Is there any sympathy for Bragg?

MikeyB

Sergeant
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Sep 13, 2018
I am a total novice on Chickamauga campaign, just started reading Six Armies in Tennessee.

However, I am struck at more than one occasion where the author suggests Bragg had some very promising plans that were just flat out ignored, delayed or not carried out by his subordinates (i believe mostly Polk).

It seems that Bragg is almost universally reviled. So my question is - if Bragg had a better senior corps commander, might we be talking about him in a much more different, light than we are today? Are there any Bragg sympathizers? i just don't know enough about him.
 
I am a total novice on Chickamauga campaign, just started reading Six Armies in Tennessee.

However, I am struck at more than one occasion where the author suggests Bragg had some very promising plans that were just flat out ignored, delayed or not carried out by his subordinates (i believe mostly Polk).

It seems that Bragg is almost universally reviled. So my question is - if Bragg had a better senior corps commander, might we be talking about him in a much more different, light than we are today? Are there any Bragg sympathizers? i just don't know enough about him.
There have been one or two recent books that are more sympathetic to Bragg maybe others might know the titles.
Certainly Forrest,Longstreet and other Confederate Generals were not huge fans of Bragg to say the least. No doubt Bragg is an interesting figure.
Leftyhunter
 
If you read Reminiscences of a soldier of the Orphan Brigade, by Lieutenant Lot D. Young, you'll notice some bitterness towards any mentioning of Bragg. Nobody liked him, and that KILLED his effectiveness. The soldiers didn't seem to have faith in him, and that mostly is because of his subordinates. I think his subordinates were jerks, but he wasn't exactly blameless either.

Personally, I feel for the guy. He seems to try so hard, yet his plans never turn out...like me!
 
Bragg lacked a key attribute for any effective manager and/or leader: he was generally disliked and not respected, not only by his subordinate officer corps but by the rank and file as well. This was a combination of his personality, his various medical ailments, and his way of reacting with people. As a result, some of Bragg's critical battle plans were stymied, particularly by Generals Polk and D.H. Hill at the prelude to Chickamauga, when Bragg foresaw a favorable opportunity to assault separated wings of Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland and destroy them in detail. What could almost be considered insubordination on the part of Polk and Hill meant that Thomas' XIV Corps and Crittenden's XXI Corps escaped the trap that Bragg had set for them on more than one occasion.

Bragg's feud with his senior officers adversely effected other plans. After joining the western campaign. General Longstreet quickly joined the anti-Bragg camp; Bragg's decision to rid Longstreet and his divisions by ordering him to Knoxville and East Tennessee, while based on some level of military thought, greatly hindered the defense and resulted in the loss of Chattanooga in November 1863 by, among other things, the lack of manpower that was represented by Longstreet's command.

So there is probably some amount of sympathy to be had for Bragg, particularly given the logistical problems that all the confederate armies and commanders in the west faced. But Bragg's undoing is still mostly of his own making.
 
Are there any Bragg sympathizers? i

Yes, there were. Just as the confederate political world divided into pro-Davis and anti-Davis camps, so the military political world in the western theater divided into pro-Bragg and anti-Bragg camps. There actually were some units who wrote Jeff Davis in 1864 pleading that Bragg be put back in command before Atlanta be lost.

My take (for what little it's worth) is this: Bragg had a good mind for the strategic plan. His moves into Kentucky and his trap for Rosecrans in northern Georgia were brilliant. He was willing to take risks and take the fight to the enemy, a quality Lee was revered for. Until Missionary Ridge, his men often times did not considered themselves as a beaten army. With a clear view of how the war unfolded, we today see them as a losing army, but the men in the line felt they gave their opponent more than an even exchange.

Bragg had mortal problems. First, by all accounts, he was not the most likeable guy to work with and the men he counted on the most were the ones who encountered this in him times of stress or frustration. Second, Bragg did not seem to have that fluid capacity to adjust his plans on the fly as things changed. Third, and most important, his primary lieutenant officers were outright mutinous towards him. This was the result of Lt. Gen. Polk's constant backstabbing of Bragg coupled and the protection Jeff Davis gave to Polk. Polk, a man whose career as a bishop made him adept at persuasion and working to change outlooks, was skillful at poisoning the opinions of other generals against Bragg, the very generals Bragg counted on the most. In my estimation, Polk is at least as responsible for Bragg's ultimate failure as Bragg himself. What Davis saw in Polk is utterly beyond me. (BTW, my opinion here was shaped greatly by Stephen Woodworth's "Jeff Davis and His Generals".

To this list, I would add one more huge problem, one that was completely out of Bragg's control: he had the great misfortune of facing Gen. Thomas is the opposing army in every battle. He kept his cool at Murfreesboro. He saved the Union's bacon at Chickamauga. He succeeded where Sherman could not at Chattanooga. I really don't think Thomas' critical presence in the other army can be emphasized enough in judging Bragg.

In summary, Bragg was no Lee or Grant. But he was a smart commander who was ready to fight vigorously to defend his territory. Subtract Polk from his own army and Thomas from his opponent's army, and I suspect he would have been much more highly regarded today.
 
Yes, there were. Just as the confederate political world divided into pro-Davis and anti-Davis camps, so the military political world in the western theater divided into pro-Bragg and anti-Bragg camps. There actually were some units who wrote Jeff Davis in 1864 pleading that Bragg be put back in command before Atlanta be lost.

My take (for what little it's worth) is this: Bragg had a good mind for the strategic plan. His moves into Kentucky and his trap for Rosecrans in northern Georgia were brilliant. He was willing to take risks and take the fight to the enemy, a quality Lee was revered for. Until Missionary Ridge, his men often times did not considered themselves as a beaten army. With a clear view of how the war unfolded, we today see them as a losing army, but the men in the line felt they gave their opponent more than an even exchange.

Bragg had mortal problems. First, by all accounts, he was not the most likeable guy to work with and the men he counted on the most were the ones who encountered this in him times of stress or frustration. Second, Bragg did not seem to have that fluid capacity to adjust his plans on the fly as things changed. Third, and most important, his primary lieutenant officers were outright mutinous towards him. This was the result of Lt. Gen. Polk's constant backstabbing of Bragg coupled and the protection Jeff Davis gave to Polk. Polk, a man whose career as a bishop made him adept at persuasion and working to change outlooks, was skillful at poisoning the opinions of other generals against Bragg, the very generals Bragg counted on the most. In my estimation, Polk is at least as responsible for Bragg's ultimate failure as Bragg himself. What Davis saw in Polk is utterly beyond me. (BTW, my opinion here was shaped greatly by Stephen Woodworth's "Jeff Davis and His Generals".

To this list, I would add one more huge problem, one that was completely out of Bragg's control: he had the great misfortune of facing Gen. Thomas is the opposing army in every battle. He kept his cool at Murfreesboro. He saved the Union's bacon at Chickamauga. He succeeded where Sherman could not at Chattanooga. I really don't think Thomas' critical presence in the other army can be emphasized enough in judging Bragg.

In summary, Bragg was no Lee or Grant. But he was a smart commander who was ready to fight vigorously to defend his territory. Subtract Polk from his own army and Thomas from his opponent's army, and I suspect he would have been much more highly regarded today.

Thanks for the long post. In the few chapters I've been reading on Chickamauga campaign, it seems that not only did Bragg identify opportunities to crush smaller Union battle groups, but that he actually ordered plans in place to do this. And had it not been for mostly Polk not executing, he had a better than fairer chance of succeeding. Awful personality or not, if he had soldiers who executed orders, the entire campaign may have been much different
 
I think recent historians have been taking a better look at Bragg and he's getting a little love after all! Myself, I think he was a good commander but not a brilliant one, and part of his problem (aside from an unhappily abrasive personality and some distinct prejudices) was inheriting A S Johnston's territory. Davis thought of Johnston as the epitome of a soldier and laid a very heavy load on him, which eventually came into Bragg's lap. He actually got a lot better support out of people like Forrest, who deserved better handling, and undeserved snarking from less able generals like Polk. Polk had something of a nerve doing that to Bragg when together they had invaded Kentucky - a bad move to say the least. Bragg was not his own best friend, either, but I believe he had simply been promoted beyond his abilities. He and Johnston together might have been a very good team, like Grant and Sherman. Sherman could not have held the position Grant held and might have been the Union's Bragg - but yoked together with Grant, he was quite good. One thing Bragg was really bad at was management. His subordinates did things like start round-robin letters to get him removed, finished breakfast or sulked in their tents when ordered to make an important movement, and others were mystified - like Forrest. He recognized Bragg's abilities as a commander but couldn't reconcile his actions with common sense. "What does he fight battles for?" Eventually they came to a, shall we say, parting of the ways which was better for both. However, Forrest did not join the dissatisfied and rejected the removal letter when it came to his desk, and he followed his orders. It's just he decided after financing and training a couple brigades then having them yanked out from under him, maybe he'd be better used elsewhere!
 
Notwithstanding his personality problems, and when compared with other CSA army commanders in the West such as Johnston, Beauregard, and Hood, Bragg's military competence is certainly not lacking. As noted, he managed to plan and order maneuvers that would have, if carried out, dealt a severe blow to the AOTC prior to Chickamauga. His initial battle plan for assaulting the Union right at Stones River was executed effectively and almost spelled defeat for the AOTC at the end of the first day. And although Bragg's (with Kirby Smith) Kentucky campaign did not accomplish many of its objectives, it was no less a failure than Lee's simultaneous campaign into Maryland.
 
Are there any Bragg sympathizers?
Yes there are. Others above have set forth plenty of reasons. I would add that there is not much mention of his effective organization and training of 10,000-12,000 raw troops in Florida and Alabama very early in the war and transfer of same to fighting brigades/divisions elsewhere. For myself,I have made the decision not to engage in any of the bashing of Bragg for the sake of bashing. I respect his service. He paid a heavy price physically and mentally for his service. He served honorably and it wore him down.
 
I’ll echo some of the others and say that, while he was apparently quite unlikeable, he was dealt no favors when it came to his subordinates. They were pretty much terrible in many cases, failing to execute plans and openly campaigning against him. It made for a pretty terrible work environment and a situation where nobody could have succeeded, not even a deity like Lee or Grant. With competent help, he’s far more effective.

@Georgia Sixth has another good point I can’t help but echo. He was also fighting the West’s best general in George Thomas. That’s a tough spot.
 
I am a total novice on Chickamauga campaign, just started reading Six Armies in Tennessee.

However, I am struck at more than one occasion where the author suggests Bragg had some very promising plans that were just flat out ignored, delayed or not carried out by his subordinates (i believe mostly Polk).

It seems that Bragg is almost universally reviled. So my question is - if Bragg had a better senior corps commander, might we be talking about him in a much more different, light than we are today? Are there any Bragg sympathizers? i just don't know enough about him.

Yep, I'm a Bragg apologist I must confess. In fact, if u take another look at the book above you'll see my work referenced repeatedly in the chapter that covers what transpired between Bragg and Longstreet between 10/25 and 11/30 of 1863. Woodworth relies heavily on an article I wrote ca 1993 that was published in a collection of essays by Savas/Woodbury ca 1995. Dr Woodworth also has nice things to say about me, Edward Carr Franks, in the foreword to his book. : )

Sadly, Bragg apologists remain, my work notwithstanding, rare as hen's teeth, still.
 
He is a handy person to joke about--but I totally agree he was chunked into an unworkable situation. He was constantly backstabbed by Polk, Hardee and Hill--and good ol' Jeff Davis just frankly let them get away with it. I have little patience or sympathy for Davis. His favoritism blinded him to situations he should have stepped into decisively--like Bragg's. In fairness, I have to say his handling of the Arkansas-Missouri goings-on early in the war and his continued backing of Van Dorn pretty much explains his inability to handle THIS situation. I do like the idea of pairing Bragg with someone like Johnston. That might have been a viable solution. Maybe.
 
Yep, I'm a Bragg apologist I must confess. In fact, if u take another look at the book above you'll see my work referenced repeatedly in the chapter that covers what transpired between Bragg and Longstreet between 10/25 and 11/30 of 1863. Woodworth relies heavily on an article I wrote ca 1993 that was published in a collection of essays by Savas/Woodbury ca 1995. Dr Woodworth also has nice things to say about me, Edward Carr Franks, in the foreword to his book. : )

Sadly, Bragg apologists remain, my work notwithstanding, rare as hen's teeth, still.
Welcome to our forum sir.
 
Yep, I'm a Bragg apologist I must confess. In fact, if u take another look at the book above you'll see my work referenced repeatedly in the chapter that covers what transpired between Bragg and Longstreet between 10/25 and 11/30 of 1863. Woodworth relies heavily on an article I wrote ca 1993 that was published in a collection of essays by Savas/Woodbury ca 1995. Dr Woodworth also has nice things to say about me, Edward Carr Franks, in the foreword to his book. : )

Sadly, Bragg apologists remain, my work notwithstanding, rare as hen's teeth, still.

Just ordered Woodworth’s book. Is there a link to your Article? Thanks
 
Welcome @edfranksphd from the Shiloh/Pittsburg Landing Forum and North Mississippi! Be sure and visit the Forum soon.
As for myself, I have little respect for Bragg based on his actions with Colonel Randall L. Gibson act Shiloh. Bragg did his best to have Gibson vilified and disciplined for his behavior and command of the 1st Brigade in Ruggles's Division. Here is a copy of Bragg's Official Report below with his comments reagrding Gibson hi-lighted which were untrue and designed to impune Gibson's honor and reputation.
Regards
David

"The command soon returned to its work, but was unequal to the heavy task. Leaving them to hold their position, I moved farther to the right, and brought up the First Brigade (Gibson), of Ruggles' division, which was in rear of its true position, and threw them forward to attack this same point. A very heavy fire soon opened, and after a short conflict this command fell back in considerable disorder. Rallying the different regiments, by means of my staff officers and escort, they were twice more moved to the attack, only to be driven back by the enemy's sharpshooters occupying the thick cover. This result was due entirely to want of proper handling. Finding that nothing could be done here, after hours of severe exertion and heavy losses, and learning of the fall of our commander, who was leading in person on the extreme right, the troops were so posted as to hold this position, and leaving a competent staff' officer to direct them in my name, I moved rapidly to the extreme right."
 
I’ll echo some of the others and say that, while he was apparently quite unlikeable, he was dealt no favors when it came to his subordinates. They were pretty much terrible in many cases, failing to execute plans and openly campaigning against him. It made for a pretty terrible work environment and a situation where nobody could have succeeded, not even a deity like Lee or Grant. With competent help, he’s far more effective.

@Georgia Sixth has another good point I can’t help but echo. He was also fighting the West’s best general in George Thomas. That’s a tough spot.
the west's best genl.? Thomas? he was good, but Cleburne was better. he did more with lessand, didn't complain about it even after havin to deal with braggs idiosyncracies. like the time bragg fined himself for being late to a mtg.[ his own mtg.] yup the guy had problems. like the time he let Cleburne sit overlookin the Lafayette valley where a third of the aoc sat. he coulda rolled 'em up [Cleburne], but he waited for braggs final approval. [ never came] chetham was another that didn't like bragg, but didn't sign the letter of discontent. bragg also transferred d.h. hill away from missionary ridge, further weakening the army. weakening the army so much in the face of the enemy, was disasterous.[ removing hill and longstreet]. and as usual, when they were routed, bragg called on Cleburne again to save the army. which Cleburne would do time and again. Cleburne shoulda been promoted to corps command but, hardee was to get that corps command when the time came.
 
You're comparing apples to oranges; a very capable division commander to a very capable commander of an army of three corps. The jobs are quite different.
maybe, but the qualities are still there. pat Cleburne was every bit the equal. in fact Thomas was almost removed from command at Nashville.
 
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