Yes, there were. Just as the confederate political world divided into pro-Davis and anti-Davis camps, so the military political world in the western theater divided into pro-Bragg and anti-Bragg camps. There actually were some units who wrote Jeff Davis in 1864 pleading that Bragg be put back in command before Atlanta be lost.
My take (for what little it's worth) is this: Bragg had a good mind for the strategic plan. His moves into Kentucky and his trap for Rosecrans in northern Georgia were brilliant. He was willing to take risks and take the fight to the enemy, a quality Lee was revered for. Until Missionary Ridge, his men often times did not considered themselves as a beaten army. With a clear view of how the war unfolded, we today see them as a losing army, but the men in the line felt they gave their opponent more than an even exchange.
Bragg had mortal problems. First, by all accounts, he was not the most likeable guy to work with and the men he counted on the most were the ones who encountered this in him times of stress or frustration. Second, Bragg did not seem to have that fluid capacity to adjust his plans on the fly as things changed. Third, and most important, his primary lieutenant officers were outright mutinous towards him. This was the result of Lt. Gen. Polk's constant backstabbing of Bragg coupled and the protection Jeff Davis gave to Polk. Polk, a man whose career as a bishop made him adept at persuasion and working to change outlooks, was skillful at poisoning the opinions of other generals against Bragg, the very generals Bragg counted on the most. In my estimation, Polk is at least as responsible for Bragg's ultimate failure as Bragg himself. What Davis saw in Polk is utterly beyond me. (BTW, my opinion here was shaped greatly by Stephen Woodworth's "Jeff Davis and His Generals".
To this list, I would add one more huge problem, one that was completely out of Bragg's control: he had the great misfortune of facing Gen. Thomas is the opposing army in every battle. He kept his cool at Murfreesboro. He saved the Union's bacon at Chickamauga. He succeeded where Sherman could not at Chattanooga. I really don't think Thomas' critical presence in the other army can be emphasized enough in judging Bragg.
In summary, Bragg was no Lee or Grant. But he was a smart commander who was ready to fight vigorously to defend his territory. Subtract Polk from his own army and Thomas from his opponent's army, and I suspect he would have been much more highly regarded today.