Grant Grant v Lee

[Saphroneth]

This forgets Vicksburg.

Which isn't regular approaches - it's starving the enemy out. They're conflated under the term "siege" but the two are very different.

 

[limberbox]

But you can also force the Confederates to abandon their prepared positions with regular approaches. Both methods render the enemy position untenable.


This process was going on well before Grant's leadership, and indeed Grant had little to do with the formation of large cavalry raiding units - the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps for example actually gets slightly smaller over the period of Grant's takeover, as far as I can determine.

AOP was just one of the commands reporting to Grant. Wilson (who IIRC correctly was sent West by Grant) turned the Dept of Tennessee's cavalry into an unstoppable force that played a major role in defeating Hood at Nashville and then romped through AL and GA until the war ended, destroying the remaining CS war-making resources, etc.

 

[limberbox]

Which isn't regular approaches - it's starving the enemy out. They're conflated under the term "siege" but the two are very different.

No; read the histories. They employed regular approaches. The surrender occurred because Pemberton knew how close those approaches had become and that a final assault was imminent.

 

[Saphroneth]

No; read the histories. They employed regular approaches. The surrender occurred because Pemberton knew how close those approaches had become and that a final assault was imminent.

Fair enough, by the looks of things the main thing making progress was the mines. Grant may have determined that that was the part of regular approaches which actually worked, which would then explain why he used those (but not really a determined attempt to gain vital terrain for artillery) at Petersburg.

 

[atlantis]

Lee is to be faulted for not accepting that Richmond was expendable the ANV was not.

 

[Piedone]

I'd suggest that BOTH were not expendable - being dependent on each other.

 

[Saphroneth]

Lee is to be faulted for not accepting that Richmond was expendable the ANV was not.

At what point should he have given up Richmond to preserve the ANV, under this metric?

Notwithstanding the extreme value of holding the national capitol for any kind of scenario where the CSA actually continues to exist (by which I mean that there isn't really a viable situation in which Richmond is lost but the CSA still ends up independent, whether by foreign intervention, a peace of exhaustion or compelling the Union to come to terms), the loss of Richmond also quickly starts causing massive other problems for where the AoNV should go next...

 

[Saphroneth]

The usual term for giving up territory when it makes sense to do so is "trading space for time", and this has more than a kernel of truth to it - when you give up territory, you're doing it for one of two reasons.


The first is that you are trading space for time - by giving up the position and moving away, you are creating or exploiting an opportunity where your strength will be becoming greater over time and/or your enemy will be becoming weaker over time.

The second is that holding the territory is untenable, meaning either that by holding it you will suffer worse losses than would otherwise be the case (by pulling back to a different defensive position) or relatedly that you cannot prevent the loss of the area anyway and there is no meaningful benefit from continuing to hold it.


These are of course broad rules of thumb, but we can see how they would apply.

If Lee gives up Richmond, then he doesn't actually gain much time from giving up that space (because Richmond is a transport hub) and there is no short term trend of strengthening the Confederates or causing the deterioration in strength of the Union. It is plausible that there is a long term trend, resulting from Union war weariness, and Lee tries to provoke the Union to abandon the siege to pull back towards Washington because that would mean that the Union would have to come south through central Virginia all over again to get at Richmond.

Richmond is also not untenable for most of the period for which Lee holds it, unless there is a superior location at which to sustain the Army of Northern Virginia (in that it would cause more overall problems for the Union to try to fight the AoNV there).

 

[Piedone]

Except Colonel Lee was not very successful, was he? He won a number of tactical battles. But his state was partitioned. The economy of the state of Virginia was ruined. The white, male population of Virginia and North Carolina suffered a high percentage of death and disability. The institution of chattel slavery disappeared in the USA.
On the other hand Grant became President, and served two complete consecutive complete terms. The 15th Amendment, which Grant favored at the time of ratification, but which later he regretted, was passed and ratified during his first term. And yet, a segment of Civil War denialists wants to argue about every detail of his operations and success in ending the US Civil War in a way which prevented the outbreak of a second war.

While you are absolutely right with Grant being much more successful after the war as a politician I always got the impression that both of them shared many traits before that time.

Of course Lee could somehow rely on his wealthy relatives but he lived everything but a aristocratic life (with his mother struggling to pay for the education of her several children) and very much depended on the government´s underpayment as Grant did and led a middle-class life on army posts.
They shared more or less the same education, served in the same army and were to a large degree shaped by their experiences in that army.

Both of them had only limited actual combat experience when the Civil War started.

Regarding the fact that Lee served over thirty years for the US army and was a most reluctant secessionist until 1861 I am pretty sure that their feelings regarding the United States were (as strange as that sounds) not too different.
Pryor wrote that it seemingly was the loss of Arlington that produced resentment in Lee and led him to embrace a stouter southern point of view.

Regarding their military prowess both learned their trade on-the-job - and because of that both experienced some disappointments.

Both excelled with their aggressiveness and preferred maneuver warfare - and both were quick to adapt technological inventions (Lee´s railroad gun, Grant´s amphibious operations, early trench warfare, innovative tactics etc.)
Both of them had a not always untroubled relation to their subordinates, Grant didn´t realise the qualities of Thomas, Lee somehow overestimated Ewell and Early etc.

Both of them were at their best when inspiring their soldiers with a decisive fighting spirit.

One could say that Grant never experienced miltary disasters like Antietam (maybe rather a half-disaster) or Gettysburg - but this may well be just a consequence of the relation of the forces and the Union´s trump card of near total control of rivers and the sea.

Another difference would be their different behaviour after the war with Grant embracing the idea of reconciliation and Lee acting definitely reserved. But maybe it´s easier to think about reconciliation if you won a war...but it might also be a character trait where they differed...I don´t know.

I also got the impression that Grant was well aware of Lee´s qualities whereas I am not so sure that Lee really realised the qualities of Grant.

The oft-repeated dichotomy of the upstart selfmade-man Grant, the typical American - and the aristocratic slave-holding Lee I am somehow reluctant to buy and take at face-value (see their above similarities) - but it has most probably to be accepted that Lee was more elitist in his thinking -
albeit the old army seems to have been an environment where eg. racist prejudices where pretty prevalent.

I think that many of Grant´s political ideals were shaped by his life after the Civil War.

 

[Saphroneth]

One could say that Grant never experienced miltary disasters like Antietam (maybe rather a half-disaster) or Gettysburg - but this may well be just a consequence of the relation of the forces and the Union´s trump card of near total control of rivers and the sea.

I think Shiloh comes pretty close to a disaster (at least, if Gettysburg counts as one). Certainly Grant's decision making there is an active detriment before the battle and sets up the heavy casualties, while the second day counterattacks result chiefly from the arrival of reinforcements almost despite Grant (as he'd been assuring Buell a couple of days prior he didn't need to hurry, and Buell did hurry).


It's sort of interesting to try and identify the first battle where Grant's tactical control is actually significant in producing a positive outcome.

The oft-repeated dichotomy of the upstart selfmade-man Grant, the typical American - and the aristocratic slave-holding Lee I am somehow reluctant to buy and take at face-value (see their above similarities)

If nothing else, both men did own slaves.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I think Shiloh comes pretty close to a disaster (at least, if Gettysburg counts as one). Certainly Grant's decision making there is an active detriment before the battle and sets up the heavy casualties, while the second day counterattacks result chiefly from the arrival of reinforcements almost despite Grant (as he'd been assuring Buell a couple of days prior he didn't need to hurry, and Buell did hurry).

Buell hurried? That's a new one.

The reinforcements weren't all Buell. Grant's missing division (Wallace) showed up at the end of the first day. Grant would have counterattacked regardless of Buell. Regarding heavy casualties, it was bad but not as bad as Antietam.

 

[Saphroneth]

Buell hurried? That's a new one.

Grant was telling Nelson that they should march so as to arrive at Savannah (a day's march away from Grant's campground) on the 7th, is my understanding.

Nelson crossed the Duck (by fording, the river being high and the bridge not completed) on the 29th and 30th, with the force marching (per Ammen):
29th: 10 miles to reach the river (rear 2 brigades).
30th: 4 miles
31st: 10 miles
1st: 14 miles
2nd: 16 miles
3rd: 15 miles
4th: 10 miles
5th: arrives at Savannah after 10 mile march, around noon. Grant says he'll send boats for them "Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week".

Most of the rest of Buell's force pretty much kept up with this marching speed or at least was close enough behind. It's a long way from crossing the Duck to reaching Savannah, and Buell's men moved at faster on average than the 10 mile "rule of thumb" you can usually expect.

The reinforcements weren't all Buell. Grant's missing division (Wallace) showed up at the end of the first day. Grant would have counterattacked regardless of Buell. Regarding heavy casualties, it was bad but not as bad as Antietam.

Did Grant himself actually counterattack? Certainly a counterattack took place, but that's not necessarily the same thing...

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant was telling Nelson that they should march so as to arrive at Savannah (a day's march away from Grant's campground) on the 7th, is my understanding.

Nelson crossed the Duck (by fording, the river being high and the bridge not completed) on the 29th and 30th, with the force marching (per Ammen):
29th: 10 miles to reach the river (rear 2 brigades).
30th: 4 miles
31st: 10 miles
1st: 14 miles
2nd: 16 miles
3rd: 15 miles
4th: 10 miles
5th: arrives at Savannah after 10 mile march, around noon. Grant says he'll send boats for them "Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week".

Most of the rest of Buell's force pretty much kept up with this marching speed or at least was close enough behind. It's a long way from crossing the Duck to reaching Savannah, and Buell's men moved at faster on average than the 10 mile "rule of thumb" you can usually expect.



Did Grant himself actually counterattack? Certainly a counterattack took place, but that's not necessarily the same thing...

I notice you didn't say anything about the length of time before and during the delay at the Duck. But yes, Nelson was chomping at the bit. Buell, not so much.

Of course Grant counterattacked. I don't know what you're insinuating.

 

[Saphroneth]

I notice you didn't say anything about the length of time before and during the delay at the Duck. But yes, Nelson was chomping at the bit. Buell, not so much.

Well, the operative part is the final part of the movement, and the rest of Buell's column wasn't all that far behind (which is how much of it got into the fight at all).

The Duck is simply a river which requires bridging for a serious movement, and the rebels burned the bridge. From the moment it is crossed to reaching Shiloh is somewhat more than a hundred miles of marching; this takes time, and so does bridging the Duck.

Of course Grant counterattacked. I don't know what you're insinuating.

What I mean is that what we have is a counterattack by Buell's divisions and elements of Grant's army; Buell was the ranking general on the field.
I've checked Wallace's account, however, and it does indeed specify that Grant gave him his direction of attack at a point after daybreak.

 

[OpnCoronet]

It could also be regarded how well both were able to shape their corps of officers and elicit a spirit of cooperation and confidence in them - a field where many others terribly failed.

I agree to a certain extent,. Except I know Meade lamented that he needed corps commanders and I am think Grant and Lee both shared that sentiment.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think it's a systemic problem with the whole Union army, in that respect - and the whole Confederate one. Neither had an adequate base of commanders who'd come up through brigade, division and corps command and got appropriate seasoning at each level - you were basically reduced to, at best, picking from whoever seemed able to manage reasonably well at the next level down with a few months' performance to go on.
At worst you had the seniority "lottery".

 

[DanSBHawk]

Well, the operative part is the final part of the movement, and the rest of Buell's column wasn't all that far behind (which is how much of it got into the fight at all).

The Duck is simply a river which requires bridging for a serious movement, and the rebels burned the bridge. From the moment it is crossed to reaching Shiloh is somewhat more than a hundred miles of marching; this takes time, and so does bridging the Duck.



What I mean is that what we have is a counterattack by Buell's divisions and elements of Grant's army; Buell was the ranking general on the field.
I've checked Wallace's account, however, and it does indeed specify that Grant gave him his direction of attack at a point after daybreak.

Buell spent 3 weeks delayed by the Duck. When he did start crossing, it took him 6 days to cross 3 divisions. That doesn't seem very hurried to me.

Buell was not the ranking general on the field at Shiloh. Grant was.

 

[James N.]

I haven't seen this one before, but Fuller's The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant was interesting if understandably biased toward Grant and the North, and I would presume he came to the same conclusion in your title as well. Fuller was a very important British military thinker and writer in the interwar era after having been seriously wounded as an infantry officer in the trenches. Here's a combined review I wrote about his Grant study comparing and contrasting it with one of Stonewall Jackson written slightly earlier by another former British officer Col. J. F. C. Fuller:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/th...-stonewall-jackson-by-g-f-r-henderson.159139/

Of course that should've read Col. G. F. R. Henderson - too many initials and written in too big a hurry, I guess!

 

[Saphroneth]

Buell was not the ranking general on the field at Shiloh. Grant was.

Mea culpa; got mixed up between their ranks as of the Fort Henry/Donelson offensive and their subsequent ranks.

Buell spent 3 weeks delayed by the Duck. When he did start crossing, it took him 6 days to cross 3 divisions. That doesn't seem very hurried to me.

Ammen's account says that Nelson's division was on the march from Nashville March 17th, and that McCook's division was repairing the bridge over the Duck at Columbia as of the 20th. (Nashville-Columbia 43 miles) The bridging operation took long enough that Nelson's division was first over the river by fording (at which point the river was falling, so beforehand it had been too high to ford) on the 29th; if Buell's last division did cross only by "six days" after Nelson's division then it would be crossing on the 3rd, which would mean that it would have marched almost a hundred miles in four days to be at Shiloh on the 7th. (That would be astonishing!)

If the whole force crossed on the 29th and marched 29th, 30th, 31st, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, and arrived on the evening of the 7th (too late for Shiloh) they'd have been marching about ten miles per day.

What period do you have him crossing each division?

(Ammen also reports that he was told to conduct the march so as to arrive at Savannah on the 7th "as we are not wanted there before that time")

 

[James N.]

No, the issue is that the Union had a monopoly on large Parrott guns. The smaller patterns or knock-offs thereof were made in Tregedar IIRC, but the large patterns like the 8" had not been developed before the war started and the man doing the dev work (Parrott) was a Union officer.


Lee would have been stocking up on Parrott field guns; the lack of larger guns in the Confederate artillery park was a pretty significant limit on their operations in e.g. 1862 (as they could not go after Washington with their own siege guns).


As far as I am aware Grant made no serious attempt at regular approaches.

Robert Parker Parrott, Superintendent of the West Point Foundry, located just across the Hudson River from the Military Academy. One wag of the day suggested that the U.S. National symbol should be changed from the eagle to the parrot! I was surprised during my recent visit to Fredericksburg to discover that Lee had near Lee's Hill during the battle a single 30-pounder Parrott that had been brought up from the Richmond defenses and could likely have reached any of the positions on that field from its central location. Impressive as it looks, however, it pales in comparison with the 100 and 300-pounders available in the Union arsenal!