Gettysburg Southern Front

[neyankee61]

As Lee moved north in June 1863, Gen. Hooker proposed that the AoP make a quick strike towards Richmond. This was rejected by Lincoln. This did not mean that a demonstration towards Richmond by Union forces was out of the question. By the middle of the month, Gen. Halleck instructed Gen. John Dix at Fortress Monroe to look into the possibility of such a move by his forces. Dix had under his command about 20,000 men in the IV and VII Corps. On July 1 he had moved his forces to White House on the Pamunkey. From there he ordered Gen. Erasmus Keyes to march to Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy.
There Keyes was to made a demonstration of force to tied down Confederate defenders and threaten Richmond. He was to distract the rebels from the movement of Gen. George Getty whose force was marching to burn the bridges over the South and North Anna rivers. Keyes' failure to do this led the Gen DH Hill to move against Getty's force leading it being unable to complete its assignment. Did the North missed a golden opportunity at this time to influence Lee and his invasion of the North?

 

[Saint Jude]

Just to be clear, do you mean that if Keyes had succeeded in threatening Richmond, Lee would have had to turn back to defend it? Also, re. Hooker's wish to have one corps of the AotP chase Lee and the rest of them to have another go at Richmond via Fredericksburg, u wouldn't that also have made Lee turn back? Lincoln had a hard time convincing Fighting Joe that his true objective was Lee's army, not Richmond.

 

[infomanpa]

He was to distract the rebels from the movement of Gen. George Getty whose force was marching to burn the bridges over the South and North Anna rivers.

I wonder if General Getty ever thought of the irony that he was never involved in the Gettysburg campaign.

 

[neyankee61]

If Dix was a little more aggressive Pickett's whole Division which was at Hanover Junction may have remained there instead of matching north. As it was Corse's brigade was delayed and never joined the Division

 

[Saphroneth]

Lincoln had a hard time convincing Fighting Joe that his true objective was Lee's army, not Richmond.

Amusingly he'd had a completely different point of view back in October 1862...

There Keyes was to made a demonstration of force to tied down Confederate defenders and threaten Richmond. He was to distract the rebels from the movement of Gen. George Getty whose force was marching to burn the bridges over the South and North Anna rivers. Keyes' failure to do this led the Gen DH Hill to move against Getty's force leading it being unable to complete its assignment. Did the North missed a golden opportunity at this time to influence Lee and his invasion of the North?

The basic issue I think is that the force in Richmond is adequate to defend it against anything short of an "engineering" attack (i.e. an attack with engineering support) and to get into position to make such an engineering attack you need to have a good secure supply line. So the threat has to be quite substantial; posing such a threat is possible, but a lot depends on exactly how strong the defenders of Richmond are - that is, how much of the Dept. of NC is actually in Richmond at that date.

A threat to Richmond would absolutely pull Lee back south, but it has to be a credible one.

 

[neyankee61]

Even a credible one may have held Pickett's Division at Hanover Junction. The biggest failure was Keyes not mounting a credible threat to Richmond. He was suppose to be cover for Getty to destroy the bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers. Complete destruction of the bridges plus rails would have caused problems for Lee, esp. after his defeat and retreat from Gettysburg.

 

[Saphroneth]

Even a credible one may have held Pickett's Division at Hanover Junction. The biggest failure was Keyes not mounting a credible threat to Richmond. He was suppose to be cover for Getty to destroy the bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers. Complete destruction of the bridges plus rails would have caused problems for Lee, esp. after his defeat and retreat from Gettysburg.

But does Keyes have the means to mount a credible threat to Richmond? As of June 30 he has about 7,000 men PFD from his corps at White House (the corps is 10,500, but a third of them were back at Yorktown) and another 12,000 from other formations; he has about seven batteries of artillery.

The Department of Richmond itself (not including any of the Dept. of NC troops who may have been there) is about 8,000 PFD, and DH Hill has nearly 20,000 PFD in the Dept. of NC, much of which was moved to Petersburg and which could well have been in Richmond.

So how credible is credible?

 

[neyankee61]

Keyes was tasked with making a move on Bottom's Bridge. Instead of aggressively marching there, he made excuses as to why he could not. It didn't take long for Hill to understand that this was not a threat and even attacked Keyes.

 

[Saphroneth]

Keyes was tasked with making a move on Bottom's Bridge. Instead of aggressively marching there, he made excuses as to why he could not. It didn't take long for Hill to understand that this was not a threat and even attacked Keyes.

And are those excuses reasonable or not? That's sort of the question. Advancing to Bottom's Bridge is viable, perhaps, but a more serious threat to Richmond really isn't - and would Hill have evaluated a move to Bottom's Bridge as a threat to Richmond?

And, as always, you have to consider - what happens if the enemy does what you don't want? If Keyes advances to Bottom's Bridge and DH Hill blows away the White House Landing supply base as per exactly a year ago?

 

[neyankee61]

Dix had enough troops at White House to defend it esp. if Keyes tied down Hill's troops. If was important that Keyes keep the initiative.

 

[Saphroneth]

Dix had enough troops at White House to defend it esp. if Keyes tied down Hill's troops. If was important that Keyes keep the initiative.

Okay, but now you're double counting the troops at White House - if the troops from Dix's dept. are defending White House, Keyes is launching an expedition with 7,000 men PFD.

That's eminently defeatable in the field by what Hill has - and is, by no means, enough to threaten Richmond. It's practically outnumbered by the garrison.


Tempo is not worth exposing a significant Union force to defeat. You cannot simply avoid unfavourable engagements by being aggressive.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Keyes demonstrated why he had been left behind on the Peninsula after the rest of the Army of the Potomac left in summer 1862.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'd hardly call him one of Lincoln's better picks as corps commanders, but I was actually getting at the question of whether he had the means to achieve much of significance. Richmond itself isn't vulnerable to a corps-sized raid so long as there's enough men to garrison the forts - heavy forts can let regiments repulse divisions, as per Vicksburg - and Keyes doesn't have the means to protect his supply line from WHL to Richmond. Any threat he poses cannot be existential and going far enough to be more than vaguely threatening risks his army; as it is, DH Hill and the defences of Richmond combined mean that Keyes has kept the attention of at least half the manpower of the total force at WHL.

The Confederates are going to react according to perceived threat, but they're also liable to take opportunities if they're offered.

 

[milhistbuff1]

Moving them to the Potomac might have been more effective and with Dept of NC troops in/near Richmond and Petersburg... Lee finding elements of 4th/7th and 8th Corps interdicting his supply/retreat route might give him pause. Combined with the Harper's Ferry garrison you've approximately 20K men.

 

[Saphroneth]

Moving them to the Potomac might have been more effective and with Dept of NC troops in/near Richmond and Petersburg... Lee finding elements of 4th/7th and 8th Corps interdicting his supply/retreat route might give him pause. Combined with the Harper's Ferry garrison you've approximately 20K men.

Doing that is... hm. I would anticipate somewhat tricky, a lot depends on timings. It takes a long while to ship troops, especially if you're shipping them complete with the wagons they need to operate in the field long term (this is what screwed up the retirement from the Peninsula in August, a single transport has about a ~6 day round trip between Yorktown and Alexandria but the first lift only carried troops - the wagons filtered in over the following weeks.)

Separately, there's the issue that making an offensive with a chunk of the Dept. of Virginia is less problematic than moving a chunk of the Dept. of Virginia out of their defined operational area. The latter means potentially exposing Suffolk, Yorktown etc. to Confederate raids - so you can't really concentrate the lot.

Forming a new mass of manoeuvre numbering ca. 20,000 men on the Potomac would be quite tricky.

French's division, which is what happens when you generate a field force from 8th Corps, is to my understanding about 7,000 men before sending 2,500 of them to Washington (and 4,500 after) and had to link up with 3rd Corps pretty quickly so it could be attached to an existing corps train.

The entirety of the Dept. of Virginia is less than 30,000 men PFD, and that includes all sorts of garrisons. The field force at White House Landing is 19,000 men PFD, but that's by drawing down the garrisons which can safely be drawn down because the field force is between them and the enemy; more to the point, if you try to take ca. 16,000 men from the Tidewater region and move them to the region of Washington DC as a force able to manoeuvre in the field, a lot depends on shipping availability for how fast that can be done but of course that also means the timing of the decision has to be pushed back further.

Potentially enough that the Confederates can meaningfully respond.

I'll also flag up that I'm not sure enough wagons were available.

 

[neyankee61]

Keyes advanced from White House with approx. 6,000 men. His orders were to "advance on the Richmond road, and attack the enemy" who were thought to be in considerable force on the west side of the Chickahominy near Bottom's Bridge. He was ordered to "hold his position for two or three days, until there was reason to believe that General Getty had accomplished his objective." Keyes was not to destroy the bridge there, only to "engage the enemy with a view to detain them." It was 12 miles from White House to Bottom's Bridge, not a great distance and Keyes was expected to complete the march in one day. Keyes was picked for the command because of his rank and the fact that he was familiar with the area having commanded troops there in the 1862 campaign.
Keyes marched out of White House on July 1 and advanced 8 miles where he halted at Crump's (Baltimore) Crossroads. There he paused and began to erect defensive positions. It appears that Keyes felt his mere presence would serve to divert Hill's attention from Getty.
Dix's force was as follows: Keyes 6,000 men, Getty 10,000 men, at White House 4,000 men under Gen. George Gordon. Keyes' entire first division under Rufus King, about 4,000 men remained behind at Yorktown.
On the same day July 1, Dix received the following orders from Halleck:
"As soon as the expedition now terminates, you will draw in all your forces to Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and the defenses of Norfolk, and send to this place (Washington, DC) all troops not absolutely required for the defense of those three places."

 

[Saint Jude]

Amusingly he'd had a completely different point of view back in October 1862...

Live and learn--as they say!

 

[Stryker65]

But what we are not considering here, I think, is the perspective of the politicians -- any "major" threat to Richmond, imagined or otherwise, would surely stir the politicians into a panic, and badger Davis into pulling troops back for the defense of the capital. While he already had Cooke's, Corse's, Jenkins's, and Ransom's brigades in the area, the capture of part of the 44th NC during the campaign could surely weaken Confederate belief in the ability of their forces to hold, regardless of the Union's numerous intelligence, tactical, and command failures.

 

[Hampton Newsome]

Great discussion. I explored these issues in my book in case you haven't had a chance to check it out -
Print version here.
Audio version here.

https://www.audible.com/pd/Gettysbu...42b-8c8dceb62f2c&ref=a_search_c3_lProduct_1_1

 

[Belfoured]

Great discussion. I explored these issues in my book in case you haven't had a chance to check it out -
Print version here.
Audio version here.
View attachment 569624
https://www.audible.com/pd/Gettysbu...42b-8c8dceb62f2c&ref=a_search_c3_lProduct_1_1

Strongly recommended.