a Cavalry raid to destroy one of the Pontoon bridges, but much more could have been done.

A big clue is found in Meade's congratulatory Ltr. to the AoP, after Lee escaped into Va, i.e., Meade had no intention of impeding Lee's returning to Va. ASAP.

Emplacing Union troops S. of the Potomac would trap Lee and the ANV North of the Potomac. Lee would have the choice of surrendering or fighting a last ditch battle against the AoP. Lee was prepared to go down fighting, Meade, most definitely was not.


P.S. After Lee escaped, and Meade was forced to pursue the ANV, Meade seems to have followed his tactics while pursuing the ANV after Gettysburg of carefully maintaining approximately 24 hrs. distance between the ANV and the AoP.