- Joined
- Apr 4, 2017
- Location
- Denver, CO
Snowy day here in Denver, so it might be a good day for this attempt. By the time Grant made it to Chattanooga he had consulted in person with the Sec'y of War and visited with Governor Johnson in Nashville. Whether Robert Allen in Louisville and Slocum in Nashville reported to their department commander is unknown.
On the way to Chatanooga he had a briefing with Rosecrans, Howard reported to Grant as did Hooker also after some delay.
Grant rode over the tortuous mountain path from Bridgeport to the north bank of the Tennessee River opposite Chatanooga. Neither Thomas, nor Hooker had to make that ride, and the shorter route from Kelly's Ferry to Chattanooga was available by the time Sherman was in Tennessee. Maybe Grant had the best information about the operational situation and the strategic objective and should not have been second guessed by Cumberland advocates after the war/
It seems to me that Grant concluded if the mountain road had kept the US army from retreating or surrendering, the Cracker Line route which eliminated most of the wagon miles should have been good enough.
Grant was impatient. He was finding that with rank came responsibility and at Chatanooga he was reporting to Stanton and Lincoln as much as to Halleck.
As to the two big controversies, Sherman's so called failed attack and whether the attack on Missionary Ridge was directed by Grant, my suggestion is different.
There was often some gap between Grant's written orders and the verbal discussions. He often suggested possibilities that had to be investigated on the field of battle. With respect to Sherman's force extending to the east and forcing Bragg to attack or retreat to protect his communications, it seems so obvious tha Thomas, Grant and Sherman had to have discussed it. Thomas was against that move. He wanted to strengthen US control of the RR, not strike at the Confederate RR. But since Grant did create a small eastward cavalry raid to Cleveland, a following infantry movement in the same direction would be typical tactics for Grant. I think with respect to the attack on Missionary Ridge, Grant and Thomas were surprised to see more than a light picket line evacuate the Confederate rifle pits/trenches. Grant. Thomas and the corps commander Granger were right where they were supposed to be. Orders to come off the ridge were reversed within minutes. That suggests to me that the conditions for a full assault on the ridge were developing quickly. The soldiers may have anticipated the generals by a few minutes. But it may have also have been the case that the soldiers in Sheridan's and Johnson's divisions could hear the progress to their right, just as they had seen the US flag displayed on the peak of Lookout Mountain. The soldiers may have had better information that the commanders. Grant took a chance on not trying to control the battle too tightly, and in that instance it paid off.
On the way to Chatanooga he had a briefing with Rosecrans, Howard reported to Grant as did Hooker also after some delay.
Grant rode over the tortuous mountain path from Bridgeport to the north bank of the Tennessee River opposite Chatanooga. Neither Thomas, nor Hooker had to make that ride, and the shorter route from Kelly's Ferry to Chattanooga was available by the time Sherman was in Tennessee. Maybe Grant had the best information about the operational situation and the strategic objective and should not have been second guessed by Cumberland advocates after the war/
It seems to me that Grant concluded if the mountain road had kept the US army from retreating or surrendering, the Cracker Line route which eliminated most of the wagon miles should have been good enough.
Grant was impatient. He was finding that with rank came responsibility and at Chatanooga he was reporting to Stanton and Lincoln as much as to Halleck.
As to the two big controversies, Sherman's so called failed attack and whether the attack on Missionary Ridge was directed by Grant, my suggestion is different.
There was often some gap between Grant's written orders and the verbal discussions. He often suggested possibilities that had to be investigated on the field of battle. With respect to Sherman's force extending to the east and forcing Bragg to attack or retreat to protect his communications, it seems so obvious tha Thomas, Grant and Sherman had to have discussed it. Thomas was against that move. He wanted to strengthen US control of the RR, not strike at the Confederate RR. But since Grant did create a small eastward cavalry raid to Cleveland, a following infantry movement in the same direction would be typical tactics for Grant. I think with respect to the attack on Missionary Ridge, Grant and Thomas were surprised to see more than a light picket line evacuate the Confederate rifle pits/trenches. Grant. Thomas and the corps commander Granger were right where they were supposed to be. Orders to come off the ridge were reversed within minutes. That suggests to me that the conditions for a full assault on the ridge were developing quickly. The soldiers may have anticipated the generals by a few minutes. But it may have also have been the case that the soldiers in Sheridan's and Johnson's divisions could hear the progress to their right, just as they had seen the US flag displayed on the peak of Lookout Mountain. The soldiers may have had better information that the commanders. Grant took a chance on not trying to control the battle too tightly, and in that instance it paid off.
Bringing the