Grant Grant Under Fire: A Question

Historians require three independent sources as a minimum to support an assertion. As is obvious in the pages posted here, the author's extraordinary conclusions are not supported by even one historical source.

Rose's publication is what is known as a vanity book. The author's preconceptions take center stage throughout. Inductive logic rejects all evidence that does not support the preconceptions. Anything, no matter how flimsy or tangential, is cited as accepted fact.

Authors such as Rose, more often than not, cite their own writings to support their conclusions… multiple times.

This is rightly known as a vanity book & as such is a waste of time to read or discuss.
 
Historians require three independent sources as a minimum to support an assertion. As is obvious in the pages posted here, the author's extraordinary conclusions are not supported by even one historical source.

Rose's publication is what is known as a vanity book. The author's preconceptions take center stage throughout. Inductive logic rejects all evidence that does not support the preconceptions. Anything, no matter how flimsy or tangential, is cited as accepted fact.

Authors such as Rose, more often than not, cite their own writings to support their conclusions… multiple times.

This is rightly known as a vanity book & as such is a waste of time to read or discuss.
Obviously you have never read it. As I recall Rose has 75 pages or so of sources.

Vanity is on display for those who hero worship someone to the point they can't accept any critical analysis. Seems many who worship Grant praise all critical thought of Lee. Spew Lost Cause etc. Absolutely Hilarious.
 
...
Showing a better grasp of strategy right from the start, McClernand had advised Stanton back in mid-November that troops could move down the west bank and cross on transports brought upriver past Port Hudson, which the rebels had started to strengthen.
...
That's a strange complaint. In November, Grant was vaguely aware of a riverine operation in the works, but oblivious to his role in any of it. In October he had set upon a course of driving Pemberton south and taking Jackson, which would have obviated the defenses at both Port Hudson and Vicksburg.

What's the source for this message to Stanton?
 
On this topic of "three references," John Y. Simon wrote a superb article about the 31st July meeting between Grant and Lincoln. However, it was highly critical of Grant. Thus, Brooks Simpson's references for the meeting were:

1749210628792.png


Simpson dismisses Simon because it does not conform to what he believes. He offers three other sources:

1. Massena Patrick's Diary for 5th August

Prettymuch repeats that Meade reported Grant said to him. That's hardly surprising as Meade would be his source. It says:

Friday, 5' August[,] 1864 Same Camp, near Bir- chett's[.]

But a part of what I might have said, was written on the opposite page Grant left about 12' or 12'30" yesterday, soon after the Mail Boat passed Harrison's Landing where she had been shelled by 'Johnny,' at her first attempt. . . . Today — this morning Meade sent over for me and I spent some two hours with him — It seems there is trouble brewing — [Gen Henry W.] Halleck and [Edwin M. Stanton] are hostile towards Grant and it appears that when we were in the neighbourhood of Hanover or rather, of Guinea [Guiney's] Station, Halleck advised Grant to hold onto that road for his Line of Communication and move by the Right flank instead of the Left, as that would keep him between the Enemy and Washington, which if uncovered would lead to disaster — Hallack was overruled, & now retorts upon Grant that he warned him of invasion — the necessity, now of placing someone of rank to command allof Washington & about it, Cause Grant to recommend [William B.] Franklin — This was returned disapproved, as Franklin was not acceptable — The Same proposition of Consolidation was urged in behalf of [Gen. George B.] McClellan by very strong Republicans for two reasons. One, that by giving him military position it would dispose of him politically — the other, that his name would bring forward a host of volunteers -- The plan was rejected at Washington -- Then Grant Suggested the name of Meade, which caused the call for an interview with the President, who asked if Meade desired it -- Grant said he had not spoken to him as to whether it would be agreeable or not, and that Meade was a man to obey orders without questions -- It was then decided, that as there had been a clamor some time ago about his removal, which he (Old Abe) opposed, it would look as if he had yielded and displaced Meade for Cause--So the thing Stood and Grant came home & sent Sheridan merely to command the Troops, not the Departments -- Meade wants to go but thinks the Administration & Grant fear him. He certainly has a high opinion of himself -- He is now, very inimical to McClellan & every body above him..."

This, of course, says nothing about the actual meeting, only what Grant told Meade, and Meade related to Patrick.

2. Meade writing to his wife, 3rd August (direct link)

As you can read, Meade is suspicious of Grant's statement as what happened, and doubts Grant is being honest. A few days earlier on the 29th Meade wrote that Washington had asked for the appointment of an officer to command at Washington, and Grant had suggested Franklin - however Franklin was rejected* and then he suggested Meade, to which there was no reply. Meade stated he'd like the command, however on the 3rd he wrote:

1749211483424.png


* Halleck told Lincoln that Franklin would be unacceptable, and McClellan had covered for Franklin's errors and taken the blame on himself.

3. Lyman's Diary entry for 1st August (direct link)

Lyman speculates on what was said without any knowledge and reports a rumour that Hancock was going to take command vice Meade.

None of these three references support Simpson's dismissal of Simon. They, in fact, confirm that Lincoln is overruling Grant and no longer trusts his judgement, which was Simon's thesis.
 
That's a strange complaint. In November, Grant was vaguely aware of a riverine operation in the works, but oblivious to his role in any of it. In October he had set upon a course of driving Pemberton south and taking Jackson, which would have obviated the defenses at both Port Hudson and Vicksburg.

What's the source for this message to Stanton?

Agreed, where is this citation? More importantly, what was Stanton / Lincoln's response to this brilliant strategic insight? Who else did he share it with? Were Farragut & Butler consulted about the massive logistical challenges involved? Amassing the 60 day supply minimum at New Orleans would have involved significant assets / planning, where can we find that?

As they say, amateurs talk about tactics, professionals logistics.
 
The only people who don't make errors are those who do nothing.

Doing nothing is also an error.

Rhea admitted at a conference I attended that Grant usually did not employ cavalry that way throughout his career.

Grant rarely employed cavalry at all.

Belmont: nope
Donelson: no
Shiloh: practically, no

Vicksburg: raided by Van Dorn, raided with Grierson. I think his corps crossing the Mississippi might have employed a nominal amount of cavalry.

Chattanooga: AOC's cavalry was broken down from the siege. Sherman and Hooker brought no cavalry with them. This was an infantry fight.

Thus by the time Grant gets to Virginia he literally doesn't know what to do with an entire cavalry corps because, up to that point, he's rarely even had a brigade of cavalry.

Rose's publication is what is known as a vanity book.

I knew Varney had been published by Savas Beatie, but until now I hadn't realized Rose's book was only published by a vanity press.

I also hadn't realized that it's over 800 pages long.

I don't think there is anyone, living or dead, about whom I'm willing to read 800 pages telling me how they, and all their friends, were actually a bunch of lying scumbags, whether I agreed with the appraisal or not. If they have committed that perfidy it should be obvious.
 
On this topic of "three references," John Y. Simon wrote a superb article about the 31st July meeting between Grant and Lincoln. However, it was highly critical of Grant.
Would you please cite the article about the July 31 meeting that you assert exists and share with us the evidence Simon offers in support of his argument?

I think you'll find that the "article" you reference is an essay in a 1994 collection of essays edited by Gabor Boritt that covers the entire Lincoln-Grant relationship. The "article" you suggests exists is a discussion over pages 178-81 that offers no evidence as to what happened at the meeting (less than Catton, for example). Even Simon admits as much: "So little is known of that discussion that the noted historian T. Harry Williams wondered if they had actually met; yet they did meet."

Simon speaks of "Lincoln's rebuke" (179) but admits "nothing is known of the actual content of the conference." Seems speculative to me.
 
That is not true. What is important is the quality of the source(s), and any verification or contradiction. There are many single-source assertions in the literature, some of which are simply untrue.
You might be confused. We're discussing military historians, not "social" historians as you falsely labeled Steven Woodworth:

 
Would you please cite the article about the July 31 meeting that you assert exists and share with us the evidence Simon offers in support of his argument?

I think you'll find that the "article" you reference is an essay in a 1994 collection of essays edited by Gabor Boritt that covers the entire Lincoln-Grant relationship. The "article" you suggests exists is a discussion over pages 178-81 that offers no evidence as to what happened at the meeting (less than Catton, for example). Even Simon admits as much: "So little is known of that discussion that the noted historian T. Harry Williams wondered if they had actually met; yet they did meet."

Simon speaks of "Lincoln's rebuke" (179) but admits "nothing is known of the actual content of the conference." Seems speculative to me.

Huh, an article published in a book isn't an article. Who knew? Simon is almost certainly right that this was what we'd call an "interview without coffee." This is because he's analysed the situation and outcome.

"The day after the battle of the Crater, with Early still a threat to northern cities, Lincoln arrived at Fort Monroe for a five-hour conference with Grant. So little is known of their discussion that the noted historian T. Harry Williams wondered if they had actually met; yet they did meet. This time, however, Lincoln came without Tad, Grant without his staff. Lincoln neither reviewed troops nor regaled an appreciative audience with stories. Grant omitted all mention of this meeting in his Memoirs.

...Grant's silence about the Fort Monroe meeting speaks eloquently of the pain of Lincoln's rebuke. Grant had been slow and ineffective in meeting Barry's threat and had not yet coordinated a unified pursuit. After leading his army on the bloody road to Petersburg, he had not harvested the reward of his strategy. He had been vacillating and tentative in restructuring his command team and had ignored political realities tied to generalship. Although nothing is known of the actual content of the conference, its consequences were clear enough. If Grant had entered the Wilderness with any misconception that Lincoln had delegated management of the war, Grant received the necessary correction. Lincoln took control.

... In effect Lincoln had told Grant where to go and what to do, and had at least hinted what might happen if he failed the assignment. With twice as many troops as Lee, Grant had settled into a protracted siege and had allowed himself to become "McClellanized." Furthermore, Lincoln analyzed the military situation more clearly than did Grant. Lee had pinned Grant at Petersburg effectively enough to detach Barry's corps for a major northern campaign, with enough men to sweep down the Shenandoah Valley and to approach the defenses of Washington. If Lincoln's intervention had been unseemly, it was timely and necessary. Further, he had withheld intervention until the case for defending Washington was airtight. Even Grant recognized the necessity for an offensive in the Shenandoah Valley."

Further, I'd add that afterwards Grant is still obsessed with getting his troops back and instead of making an offensive in the Shenandoah, he wanted them back. He advised the Sheridan should not attack Early, but remain on the defensive until the rebel forces were weakened. After laying low for a month he tried to negotiate with Halleck to get 6th Corps back by proffering that 19th Corps could stay. Grant finally travelled to see Sheridan. Grant's intent for Sheridan is unknown, only that it was not to attack Early, for Grant's memoirs state that he never took his plans out of his pocket, and never told Sheridan his plans. Instead Sheridan was allowed to do what he wanted. However, shortly before this he'd been asking Halleck to remove the bulk of Sheridan's command and send it back to Petersburg...
 
"Credit belongs to the man in the arena."
Is this the "arena" we're referring to? I certainly don't think so. I've read some of your work and I very much doubt that you would publicly accuse another historian of "falsehoods", "distortions", publishing "ridiculous" claims, and engaging in a "cover up" because they might disagree with your interpretation regarding this or that event.

 
Is this the "arena" we're referring to? I certainly don't think so. I've read some of your work and I very much doubt that you would publicly accuse another historian of "falsehoods", "distortions", publishing "ridiculous" claims, and engaging in a "cover up" because they might disagree with your interpretation regarding this or that event.


A friendly edit: "…read some of your vanity publications…" "…publicly accuse actual historians…" Just a thought.
 
Doing nothing is also an error.



Grant rarely employed cavalry at all.

Belmont: nope
Donelson: no

Had the equivalent of two cavalry regiments, all attached to McClernand. Cavalry led the approach towards the fort.
Shiloh: practically, no

Cavalry screen out, detected body of infantry two miles out, but the army was under strict orders not to risk a general engagement.

Vicksburg: raided by Van Dorn, raided with Grierson.
Half his army was stripped away and sent downriver for direct assault. Grant pulled everything he could spare (including cavalry) to the front to feign enough activity to prevent reinforcements from leaving for Vicksburg.
I think his corps crossing the Mississippi might have employed a nominal amount of cavalry.
Each corps had a cavalry regiment screening its advance.
 
Huh, an article published in a book isn't an article. Who knew? Simon is almost certainly right that this was what we'd call an "interview without coffee." This is because he's analysed the situation and outcome.

"The day after the battle of the Crater, with Early still a threat to northern cities, Lincoln arrived at Fort Monroe for a five-hour conference with Grant. So little is known of their discussion that the noted historian T. Harry Williams wondered if they had actually met; yet they did meet. This time, however, Lincoln came without Tad, Grant without his staff. Lincoln neither reviewed troops nor regaled an appreciative audience with stories. Grant omitted all mention of this meeting in his Memoirs.

...Grant's silence about the Fort Monroe meeting speaks eloquently of the pain of Lincoln's rebuke. Grant had been slow and ineffective in meeting Barry's threat and had not yet coordinated a unified pursuit. After leading his army on the bloody road to Petersburg, he had not harvested the reward of his strategy. He had been vacillating and tentative in restructuring his command team and had ignored political realities tied to generalship. Although nothing is known of the actual content of the conference, its consequences were clear enough. If Grant had entered the Wilderness with any misconception that Lincoln had delegated management of the war, Grant received the necessary correction. Lincoln took control.

... In effect Lincoln had told Grant where to go and what to do, and had at least hinted what might happen if he failed the assignment. With twice as many troops as Lee, Grant had settled into a protracted siege and had allowed himself to become "McClellanized." Furthermore, Lincoln analyzed the military situation more clearly than did Grant. Lee had pinned Grant at Petersburg effectively enough to detach Barry's corps for a major northern campaign, with enough men to sweep down the Shenandoah Valley and to approach the defenses of Washington. If Lincoln's intervention had been unseemly, it was timely and necessary. Further, he had withheld intervention until the case for defending Washington was airtight. Even Grant recognized the necessity for an offensive in the Shenandoah Valley."

Further, I'd add that afterwards Grant is still obsessed with getting his troops back and instead of making an offensive in the Shenandoah, he wanted them back. He advised the Sheridan should not attack Early, but remain on the defensive until the rebel forces were weakened. After laying low for a month he tried to negotiate with Halleck to get 6th Corps back by proffering that 19th Corps could stay. Grant finally travelled to see Sheridan. Grant's intent for Sheridan is unknown, only that it was not to attack Early, for Grant's memoirs state that he never took his plans out of his pocket, and never told Sheridan his plans. Instead Sheridan was allowed to do what he wanted. However, shortly before this he'd been asking Halleck to remove the bulk of Sheridan's command and send it back to Petersburg...
Let's try again. You claimed Simon wrote an article about the July 31st meeting. He didn't. He mentioned the meeting in a larger book chapter. You thus misrepresented the text under discussion: doubling down on it is evidence that the distortion was not accidental.

As for the remainder of your post, you simply repeat Simon's unsupported assertions. Repeating unsupported claims does not make them any better.

Simon admitted he had no sources. You omit that in quoting so much. I take that distortion as being deliberate as well.

Your last paragraph has nothing to do with Simon.

I have now read the text Simpson offered. Seems a reasonable explanation to me about the larger issue at stake. Includes much more information and actual citations.

That's enough. No need to go down another rabbit hole with someone who is desperate to deflect attention from Rose's mistakes. At least Rose published his work (admittedly, he self-published them). Reader beware.
 
Had the equivalent of two cavalry regiments, all attached to McClernand. Cavalry led the approach towards the fort.


Cavalry screen out, detected body of infantry two miles out, but the army was under strict orders not to risk a general engagement.


Half his army was stripped away and sent downriver for direct assault. Grant pulled everything he could spare (including cavalry) to the front to feign enough activity to prevent reinforcements from leaving for Vicksburg.

Each corps had a cavalry regiment screening its advance.
Useful. Thanks.
 
Obviously you have never read it. As I recall Rose has 75 pages or so of sources.
Yup. He cited the source for Black's testimony. He just attributed it to Belknap and then fumbled the analysis. He's apparently not able to own up to the mistake, suggesting that it was more than a simple error.

Doesn't matter how many pages of notes or sources you have if you misuse them.
 
That's a strange complaint. In November, Grant was vaguely aware of a riverine operation in the works, but oblivious to his role in any of it. In October he had set upon a course of driving Pemberton south and taking Jackson, which would have obviated the defenses at both Port Hudson and Vicksburg.

What's the source for this message to Stanton?
The notes for the paragraph:
OR 17:2:547, 866-867. OR 24:3:4. John McClernand to Abraham Lincoln, February 14 1863, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LOC. J.H. Wilson, Life of Rawlins, 116-117.

The paragraph comes after Rose criticizes Grants Memoirs for Grant claiming he never felt confident in the various measures that failed and that all winter he had been contemplating a way to get below Vicksburg by land. Rose argues in the quoted paragraph that McClernand knew all along how to successfully operate against Vicksburg, and that Grant should have consulted him.
 
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Doing nothing is also an error.



Grant rarely employed cavalry at all.

Belmont: nope
Donelson: no
Shiloh: practically, no

Vicksburg: raided by Van Dorn, raided with Grierson. I think his corps crossing the Mississippi might have employed a nominal amount of cavalry.

Chattanooga: AOC's cavalry was broken down from the siege. Sherman and Hooker brought no cavalry with them. This was an infantry fight.

Thus by the time Grant gets to Virginia he literally doesn't know what to do with an entire cavalry corps because, up to that point, he's rarely even had a brigade of cavalry.



I knew Varney had been published by Savas Beatie, but until now I hadn't realized Rose's book was only published by a vanity press.

I also hadn't realized that it's over 800 pages long.

I don't think there is anyone, living or dead, about whom I'm willing to read 800 pages telling me how they, and all their friends, were actually a bunch of lying scumbags, whether I agreed with the appraisal or not. If they have committed that perfidy it should be obvious.
I would only add that Grierson's raid was important both from a logistical perspective and from a larger strategic perspective.
 
A friendly edit: "…read some of your vanity publications…" "…publicly accuse actual historians…" Just a thought.
To be clear, the two books I've read are published by Westholme. I know them primarily as a top rate publisher of books on the AWI so I do not consider those "vanity publications". They publish authors such as Gary Ecelbarger, Gary Wheeler Stone, John Buchanan, Edward Lengel, Don Hagist, Mark Edward Lender, and Bert Dunkerly, among many others. That's a "who's who" in the AWI publishing area. Westholme and Savas Beatie are the two "go-to" niche publishers in that area. Night and day from the vanity publisher at issue here.
 

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