Just curious

Ha! Thank you. Well, it's SO not overlooked here, believe me! " Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions ", Eric Wittenberg, opened up the cavalry battles inclusively in a way which REALLY shed an awful lot of light on the rest of the battle for me- explained extremelyyyy well, since I'm a true amateur with this stuff. I bumped into it because I had a grggrandfather in the 6th US Cav, which was schmeared horribly at Fairfield. I forget who pointed me to the book, possibly someone here, but it's a re-read, to be sure. I'm still just an 'enthusiast', as opposed to someone who could lay claim to knowing a whole lot but have to say that book is like an entertaining textbook. You almost never find a balanced account of Farnsworth's death, for instance, various agendas on the subject being what they are, and the book provides enough information to allow you to kind of make up your own mind. ( No, I do not think he did commit suicide,laying out there in the field wounded, except for making the charge in the first place- THAT was suicidal. ) Who isn't still mad at Kill Cavalry for the order?

And heck, now I have to go re-read THAT. I thought it was the 15th the next day, having to withstand yet another horrific action.
 
Y'know, I realize I'm not incredibly converant with the whole play-by-play on LRT, but surely the concensus on the 15th Alabama's high point had to be breaking the Federal lines- they did that a FEW times, with ( I'm sure ) quite a few witnesses. You just wouldn't think it would be controversial. I'm generally a Chamberlain fan, but the single thing which has prevented me from being one across-the-board has been this baffling refusal to cooperate with Oates. Chamberlain seems to praise those men himself, admits to being so hard-pressed he was compelled to order the famous bayonet charge out of desperation. He's always very even with Union/Confederate, so that whole monument thing feels a little like a black mark in his record to me.
 
Y'know, I realize I'm not incredibly converant with the whole play-by-play on LRT, but surely the concensus on the 15th Alabama's high point had to be breaking the Federal lines- they did that a FEW times, with ( I'm sure ) quite a few witnesses. You just wouldn't think it would be controversial. I'm generally a Chamberlain fan, but the single thing which has prevented me from being one across-the-board has been this baffling refusal to cooperate with Oates. Chamberlain seems to praise those men himself, admits to being so hard-pressed he was compelled to order the famous bayonet charge out of desperation. He's always very even with Union/Confederate, so that whole monument thing feels a little like a black mark in his record to me.

If I were a 20th Maine soldier or officer, I'd want the Alabamans marker in my line if that is where they advanced to. That "we" repulsed them would look even more heroic.
 
Who isn't still mad at Kill Cavalry for the order?

And heck, now I have to go re-read THAT. I thought it was the 15th the next day, having to withstand yet another horrific action.

First, remember, it WAS the 15th ( among others ): The 15th Alabama was in Law's Alabama Brigade of Hood's Division ( commanded by Law after Hood's wounding ) of Longstreet's I Corps, so they were included with others that repelled the charge. As for Kill-Cavalry, remember that when Sherman picked HIM to command his cavalry during the March to the Sea, someone pointed out that Kilpatrick was "a He ll of a D amned Fool", Sherman supposedly replied, "That's just the sort of man I want to command my cavalry!"
 
Y'know, I realize I'm not incredibly converant with the whole play-by-play on LRT, but surely the concensus on the 15th Alabama's high point had to be breaking the Federal lines- they did that a FEW times, with ( I'm sure ) quite a few witnesses. You just wouldn't think it would be controversial. I'm generally a Chamberlain fan, but the single thing which has prevented me from being one across-the-board has been this baffling refusal to cooperate with Oates. Chamberlain seems to praise those men himself, admits to being so hard-pressed he was compelled to order the famous bayonet charge out of desperation. He's always very even with Union/Confederate, so that whole monument thing feels a little like a black mark in his record to me.
According to Oates, the 15th Alabama broke the 20th Maine's line about 5 times, pushing the 20th Maine back and them pushing the 15th AL back out, as Oates says in his memoirs:

"We drove the Federals from their strong defensive position; five times they rallied and charged us, twice coming so near that some of my men had to use the bayonet, but in vain was their effort. It was our time now to deal death and destruction to a gallant foe, and the account was speedily settled. I led this charge and sprang upon the ledge of rock, using my pistol within musket length, when the rush of my men drove the Maine men from the ledge. . . . About forty steps up the slope there is a large boulder about midway the Spur. The Maine regiment charged my line, coming right up in a hand-to-hand encounter."

So far, this is the only account I have at hand right now and of course Oates could have exaggerated to some degree. It would interesting if I could find some other accounts of men in the 15th Alabama and 20th Maine and compare their experiences.
 
According to Oates, the 15th Alabama broke the 20th Maine's line about 5 times, pushing the 20th Maine back and them pushing the 15th AL back out, as Oates says in his memoirs:

"We drove the Federals from their strong defensive position; five times they rallied and charged us, twice coming so near that some of my men had to use the bayonet, but in vain was their effort. It was our time now to deal death and destruction to a gallant foe, and the account was speedily settled. I led this charge and sprang upon the ledge of rock, using my pistol within musket length, when the rush of my men drove the Maine men from the ledge. . . . About forty steps up the slope there is a large boulder about midway the Spur. The Maine regiment charged my line, coming right up in a hand-to-hand encounter."

So far, this is the only account I have at hand right now and of course Oates could have exaggerated to some degree. It would interesting if I could find some other accounts of men in the 15th Alabama and 20th Maine and compare their experiences.

Also, one can't forget that the 47th Alabama had gotten mixed up with the 15th so it wasn't just the 15th Alabama attacking the 20th Maine. If we look at all of the accounts, it's pretty clear that there were at least 2 times when the 15th/47th Alabamas engaged the 20th Maine in hand-to-hand combat with the lines waving back and forth a few yards in each direction.

R
 
Yes, well the thing is, Chamberlain's own account is of a struggle pretty much that desperate, so why he'd refute anything years later truly is baffling. It actually hadn't occured to me that Oates might have exaggerated, only because gee whiz- what would be the point, in THAT awful mess, what would be the need to have it sound even MORE amazing- from either side, really. Still- you have to wonder how on earth Oates lived through that, can you imagine?? Chamberlain was hit more than once, and he wasn't charging uphill into a solid barrage from behind defenses ( such as they were ).

Thanks very much, for the info on the 47th. I'm guessing it must have been included in one of the accounts I came across somewhere, then was forgotten- seems a pretty important piece of information not be 'out there' in all the Wikis, etc. . Of course now will go read more. It's like the 83rd PA, defending next-door to the 20th Maine, not the extreme flank but boy, certainly part of it and not the LRT by-word the 20th Maine is.It takes nothing away from anyone- so MANY people seem dismissive of the people who genuinely did what they did, bottom line. Just is inclusive, that's all.
 
Thanks JamesN, so the 15th was included there? It seemed so, so unlikely, reading about, alllll the regiments present at Gettysburg, that particular battered one would have a 2nd momentous brush with History like that, gee whiz. Love to read a journal or report written by one of those men, what they must have been thinking!

See, this is where I REALLY need to do more reading, figure out a ton more on Kilpatrick. Sherman really was pretty well loved ( for want of a better guy-word ) by the men under him, esp. during that famous March to the Sea, because he wouldn't risk their lives without cause- took that responsibility terribly seriously. During the entire march, that army only lost what, 600 men? Yes, sounds like 'enough' but compared to Federal losses in comparable circumstances, it was astonishing. Kilpatrick had seemingly zero regard for the men's lives, kind of really well highlighted by Farnsworth's famous charge ( which wasn't an oddity in some otherwise sterling career, like when Merrick sent the 6th US Cav out alone to Fairfield ). Even if Sherman required a H*ll of a d*m fool, you'd have thought the fool he required would be one which resembled himself more closely, as far as regard for his troopers.

This is all 'just' opinion, truly. I genuinely do not know enough to really conjecture. I'd get myself in an awful lot of trouble, pretending to be other than still at the 5th grade level in the Civil War classroom. :)
 

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