Grant Grant v Lee

[James N.]

Is there any explanation why the Confederates could still handle US cavalry intrusions in 1864 (Second Reams Station, the Kautz Ride)?

By April 1865 they weren't doing so well; even Nathan Bedford Forrest couldn't turn back James Wilson's attack on Selma, Alabama, losing the battle at Bogler's Creek in the process.

 

[jackt62]

They shared more or less the same education, served in the same army and were to a large degree shaped by their experiences in that army.

Interesting that Lee's experience as an engineer served him well during the CW in understanding terrain and entrenchments, whereas Grant, whose Mexican War experience as a quartermaster, served him well when it came to a keen understanding of logistics and supply during his CW campaigns.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Mea culpa; got mixed up between their ranks as of the Fort Henry/Donelson offensive and their subsequent ranks.



Ammen's account says that Nelson's division was on the march from Nashville March 17th, and that McCook's division was repairing the bridge over the Duck at Columbia as of the 20th. (Nashville-Columbia 43 miles) The bridging operation took long enough that Nelson's division was first over the river by fording (at which point the river was falling, so beforehand it had been too high to ford) on the 29th; if Buell's last division did cross only by "six days" after Nelson's division then it would be crossing on the 3rd, which would mean that it would have marched almost a hundred miles in four days to be at Shiloh on the 7th. (That would be astonishing!)

If the whole force crossed on the 29th and marched 29th, 30th, 31st, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, and arrived on the evening of the 7th (too late for Shiloh) they'd have been marching about ten miles per day.

What period do you have him crossing each division?

(Ammen also reports that he was told to conduct the march so as to arrive at Savannah on the 7th "as we are not wanted there before that time")

Buell was in Columbia from March 10 until April 3. He moved his 4 divisions across the Duck from March 29 to April 3.

 

[atlantis]

Lee acted as if Richmond was the transport hub of the confederacy it was not, Atlanta was. In November of 62 when Joe Johnston return to duty command of the ANV should have been returned to him given the disaster of the Sharpsburg campaign. Lee should have replaced Cooper as AG and IG a role more suited to his talents.

 

[Piedone]

Lee acted as if Richmond was the transport hub of the confederacy it was not, Atlanta was. In November of 62 when Joe Johnston return to duty command of the ANV should have been returned to him given the disaster of the Sharpsburg campaign. Lee should have replaced Cooper as AG and IG a role more suited to his talents.

But aren´t the two cities just too far away as any of them being able to be "the transport hub of the Confederacy"?
I´d say it´s correct regarding Atlanta´s role for the lower South.

 

[Saphroneth]

Buell was in Columbia from March 10 until April 3. He moved his 3 divisions across the Duck from March 29 to April 3.

That still leaves the trailing division only the days of the 3rd (partial), 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th to reach Shiloh in time to participate, which given that it's a hundred miles seems frankly incredible - and not at all worth his being called slow!

Lee acted as if Richmond was the transport hub of the confederacy it was not, Atlanta was. In November of 62 when Joe Johnston return to duty command of the ANV should have been returned to him given the disaster of the Sharpsburg campaign. Lee should have replaced Cooper as AG and IG a role more suited to his talents.

Lee was senior, I believe; his date of rank was June 14.

 

[Saphroneth]

The position of Richmond is such that it dominates the rail net in Virginia, and offers multiple avenues of attack into North Carolina; the only viable routes for Confederate victory include their keeping control of Richmond.

As for Atlanta, weirdly enough you can actually do away with Atlanta with relatively little disruption, at least if the Union already controls Chattanooga. The route via Macon means there's still a rail path connecting whatever else Atlanta had connected.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That still leaves the trailing division only the days of the 3rd (partial), 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th to reach Shiloh in time to participate, which given that it's a hundred miles seems frankly incredible - and not at all worth his being called slow!

Buell didn't have his entire army engaged at Shiloh. I believe he had five divisions total, but only two and a half fought at Shiloh on the morning of the second day. Someone else can verify or correct that.

 

[Piedone]

By April 1865 they weren't doing so well; even Nathan Bedford Forrest couldn't turn back James Wilson's attack on Selma, Alabama, losing the battle at Bogler's Creek in the process.

You are of course right - but weren´t we talking about the ANV?

Of course that well-mounted cavalry with their repeating carbines were a powerful force - but I´d think that they still could be kept under control with (experienced) infantry and some artillery support (to the ANV both was still available), at least the aforementioned battles seem to show this somehow.

In the West there was seemingly just not much confederate infantry available any more (except of Johnston´s force), especially no experienced outfits.

IIRC Forrest´s force comprised mainly cavalry - and in such a clash they had obviously bad cards against their counterparts.

Hence I´d personally conclude that the more modern armed Union cavalry had indeed a much improved firepower but was still not that blatantly superior (especially not against well-led infantry)....

 

[Saphroneth]

Buell didn't have his entire army engaged at Shiloh. I believe he had five divisions total, but only two and a half fought at Shiloh on the morning of the second day. Someone else can verify or correct that.

Wood's division arrived too late to be much use even on the second day, but they did arrive (they had four wounded, no killed)... that still means that they marched on the 3rd (partial), 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th to reach Shiloh - which means an average of 20+ miles per day.

The third division to arrive would have had the 1st (partial), 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th (partial) (6.5 days) and average around 15-16 miles per day.

These are credible performances.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Wood's division arrived too late to be much use even on the second day, but they did arrive (they had four wounded, no killed)... that still means that they marched on the 3rd (partial), 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th to reach Shiloh - which means an average of 20+ miles per day.

The third division to arrive would have had the 1st (partial), 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th (partial) (6.5 days) and average around 15-16 miles per day.

These are credible performances.

Maybe the last week of marching was decent. But the point is that if you look at the entire period, there was significant delay. And it was Buell who asked to march his army, rather than move his army by river from Nashville.

 

[atlantis]

The confederates could not win the war in Virginia but they could lose the war in Tennessee. Lee should have set aside personal feelings and advised/supported an all out effort in Tennessee. Lee was a trusted advisor to Davis his advice carried weight. Grant had the advantage of a better background in logistics Lee was superior in reading the land. The war being in the industrial age, logistics was king. The confederacy could lose Virginia and still win the war.

 

[Saphroneth]

Maybe the last week of marching was decent. But the point is that if you look at the entire period, there was significant delay. And it was Buell who asked to march his army, rather than move his army by river from Nashville.

The movement has three phases, those being:

Nashville to the Duck river
Bridging the Duck
Duck river to Shiloh

Of these:

To the Duck
The map I've looked at shows Buell leaving Nashville on 16 March, which accords with Ammen's bde leaving on the 17th and not being the leading brigade of the movement. Here to the Duck is a march of 43 miles, so we'd expect Buell to arrive here around the 20th or so if he's moving at around 10 miles per day, and indeed McCook is repairing the bridges by the 20th (Ammen's account).

Bridging the Duck
The destruction of the bridges and the ford being unmanageably high is the main cause of the delay here. If the bridge had been completely undestroyed and the divisions could just march through, then we'd expect Buell's head of column to have arrived at Shiloh (with a march rate of 10 miles per day) around the 30th (which would put him having marches on the 16th-30th inclusive, 15 days, to travel about 143 miles).

Instead, his divisions arrive about a week after that (leading division arrives on the 6th April).

Duck river to Shiloh
On this stage, Buell actually "makes up" time compared to what we would expect.


Thus, in both the cases where Buell's army is in motion, it's moving as we would expect if not faster.


This implies to me that the big concern is bridging the Duck river, and that that cost about a week compared to an "optimal route march" at 10 miles a day for the whole distance. It doesn't seem unreasonable to me, especially when he has no dedicated engineers and is trying to bridge a flooded river.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The movement has three phases, those being:

Nashville to the Duck river
Bridging the Duck
Duck river to Shiloh

Of these:

To the Duck
The map I've looked at shows Buell leaving Nashville on 16 March, which accords with Ammen's bde leaving on the 17th and not being the leading brigade of the movement. Here to the Duck is a march of 43 miles, so we'd expect Buell to arrive here around the 20th or so if he's moving at around 10 miles per day, and indeed McCook is repairing the bridges by the 20th (Ammen's account).

Bridging the Duck
The destruction of the bridges and the ford being unmanageably high is the main cause of the delay here. If the bridge had been completely undestroyed and the divisions could just march through, then we'd expect Buell's head of column to have arrived at Shiloh (with a march rate of 10 miles per day) around the 30th (which would put him having marches on the 16th-30th inclusive, 15 days, to travel about 143 miles).

Instead, his divisions arrive about a week after that (leading division arrives on the 6th April).

Duck river to Shiloh
On this stage, Buell actually "makes up" time compared to what we would expect.


Thus, in both the cases where Buell's army is in motion, it's moving as we would expect if not faster.


This implies to me that the big concern is bridging the Duck river, and that that cost about a week compared to an "optimal route march" at 10 miles a day for the whole distance. It doesn't seem unreasonable to me, especially when he has no dedicated engineers and is trying to bridge a flooded river.

The march to Savannah was more like 90 miles from Columbia. Some of his army was transported by river from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing. Nelson did march to the opposite bank from Pittsburg Landing.

So, in all, maybe 140 miles divided by 22 days is about 6.5 miles a day.

Buell did not hurry. But I will excuse him a little bit after remembering and reading this past thread. Halleck didn't ask him to hurry. And in fact, Halleck initially wanted Buell to hold up and stop in Waynesboro (30 miles east of Shiloh) so that Halleck could come down and lead the combined armies.

 

[Saphroneth]

The march to Savannah was more like 90 miles from Columbia. Some of his army was transported by river from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing. Nelson did march to the opposite bank from Pittsburg Landing.

So, in all, maybe 140 miles divided by 22 days is about 6.5 miles a day.

But that's broken up into some days marching (at an average speed of 10+ miles per day) and some days stopped by a river. The problem here is getting over the river, and you can't just march straight through - not until around the 29th when the river falls enough to cross a large body of troops over the available ford, and even then it means a detour.

Troops cannot walk on water...


And yes, you can count based on the journey to Savannah, but then you have to count based on their arrival at Savannah (which means that the trailing division arrived earlier). It's not quite a wash, and I agree we should factor it in, but if we're counting their arrival time at Shiloh we also need to count the whole of the route they took to get to Shiloh - and possibly the limiting factor which is the supply of steamboats, since McCook could only load about a brigade (+ 1 regiment) at a time when he got to Savannah and tried.

 

[DanSBHawk]

But that's broken up into some days marching (at an average speed of 10+ miles per day) and some days stopped by a river. The problem here is getting over the river, and you can't just march straight through - not until around the 29th when the river falls enough to cross a large body of troops over the available ford, and even then it means a detour.

Troops cannot walk on water...


And yes, you can count based on the journey to Savannah, but then you have to count based on their arrival at Savannah (which means that the trailing division arrived earlier). It's not quite a wash, and I agree we should factor it in, but if we're counting their arrival time at Shiloh we also need to count the whole of the route they took to get to Shiloh - and possibly the limiting factor which is the supply of steamboats, since McCook could only load about a brigade (+ 1 regiment) at a time when he got to Savannah and tried.

How do you know that it wasn't fordable until the 29th?

No, troops can't walk on water. But they can walk through it if it's 3 foot deep.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Here's an account from a soldiers diary of March 30, 1862, marching 8 miles to Columbia, fording the Duck River, and marching another 2 miles. All in the same day. So really, how much of an obstacle was this river? Buell was obviously not in a hurry.

March 30. - Our brigade commences another march today. We marched about eight miles to the village of Columbia, where we crossed Duck River, and from there some two or three miles further, where we camped for the night. The crossing of Duck River was a novel spectacle. The bridge had been destroyed by the rebels before leaving and we were obliged to ford the stream , which is here some fifteen or twenty rods across, and more than three feet deep. The boys divested themselves of all the lower portions of their clothing and plunged in with a shout. As the crossing continued, the scene was indeed singular. To the left were the piers and abutments of the bridge destroyed by the rebels , and partly reconstructed by our troops . In front were regiment after regiment crossing, naked to the waist, while our brass band was playing " The Star Spangled Banner," " Yankee Doodle, " " Hail, Columbia , " and other national airs, (our regiment was in advance) , and to the right are the clear waters of the stream , whose lofty banks in the dusky twilight , lend a sombre aspect to the scene.​

https://books.google.com/books/about/Memories_of_Andrew_Simon_Cutler.html?id=j_A4AQAAMAAJ

 

[Saphroneth]

How do you know that it wasn't fordable until the 29th?

Ammen's account has:

March 20 - "bridge over Duck River at Columbia burned by the rebels; river high; no boats."
On the 27th, when Nelson discusses crossing with Ammen, Nelson says there are still no boats, but "that the river is falling, and **** you, get over".
On the 28th, Ammen observes forage wagons crossing the river (so there's an argument that it was fordable as early as the 28th, and possibly the 27th). The water is just up to the bed of the wagons.
On the 29th, when Ammen's brigade crosses, they do so with cavalry using their horses to break the current and the infantry holding their pantaloons etc. on bayonets over their heads.

I must recant the claim about the 29th, as it seems that the river was probably fordable a day or two before then. However, I don't think more than that can be said, because the force that crossed was a complete one (including trains and artillery) and if the water was just up to the bed of the wagons on the 28th then (since it was falling on the 27th) it would have been enough to swamp the wagons on the 25th and 26th.

 

[atlantis]

The western theater was a good training ground for Grant and he did not have the burden of high expectations from superiors. War has a way of weeding out the incompetent.

 

[Saphroneth]

Here's an account from a soldiers diary of March 30, 1862, marching 8 miles to Columbia, fording the Duck River, and marching another 2 miles. All in the same day. So really, how much of an obstacle was this river? Buell was obviously not in a hurry.

Well, since the river had been falling since the 27th at least (explicitly stated as such), it's pretty obvious that it was more of an obstacle before. That's what water depth means.

I mean, I already said that Ammen's bde were fording the river on the 29th, and you're quoting it being fordable on the 30th? I may be missing something.