Grant Henry W. Halleck

[SSVilla]

This post is more about Halleck than Grant but there's no Halleck tag, and the statements about Halleck are made by Grant, so I thought I'd stick it here.

In his tour around the World, after his Presidency, reflecting on his interactions with Halleck, Grant doesn't appear to hold any grudges against him. He said of him that "[he was] a very able military man… had intellect, and great acquirements outside of his military education." And that when he was made a major general at the start of the war, everyone that knew him from the old army was "gratified" by his appointment.

He also respected that Halleck had graciously stepped down and continued in the army service despite no longer being General in Chief after Grant's promotion. Grant was disappointed in those generals who refused to return to the service after being removed by the administration unless they were at the head of commands such as the ones they wanted. Gen. Don Carlos Buell came to mind, but there are probably others.

His only criticism of Halleck is one that would probably have been acknowledged by anyone who knew him, because it can be seen from his dispatches and interactions with others. Grant said:

"His fault—and this prevented his being a successful commander in the field—was timidity in taking responsibilities. I do not mean timid personally, because no one ever doubted his courage, but timid in reaching conclusions. He would never take a chance in a battle. A general who will never take a chance in a battle will never fight one. When I was in the field, I had on two or three occasions to come to Washington to see that Halleck carried out my orders. I found that there was some panic about the rebels coming between our army and the capitol, and Halleck had changed or amended my orders to avoid some such danger. I would say, 'I don't care anything about that. I do not care if the rebels do get between my troops and Washington, so that they get into a place where I can find them."

— Conversations with General Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, John Russell Young

https://a.co/2MoOtTf

 

[DanSBHawk]

I remember reading an excerpt of a letter that Halleck wrote to his wife after Grant assumed the General-in-Chief position, with Halleck writing of being relieved that he no longer had to make the tough decisions.

EA Hitchcock wrote that Lincoln called Halleck "apathetic" in 1864. But maybe it was more of an issue of just avoiding being decisive.

 

[SSVilla]

I remember reading an excerpt of a letter that Halleck wrote to his wife after Grant assumed the General-in-Chief position, with Halleck writing of being relieved that he no longer had to make the tough decisions.

EA Hitchcock wrote that Lincoln called Halleck "apathetic" in 1864. But maybe it was more of an issue of just avoiding being decisive.

He certainly didn't want to get involved. The Administration's panic with Rosecrans after the battle of Chickamauga comes to mind as an explicit example of a crisis that required Halleck's personal intervention as Commander in Chief back then. When I saw the dispatch from Dana to Stanton asking to send Halleck and yet nothing from Halleck, I understood the reason Lincoln would complain that Halleck was only a glorified desk clerk. I am sure that's an over simplification as in that quote above Grant doesn't in any way diminish or disrespect his contribution, advice and cooperation, but Halleck wouldn't get involved.

As Commander in Chief in 1863, Halleck could have gone to Chattanooga and removed or kept Rosecrans in command, whatever the administration or he wanted, without involving Grant, but Halleck wasn't up to the task. As you say, he would appear apathetic to Lincoln, but it was something else.

I was listening to a video on CSpan and one of the people in the public asked the historian presenting about Grant's relationship with Halleck after the command change. The historian answered that Halleck was very insecure. He was indeed relieved that the burden of command was off his shoulders because he knew he wasn't giving Lincoln what he needed.

Edited to add link, check Minute 47:40.

 

[rpkennedy]

I remember reading an excerpt of a letter that Halleck wrote to his wife after Grant assumed the General-in-Chief position, with Halleck writing of being relieved that he no longer had to make the tough decisions.

EA Hitchcock wrote that Lincoln called Halleck "apathetic" in 1864. But maybe it was more of an issue of just avoiding being decisive.

Lincoln had been complaining about Halleck not making decisions as early as late 1862. It frustrated him to no ends that Halleck wouldn't opt for something but would rather suggest or request rather than order. Meade certainly could commisserate on that note as well.

Grant, on the other hand, had no such problems being decisive.

Ryan

 

[Present Arms]

What was Halleck's job description? What was he expected to do? What was his authority to do it? What resources were available to him to accomplish that mission? Was he expected to make operational decisions (lead troops)? Was he supposed to recommend actions to Lincoln? Did he have the authority to hire and fire? To whom was he accountable for his performance? Was his role to provide resources to meet the requirements of the armies in the field? Leaders must have a clear mission, clear authority, adequate resources and a clear understanding of who is his boss. Many military leaders have failed because those questions were unanswered.

 

[SSVilla]

^ Halleck was the General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States from July 23, 1862 – March 9, 1864. That meant he was the top U.S. General for that period.

The General in Chief at that time was only subordinate to the War Department and the President. He was preceded by Gen. Winfield Scott, who was too old and unfit for service in the field and that together with poor health, forced his retirement. He designed the Anaconda Plan before he did so though - a strategy for the entire war theater. McClellan, a young man, succeeded Winfield Scott but he had sharp disagreements with the Lincoln administration that undermined his effectiveness and was thus quickly replaced by Henry Halleck.

 

[A. Roy]

His only criticism of Halleck is one that would probably have been acknowledged by anyone who knew him, because it can be seen from his dispatches and interactions with others.

While reading Grant's Memoirs, I think I saw rather more criticisms of Halleck than this. Grant doesn't exactly rake Halleck over the coals, but I think I see some lingering resentment.

One example I can think of occurred between the time of Grant's taking Forts Henry and Donelson, and the Battle of Shiloh. Grant's communiques to Halleck were being intercepted and blocked by a Confederate operative, so Halleck thought Grant was being negligent. Halleck and McClellan considered having Grant replaced and even arrested, until the reason for Grant's failure to communicate was uncovered. In his memoirs (page 146 in the edition I'm looking at -- near the end of chapter 23) he writes:

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Halleck sent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. He forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. On the contrary, he wrote to me, 'Instead of relieving you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories.' In consequence I felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. I never knew the truth until General Badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns."

ARB

 

[Cavalier]

Just an opinion but very little respect on my part for Halleck. He seems like the kind of guy who accepts high position and its benefits but avoids the responsibilities. I believe I've run to a few of those in my life.

I think Harry Truman as President had a sign on his desk, "The buck stops here". Can't imagine "old brains" subscribing to that theory myself.

John

 

[SSVilla]

@A. Roy That's true. I think the audience Grant was talking to must have had an effect on what he said.

I consider Grant to be very dignified when talking about any of the generals who once held the position of Commander in Chief of the Army, specifically the dignity and respect due to someone who once had his responsibilities. In a different post from the same book above, I noticed that he is very forgiving of McClellan, giving him a lot of deference. He said that McClellan was very young and inexperienced when thrusted into the responsibility of commanding a large army, at a time early in the war when the weight of it all could break anybody. He memorably said that if McClellan failed it was because the conditions were so trying - phrase that stuck with me. However he thought McClellan's big mistake was getting involved in politics and publicly opposing the President, and he was disappointed that he failed to crush Lee at Antietam.

Anyways, that subject sidetracks me a little bit from Halleck, but I cite it because Grant is not denigrating any U.S. Generals abroad. I think he was very sincere in stating that Halleck was a very intelligent man with a lot of military knowledge who he respected. He was useful and helpful, and he appreciated that he remained in the service - contrasted with others who would balk at a perceived demotion.

But they obviously had very difficult interactions when Halleck was his commander in 1862. It maybe was in bad taste to be sharing all the complexities of his relationship with him abroad specially because he was talking about his assessment of Halleck's generalship.

I think he was right in his impression that Halleck underperformed because he was very timid about taking any risks inherent to the responsibility of command. He gives the example that he had to constantly ensure Halleck followed his orders because he was so timid with risk, whereas Grant wanted to catch the rebels outside their entrenchments. But that's just an easy example. Grant probably found out how risk averse Halleck was in the incredibly slow march and daily entrenching from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth. I recall in the memoirs he was so disappointed that the rebels were allowed to get away and he even criticized the huge fortifications Halleck ordered to be built at Corinth, which he didn't have enough men to staff. I'd love to see pictures of that. I just can't imagine what he refers to.

———-

One last point about Halleck specifically, and is one I recently learned. I am not super well versed on McClellan. I haven't read Sears books about him or the AoP, but when Lincoln promotes Halleck to Commander in Chief it's primarily to deal with a crisis he's already facing with McClellan in the Peninsula campaign and this now rings similar to Grant being promoted to a newly created command specifically to deal with a crisis in Chattanooga with Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland. Grant goes to Chattanooga and literally takes command, whatever happens it's going to be on his head. Whether others like his choices or not, he's the one that goes there organizes everybody, makes dispositions, prioritizes, delegates etc.

Halleck on the contrary, when he meets McClellan in Virginia, basically consults with him, gives McClellan a couple of options but he doesn't take responsibility for any outcome and leaves McClellan to decide what to do for himself. There's a lot more to explore here in this interaction with McClellan if anyone wants to enlighten us with more details. I am going off on Castel's book Victor's in Blue, Ch 6 "Nobody at Antietam." But it would just appear that in spite of being just promoted to Gen. in Chief to handle that specific situation, Halleck instead turns into a kind of advisor and intermediary between McClellan and Lincoln, giving advice to one or the other but solving nothing. Lincoln and McClellan still have to make their own judgments and decisions as if Halleck hadn't been there. I think this time period is just as interesting in revealing Halleck's generalship and his problems with command, as the interactions with Grant and Rosecrans.

 

[SSVilla]

While reading Grant's Memoirs, I think I saw rather more criticisms of Halleck than this. Grant doesn't exactly rake Halleck over the coals, but I think I see some lingering resentment.

One example I can think of occurred between the time of Grant's taking Forts Henry and Donelson, and the Battle of Shiloh. Grant's communiques to Halleck were being intercepted and blocked by a Confederate operative, so Halleck thought Grant was being negligent. Halleck and McClellan considered having Grant replaced and even arrested, until the reason for Grant's failure to communicate was uncovered. In his memoirs (page 146 in the edition I'm looking at -- near the end of chapter 23) he writes:

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Halleck sent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. He forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. On the contrary, he wrote to me, 'Instead of relieving you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories.' In consequence I felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. I never knew the truth until General Badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns."

ARB

Yup and I think despite their differences Grant really did respect Halleck up until the point he found out that Halleck was disobeying and interfering with his orders. Halleck even does this with orders Grants gives concerning Sherman's and Johnston's negotiations in Atlanta.

I can't recall when Grant finds out about the 1862 betrayal and scheming, but my belief is that he discovered it after the war when he had access to records in the war department. Allegedly he wished he hadn't learned that. I can imagine that the level of trust required for that working relationship to work was destroyed.

As I stated in the post I made before, I think the audience Grant was talking to influenced how much he shared (brief opinion about Halleck's generalship vs a story about betrayal that almost had him quit the army and how he found about it).

 

[jackt62]

Halleck was timid in decision making and a lot of that had to do with his bureaucratic mentality of avoiding responsibility and ensuring that any blame fell elsewhere. Lincoln correctly understood that about Halleck not long after elevating him to the general-in-chief position, which in large part he gained because of his respectable command in the Department of Missouri and his reputation in military science. But Halleck's niche was probably as Grant's chief-of-staff. In that role, Halleck was an able administrator who acted as a liaison between Washington and the field command HQ's, a handler of the requests of multiple armies, and keeper of the pipeline to ensure that paperwork flowed efficiently.

 

[rbasin]

Still my favorite

 

[SSVilla]

I have come across this video titled Union Command in the Shenandoah in 1864 with historian Joseph Glatthaar.

I have to share that Halleck doesn't come across very well at all. I feel like Marszaleck, Halleck's biographer is too kind in his evaluation of the man.

 

[67th Tigers]

Before 1857, the General-in-Chief commanded the US Army. After the 1857 revision of the regulations, by Jeff Davis, the GinC was a sinecure - a job with no powers or responsibilities. If I may repost:

The General-in-Chief

Jacob Brown was really just an advisor. The creation of a real "General-in-Chief" occurred under Macomb. This was codified in the 1834 edition of the Regulations, which made the GINC the absolute head of the army and the bureaus (see article 41). There was immediate pushback against this from the bureau chiefs, who had reported directly to the Secretary-of-War. This was amended in 1835 to reestablish the independence of the bureaus from the GINC (see article 39, the second clause of the 1834 art. 41 has been deleted). A similar status was retained in the 1841 regulations (article 63) etc.

After clashing with Scott, Jefferson Davis drafted a new set of regulations in 1857 and ordered them published. He completely deleted the definition of the General-in-Chief. From this point forward the General-in-Chief did not command anything as a right other than his personal staff. However, the office of the General-in-Chief still existed, and it was unclear what authority he had. Jeff Davis added additional clauses to stop Scott (as GINC) giving further orders, such as article 8 which gave only the Secretary-of-War the right to move troops around in peacetime. Effectively, the office of General-in-Chief had become a sinecure.

With the change in regulations, General Scott went into exile in New York, with only a small personal staff as proscribed in regulations. Jeff Davis took direct control of the army. Scott remained in exile until December 1860 - when it emerged the incumbent secretary-of-war, Floyd, who had been selling large quantities of arms to the south, was requested to resign and recalled Scott to Washington. The President placed Scott back in command of the army.

To be clear, for the period 1857-1860, Scott was still general-in-chief. However, in this period he commanded nothing more than his personal staff.

Lincoln clashed with Scott, and accepted his retirement in November. Major-General McClellan was appointed to the post, and given command of all the land forces except those under Brevet Major-General Wool. Wool was second in seniority in the army until McClellan and Fremont were appointed. He argued with Lincoln (wrongly) that McClellan could not give him an order because he asserted (wrongly) that he ranked McClellan.

The General-in-Chief was typically assigned based on seniority, and the case of the assignment of Macomb showed that brevets counted in this matter. Thus Wool contended that he was General-in-Chief by right, since his brevet made him senior to McClellan. However, the law on brevets was that the President could chose whether to assign an officer with a brevet to duty in their brevet rank, or not. Thus, unless Lincoln assigned Wool to duty as a major-general, then McClellan, Fremont and Halleck were senior. On 16th May '62, to placate Wool, Lincoln promoted him to substantive major-general. This made him the senior major-general in the army (since the rank immediately backdated to the date of the brevet), and in fact gave Wool a legitimate claim to supersede McClellan as General-in-Chief. However, on the 4th April Congress passed a resolution that clarified that the President could chose between officers in the same grade when appointments to command were made, and he was not bound by seniority. From then on, Lincoln had a completely free hand in selecting the General-in-Chief from the regular major-generals (since regular major-generals were considered to be a higher grade than volunteer major-generals). Lincoln did not assign Wool to be General-in-Chief in May '62. He assigned Halleck in July. Halleck was initially unsure about whether he could legally be General-in-Chief, until the Resolution was pointed out to him. His reading of the same resolution meant that he tendered his resignation then Grant was appointed Lieutenant-General, which altered Lincoln's apparent plans to retain Halleck as GINC.

The fact that it was not clear that anyone else could be general-in-chief in March 1862 likely explains why McClellan was not formally relieved of the position. The order simply reassigned large parts of the army to report directly. It was only with a creative reading of the 4th April 1862 resolution that anyone else could be assigned. Halleck's tenure was the only period of time when the general-in-chief was not the senior general, discounting Wool (who was retired immediately after Halleck was made GINC).

For those interested in these matters, you can read MG(V) Butler's spurious claim that he ranked McClellan because he accepted his volunteer rank before McClellan accepted his regular rank.

Further to the periods of Scott and McClellan both being in office but deprived of their powers, something similar happened to Sherman. Whilst initially assigned by Grant (then President) to command the army on taking office, within a month Grant would reverse his decision and soon Sherman had no command over the army whatsoever. In fact, given that he had no command he decided to simply leave the United States and spent November 1871-October 1872 touring Europe. He returned to find nothing had changed. In 1873 Belknap (the then Secretary-of-War) attempted to further reduce the position of General-in-Chief by trying to place the SECWAR in the military line-of-command. This was defeated, but with no command, Sherman went into exile in 1874 after applying to move to St. Louis. Belknap assented, but noted that Sherman could not take command of any troops except by order of the War Department - "no material change shall be made in the stations of troops or commanders."

This situation continued until Belknap's impeachment, and as Taft assumed the office he invited Sherman to return and promised that Sherman would be allowed the command the army. With the issue of General Order 28 of that year, Sherman was given command of the army. In 1881 this was reincorporated into the regulations. From 1881 through 1903, when the office was abolished, the General-of-the-Army actually was the commander of the army by regulations, as per 1834-1857. In the 69 years the position of General-in-Chief/ Commanding General/ General-of-the-Army existed, for 24 of those years their status was governed not by regulation, but by Presidential diktat.

 

[52ndFandS]

What was Halleck's job description? What was he expected to do? What was his authority to do it? What resources were available to him to accomplish that mission? Was he expected to make operational decisions (lead troops)? Was he supposed to recommend actions to Lincoln? Did he have the authority to hire and fire? To whom was he accountable for his performance? Was his role to provide resources to meet the requirements of the armies in the field? Leaders must have a clear mission, clear authority, adequate resources and a clear understanding of who is his boss. Many military leaders have failed because those questions were unanswered.

I considered those points. IMO Halleck had no clear mission. Perhaps it was for that reason that he had his favorites and not. Nothing else to do.

Grant was very magnanimous in his writing on Halleck. Interesting as he wasn't with Prentiss. The latter doing mote good than harm.