Iuka - Victory as Failure

[1SGDan]

I don't see anything in the second comment which says anything.

I'll make it simple for you. An army commander should know how and where he needs to be and when he needs to be there. This was not the case with Rosecrans column.

 

[Nathan Towne]

By who? The Lamers book map on page 102 does not show it and several other maps offered up here also do not. The truth here is that retreat to the east by any available route would have been the only option for Price if the pre-operational plan had been conducted successfully, unless he opted to slug it out in three directions with Ord and Rosecrans.

Lamers' map was not a detailed map. It was a hand drawn map to show the Jacinto, Fulton and connecting roads.

You made several other errors on this subject, as well, unfortunately. There were multiple roads coming into Iuka from the west, for instance, both north of and south of the rail line, contrary to what you stated.

I would highly recommend that you go back and read through all of the June-September correspondence in the OR.

The plan failed because not all of the requisites for success were able to be fulfilled. Having covered just the Jacinto and Fulton roads would have resulted in failure of the operation, per its conception. I will reference you back to Post #69.

 

[TallTallMan]

 

[1SGDan]

There were multiple roads coming into Iuka from the west, for instance, both north of and south of the rail line, contrary to what you stated.

I said nothing about the roads in those directions other than the three principle roads involved in the plan.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yeah, you're right. It was a response to "how's the wife" and Grant was all like "we will see how it goes, but I may need to return to Corinth the day after" … Corinth of course being a euphemism if ya know what I mean.

I wouldn't read too much into that that way.

Remember, Grant wrote to Halleck on September 19th that "Corinth is well watched at a long distance out, and unless the approach of a large force on that place should call us back I think it will be impossible for Price to get into Tennessee. I will do all in my power to prevent such a catastrophe."

-17 OR 2: 227-228

Grant was speaking there in the context of his optimism that the operation was closing in on the Army of the West.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Had the Fulton Road been closed Price's only option for retreat would have been to the east down the rail bed.

I agree. No good roads or intact bridges have been identified east of Iuka at that time. There was a ford that was near the railroad bridge, but it's very doubtful that would have been practical for a supply train. Grenville Dodge had to construct floating bridges over Bear Creek the following spring for his expedition into Alabama.

 

[1SGDan]

I would highly recommend

that you realize that the Fulton Road was Price's escape route so it looms a bit larger in the consideration of this battle. Yes there were several causes of this failed plan as I explained in my assessment.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The whole concern which Rosecrans was expressing was that Price could pull back directly from Iuka to the east and cross Bear Creek. We know that from the correspondence and is not in doubt. We also know of at least one road which moved east out of Iuka, but I am personally only familiar with one. That is all well established.

I have been surfing for other good contemporary maps that way in order to see whether there were more or not. However, we should all be familiar with the inadequacies of many maps, as well.

 

[Nathan Towne]

that you realize that the Fulton Road was Price's escape route so it looms a bit larger in the consideration of this battle. Yes there were several causes of this failed plan as I explained in my assessment.

See Post #69.

As we know, the concept of the operation as Rosecrans outlined it was to get into position and launch the attack, which was intended, along with the attack from the west which would cut off the routes out of Iuka to the north, to deprive the Army of the West of the ability to escape. Not to block the Jacinto and Fulton roads, which could have been done along the Tuscumbia road, mutually supporting each position from there.

It was to get up into position, launch the attack and crush in the Confederate left, depriving the Army of the West of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek, in combination with the attack from the west which would deprive the Army of the West of the ability to move out of Iuka to the north.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant and Ord expected that the battle would not take place until the following morning. From Grant's report:

"During the day [19th] General Ord returned to headquarters at Iuka [Burnsville], and in consultation we both agreed that it would be impossible for General Rosecrans to get his troops up in time to make an attack that day."

This sentence suggests two things. First, that Grant and Ord still expected that Rosecrans was sticking with the plan to go the extra distance to come up the Fulton Road. Second, Grant and Ord were not in a hurry to force the battle to take place on the 19th. They were willing to wait until the next morning if it meant that Rosecrans was able to get into position.

There was no reason to force the battle to take place in the late afternoon. If Price would have evacuated that night, then oh well. That's what Price did anyways. Rosecrans was not forced to make the decisions that proved fatal to the plan. He could have stuck to the plan, even if it delayed the battle until the next morning.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That isn't known because not all of the September 19th correspondence is timestamped and Grant and on that issue, recalled later, but corroborated by Ord, there isn't a good time. Hence, the message to Halle's may have been sent before, or afterwards.

The other interpretation is simply that Grant and Ord had come to the agreement that Rosecrans wouldn't make it on the 19th, however, even if that wasn't the case, the important point is that Risecrans was operating in real time as to the Confedwrate pickets being driven in. It was as a consequence that it was known that the Confederates would know that they were coming. Furthermore, as discussed previously, it remains unclear how much Grant was comprehending how Rosecrans was seeing the situation that way. What is known is that Rosecrans conception of the plan was to strike the Army of the West in order to deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek.

Yet, certain users have not even acknowledged that the record clearly demonstrates that the Army of the Mississippi was pressed forward in order to strike the Army of the West on the 19th, which, of course, it was.

As for the point regarding the Army of the West escaping, such is precisely the point, hence why the operation was pressed forward.

Lastly, the April correspondence would not seem to be relevant if being used to describe Bear Creek generally. Grant explicitly stated on the 16th his view that it was crossable.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant explicitly stated on the 16th his view that it was crossable.

On the 16th, Grant was talking about Price moving northeast from Bay Springs to cross Bear Creek. That has nothing to do with Iuka.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That is right, but dealt specifically with crossing Bear Creek, which negates the point which is being raised regarding Dodge in April of '63. I was the one who showed this correspondence previously.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That is right, but dealt specifically with crossing Bear Creek, which negates the point which is being raised regarding Dodge in April of '63.

If Price was leisurely making his way northeast from Bay Springs, I'm sure he could figure out a way to cross Bear Creek. Even if it means securing the good fords east of Cartersville and building rudimentary bridges.

Price would not have had it so leisurely if attempting a night crossing of Bear Creek east of Iuka, with no good roads and no intact bridges. This would have been an option only in the most desperate of circumstances, and it would have cost him his supply train.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Such negates the point being made with the April of '63 correspondence. Bear Creek was understood as being crossable (which it is known that it was due to it having been crossed several days earlier, with wagons). Whether that situation had changed via the rains of the 17th and 18th is a separate issue as it wasn't covered by the relevant parties.

As we know, there was at least one road moving east out of Iuka. Regarding the bridges, more work needs to be done on this point. I am wholly aware of the contents of Grant's Memoirs, so no need to put up a quote.

Again, U.S. forces had crossed Bear Creek with trains, for whatever it is worth.

We know what the conception of the plan was from the record. It was fully recognized, per the plan as it was actually proposed, that the Army of the West could pull back to the east via Bear Creek. That isn't in dispute amongst anyone who reads the relevant record. Whether that was an accurate assessment is a separate point.

Regardless, the Army of the West could pull out of Iuka moving northward, as well, unless deprived of such from the west. Being that they knew that they were coming, one can quickly see the situation.

 

[DanSBHawk]

There was very little concern about the confederates trying to escape to the north to be blocked by the Tennessee River, or directly to the east through the "difficult bottom" of Bear Creek.

The plan was for Rosecrans to block the two southern roads, which were considered to be the confederates routes of escape.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There was very little concern about the Confederate force escaping to the east or the north was there? Rosecrans covered the escape to the east via Bear Creek in virtually every message, so we don't need to cover that again. It has been shown to you repeatedly.

To the north, here is Rosecrans to Grant on September 17th:

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee toward Eastport, in hopes to find means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?"

-17 OR 2: 224

 

[DanSBHawk]

One thing I have noticed about Rosecrans' communications is that he was very voluble and constantly sending out messages expressing every idea that went through his head.

And this is not just a thing related to Iuka, but to all his messages during the war. You see the wild ideas sent to Grant during the period of the Corinth battle, such as not waiting for the confederates to arrive but to cast loose from his fortifications and "push them to the wall."

You see this same issue later when Halleck had to tell him to stop sending so many telegrams.

This is the problem with relying too much on Rosecrans' communications when trying to make some claims. His ideas varied widely from day to day. His communications cannot be solely relied on without corroborating evidence from other sources.

We know from Grant's report that there was not any major concern about Price escaping north or east in the Iuka battle plan.

 

[Nathan Towne]

We know what the plan was, in terms of how it was laid out in the contemporary correspondence, from the contemporary correspondence itself.

As far as the above is concerned, I would agree that Rosecrans could at times get a bit frenetic, but that wouldn't seem to be really relevant to the issue here. A definitive statement was made, based on not knowing the relevant record, which was shown to be incorrect and the response is that it is irrelevant because Rosecrans wasn't serious in that lots of things often went through his mind. Okay……………………

 

[DanSBHawk]

A definitive statement was made, based on not knowing the relevant record, which was shown to be incorrect and the response is that it is irrelevant because Rosecrans wasn't serious in that lots of things often went through his mind.

False. You shouldn't presume what others know or don't know. I was certainly aware of the "old woodpecker" quote. But as it doesn't make any sense, I'm not going to treat it as something that signifies anything about the actual Battle of Iuka.

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee toward Eastport, in hopes to find means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?"

A course down the Tennessee towards Eastport? How? From where?

What does Hamburg Landing in Tennessee have to do with it? Price is going to march into Tennessee on the west side of the river and risk getting cornered by Grant's entire force?

It has nothing to do with the battle plan for Iuka, and is just Rosecrans' having a stream of consciousness moment.