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Controversy erupted almost immediately after the guns fell silent on September 20th, 1863 and the subsequent inability for the Army of Tennessee to drive the Army of the Cumberland out of Chattanooga and back across the Tennessee River. Once the operations around Chattanooga developed into a quasi-siege, several of Braxton Bragg's subordinates would raise their objections to what they considered to be, in the words of D. H. Hill, a "barren victory." There were chief dissidents beyond Hill—James Longstreet, Simon Buckner, and a plethora of division and brigade commanders would, in addition to Hill, jointly sign a petition on October 4th seeking Bragg's relief as commanding general. It appears that, less than three weeks after a major victory, much of the senior command had grown disenchanted with Bragg, citing the army's inability to decisively act in front of Chattanooga as a primary grievance. Were their objections and complaints valid?
I recently finished Dave Powell's third book in his Chickamauga trilogy and have previously read Peter Cozzens' book on the Chattanooga Campaign, and it seems that the opinion of both historians is that these protests were more based from personal displeasure with Bragg rather than logistical and operational realities. Perhaps these subordinates, especially those from the lower level commands, were ignorant or willing to ignore the army's logistical deficiencies if it meant that Bragg could be removed?
Cozzens and Powell both state that the Army of Tennessee was distinctly lacking in transportation before the massive influx of troops from Mississippi, East Tennessee, and Virginia; while the troops from Mississippi were accompanied by their own wagon trains, Longstreet's veterans from Lee's Army arrived with no transportation beyond those necessary for the artillery battalion of E. Porter Alexander. Bragg's transportation system was already stretched thin before receiving tens of thousands of reinforcements, and it may have been the case that the army was simply incapable of major maneuvering with not enough wagons to go around. Longstreet's primary dispute would be that Bragg did not seek a turning movement to force Rosecrans from Chattanooga, with the Tennessee River being conceivably fordable both above and below Chattanooga. Was Longstreet, recently arrived to both the army and the theater, unaware of the impracticability of such an operation?
In regard to the immediate aftermath of Chickamauga, Powell was fairly favorable toward the intensity of Bragg's pursuit. The Confederate high command, with few exceptions, expected a resumption of battle on September 21st, and Powell highlighted that Forrest and Wheeler either produced meaningless or nonexistent scouting reports throughout the day, respectively. Once Bragg ascertained that Rosecrans' army had concentrated around Rossville in the late afternoon, Bragg started to put the army's main body in motion northward toward Chickamauga Station and the north end of Missionary Ridge, seemingly intent on turning the federals out of the defensible gaps of the ridge. There would be limited action on the 22nd, with only a number of light skirmishes before Bragg realized that the federals were expanding the fortifications of Chattanooga with no apparent intent to immediately retire.
Powell, citing Bragg's dispatches to Wheeler on the 21st and 22nd, argues that Bragg was of the belief that Rosecrans would not fight another general engagement to retain Chattanooga and that Bragg only needed to apply some pressure to compel his retiring across the river. As we all know, the Army of the Cumberland would not withdraw from Chattanooga. Was it Bragg's overconfidence in Rosecrans' being whipped or the lackluster intelligence that compelled him to begin the pursuit late on the 21st, or more likely, a combination of both?
From my reading I've come to the conclusion that the victory of Chickamauga wasn't particularly "squandered," or at least moreso than any other major battles during the war. With the exceptions of Thomas' pursuit of Hood following Nashville and Grant's pursuit of Lee after the fall of Richmond, there are no examples of pursuits being powerful or decisive. The victorious army was often as disorganized as the defeated one, and Powell argues that Chickamauga is no exception to either rule.
The lack of maneuvers after Chickamauga appear to be reasonable as well. Bragg seemingly lacked the ability to pursue any bold turning movements ala Lee's Second Manassas Campaign or Grant's Vicksburg Campaign for want of transportation. Bragg is popularly remembered as an incompetent, wanting army commander, and it looks his negative reputation has proceeded him in the popular notions of Chickamauga and Chattanooga. In my opinion, Bragg's movements (or lack thereof) post-Chickamauga, given the issues of transportation seem very reasonable indeed, rather than the actions of an incompetent general snatching strategic defeat from the hands of decisive, perhaps war-winning victory.
I recently finished Dave Powell's third book in his Chickamauga trilogy and have previously read Peter Cozzens' book on the Chattanooga Campaign, and it seems that the opinion of both historians is that these protests were more based from personal displeasure with Bragg rather than logistical and operational realities. Perhaps these subordinates, especially those from the lower level commands, were ignorant or willing to ignore the army's logistical deficiencies if it meant that Bragg could be removed?
Cozzens and Powell both state that the Army of Tennessee was distinctly lacking in transportation before the massive influx of troops from Mississippi, East Tennessee, and Virginia; while the troops from Mississippi were accompanied by their own wagon trains, Longstreet's veterans from Lee's Army arrived with no transportation beyond those necessary for the artillery battalion of E. Porter Alexander. Bragg's transportation system was already stretched thin before receiving tens of thousands of reinforcements, and it may have been the case that the army was simply incapable of major maneuvering with not enough wagons to go around. Longstreet's primary dispute would be that Bragg did not seek a turning movement to force Rosecrans from Chattanooga, with the Tennessee River being conceivably fordable both above and below Chattanooga. Was Longstreet, recently arrived to both the army and the theater, unaware of the impracticability of such an operation?
In regard to the immediate aftermath of Chickamauga, Powell was fairly favorable toward the intensity of Bragg's pursuit. The Confederate high command, with few exceptions, expected a resumption of battle on September 21st, and Powell highlighted that Forrest and Wheeler either produced meaningless or nonexistent scouting reports throughout the day, respectively. Once Bragg ascertained that Rosecrans' army had concentrated around Rossville in the late afternoon, Bragg started to put the army's main body in motion northward toward Chickamauga Station and the north end of Missionary Ridge, seemingly intent on turning the federals out of the defensible gaps of the ridge. There would be limited action on the 22nd, with only a number of light skirmishes before Bragg realized that the federals were expanding the fortifications of Chattanooga with no apparent intent to immediately retire.
Powell, citing Bragg's dispatches to Wheeler on the 21st and 22nd, argues that Bragg was of the belief that Rosecrans would not fight another general engagement to retain Chattanooga and that Bragg only needed to apply some pressure to compel his retiring across the river. As we all know, the Army of the Cumberland would not withdraw from Chattanooga. Was it Bragg's overconfidence in Rosecrans' being whipped or the lackluster intelligence that compelled him to begin the pursuit late on the 21st, or more likely, a combination of both?
From my reading I've come to the conclusion that the victory of Chickamauga wasn't particularly "squandered," or at least moreso than any other major battles during the war. With the exceptions of Thomas' pursuit of Hood following Nashville and Grant's pursuit of Lee after the fall of Richmond, there are no examples of pursuits being powerful or decisive. The victorious army was often as disorganized as the defeated one, and Powell argues that Chickamauga is no exception to either rule.
The lack of maneuvers after Chickamauga appear to be reasonable as well. Bragg seemingly lacked the ability to pursue any bold turning movements ala Lee's Second Manassas Campaign or Grant's Vicksburg Campaign for want of transportation. Bragg is popularly remembered as an incompetent, wanting army commander, and it looks his negative reputation has proceeded him in the popular notions of Chickamauga and Chattanooga. In my opinion, Bragg's movements (or lack thereof) post-Chickamauga, given the issues of transportation seem very reasonable indeed, rather than the actions of an incompetent general snatching strategic defeat from the hands of decisive, perhaps war-winning victory.
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