Hooker and Gettysburg

[wausaubob]

We don't know that Joe Hooker thought about the Gettysburg battle. But the artillery reserve he formed was decisive. The cavalry reforms under Pleasonton brought the US cavalry even with the Confederate cavalry. The quartermaster service under Rufus Ingalls was working and the army under Hooker was better fed and could move. It was no longer a stationary siege army. The railroad system under Haupt was keeping track of the army's progress northward, because the reporting was timely and accurate.
From the disaster at Fredericksburg the Army of the Potomac made a great deal of progress under Hooker. The defeat at Chancerloville
hurt the army but did not break it, because it was so much better organized.
Hooker could have taken pride in what he had accomplished.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Lee wanted to cause panic and for troops, especially the US IX Corp to be withdrawn from the Vicksburg siege. He caused concern, but no panic.
The war was being won from the west to east. By July 10, 1863 the US had complete control of the far west, control of Missouri and Kansas, and control of Territorial Nebraska and Colorado. The US had at least military control of the entire Mississippi River and the throne of the cotton empire in Mississippi and Louisiana.
General Halleck and Sec'y Stanton knew that Lincoln wanted the Vicksburg campaign completed, and was willing to take risks to accomplish that.
The response to General Lee's invasion was significantly different than the response to defeat of the Cumberland Army in no. Georgia.

And still no sources. Like I said, as expected, your only source for your contentions is your own suppositions. Again, I thank you for confirming that.

 

[wausaubob]

The sources are about the strip of states from Georgia to New York City. But the war was much more about controlling the west and extending the 19th century Republican party throughout the west. The tactical to and fro in the east made the headlines. But the real war was fought at sea and on the internal rivers. Small, but critical actions in the west put the US in control of the future of the country.
Judging from what happened after the war, the US did not care much about what happened in the south, as long as they did not have an independent entity. But the US cared a great deal about Missouri, building a railroad to California, and Texas.

 

[wausaubob]

As for what the army thought of General Hooker, Generals Meade and Grant repeated his opening campaign later in May of 1864 with one important change. No matter what happened, Grant and Meade were going to turn south to Richmond. That is evidence that they thought Hooker had made a good start in 1863.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

The sources are about the strip of states from Georgia to New York City. But the war was much more about controlling the west and extending the 19th century Republican party throughout the west. The tactical to and fro in the east made the headlines. But the real war was fought at sea and on the internal rivers. Small, but critical actions in the west put the US in control of the future of the country.
Judging from what happened after the war, the US did not care much about what happened in the south, as long as they did not have an independent entity. But the US cared a great deal about Missouri, building a railroad to California, and Texas.

So, one more time: I am asking you for specific credible citations to specific credible sources that support your contention, not vague generalities. Specific credible citations are to a specific source identified by author, title, date of publication, and page number, if appropriate. So far, and despite multiple requests that you provide a credible specific source, you've provided nothing but vague generalities and your own suppositions. Therefore, my assumption, absent a single credible source, is that you have nothing but your own suppositions to support your claim. That, in turn, means that it's your opinion. If that's the case, it's fine--you're entitled to your opinion--but you should say so, and that will be the end of this dialogue.

And again, I think that I know a little bit of something about researching these events, and I am generally pretty aware of what are and are not credible sources. I'm also a 35 year litigator with a lot of trial experience, so I know a little bit about burdens of proof and credible evidence too.

 

[neyankee61]

I'm not sure you can give Hooker that much credit for the artillery reserve. He took it apart during the Chancellorsville campaign and made Hunt a purely admin officer. After the battle he put it back together and put Hunt back in control. If a person creates the problem and then claims credit for solving it, I'm not sure if he deserves that credit

 

[wausaubob]

I don't claim to be a historian. I will assert that these tactical battles like Gettysburg were completely useless and insane. It was just Borodino on a smaller scale. Armies formed. They met. Men murdered each other. For what, so the Confederacy might enjoy a temporary political reprieve from their colossal strategic failures?
All the what ifs don't stand up to the fact that the Confederates made it to Pennsylvania and never made even to Harrisburg, because they knew the approximate surrender date in Vicksburg was going to be in the first week of July.

 

[wausaubob]

If he had commented on Gettysburg Hooker probably would have agreed with Sherman. Sherman thought that by 1863 the US armies had become professional. In additional the economy of the paid labor states had recovered. The railroad companies in the north were earning profits. The full naval power of the US was deployed. Even immigration had returned to normal levels. Hooker might have said it was too late for the Confederacy.

 

[wausaubob]

I'm not sure you can give Hooker that much credit for the artillery reserve. He took it apart during the Chancellorsville campaign and made Hunt a purely admin officer. After the battle he put it back together and put Hunt back in control. If a person creates the problem and then claims credit for solving it, I'm not sure if he deserves that credit

Hooker must have seen his mistake. And it was fixed in time for Gettysburg.

 

[BarryR]

Please correct me if Im wrong..I was under the impression that Lee's invasion of the north was to "threaten" Washington. In an effort to actually draw the Union forces into a Major engagement and to defeat them. He knew the "war" climate in th North was ebbing and believed a negotiated peace would follow after the defeat of the AOtheP...

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

I don't claim to be a historian. I will assert that these tactical battles like Gettysburg were completely useless and insane. It was just Borodino on a smaller scale. Armies formed. They met. Men murdered each other. For what, so the Confederacy might enjoy a temporary political reprieve from their colossal strategic failures?
All the what ifs don't stand up to the fact that the Confederates made it to Pennsylvania and never made even to Harrisburg, because the new the approximate surrender date in Vicksburg was going to be in the first week of July.

My problem, with all due respect, is presenting extreme opinions as matters of fact, which is why I asked you for sources. Had you said all along that you were expressing your opinion, I would never have jumped in. That said, and with all due respect, nobody knew that Vicksburg's garrison was going to surrender or when.

 

[wausaubob]

My problem, with all due respect, is presenting extreme opinions as matters of fact, which is why I asked you for sources. Had you said all along that you were expressing your opinion, I would never have jumped in. That said, and with all due respect, nobody knew that Vicksburg's garrison was going to surrender or when.

Once Grant relieved McClernand and Rosecrans/Thomas were in motion, I think the US administration was sure that Vicksburg would fall. So we disagree there.
Some messages were leaking out of Vicksburg on the Confederate side, before about June 17. I think Johnston communicated to Richmond the probable timetable. It just seems very strange to me that Lee would accept such a climatic battle so far from Richmond, on ground that Meade thought worth defending, if he did not know Vicksburg was doomed. There's that and the once late attempt made in Parliament in London to force mediation, which was ridiculed by John Bright. Then too, the covert action in New York to provoke the labor strife and draft riots was part of the plan.
The US Civil War was about to take an incredible turn to the positive by July 1, 1863. First Vicksburg fell and Lee's army had to recross the Potomac. Port Hudson fell. Soon Rosecrans was blocking and flanking past Tullahoma down to Chattanooga. The US able to also occupy Knoxville and Little Rock. The Confederates had to abandon Battery Wagner for both sanitary reasons and to escape US heavy artillery that had been landed on Morris Island.

 

[wausaubob]

The army that Hooker had worked to create understood how to care for soldiers and Ingalls knew how to keep the wagon trains out of the way of the infantry divisions.
@Eric Wittenberg is the acknowledged cavalry expert. I think he probably knows how the cavalry reforms implemented by Pleasonton caused the US Cavalry to take up much more space, and made the US Army much harder to get around.

 

[GwilymT]

Please correct me if Im wrong..I was under the impression that Lee's invasion of the north was to "threaten" Washington. In an effort to actually draw the Union forces into a Major engagement and to defeat them. He knew the "war" climate in th North was ebbing and believed a negotiated peace would follow after the defeat of the AOtheP...

If that was Lee's intent then we can cast his effort as one of the most miserable and complete failures in military history.

 

[wausaubob]

In October of 1863 Hooker probably would have kept his mouth shut if asked about Gettysburg. He had a new assignment and a chance to fix his career. By September of 1864 he probably would criticized the entire war effort in colorful language.

 

[wausaubob]

If that was Lee's intent then we can cast his effort as one of the most miserable and complete failures in military history.

The US administration did not reinforce the Army of the Potomac and in contrast to the previous fall, they did not recall General McClellan to command. General Meade, the Pennsylvanian, relieved Joe Hooker. But Hooker was not cashiered and had a new assignment about 3 months later. Hooker could easily have claimed that although he did not command during the battle at Gettysburg he had managed the movement northward in compliance with his instructions and had done a credible job of it.

 

[neyankee61]

Surprisingly Hooker kept his mouth shut after he was relieved from command of the AoP. He was then sent west where he did a good job in command of the XX Corps. Then after McPherson's death and Howard's promotion he couldn't keep quiet and Sherman sent him home. Unlike John Logan who felt he deserved the command. Logan waited until he became Senator and Sherman Commander of the Armies.Then Logan took out his anger on Sherman by slashing the Army budget and manpower.

 

[JimN]

Hooker'a view doesn't matter. Halleck and Stanton got what they wanted. Lee was allowed to go north, and his opportunity to reinforce either Bragg or Johnston was lost. They administration did not want any battle until the time line on the surrender at Vicksburg looked inevitable. Removing Hooker prevented a sudden aggressive action by Hooker. It hurt the Army of the Potomac, but the corp commanders in that army pulled together and did there best management of the entire war. They may have been somewhat frightened that they might lose.

Hooker's view may not matter to you. It does to me and I would think it would matter to some historians.
I'm not asking if his view had any effect on anyone, just to get an idea of the man himself which interests me.

 

[Irishtom29]

Sherman commanded 3 armies in his invasion of Ga., Sherman's Army of the Tn, Thomas' Army of the Cumberland and Hooker's rump corps from the AoP, designated as an 'Army' as an army for administrative reasons. So in fact Hooker did successfully command an army after Chancellorsville. As far as I can see the Hooker in the West was the Hooker in the East. He was self important and self confident and seems to have been criticizing others and proclaiming himself as better. He was a very competent commander of large bodies of men and was adept at playing at 'Army Politics; as most senior commanders are, then and now.

By the Georgia campaign the 11th and 12th Corps had been organized together as a new 20th Corps and made a part of the Army of the Cumberland which then consisted of the 4th, 14th and 20th Corps. Hooker commanded the 20th Corps and was subordinate to Thomas. Howard commanded the 4th Corps and Palmer the 14th.

Sherman's small third army was the Army of the Ohio which consisted of only one corps, the 23rd and was commanded by Schofield.