Iuka - Victory as Failure

[1SGDan]

That is very good of you, Dan. Like you, I believe in doing your own freaking work. Get a little help from your friend. Sure, but you've done nothing if you haven't done your own work. Period.

We go back a few years. We've seen Ky grow up, And the boys. I will bet you never did their work for them. Get your butt into it and do it!

And this is what I am telling girl. Oh yes, we'll help, but we aren't going to write your freaking paper for you.

Ole
Yes Ky is in college now but I never would do any work for my kids. Guidance on how to do it was more important and work of your own hand regardless of the end result more rewarding. I never criticized honest effort nor should anyone else.
Dan

 

[1SGDan]

girl lol p reports that she did quite well on her report. Got a 100

 

[SSVilla]

The All Important Plan
With the critical information in hand Grant was eager to get started. His concept of the operation was to call Rosecrans north (minus details to provide early warning of a movement by Van Dorn) from Jacinto to cooperate with MG Edward O.C. Ord's division. Ord's men, reinforced by BG Leonard Ross' division from Bolivar, totaled around 6,000 men of all arms. They would return to Iuka via the Burnsville Road while Rosecrans, with about 9,000 troops, would march east along the railroad. Grant hoped to catch Price between these pincers and force him to relinquish the town. By his estimate he had four days to act before Van Dorn could pose any threat to the thus depleted defenses at Corinth.

Rosecrans was also eager to act but he had a plan of his own. Acting on a suggestion from BG Charles S. Hamilton, his Third Division commander, Rosecrans proposed that he avoid the unnecessary trek north and begin operations from his current location at Jacinto. He argued that an advance in this fashion would allow him to seal off the Jacinto and Fulton Roads in Price's rear. Thus denied the only real escape routes Price would be caught between the jaws of a Union vise, Ord's division attacking from the north and his forces suddenly appearing in his rear.

The plan immediately appealed to Grant who saw the great possibility of success that it offered. He was further convinced in the knowledge that Rosecrans had spent time in Iuka and was "personally familiar with the ground." He was also impressed with a map of the area that Rosecrans had drawn up that would facilitate movement. The plan was approved and everything pointed to a grand victory. Grant was so completely convinced of the validity of the plan years later while writing his memoirs he noted that he felt at the time if Price was still in Iuka when the Federal columns converged there "his annihilation was inevitable." The march to Iuka was no longer about regaining the town but about the destruction of Price's Army.


Author's Note : I may be traveling here for the next couple of days please be patient.

Thanks for all these posts. I hadn't read them before and they are very good! You have skill as a narrative writer. I am enjoying reading your account very much.

I have a question for you, and frankly this occurred to me right now as I am reading this. Rosecrans' promotion to MG was after this battle. Should Rosecrans have joined Ord, would Ord have been in command of the whole. Knowing Rosy, he would not have liked that at all.

 

[SSVilla]

Game On
In Iuka Price was also hearing about a different plan. A courier arrived from Van Dorn announcing that he had been named overall commander in Mississippi by Jefferson Davis. He also informed Price that he had reconsidered a joint venture against Corinth and wished him to move toward unification. Although Price wanted to comply the call from Van Dorn had come too late. His cavalry had already detected the first Union movements down the Burnsville Road. BG Dabney Maury's division was pushed out to establish a line of defense. The idea of attempting a move away while under imminent threat did not appeal to Price who sent a message to Van Dorn stating that he would move as quickly as possible but was now preparing for the expected Federal assault. The wagons were loaded and all preparations made for a getaway but the first business at hand was the threat from Ord's troops on the Burnsville Road. He also strengthened the position there by adding BG Henry Little's division to extend the line. There was no thought of a threat from the rear.

Indeed the Federal forces were gathering for a strike from Burnsville. The attack was scheduled for 0430 on the 19th. Unfortunately Rosecrans plan began to unravel almost from the start. BG David Stanley's division had been led astray by a guide and did not arrive at Jacinto until 2100 on the 18th. The attack would have to be delayed. Rosecrans estimated that an early start on the 19th would have his troops in place by 1400. Grant doubted the distance (18-20 miles) could be covered in that time and began altering the plan even more. In a message to Ord Grant claims to have instructed him to attack at the first sound of guns to the south. Ord claims he did not receive the message until 1000 when he was informed of Rosecrans' delay and told "not to be too rapid with your advance this morning."*

To the south Rosecrans was doing his best to make up for lost time. The cavalry vanguard broke camp at 0430 and the infantry units were all on the road by 0600. The march was invigorated by the news of the Confederate defeat at Antietam and made excellent time. The march proceeded unabated to Barnett's Crossroad. Here the column was expected to split. Hamilton was to continue on to the Fulton Road while Stanley would turn north on the Jacinto Road. But events produced a drastic and fatal change to the original plan. The cavalry screen in that area, eight companies of the 3rd Michigan, encountered Confederate cavalry in their path. In a short skirmish the enemy was driven off but the lead elements of Hamilton's division, Col. John Sanborn's brigade, opted to stop and await orders. A messenger from the cavalry advance brought back word that the true distance between the two roads was more than five miles. Rosecrans knowledge of the area and his map makers had failed him. This was double the distance that he had considered in his plan. The extra distance would take his separate columns out of mutual support range. Doubts about his plan began to creep into his thinking and he decided to forego the advance on the Fulton Road, both divisions would move north on the Jacinto Road. They would block the side door but the back door would remain unprotected.

At 1230 two Grant staffers arrived to discuss matters with Rosecrans. One claimed to have given Rosecrans a message from Grant but Rosecrans later denied it. The one thing that was certain was that there was a complete misunderstanding about how the battle would be initiated. Ord acting on Grant's directive was to wait for the sound of guns from the south while Rosecrans told his visitors that Ord would start the battle to gain the enemy's full attention allowing him to gain a position in the rear. The ambitious plan was falling apart with each step.

*This begs the question of why if the attack was scheduled for 0430 a 1000 message found Ord still in camp. One of these two men is telling the wrong tale.

I feel like to give proper justice to the really contradictory and opposite nature of those accounts from Grant's staff and Rosecrans in a book one would have to explore a bit the hatred these two would develop for each other. You did an admirable job reducing the controversy to a paragraph , without hiding it or diminishing it.

The asterisk. One has to wonder that Ord was informed verbally somehow, or if given a written order it was misplaced, something more common than one would want. Having had orders to move forward at 4:30 am and not doing so, brings to my mind a statement Grant once made that people formed opinions based on written dispatches but knew nothing of what was said in person. I tend to think someone on Ord's staff prepared that report who didn't know about any verbal exchanges. The wondering is that Ord signed it as it was, but it's just unbelievable he wouldn't have moved forward per orders unless they were changed somehow. I liked how you dealt with that so succinctly and didn't need to explain this problem much for it to be evident.

 

[SSVilla]

Commanders, from Lincoln on down, seemed to always want to create a "pincer movement" catching the enemy in between opposing forces. The problem is, as Napoleon complained, that coordinating the movement of widely seperated armies is next to impossible. It "might" work if the enemy stays still, but he's unlikely to do so. Moreover, the well-known defense against such a movement is to pick one of the "pincers", hit it hard with everything you've got, then after defeating that force turn and face the other force. Examples:

1) Lincoln thought he could coordinate three Union armies to capture Jackson in the valley in early 1862, but it didn't work.

2) At Chancellorsville in 1863 Hooker tried to force Lee into a vice between forces advancing at Harper's Ferry and the main force crossing the river(s) several miles upstream, yet Lee defeated each one in turn.

(3) In the spring of 1864 Lincoln and Halleck tried the same thing in the Red River campaign, with troops under Banks moving north-east from New Orleans and others moving south-east from Little Rock, with Shreveport as the combined objective. Both forces were defeated in turn.

It seems to me that the distances and communications system of the time simply didn't allow for such a strategy, except by accident. You need real-time intelligence of the enemie's location and direction of movement, as well as that of your own men, combined with a speed of response which was rare in a Civil War army of that time.

It's one of those things that looks good in paper. Brilliant idea, right. Yet there's several opinions of the time I have read from military men who were not impressed, but I'll cite two. General W.T. Sherman would note he didn't exactly understand Grant being upset with Rosecrans over the outcome of the battle because those kind of movements usually always failed unless carried out with the very best of troops in very favorable conditions. General Stanley from Rosecrans army equally remarked years later that while the battle started a rift that never healed (only deepened and widened one would say) the plan was one that required such precision and left such little room for errors that it would invariably lead to disappointment.

In this case, nature and human errors both intervened, in weather, bad roads, noise abnormalities, and one bad scout. Credit to MG Price though for deploying cavalry that discovered Rosecrans early and handling his business.

 

[1SGDan]

It's one of those things that looks good in paper. Brilliant idea, right. Yet there's several opinions of the time I have read from military men who were not impressed, but I'll cite two. General W.T. Sherman would note he didn't exactly understand Grant being upset with Rosecrans over the outcome of the battle because those kind of movements usually always failed unless carried out with the very best of troops in very favorable conditions. General Stanley from Rosecrans army equally remarked years later that while the battle started a rift that never healed (only deepened and widened one would say) the plan was one that required such precision and left such little room for errors that it would invariably lead to disappointment.

In this case, nature and human errors both intervened, in weather, bad roads, noise abnormalities, and one bad scout. Credit to MG Price though for deploying cavalry that discovered Rosecrans early and handling his business.

Part of the problem here is that Rosecrans and Stanley both failed to conduct pre-operational reconnaissance. Rosecrans thought too much about what he knew of the terrain and did not recon the distance between the two roads. Stanley had not reconned the road connecting him to Rosecrans and was led astray by a guide making him late. Knowing your area of influence is a basic military standard. Had Rosecrans conducted that recon the plan almost certainly would have taken a different shape.

The issue of date of rank was an issue for many during the Civil War. Most left it an insult to be commanded by someone below them on the time and grade scale.

 

[SSVilla]

Part of the problem here is that Rosecrans and Stanley both failed to conduct pre-operational reconnaissance. Rosecrans thought too much about what he knew of the terrain and did not recon the distance between the two roads. Stanley had not reconned the road connecting him to Rosecrans and was led astray by a guide making him late. Knowing your area of influence is a basic military standard. Had Rosecrans conducted that recon the plan almost certainly would have taken a different shape.

The issue of date of rank was an issue for many during the Civil War. Most left it an insult to be commanded by someone below them on the time and grade scale.

The reason the rank came to mind is that I remembered reading that part of the reason Burnisde had been up to something completely different than aiding Rosecrans prior to Chickamauga is that Rosecrans had discouraged him from joining him because if he did, Burnside would be in command, which Rosecrans would naturally reject. I can't recall where I read it. Obviously when Rosecrans did need all the help he could get, Burnside might as well have been on the moon. He was spread out somewhere, very difficult to concentrate and dash to help Rosecrans.

I didn't think about the rank issue until I read in your account of Grant's original plan. He still would have kept each commander with his own troops because they weren't moving as one army I suppose… Thanks for answering.

————

Thanks also for the info regarding the reconnaissance failures being a factor. I didn't know that. I tended to think of the speed and urgency with which Rosecrans had cooked that plan up, and thus tended not to judge the lack of preparation. That was another civil war complication, the poor and inaccurate maps.

 

[1SGDan]

the poor and inaccurate maps.

All the more reason to recon.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The reason the rank came to mind is that I remembered reading that part of the reason Burnisde had been up to something completely different than aiding Rosecrans prior to Chickamauga is that Rosecrans had discouraged him from joining him because if he did, Burnside would be in command, which Rosecrans would naturally reject. I can't recall where I read it. Obviously when Rosecrans did need all the help he could get, Burnside might as well have been on the moon. He was spread out somewhere, very difficult to concentrate and dash to help Rosecrans.

I didn't think about the rank issue until I read in your account of Grant's original plan. He still would have kept each commander with his own troops because they weren't moving as one army I suppose… Thanks for answering.

————

Thanks also for the info regarding the reconnaissance failures being a factor. I didn't know that. I tended to think of the speed and urgency with which Rosecrans had cooked that plan up, and thus tended not to judge the lack of preparation. That was another civil war complication, the poor and inaccurate maps.

I received your message on the other thread.

First, before I get into it, I would note that there was very limited time by the time that the plan was being formulated to conduct much reconnaissance. The reconnaissance information which Rosecrans did have led him to balk at the initial proposal which Grant had recommended and ultimately the operation as it was suggested by Rosecrans was authorized and put into motion. I don't really know that additional information that way would have materially altered much in the sense that they were either going to go forward with the plan, or not. If it had been deemed ahead of time that U.S. forces could not mutually support one another from the Jacinto and Fulton roads for most of their length and it was consequently too dangerous to move via both of them without possession of the connecting road, they would either elect to go forward with the plan regardless, or just not try at all, unless one of three of Ord's Divisions could have/would have then been allocated to Rosecrans force. What would have been valuable would have been additional information in real time pertaining to the condition of Bear Creek from the rains on September 17th and 18th, as the operation was going into and then was in motion, but how that would have been attained is difficult to say.

In response to your comment on the other thread, we know that there was at least one road running out of Iuka eastwards towards Bear Creek. The trouble for Price was that if a force were rapidly closing on them, they wouldn't be able to effectively withdraw having to cross such narrow corridors along Bear Creek. That is just the nature of the situation whenever you have a river to your back that way. Again, think of Lee's situation at Antietam during the day on September 18th with the Army of the Potomac sitting right in front of the Army of Northern Virginia. That is just fundamental.

Now, regarding what I said as far as the Fulton road is concerned, no, I don't believe that Rosecrans was opting to not cover the Fulton road, at all. The relevant point was that we know in that the conception of the plan, the Army of the West was always understood to be able to pull back via Bear Creek to the east, at least by Rosecrans (and Grant made similar comment on September 16th, as well). Hence, Rosecrans stated in his correspondence with Grant that the U.S. force would need to mass on the Fulton road, attack and crush in the Confederate left, in order to deprive them of the ability to do so. The relevant point then is that with the situation becoming clear that mutual support across the two roads would be impossible prior to the connecting road (they were literally separated by a bog and deep undergrowth, per the available accounts) and due to the day passing away and the clock ticking, all the while with the Confederates knowing that U.S. forces were coming due to them having driven in Confederate pickets over the course of the 19th and recognizing that they had to get to the connecting road anyways in order to be able to launch the attack which could/would deprive the Army of the West of their ability to pull back to the east, you can see the basic logic very quickly of what Rosecrans elected to do. It makes all the sense in the world frankly. They couldn't hold back and wait until morning. That wasn't an option. They had to get there and be able to launch the attack and they had to get to the connecting road in order to be able to launch the attack anyways.

In addition, it was covered in the correspondence that the Army of the West could move directly to the north out of Iuka, as well, towards the Tennessee river, or there was at least one other road which moved to Bear Creek north of Iuka, as well. Ord's attack would be responsible for cutting off that avenue. In addition, the whole operation was being conducted with a near bare minimum number of men, perhaps 17,000 men PFD (I would need to crunch the numbers again to provide a more precise estimate that way). The Army of the West had around 12,000 men PFD. The way I see it, the whole operation was a long shot from the start in many ways, but it was a bold plan, rapidly formulated amongst several excellent and enterprising officers, who, despite coming to not like one another personally very much, put this together rapidly and neither of whom I am overly critical towards amidst this, although there is certainly room for criticism in how effectively it was ultimately coordinated amongst them. It was possible that the Army of the West could have been trapped and decimated, but it was probably a pretty long shot. It came close, but didn't quite catch them.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The All Important Plan
With the critical information in hand Grant was eager to get started. His concept of the operation was to call Rosecrans north (minus details to provide early warning of a movement by Van Dorn) from Jacinto to cooperate with MG Edward O.C. Ord's division. Ord's men, reinforced by BG Leonard Ross' division from Bolivar, totaled around 6,000 men of all arms. They would return to Iuka via the Burnsville Road while Rosecrans, with about 9,000 troops, would march east along the railroad. Grant hoped to catch Price between these pincers and force him to relinquish the town. By his estimate he had four days to act before Van Dorn could pose any threat to the thus depleted defenses at Corinth.

Rosecrans was also eager to act but he had a plan of his own. Acting on a suggestion from BG Charles S. Hamilton, his Third Division commander, Rosecrans proposed that he avoid the unnecessary trek north and begin operations from his current location at Jacinto. He argued that an advance in this fashion would allow him to seal off the Jacinto and Fulton Roads in Price's rear. Thus denied the only real escape routes Price would be caught between the jaws of a Union vise, Ord's division attacking from the north and his forces suddenly appearing in his rear.

The plan immediately appealed to Grant who saw the great possibility of success that it offered. He was further convinced in the knowledge that Rosecrans had spent time in Iuka and was "personally familiar with the ground." He was also impressed with a map of the area that Rosecrans had drawn up that would facilitate movement. The plan was approved and everything pointed to a grand victory. Grant was so completely convinced of the validity of the plan years later while writing his memoirs he noted that he felt at the time if Price was still in Iuka when the Federal columns converged there "his annihilation was inevitable." The march to Iuka was no longer about regaining the town but about the destruction of Price's Army.


Author's Note : I may be traveling here for the next couple of days please be patient.

Ord's force consisted of three Divisions, not one, reinforced by a second. Those were the divisions under the commands of Thomas Davies, John McArthur and Leonard Ross. Ord stated in his report that his entire force consisted of around 8,000 men, rather than 6,000, which Cozzens got from Grant's second report. Grant explicitly stated in his report that "Not having General Ord's report, these figures may not be accurate." (17 OR 1: 65). The 8,000 figure is roughly corroborated by the available returns.

Your description of the plan is not really accurate, as shown via the correspondence.

This all appears to have been essentially taken from Cozzens. It contains a number of errors though, unfortunately and vital information is not recognized or presented.

 

[DanSBHawk]

1SGDan did a fine job of explaining the Battle of Iuka. People can have differing opinions of the details of the battle, but criticism of his work as being inaccurate is nonsense. People are free to offer their opinions on the battle and while doing so, they should keep in mind that their opinions are no more valid than anyone else's opinion here.

 

[Nathan Towne]

If users have nothing of substance to provide, are impervious to facts and know very little about the subject matter, they should probably refrain from bothering to comment.

 

[DanSBHawk]

If users have nothing of substance to provide, are impervious to facts and know very little about the subject matter, they should probably refrain from bothering to comment.

Okay, I guess we won't be hearing from you again in this thread.

 

[Nathan Towne]

@SSVilla

I will have whatever level of discussion on this subject which you want to.

 

[bdtex]

The old courthouse museum in Iuka is quite a gem. Please don't take this thread in the direction the other thread went.

"Rule 3: Be Civil

Be courteous and decorous to everyone you deal with. It is possible to disagree, even vehemently, with people (both on and off the site) in a constructive fashion.

Respect the participation of others. Attack arguments, not people. Don't post personal attacks or insults, or join a thread for the purposes of attacking someone else.

At its most basic, incivility is trying to crowd out others. Personal attacks, insults, extreme condescension, threats (particularly those relating to the report system or the ignore system, which are often grandstanding) and a feeling like their private thoughts will be used against them all push users away from CivilWarTalk, and are not tolerated.

This doesn't mean a vigorous debate is prohibited. But it means you need to "play the ball and not the man". Posts need to focus on opinions, positions, and ideas - and not on other users. Maintaining civility encourages it in others and builds a better community."

 

[Nathan Towne]

The old courthouse museum in Iuka is quite a gem. Please don't take this thread in the direction the other thread went.

"Rule 3: Be Civil

Be courteous and decorous to everyone you deal with. It is possible to disagree, even vehemently, with people (both on and off the site) in a constructive fashion.

Respect the participation of others. Attack arguments, not people. Don't post personal attacks or insults, or join a thread for the purposes of attacking someone else.

At its most basic, incivility is trying to crowd out others. Personal attacks, insults, extreme condescension, threats (particularly those relating to the report system or the ignore system, which are often grandstanding) and a feeling like their private thoughts will be used against them all push users away from CivilWarTalk, and are not tolerated.

This doesn't mean a vigorous debate is prohibited. But it means you need to "play the ball and not the man". Posts need to focus on opinions, positions, and ideas - and not on other users. Maintaining civility encourages it in others and builds a better community."

If @SSVilla wants to have an in-depth and serious discussion, we can.

 

[bdtex]

Nothing which can be done about that.

Something can be done about Rule 3.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Something can be done about Rule 3.

I will merely note the poor form exhibited above. Facts are facts.

Would be happy to talk to @SSVilla on the subject, or anyone really, if they are interested in having a serious discussion.

Is a very important subject, obviously.

 

[1SGDan]

Ord stated in his report that his entire force consisted of around 8,000 men, rather than 6,000

Exactly what Ord had was somewhat irrelevant since he did nothing with it to foster success of the operation. Grant based Ord's part of the plan on what he believed to be around 6000 troops. But they ended up doing very little in the execution of Rosecrans' pre-operational intent.

 

[1SGDan]

Your description of the plan is not really accurate,

This all appears to have been essentially taken from Cozzens.

Your argument is incorrect and lacks civility. My description of the plan comes directly from Rosecrans own words.
Plan for Iuka

September 18, 1862.

If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Brigadier- General.

Taken from OR Vol. 17, Part 1, Rosecrans to Grant, Page 66

In this short message Rosecrans clearly describes his pre-operational intent. Explaining the failure of that intent was the purpose of this series of posts.