Leadership

I was reading the other day and was struck with a thought. I know, you are astonished that a thought could actually work its way into this thick skull, but anyway, I thought I would bounce it off of y'all.

It seems to me that one of the great differences in leadership between the Union and Confederate armies is that the Confederate leadership practically sprung forth at the commencement of the war fully formed, like Athena from the head of Zeus. Granted, there was a little shuffling at the start of the war, but Lee, Johnston, Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart, etc. were identified early and placed in positions of command. Once these commanders fell or needed to be replaced, the pool of competant replacements just wasn't there.

In the Union army, however, it took some time for the cream to rise to the top: Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Meade, Sheridan, etc. all worked their way up. The command structure of the Union at the end of the war was infinitely stronger than the start of the war, where the Confederate command structure was weaker.

Why do you suppose this was? Were the best Confederate subordinate commanders killed off before they could rise? Did politics prevent some of the better ones (like, for instance, Cleburn of whom I know little but who is highly respected on this forum) from rising to higher command? Did the fact that the Confederate have a Lee, a Jackson and a Longstreet at the start mean that there was not simply the opportunity to rise as in the Union ranks where the top echelons were weaker? Was the Confederate "first rank" simply so good that it was impossible to do any better, as opposed to the Union where almost anyone could do a better job? Or am I wrong in my initial premise?

Ladies and Gentlemen, what say you?

Getting back to the topic at hand,

I agree completely confederate leadership at the beginning of the war was better overall than Union leadership at that point in time. Some of it was due to southern culture of the time, which valued military service and military training. While the Federals had their share of West Point trained men, most of the men remaining in leadership positions in the US Army were folks like Winfield Scott, who while retaining a brilliant mind was unfit for service in the field, and couldn't even mount a horse by himself. And I feel sorry for the horse who had to carry that 300 lb. plus weight anywhere. And others like Robert Patterson, who was 69 years old at the outbreak of the war. Campaigning was for younger men, and the old timers had to be weeded out, which took some time. The confederates didn't have an existing structure so they could put vigorous, energetic officers in place from the start.

The Union leadership did catch up and surpass the confederates due to combat attrition of confederate leadership and the opportunity for leaders like Grant and Sherman to develop and move up.

Regards,
Cash
 
I believe the slaveocracy was planning & prepping for war w/ the US at least since the 1856 election. They were certainly cultivating leaders both military and political into the cause of the CS.

IMO they (the slaveocracy) managed to emasculate the US military prior to the 1860 election and as seccesion took hold they further did so by succesfully culling a third or more of the officer ranks and then plundering the treasury. I believe such organized and carefully orchestrated actions were coordinated in such a way that the US could not meaningfully respond.


IMO Lincoln was caught in a catch 22 and the military had no viable options at all. Lincoln was a great president in that he was willing to stick it out instead of just throwing up his hands and giving up; which is what the slaveocracy had depended upon. And I believe that was their greatest miscalculation.

As to the military leadership at both sides of the argument there were no true professional soldiers of the European sense. While West Point was there as well as a few other military schools none approached the professionalism of the English or French systems of professional higher education for their officers. The crucible of war quickly taught those US & CS officers the reality vs the theory of war and they adapted. Those that did not adapt withered on the vine.

For the rank and file, leadership on a more individual level makes for an interesting study. Both the US & CS worked w/in a democrtic sys of electing officers and NCO's. In some case this worked well, but in other cases individuals of no talent or capability lobbied their way into positions they were totally unqualified for. IMO up until 1863 you have two armies made up of, at best, enthusiatic amatuers. By 1863 though both armies had matured to the point that they were among the most formidable on earth. Men had learned to march, fight and survive; most of the chaff & dead weight had been cleared away leaving the meat of both armies. The difference between the CS & US was that the US could afford to replace their losses while the CS couldn't.

IMO both of the AoT were among the finest in their respective armies. But while the CS AoT was hamstrung by incompetence and infighting at higher levels the US AoT was shaped and forged by Grant and IMO the best officers in the US military. Both had superb raw material, but the CS AoT had Bragg and all of the ugly infighting that went w/ that.

Just my two pence.
 
Incidently "pound for pound" the US soldier has always been a suprise to his european adversery and it doesn't matter one spit whether he was from Alabama or the Dakotas. National Guard units from the "North" fought every bit as well as units from the "South" in WW1 & WW2.

I served beside men from darn near every state in the US during my seven years and would gladly do so again. Yes, I served w/ my fair share of charachters w/ dubious morals and backgrounds but they weren't from any one region. The US soldier has carved his place in history at places across the world and he doesn't say: I'm a southern soldier or I'm a northerner. He say's I'm an American soldier. Today's active duty military certainly doesn't differentiate between Northerner or Southerner and right that they shouldn't. Give me a kid fresh off the ranch in SD and put himbeside a swamp rat from Georgia and I'll wager they'll both make pretty darn tough paratroopers or Marines. Come to think of it I've met both; and IMO they're among the best soldiers in the world.

So pound for pound I'll take the American soldier over the "southern or northern" nonsense.
 
I think overall the Union just did a better job of weeding out the incompetents and developing those with promise. We all know about Grant and Sherman but think of those lesser known men such as John Logan, John Gibbon, Ranald Mackenzie, and Nelson Miles. Compare where they began the war and where they ended up.

People like Polk, Bragg, and Hindman, who possessed blatant shortcomings, kept their positions while outsiders like Lee and Harvey Hill were sometimes used to fill openings within the AoT. The ability for the army to build its leadership was stunted. I have no doubt that organizations like Cleburne's division, Cheatham's Tennesseans, and the Orphan Brigade contained officers of promise but they either didn't get the chance or the war was already pretty much lost when they were given an opportunity to shine.

Lee's army was the only Confederate force that consistently weeded out the failures and promoted the officers with potential. I think this is a major reason why Lee's army consistently performed well while other Confederate armies simply rotated the same guys over and over again with the consequence being continual defeat at the strategic level.
 
I think the major reason why there were few waiting in the wings is because they kept recycling the same generals over and over again which didn't allow them to develop others for higher command.
 
I also don't think it helped the Confederacy that so many men were made full generals right at the beginning of the war. Others couldn't jump them. The Union didn't do this.
 
Bragg "jumped" Beauregard - so to speak - in taking command of the Army of Tennessee (going from major general - this is before lieutenant general for corps command being aestablished- to department and army command), so I don't think that was a problem.

As for a shortage of skilled leaders because of officers being killed off - plenty of Union generals got killed off too. Did the Confederacy suffer worse in that regard in 1862?
 
But Beauregard took sick leave without permission and Davis used that to legitimatize putting Bragg in his place. Without that act, could Davis have legally jumped Bragg over him?
 
The Iron Duke said:
But Beauregard took sick leave without permission and Davis used that to legitimatize putting Bragg in his place. Without that act, could Davis have legally jumped Bragg over him?

Transfer Beauregard to some other command, promote Bragg.
 
But Beauregard still has to be given a command large enough to accomodate his full general's rank. That will only clog up commands and prevent others from being promoted. The Federals, by virtue of keeping their generals restricted to brigadiers and majorities, created a situation which allowed them to promote Grant to lieutenant general over men who previously had been his seniors.
 
But Beauregard still has to be given a command large enough to accomodate his full general's rank. That will only clog up commands and prevent others from being promoted. The Federals, by virtue of keeping their generals restricted to brigadiers and majorities, created a situation which allowed them to promote Grant to lieutenant general over men who previously had been his seniors.

I suppose it depends on your idea of "large enough". Look at what Beauregard historically got. "The Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida." sounds more impressive than it really is - at least in terms of being somewhere you want your developing men. The main problem with a department that large is that he got more of Georgia - despite being essentially only responsible for defending the coast - than Bragg wound up with - despite being responsible for keeping the state from being invaded. But that's Davis's failure in deciding what turf the Army of Tennessee's department had.

Also, as for the Federals - let's look at Rosecrans.

Rosecrans's date of commission as a Major General was August 21st (1862) when he was given command of the Army of the Cumberland (Fourteenth Corps).

One stroke of a pen later...

The date of Rosecrans's commission as a major general is now March 31st.

Its like magic.

So if it really was necessary/desirable to do it, it was doable. Davis - presumably - had the same option (subject to a considerably less cooperative congress, of course, but that's another problem entirely).

So being able to promote Grant to Lieutenant General and nearly avoid the seniority question was a clean way to do it, but not the only way to do it.

One thing that ought to be noted, however.

As part of studying alternate organization for the Army of Northern Virginia as part of my what-if project involving the Gettysburg Campaign, I'm struck by something.

Who of the men who could be promoted do I actually feel I would promote as of mid-May 1863? What brigadiers have actually inspired faith that they can command divisions?

Maybe I'm too cautious about that judgment. But the fact remains that its not good enough to be open to promoting people as a guideline of how to do it. You also need people capable of stepping up.

Finding those people is hard. Division command is going from commanding 1,000-2,500 men to 4,000-10,000.

A corps is at least two divisions in size and usually three. And its a lot larger a leap than it sounds.

I agree that less "recycling" would have helped bring out some promising canidates. But no army in the war was consistently filled with good men at corps and division command.
 
Also, as for the Federals - let's look at Rosecrans.

Rosecrans's date of commission as a Major General was August 21st (1862) when he was given command of the Army of the Cumberland (Fourteenth Corps).

One stroke of a pen later...

The date of Rosecrans's commission as a major general is now March 31st.

Its like magic.

Rosecrans is in command of the District of Corinth, Army of the Tennessee From July of 1862 up until October 20, during which time he fought the in the battles of Iuka and Corinth. He was also in command of the Army of the Mississippi from JUne 26 to October 24 of 1862.

His Major General rank dates to March 21, 1862 when he was in the Mountain Dept. (replacement for the Dept. of Western Virginia, which Rosecrans got when McClellan moved to Washington). His time in the new Mountain Dept. was brief (March 11-29).

Just after that, Rosecrans was passing through Washington on his way West and was sent by Stanton to find the division of Blenker (10,000 men which had become lost on their way to the Shenandoah to fight Jackson, taking 12 days to travel 50 miles from Warrenton Junction to Winchester). The ensuing mish-mash led to hard feelings between Stanton and Rosecrans that lasted the rest of the war.

Tim
 
Trice: Peter Cozzens in No Better Place to Die claims the dates mentioned.

Where is he refered to as being a major general as of the 21st of March?

I feel like I'm missing something.
 
Trice: Peter Cozzens in No Better Place to Die claims the dates mentioned.

Where is he refered to as being a major general as of the 21st of March?

I feel like I'm missing something.

Checked quickly and found that in Eicher, Civil War High Commands. Looked quickly in the OR and saw this:
=====
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
June 2, 1862.
Major-General ROSECRANS:
As soon as you get one command of your division across advance it, with two days' rations, as far as Booneville, should the cavalry which precedes you find any considerable force there.

I have ordered General Granger to cross as soon as possible with cavalry regiment and a battery and pursue the enemy to Booneville. Hold your command in readiness, so that as soon as he reports any considerable resistance you can advance to Booneville.

Do not move forward until you hear from him.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. POPE,
Major-General, Commanding.

=====
Tim
 
My guess then - and it is a guess - is that its a distinction between a "permament" commission as Major General of Volunteers, and brevet rank.

Thomas was apparently not pleased to have Rosecrans take over (he thought that he would get the command after Buell was gotten out of the way in a neat and acceptable way), and refered to Rosecrans as his junior (presumably based on the August 21 date) in a protest to Halleck on October 30th.

So apparently something was done to make Rosecrans "qualified".
 

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