Iuka - Victory as Failure

[1SGDan]

I would note that there was very limited time by the time that the plan was being formulated to conduct much reconnaissance.

This is also incorrect. Occupation of Jacinto began as an outpost during the first week of September. There was ample time to renew, refresh, and supplement information regarding their area of responsibility (AOR) by reconnaissance prior to the formulation of the September 18th plan was submitted. Why more was not done in this area is one of the questions that needs to be answered. The distance between the Jacinto Road and Fulton Road was an essential part to the plan but was discovered to be greater than anticipated. A lamentable error for which ultimate responsibility falls on the commander.
The same can be said of the roads connecting the Burnsville Road and Jacinto that Stanley needed to take take to connect with Rosecrans.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Your argument is incorrect and lacks civility. My description of the plan comes directly from Rosecrans own words.
Plan for Iuka

September 18, 1862.

If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Brigadier- General.

Taken from OR Vol. 17, Part 1, Rosecrans to Grant, Page 66

In this short message Rosecrans clearly describes his pre-operational intent. Explaining the failure of that intent was the purpose of this series of posts.

That is right, massing heavily on the Fulton road and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward.

Massing on the Fulton road and crushing in the Confederate left via the attack and hence depriving the Army of the West of the ability to pull back to the east, meaning via Bear Creek as shown via the surrounding correspondence. This is all from the correspondence which I showed you.

 

[Nathan Towne]

This is also incorrect. Occupation of Jacinto began as an outpost during the first week of September. There was ample time to renew, refresh, and supplement information regarding their area of responsibility (AOR) by reconnaissance prior to the formulation of the September 18th plan was submitted. Why more was not done in this area is one of the questions that needs to be answered. The distance between the Jacinto Road and Fulton Road was an essential part to the plan but was discovered to be greater than anticipated. A lamentable error for which ultimate responsibility falls on the commander.
The same can be said of the roads connecting the Burnsville Road and Jacinto that Stanley needed to take take to connect with Rosecrans.

The scale of the Confederate force at Iuka was not revealed until the reconnaissance on the 16th, at which point the operation was formulated.

 

[1SGDan]

The scale of the Confederate force at Iuka was not revealed until the reconnaissance on the 16th, at which point the operation was formulated.

I am not talking about the size of the Confederate force. Instead the operation was started with what Rosecrans thought he knew of the road system. Grant also believed that this was well in hand. Unfortunately not much was done to verify his understanding. For about two weeks prior to the battle Union forces had been in the area and still got confused about distances and directions in the area. A poor effort was made in this area and the price was paid by failure of the pre-operational intent of the plan.

 

[1SGDan]

That is right, massing heavily on the Fulton road and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward.

Massing on the Fulton road and crushing in the Confederate left via the attack and hence depriving the Army of the West of the ability to pull back to the east, meaning via Bear Creek as shown via the surrounding correspondence. This is all from the correspondence which I showed you.

Fulton Road led to the south from Iuka. And the destruction of Price's force was the primary objective.

 

[1SGDan]

This is all from the correspondence which I showed you.

I doubt you could show me much of anything regarding this battle.

 

[TallTallMan]

I am flabbergasted that after the last one got shut down this got necroposted.

 

[JackADriscoll]

I am flabbergasted that after the last one got shut down this got necroposted.

This feels like some kind of weird time loop. I now have a new understanding of the battle of iuka and I can sum it up in six words

It is you that is wrong.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I doubt you could show me much of anything regarding this battle.

I am not talking about the size of the Confederate force. Instead the operation was started with what Rosecrans thought he knew of the road system. Grant also believed that this was well in hand. Unfortunately not much was done to verify his understanding. For about two weeks prior to the battle Union forces had been in the area and still got confused about distances and directions in the area. A poor effort was made in this area and the price was paid by failure of the pre-operational intent of the plan.

Well, the issue was not merely covering the Jacinto and Fulton roads. We know that. The objective was to strike the Confederate force and deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek. We know that.

I don't see anything in the second comment which says anything.

 

[Nathan Towne]

This feels like some kind of weird time loop. I now have a new understanding of the battle of iuka and I can sum it up in six words

It is you that is wrong.

I would refer you to Post #69, which was the basis for opening a constructive conversation with @SSVilla.

If you just the valuable posts and take note of the repeated corrections which I had to make on the facts, you can learn quite a bit.

 

[TallTallMan]

I would refer you to Post #69, which was the basis for opening a constructive conversation with @SSVilla.

This is mainly because after the last thread reopening this wound is not wise.

 

[Nathan Towne]

This is mainly because after the last thread reopening this wound is not wise.

@SSVilla and I could have a constructive conversation. I have long written off the other two as not really knowing anything about the subject matter, but also not being interested in seriously learning more about it.

Post #69 was the basis for a productive conversation.

 

[TallTallMan]

@SSVilla and I could have a constructive conversation. I have long written off the other two as not really knowing anything about the subject matter, but also not being interested in seriously learning more about it.

Post #69 was the basis for a productive conversation.

Well, it won't last long.

 

[Nathan Towne]

@Belfoured

I would be happy to walk you through the record, any of it, rather than laughing. There is a lot of fascinating stuff.

 

[tony_gunter]

The All Important Plan
With the critical information in hand Grant was eager to get started. His concept of the operation was to call Rosecrans north (minus details to provide early warning of a movement by Van Dorn) from Jacinto to cooperate with MG Edward O.C. Ord's division. Ord's men, reinforced by BG Leonard Ross' division from Bolivar, totaled around 6,000 men of all arms. They would return to Iuka via the Burnsville Road while Rosecrans, with about 9,000 troops, would march east along the railroad. Grant hoped to catch Price between these pincers and force him to relinquish the town. By his estimate he had four days to act before Van Dorn could pose any threat to the thus depleted defenses at Corinth.

Rosecrans was also eager to act but he had a plan of his own. Acting on a suggestion from BG Charles S. Hamilton, his Third Division commander, Rosecrans proposed that he avoid the unnecessary trek north and begin operations from his current location at Jacinto. He argued that an advance in this fashion would allow him to seal off the Jacinto and Fulton Roads in Price's rear. Thus denied the only real escape routes Price would be caught between the jaws of a Union vise, Ord's division attacking from the north and his forces suddenly appearing in his rear.

The plan immediately appealed to Grant who saw the great possibility of success that it offered. He was further convinced in the knowledge that Rosecrans had spent time in Iuka and was "personally familiar with the ground." He was also impressed with a map of the area that Rosecrans had drawn up that would facilitate movement. The plan was approved and everything pointed to a grand victory. Grant was so completely convinced of the validity of the plan years later while writing his memoirs he noted that he felt at the time if Price was still in Iuka when the Federal columns converged there "his annihilation was inevitable." The march to Iuka was no longer about regaining the town but about the destruction of Price's Army.


Author's Note : I may be traveling here for the next couple of days please be patient.

I think you could stress more that this was Rosecrans plan. Grant seemed a bit dubious, like he wasn't sold but thought any plan was better than no plan.

Can't remember the exact wording but something along the lines of "let's see what we can do tomorrow, but we may need to return to Corinth the day after."

 

[Nathan Towne]

I think you could stress more that this was Rosecrans plan. Grant seemed a bit dubious, like he wasn't sold but thought any plan was better than no plan.

Can't remember the exact wording but something along the lines of "let's see what we can do tomorrow, but we may need to return to Corinth the day after."

I am not sure that I would agree with that, as not all correspondence was in response to Rosecrans' messages regarding the nature of the plan. If that comment was, we would need to look at it and see the context. Furthermore, you are certainly making some logical jump there.

That would make for an interesting discussion.

Maybe at some point we will get a productive conversation going on the subject.

 

[tony_gunter]

Interesting. I am not sure that I would agree with that, as that correspondence wasn't in response to Rosecrans messages regarding the nature of the plan.

That would make for an interesting discussion though.

Yeah, you're right. It was a response to "how's the wife" and Grant was all like "we will see how it goes, but I may need to return to Corinth the day after" … Corinth of course being a euphemism if ya know what I mean.

 

[1SGDan]

deprive them of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek.

Had the Fulton Road been closed Price's only option for retreat would have been to the east down the rail bed.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Had the Fulton Road been closed Price's only option for retreat would have been to the east down the rail bed.

That is incorrect. There was at least one road running out of Iuka to the east. That is well established.

 

[1SGDan]

That is well established.

By who? The Lamers book map on page 102 does not show it and several other maps offered up here also do not. The truth here is that retreat to the east by any available route would have been the only option for Price if the pre-operational plan had been conducted successfully, unless he opted to slug it out in three directions with Ord and Rosecrans.