Grant Grant Under Fire: A Question

Joseph Rose submitted his manuscript to Ted Savas but Ted wanted it to be shorter. So Joe published the book on his own, which I think was a mistake.

I thought the manuscript should be publishedin two volumes. I was troubled that 2/3 of the book dealt with Grant in the West. That didn't leave much space for the eastern campaigns. Joseph practically ignores the siege of Petersburg.
Bryce,

I didn't submit it to Ted, although Ted stated that he wished I had and later suggested an offer. Self-publishing is the path I chose, as publishers usually don't prefer books with 621 pages of text (including a 3-page Appendix), over one hundred pages of Notes, almost forty pages in the Bibiliography, and over thirty more for the Index. I also wanted it hardcover and with a sewn binding. Many publishers go the cheap path of two hundred pages total in softcover, glued together.

I think that your "practically ignores the siege of Petersburg" is relative to the fact that there are approximately fifty pages concerning Shiloh and forty about Chattanooga. Those two battles contain a far higher proportion of Grant mythology that needs to be refuted (please see the takedown of Simpson's "What Happened on Orchard Knob?" in my essay "What Really Happened on Orchard Knob and at Missionary Ridge?"). Grant probably lied far more about each of those two battles than he did about Petersburg. And his followers, then and now, continue the stream of falsehoods.

Thanks,
Joe
 
I have not "been telling [you plural] for years to distrust every ACW military historian because [I disagree] with their interpretations." What a crock.

I point out where historians get it wrong (and every one does to a greater or lesser degree).

I am just amazed how many of the pro-Grant historians take vast liberties with the truth (or in the case of Dr. Simpson's omission of Dana's assertion that neither Grant nor Thomas intended it, they hold the truth hostage). Yet, people here won't even acknowledge that simple fact. Why don't you?
"I point out where historians get it wrong (and every one does to a greater or lesser degree)."

So let's pursue that: in your 600+ page book where have you "gotten it wrong"? And I don't mean the list of typos and similar minor "errors" on your website (plus the point you were informed about the other day in one of these threads and have now apparently added).

To the list of authors chastised in your book you've asserted in these forums that Gordon Rhea made a number of "historical errors" in vol 5 of his Overland Campaign series. And we know that you've claimed that Tim Smith in Conquer or Perish made errors that in your words rise to the level of "massive" and "ridiculous""falsehoods", "distortions", and "covering up" for Grant.
 
"I point out where historians get it wrong (and every one does to a greater or lesser degree)."

So let's pursue that: in your 600+ page book where have you "gotten it wrong"? And I don't mean the list of typos and similar minor "errors" on your website (plus the point you were informed about the other day in one of these threads and have now apparently added).

To the list of authors chastised in your book you've asserted in these forums that Gordon Rhea made a number of "historical errors" in vol 5 of his Overland Campaign series. And we know that you've claimed that Tim Smith in Conquer or Perish made errors that in your words rise to the level of "massive" and "ridiculous""falsehoods", "distortions", and "covering up" for Grant.

Adhominem attacks are a red flag that speaks for itself.
 
The only reason anyone can criticize Joseph Rose's research is because it is extensively documented. Almost all of the pro Grant posts on here are documented - if they even are - by secondary sources or post war articles and memoirs that are available on line. There is an over reliance on Grant's Memoirs.
 
The only reason anyone can criticize Joseph Rose's research is because it is extensively documented. Almost all of the pro Grant posts on here are documented - if they even are - by secondary sources or post war articles and memoirs that are available on line. There is an over reliance on Grant's Memoirs.
I rarely see anyone reference Grant's memoirs here, except to make a point about what he said post war vs during the war.
 
The only reason anyone can criticize Joseph Rose's research is because it is extensively documented. Almost all of the pro Grant posts on here are documented - if they even are - by secondary sources or post war articles and memoirs that are available on line. There is an over reliance on Grant's Memoirs.
So in fact not "every" historian "gets it wrong". Interesting.
 
So in fact not "every" historian "gets it wrong". Interesting.

Belfoured is so right. The implication is that real historians all make gross errors of fact… What's funny about this is that real historians know that when the evidence changes, the conclusions change.

For example, in the Ken Burns Civil War series both Shelby Foote & Ed Bearss cite what are now known to be apocryphal events. That is the nature of scholastic enquiry.

Recently, I found out that a citation I had used for 20 years is, in fact, from a fictional magazine story.

History is not revealed religion, only amateurs & fantasists believe in orthodoxy.
 
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The only reason anyone can criticize Joseph Rose's research is because it is extensively documented. Almost all of the pro Grant posts on here are documented - if they even are - by secondary sources or post war articles and memoirs that are available on line. There is an over reliance on Grant's Memoirs.
A book can have a massive amount of sources and still be wrong. All it takes is snipping out some of the inconvenient parts of the sources, and making some specious interpretation. And the filler in Rose's book - all the unceasingly negative judgments - makes it a dreary slog for anyone except those who hate Grant.

And no, there is no "over reliance" on Grant's Memoirs. That's what Varney claimed and he actually made false accusations against Woodworth and other historians.
 
I think that your "practically ignores the siege of Petersburg" is relative to the fact that there are approximately fifty pages concerning Shiloh and forty about Chattanooga. Those two battles contain a far higher proportion of Grant mythology that needs to be refuted (please see the takedown of Simpson's "What Happened on Orchard Knob?" in my essay "What Really Happened on Orchard Knob and at Missionary Ridge?"). Grant probably lied far more about each of those two battles than he did about Petersburg. And his followers, then and now, continue the stream of falsehoods.
You have not "taken down" any historian. I remember when you claimed with absolute certitude that you had proven that Grant had received orders before taking Paducah. That claim has since completely fallen apart.
 
Imma drag Vicksburg into it just to cross-check for bias. 😃
Let's see how Professor Simpson does on Vicksburg:

Page 172: "Absent a major blunder by McClernand, the only way Grant could nullify him would be by taking Vicksburg" [No, Grant nullified him thru a mere technicality and not even a minor blunder, and it was before taking Vicksburg. In fact, Halleck gave him authority to nullify McClernand without reason.]

Page 173: On the Vicksburg canal, "Grant thought little of this particular effort ...." [The fact is that Grant acted as if he expected important results from this. ("Work on the canal is progressing as rapidly as possible.")]

Page 174: "Soon reports circulated that Grant's men, exposed to the swamps, were sick and dying at an alarming rate. These stories had a slim foundation in fact." [Statistics on illness and death contradict this. See U.S. Army, Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion.]

The next several pages are mostly on non-campaign issues, such as Grant's drinking, but include Simpson's egregious misquotation that "Halstead was blunt: 'How is it that Grant who was behind at Ft. Henry, drunk at Donelson, surprised and whipped at Shiloh and driven back from Oxford, Miss. , is still in command?' he thundered." on Page 177.

On the same page Simpson wrote that, "It had been Rosecrans who had whispered tales of an intoxicated Grant to another Commercial reporter the previous fall." [Evidence in PUSG and elsewhere does not confirm this. Long ago, online, I asked for his proof and he offered none. It's a hugely serious allegation, with apparently no documentation, besides Legget's thinking it might have been Rosey.]

Page 181: "Grant sent McPherson and a combined army-navy force to Yazoo Pass with orders to clear out the river and create a passage for transports and ironclads" [McPherson didn't go to Yazoo Pass.]

Page 189: On the second passage, "Although Vicksburg's cannon succeeded in disabling only one steamer, the Tigress (of Shiloh fame), the loss was serious because it was carrying the medical stores that would be so sorely needed after a battle." [Tigress was more than disabled. Grant to Meigs: "This will probably be forwarded to you with the papers intended to secure payment for the Steamer 'Tigress,' lost in running the Vicksburg Batteries." Grant tried to get increased compensation for his friend, the owner.]

Page 202: ""Just as Lawler led his men forward, an officer rode up to Grant. It was General William Dwight, one of Banks's staff officers, with a copy of a message from Halleck to Banks, also dated May 11, urging Banks to take the same course of action Halleck had recommended to Grant, adding that united action would render success "almost certain." Dwight, interpreting these messages as orders, implored Grant to break off his campaign and comply with Halleck's wishes. Grant declined. No one was going to stop him from taking Vicksburg. In later years he would confuse the arrival of Halleck's dispatch to him with that carried by the staff officer, and report that he had chosen to ignore what he termed an 'order.'" [Grant wasn't the only one confused. As opposed to Simpson's suppositions, Dwight's contemporary letter shows that he did not even get to the Champion Hill until 10 pm of the day of the battle, so he could not have been at Big Black River Bridge. He did not implore Grant "to break off his campaign." In fact, he wrote that so impressed was he with Grant's brilliant success up to that point, "I withheld these views from all but Genl Grant, and in a private conversation with him I only hinted at that plan of campaign as the one which had seemed to Genl Banks the most probable." He even offered his services to Grant.]

203: Simpson described the "rolling terrain and bluffs east of the city" [Really, it's deeply incised loess, which is not a "rolling" landscape.]

I'll stop here, but will note that Simpson's whole description of Grant's drunkenness on the trip up the Yazoo is an exercise of rank apologism.
 
You have not "taken down" any historian. I remember when you claimed with absolute certitude that you had proven that Grant had received orders before taking Paducah. That claim has since completely fallen apart.
How can a claim based on Grant's own writing "fall apart," unless you are arguing that Grant fabricated the dates in the attached correspondence?

My book contains compelling circumstantial evidence: "Besides the report's unequivocal acknowledgment of Frémont's approval, the content of Grant's reply and his subsequent actions further confirmed that, before embarking, he had received Frémont's message, with its distinct authorization to move on Paducah. As to the department commander's instructions to fortify a point across the Ohio River from Cairo, Grant replied that he 'was very much opposed to occupying Fort Holt at the beginning' and, although he scarcely felt himself 'sufficiently conversant to make recommendations' on the subject of fortifications, he thought Cairo ought to have priority. In the absence of his superior's orders to immediately fortify the "Kentucky shore opposite Cairo,' these comments would have come out of the blue. Instead, he duly sent Frémont the plans for establishing Fort Holt and dutifully ended: 'The works ordered by you will be prosecuted however with all the force available for that service.' Also indicative of his receipt of the telegram with General Frémont's order for the transfer of the Cape Girardeau regiment, Ulysses Grant wrote John McClernand on the 5th (apparently late at night, to be delivered the next morning): 'Please order, by my direction, Smith's Regt. to come to Cairo by first Boat," and he reported to Frémont the next day that "last night I ordered the 8th Missouri Vols. Colonel M[organ] L. Smith, stationed at Cape Girardeau, to report here immediately.'"

Please show me the smoking gun that not merely contradicts this, but causes my conclusion to have "completely fallen apart" (and I'm pretty sure that I never used the phrase "absolute certitude"). It had better be great information, or it indicates that you're telling a falsehood.
 

Attachments

People at CWRTs also wouldnt wear disguises- unless it were a costumed event- or use pseudonyms. This says much about how public CW discussion has fallen.
 
How can a claim based on Grant's own writing "fall apart," unless you are arguing that Grant fabricated the dates in the attached correspondence?

My book contains compelling circumstantial evidence: "Besides the report's unequivocal acknowledgment of Frémont's approval, the content of Grant's reply and his subsequent actions further confirmed that, before embarking, he had received Frémont's message, with its distinct authorization to move on Paducah. As to the department commander's instructions to fortify a point across the Ohio River from Cairo, Grant replied that he 'was very much opposed to occupying Fort Holt at the beginning' and, although he scarcely felt himself 'sufficiently conversant to make recommendations' on the subject of fortifications, he thought Cairo ought to have priority. In the absence of his superior's orders to immediately fortify the "Kentucky shore opposite Cairo,' these comments would have come out of the blue. Instead, he duly sent Frémont the plans for establishing Fort Holt and dutifully ended: 'The works ordered by you will be prosecuted however with all the force available for that service.' Also indicative of his receipt of the telegram with General Frémont's order for the transfer of the Cape Girardeau regiment, Ulysses Grant wrote John McClernand on the 5th (apparently late at night, to be delivered the next morning): 'Please order, by my direction, Smith's Regt. to come to Cairo by first Boat," and he reported to Frémont the next day that "last night I ordered the 8th Missouri Vols. Colonel M[organ] L. Smith, stationed at Cape Girardeau, to report here immediately.'"

Please show me the smoking gun that not merely contradicts this, but causes my conclusion to have "completely fallen apart" (and I'm pretty sure that I never used the phrase "absolute certitude"). It had better be great information, or it indicates that you're telling a falsehood.
So no more about the "unsubmitted report?" No more partially quoting Grant's telegraph to Fremont? Anyone who is interested can use the search function to go back and see how your claim was taken apart. You misrepresented the letter version of Fremont's communication as the telegraph version, and left out key text in Grant's message.

Your "errors" go beyond being simple mistakes. There is an intent behind your "errors."
 
You have not "taken down" any historian. I remember when you claimed with absolute certitude that you had proven that Grant had received orders before taking Paducah. That claim has since completely fallen apart.
As further circumstantial corroboration that Grant received Fremont's orders beforehand, my next two paragraphs state:

"Moreover, when McClernand detailed the expedition's departure to Frémont at midnight, when Grant wrote to his superior the next day, when de Arnaud met with Frémont personally, and when Captain Andrew Hull Foote wrote to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox on the 8th, not one of them reported any absence of instructions. If Grant had only received Frémont's set of orders upon his return to Cairo, he did not bother responding. The earliest Grant biographies omitted his claim. Apparently, not until Rawlins mentioned it to Henry Coppée in 1865, did a book publish the tale. A few years later, however, three 1868 biographies by Adam Badeau, Albert Richardson, and James H. Wilson and Charles Dana contained and many others since then echoed the erroneous account. James G. Wilson omitted any reference to a lack of orders in a biographical sketch printed during the war, but his 1868 biography proclaimed that the General had proceeded without a reply from Frémont. The facts, however, clearly demonstrated that Grant lied to make himself look bold at Frémont's expense or else he completely forgot what happened at the time and what his draft report plainly stated."

And to those who claim that I cherry-pick data (as opposed to my modus operandi of gathering as much information and putting it in spreadsheets), my last two paragraphs contain opposing viewpoints:

"Of other unreliable accounts claiming that the move was made without orders, Chetlain wrongly recollected that he commanded Colonel John McArthur's 12th Illinois regiment, which went to Paducah, that the expedition embarked on September 6th, and that Frémont criticized Grant for making the move. A junior lieutenant in the navy accompanied Foote on a steamboat chase up the Ohio River a few hours after the flotilla weighed anchor. When they had caught up to it, Grant supposedly told them that Frémont had been telegraphed before leaving Cairo to ascertain de Arnaud's reliability, and Frémont vouched for him, but gave Grant no orders for taking Paducah. Seemingly, the entire population of Cairo correspondents went along. A Chicago Tribune article datelined from Paducah on the day of its occupation concluded: "This expedition was undertaken by General Grant on his own responsibility, upon the solicitation of the real Union men of the place. This absence of orders from above, and the uncertainty of its being approved, account for the delay in giving the order to march, by which we were several hours too late to capture a railroad train with 20 kegs of powder and a large lot of contraband beside." Another article in the Tribune, from Cairo the next day, commented on how the "credit of the expedition is due to Gen. Grant, who took the responsibility to make it without waiting for orders from headquarters. It was made on information that the rebels were moving on Paducah; it has been entirely successful and is approved by Gen. Fremont." A colonel of a regiment described to a writer for the Louisville Journal how the General exclaimed that he could wait no longer, telling his aide, "Come on, we will go. I will take Paducah, and save Kentucky, if it costs me my commission." An aide, William Hillyer, told a version of this tale to a mass meeting in New York City's Union Square in 1864. Perhaps these accounts were the genesis of Grant's misstatement."

You can make what you want of Simpson's writing on Paducah, as he seems to hold some sort of middle ground:

"Reacting quickly, Grant notified Fremont that unless he heard otherwise he would follow Fremont's suggestion to take the city, then commenced his movement before any dispatch could arrive to restrain him." It thus sounds as if Grant received Fremont's suggestion before departing. Let's ask Skeptical Advocate.
 

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