Gettysburg Papers

ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT AT THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
MARK R. GILMORE., MAJ., USA
B.S., Oregon State University
1977
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1988
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT
This thesis is an historical analysis of the Union artillery at the Battle of Gettysburg. It examines the significance of the Union artillery's contribution to the Federal victory. This study explores all aspects of the tactical employment of the Union artillery on the first and last days of the battle. A brief description of the evolution of artillery organization in the Army of the Potomac prior to the battle of Gettysburg is included. This is followed by the chronological presentation of the tactical employment of artillery during the battle. First its employment in the meeting engagement on 1 July is examined, followed by a study of its use on the final and decisive third day when Union forces fought a set piece defensive battle. Among the conclusions arrived at during the course of this study are these: That the Army of the Potomac's corps artillery brigades and army artillery reserve proved to be responsive and efficient organizations in fulfilling their fire support mission, and when coupled with the skillful use of artillery and aggressive leadership by the Army's Chief-of Artillery, Brigadier General Hunt, were crucial to the successful employment of the Union artillery forces. This study concludes that the Union artillery under the command of Brigadier General Henry Hunt had a decided and positive influence on the Federal victory by successfully employing its corps artillery brigades and army artillery reserve as part of a combined arms force.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

Cedarville University
DigitalCommons@Cedarville
History Capstone Research Papers
Senior Capstone Papers
4-22-2015

A Study of Civil War Leadership: Gettysburg as a Turning Point
Joseph Griffith
Cedarville University

This Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Cedarville, a service of the Centennial Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Capstone Research Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Cedarville. For more information, please contact [email protected].

The Civil War was a pivotal and tragic period in our country's history. The years that spanned from 1860-1865 were years that were paved with the blood of American men, and what determined whether these men lived or died was the men who led them. Civil War leadership on both sides of the battlefield was critical to the success of the Union and the failure of the Confederacy. Success did not happen overnight, however. The road for the Union was a long and frustrating one, with constant changes in leadership positions and a plague of poor generals. This was not the case for the whole war. The Battle of Gettysburg served as a turning point for the Union, and the Union rode this change to an eventual victory in the war. It was more of a progressive turn, with the effects unseen until 1864. The Confederacy proved successful at the onset of the war, but again, Gettysburg was a turning point for them as well only in a negative sense. Gettysburg was pivotal for the victory of the Union and the failure of the Confederacy. The war leading up to the battle, the battle itself, and the years that followed were vial in showing the progression of leadership for both sides and ultimately the Union proved stronger after years of searching for the perfect General in Chief. It was a process to be sure, but it was a process that ended in the Union's favor.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT AT THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
MARK R. GILMORE., MAJ., USA
B.S., Oregon State University
1977
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1988
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT
This thesis is an historical analysis of the Union artillery at the Battle of Gettysburg. It examines the significance of the Union artillery's contribution to the Federal victory. This study explores all aspects of the tactical employment of the Union artillery on the first and last days of the battle. A brief description of the evolution of artillery organization in the Army of the Potomac prior to the battle of Gettysburg is included. This is followed by the chronological presentation of the tactical employment of artillery during the battle. First its employment in the meeting engagement on 1 July is examined, followed by a study of its use on the final and decisive third day when Union forces fought a set piece defensive battle. Among the conclusions arrived at during the course of this study are these: That the Army of the Potomac's corps artillery brigades and army artillery reserve proved to be responsive and efficient organizations in fulfilling their fire support mission, and when coupled with the skillful use of artillery and aggressive leadership by the Army's Chief-of Artillery, Brigadier General Hunt, were crucial to the successful employment of the Union artillery forces. This study concludes that the Union artillery under the command of Brigadier General Henry Hunt had a decided and positive influence on the Federal victory by successfully employing its corps artillery brigades and army artillery reserve as part of a combined arms force.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I just finished reading this one for the second time coming away with a few thoughts. Here goes.
Thought it was strange you could do a MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE about Gettysburg and NOT cover the second day. The work is about Day-1 and Day-3 only. This ignores in my view the most interesting aspects of the artillery at Gettysburg which occurred on the second day! Here's a few egs.

* Sickles move and establishment of the gun line on Emmitsburg Road Ridge line; Seeley, Bucklyn, Turnbull batteries et al. Quite a fierce dual with CSA batteries a few hundred yards apart.
* Bigelow's Battery (9th Mass) and withdrawn by prolonge to and beyond the Trostle Farm vs 21st Miss.
* The Wheatfield Road line (rear of Peach Orchard facing south) that did damage to Hood and especially Kershaw and possibly wounded Hood if not Smith Bat on Devils Den.
* The McGilvery gun line atop Cemetery Ridge, roughly PA Monument to Father Corby monument.
* The work (damage) done by Smith's battery at Devils Den and the section in Valley of Death to their rear (east) responsible in part for the Slaughter Pen (boulders/Plum Run east of DD) getting its name.
* Little Round Top: It was quite a struggle dragging Hazlett's battery through dense woods to the summit giving fire support then blasting Devils Den.
* Cemetery Hill: Where Federal artillery quite literally blew CSA guns off of Benner's Hill and the fight that evening where the gun crews engaged the Louisiana Tigers (Hay's brigade) in hand-to-hand combat.
* Culps Hill action. This is a powerful example where the CSA had no good artillery positions on their left flank. This was particularly evident the morning of July 3rd where Fed Guns on Powers Hill and along Baltimore Pike unloaded on CSA troops along the eastern slopes of Culps Hill uncontested.
PS. thanks for posting this USS ALASKA
 
Gettysburg Magazine, no. 53
Deconstructing the History of the Battle of McPherson's Ridge

Myths and Legends of the Twenty - Sixth North Carolina on the First Day's Fight at Gettysburg
Judkin Browning

In the early afternoon of July 1, 1863, the Twenty-Sixth North Carolina Regiment, under the leadership of twenty-one-year-old Col. Henry King Burgwyn Jr., launched itself into Civil War immortality with its charge into Herbst's Woods on McPherson's Ridge against the Iron Brigade, specifically the Twenty- Fourth Michigan Regiment.


Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Gettysburg Magazine, no. 53
Deconstructing the History of the Battle of McPherson's Ridge
Myths and Legends of the Twenty - Sixth North Carolina on the First Day's Fight at Gettysburg
Judkin Browning

In the early afternoon of July 1, 1863, the Twenty-Sixth North Carolina Regiment, under the leadership of twenty-one-year-old Col. Henry King Burgwyn Jr., launched itself into Civil War immortality with its charge into Herbst's Woods on McPherson's Ridge against the Iron Brigade, specifically the Twenty- Fourth Michigan Regiment.


Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I'm pretty sure that I've read this article before but I'm going to take another look. IIRC, it was an excellent read.

Ryan
 
This paper was posted in an attempt to assist @Ethan S. query of https://civilwartalk.com/threads/winslows-battery-at-the-wheatfield.210051/

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER
Department of Defense
ARTILLERY TERRAIN WALK GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Irick. III
United States Army
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT
The Battle of Gettysburg was fought on the first three days of July in 1863. The artillery of both sides played a significant role in this battle. This project is designed to be a training aid and stimulus for thought as it leads the young artillerymen on a terrain walk of the battlefield. Stops are at actual battery locations, and the reports of each particular action are read. These after-action reports are the primary source of information presented. The objective of this walk is for today's artilleryman to learn from his 1863 counterparts and to have a greater appreciation for the Redlegs who fought in the Battle of Gettysburg. It is also desired that he recognize the similarities in the requirements of the 1863 artilleryman and his doctrine to those of his own.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

I have seen reference to an article by Winslow but have been unable to find it. If anyone can find it,
I would appreciate the info. The article is : "On Little Round Top " National Tribune 26 July 1879.
 
BUFORD AT GETTYSBURG
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DANIEL D. DEVLIN
United States Army
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
USAWC CLASS OF 1992

ABSTRACT
During the Civil War Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, then Brigadier General John Buford commanded the First Cavalry Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, U.S.A. He is generally credited with determining the importance of, and holding the ground near Gettysburg for the coming battle. This study examines the controversies surrounding Buford's actions and discusses whether the controversies have overshadowed the importance of the lessons to be learned from the events.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

INSIDE THE LINES: MEADE'S VICTORY AT GETTYSBURG
Major Phillip W. Chandler, USMC
AY 2000-01

Abstract
The concepts of interior and exterior lines gained prominence during the Napoleonic Era with the writings of Jomni. Interior Lines of Operation deal with forces whose operations diverge from a central point. The use of interior lines allows a commander to rapidly shift forces to the decisive point. The battle of Gettysburg was a great historical example illustrating the impact of interior and exterior lines. Throughout the three days of battle, General Meade applied Operational Art in positioning his forces at the decisive time and place. One must keep in mind the significance of General Meades actions at Gettysburg. He defeated the venerable General Robert E. Lee on the battlefield, a feat elusive to all previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac. This feat was made possible by the ability to decisively shape the battlefield using interior lines.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

The author is a popular gent on this board...

West Virgina University
WVU Graduate Theses
Graduate Theses, Dissertations
1992

The attack and defense of Culp's Hill: Greene's brigade at the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863.
Charles Clifford Fennell

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact [email protected].


Because of copyright, please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Theses Lehman College
2022

The 1863 Invasion of Pennsylvania General Robert E. Lee's Campaign in Error
Michael J. Gallagher
CUNY Lehman College

This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected]

Confederate General Robert E. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863 was a grave mistake, on a variety of levels, which ultimately culminated in a crippling defeat at Gettysburg. After the Army of Northern Virginia successfully defended southern territory against northern attacks, the transition to an offensive strategy, advancing north into Pennsylvania was a vast miscalculation. Lee's army now traversed enemy territory, leaving behind the advantages of a campaign on southern territory and abandoning a defensive posture. This transition to fighting on enemy territory brought several difficulties that Lee seemingly overlooked, and presented challenges for which Lee was unprepared. Lee sought to bring the fighting, which was primarily on Southern soil, into Northern territory, in hopes of breaking the will of Northerners and forcing the Federal government in to suing for peace. However, while in Pennsylvania, Lee continuously miscalculated enemy positions, all the while compromising his own while moving among a hostile populace. While amongst that populace, which Lee hoped would help push for capitulation upon seeing the Army of Northern Virginia in Pennsylvania, Lee's men found themselves at a significant intelligence and psychological disadvantage. Lee's push north in pursuit of one decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac ultimately failed to achieve its ultimate goal. This illusive triumph very likely could have been successfully achieved through other means, and should not have been sought after at the expense of a crushing defeat such as that the Army of Northern Virginia experienced at Gettysburg. Lee's move into Pennsylvania proved foolhardy, as he failed to appropriately supervise his commanders, calling in to question his own capabilities as a General. These questions about Lee's competency and capabilities litter the historical record when examining the Pennsylvania campaign, and functionally reshape the legacy of the General Lee. Ultimately, Lee sought recognition through success on Northern soil, but misjudged how attainable a decisive victory up North would be. As the Federal government considered relenting to a peace agreement, the push north into Pennsylvania by the Lee' army, riding high on victorious engagements in Virginia, forced the North's hand, all the while Robert E. Lee was overplaying his own.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Theses Lehman College
2022

The 1863 Invasion of Pennsylvania General Robert E. Lee's Campaign in Error
Michael J. Gallagher
CUNY Lehman College

This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected]

Confederate General Robert E. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863 was a grave mistake, on a variety of levels, which ultimately culminated in a crippling defeat at Gettysburg. After the Army of Northern Virginia successfully defended southern territory against northern attacks, the transition to an offensive strategy, advancing north into Pennsylvania was a vast miscalculation. Lee's army now traversed enemy territory, leaving behind the advantages of a campaign on southern territory and abandoning a defensive posture. This transition to fighting on enemy territory brought several difficulties that Lee seemingly overlooked, and presented challenges for which Lee was unprepared. Lee sought to bring the fighting, which was primarily on Southern soil, into Northern territory, in hopes of breaking the will of Northerners and forcing the Federal government in to suing for peace. However, while in Pennsylvania, Lee continuously miscalculated enemy positions, all the while compromising his own while moving among a hostile populace. While amongst that populace, which Lee hoped would help push for capitulation upon seeing the Army of Northern Virginia in Pennsylvania, Lee's men found themselves at a significant intelligence and psychological disadvantage. Lee's push north in pursuit of one decisive victory over the Army of the Potomac ultimately failed to achieve its ultimate goal. This illusive triumph very likely could have been successfully achieved through other means, and should not have been sought after at the expense of a crushing defeat such as that the Army of Northern Virginia experienced at Gettysburg. Lee's move into Pennsylvania proved foolhardy, as he failed to appropriately supervise his commanders, calling in to question his own capabilities as a General. These questions about Lee's competency and capabilities litter the historical record when examining the Pennsylvania campaign, and functionally reshape the legacy of the General Lee. Ultimately, Lee sought recognition through success on Northern soil, but misjudged how attainable a decisive victory up North would be. As the Federal government considered relenting to a peace agreement, the push north into Pennsylvania by the Lee' army, riding high on victorious engagements in Virginia, forced the North's hand, all the while Robert E. Lee was overplaying his own.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
USS ALASKA. I'm going to take a shot at this next week as I don't think maintaining Lee's venture into Pennsylvania is that easy to criticize in the negative. Thanks for posting.

Meanwhile I'm heading to God's country (Gettysburg) for a four day stay with the fam. Also, I believe the Antietam trip may not happen this weekend but definitely within the next 2 months.
But I appreciate all the advice many put on the board that I've copied for the trip and will report on it when it happens.
So, last call for souvenirs as I head out to the Blue Ridge.
 
West Virginia University
Eberly College of Arts and Science
Master of Arts
19th Century American History
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2018

Contested Narratives: The Influence of Local Remembrance on National Narratives of Gettysburg During The 19th Century
Jarrad A. Fuoss

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Copyright 2018

ABSTRACT
When the guns fell silent in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July 4, 1863, the process of rationalizing and remembering the battle's bloody consequences began. By the end of the nineteenth century, various local groups influenced the development of an idealistic and romanticized story that granted citizenship through participation and engrained Gettysburg into a cornerstone of American historical identity. This thesis examines the process of remembrance through narrative creation following the battle of Gettysburg. It aims to explain how local citizens influenced national narratives of the battle and subjectively shaped remembrance after the Civil War. By examining sources collected from civilians and soldiers alike, this work argues that the civilians of Gettysburg thoughtfully shaped early national narratives about the battle of Gettysburg and drastically influenced who and what those narratives discussed. This work broadens the historical understanding of narrative development following the American Civil War by examining the process of narrative creation for white citizens, women, militia soldiers, and African-Americans.


Because of copyright, please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Auburn University
Doctor of Philosophy
Auburn, Alabama
August 9, 2010
Copyright 2010 by Jennifer Marie Murray

"On A Great Battlefield": The Making, Management, and Memory of Gettysburg National Military Park, 1933-2009
Jennifer Marie Murray

Abstract
Since July 1863 historians have written a great deal on the three-day Battle of Gettysburg, but have devoted little attention to the history of the battlefield itself. In the decades since the sound of artillery and muskets silenced and the soldiers retreated from the field, the Gettysburg battlefield has become a place of commemoration, veneration, celebration, and controversy. It is a site unlike any other on American soil. This dissertation provides an innovative perspective on the Civil War and Gettysburg historiography by examining how the National Park Service (NPS) has administered the battlefield from its acquisition of the site in August 1933 through 2009. Underlying the National Park Service's expansive history are variables of management philosophies, land acquisition, planning initiatives, competing notions of privatization and commercialism, and evolving interpretive efforts. Between August 1933 and October 2009 ten superintendents have administered the Gettysburg National Military Park. This inevitable change in management has resulted in an ever-evolving battlefield. Superintendent's backgrounds, whether as landscape architects, government bureaucrats, or historians, consistently shape their vision for the battlefield. Additionally, several landmark eras became evident, all dramatically changing the management, interpretation, and memory of the battlefield. Those four eras are the Great Depression period, 1933-1940; World War II, 1941- 1945; the MISSION 66 and Civil War Centennial years, 1955 to 1955; and the fifteen years of John Latschar's administration, 1994 to 2009. Notwithstanding the degree of change at the battlefield, however, many variables remained constant. Management decisions made by the National Park Service receive America's close securitization because of Gettysburg's prominent place within American History and the sensationalism of the site. Controversy and heated debates underscore each administration. Additionally, throughout the twentieth century the battlefield has been used as a landscape of patriotic expression, which was seen most evidently during World War II. This dissertation examines the successes and failures of the National Park Service at Gettysburg. In its simplest form the Gettysburg battlefield is a memorial landscape to war. Yet to many Americans Gettysburg is more than a battlefield; it is a place of patriotic expression, of public display, and a place of veneration.


Because of copyright, please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Movements Of Companies Of the 20th Maine and 15th Alabama Regiments During the Attack On Little Round Top
Getz, Lowell L.
2012
Full copyright retained by Lowell L. Getz. All rights reserved.

Abstract
The Confederate attack on Little Round Top, near the end of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, often is purported to have been a pivotal battle of the Civil War. Much of the emphasis on the importance of the attack on Little Round Top is a result of the often-cited presumption that had the 15th Alabama (commanded by Colonel William C. Oates) carried the crest, the left flank of the Union line, much of the defense of which was assigned to the 20th Maine Regiment (commanded by Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain), would have been turned and the entire Union line rolled up. The struggle between the 20th Maine and 15th Alabama is one of the most publicized small unit military battles in American history. Because of this, there has been a proliferation of accounts of the battle for this small hill. In spite of all the literary and media coverage of the actions of the 20th Maine and 15th Alabama, there is no source that maps movements of individual companies. The few accounts that provide detailed maps show only general alignments of the regimental lines during one or two phases of the battle. In this account I present eleven maps that show the relative positioning of the individual companies of the two regiments during the attack of Colonel Oates' 15th Alabama against Colonel Chamberlain's 20th Maine.


Because of copyright, please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
GETTYSBURG: HOW THE BATTLE WAS FOUGHT
CAPTAIN JAMES T. LONG,
THE GUIDE AND DELINEATOR
HARRISBURG, PA.
K. K. MEYERS PRINTING HOUSE.
1891.

PREFACE
This book is issued with the hope and belief that its pages and illustrations will enable visitors to Gettysburg and those who are interested in the history of the decisive battle of the war a little insight as to how the great battle was fought, and in writing the same I have endeavored to tell the story in such a plain and comprehensive manner that all may understand it, and at the same time avoid anything that would mar the feelings of a single individual. I have simply told the story of the battle as it occurred; as I have learned it through many years of hard study on the field and coming in contact with prominent officers and men of both armies.

CAPT. JAMES T. LONG,
The Guide and Delineator
GETTYSBURG, November, 1890


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

"We were now complete masters of the field"
Ambrose Wright's Attack on July 2
Matt Atkinson

As the sun dipped below the mountains, 1,400 Georgians from Gen. Ambrose Wright's brigade emerged from the acrid smoke of the battlefield screaming the Rebel yell. For a moment, a fleeting moment, victory stood within their grasp. In vain did the men peer to the west in search of succor, and in the growing darkness atop Cemetery Ridge, victory slipped away. The aftermath brought repercussions and recriminations from fellow Confederate officers, and today historians still search for answers as to what exactly took place that fateful day, July 2, 1863.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

"We were now complete masters of the field"
Ambrose Wright's Attack on July 2
Matt Atkinson

As the sun dipped below the mountains, 1,400 Georgians from Gen. Ambrose Wright's brigade emerged from the acrid smoke of the battlefield screaming the Rebel yell. For a moment, a fleeting moment, victory stood within their grasp. In vain did the men peer to the west in search of succor, and in the growing darkness atop Cemetery Ridge, victory slipped away. The aftermath brought repercussions and recriminations from fellow Confederate officers, and today historians still search for answers as to what exactly took place that fateful day, July 2, 1863.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
This is a pretty good write up. While I don't entirely agree with some of his statements, I'd still heartily recommend anyone interested in Wright's Brigade at Gettysburg to read it.

Ryan
 
This is a pretty good write up. While I don't entirely agree with some of his statements, I'd still heartily recommend anyone interested in Wright's Brigade at Gettysburg to read it.

Ryan

Thank you sir for responding. When I started reading this and came upon this statement in the second paragraph - "When Georgia exercised its constitutional right to secession..." - all I could think of was Uh Oh, Here We Go Again, but the focus of the paper wasn't that. Thank you for your confirmation.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MISSION COMMAND AT THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History
GREGORY A. BASSETT, MAJ, US ARMY
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2019

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

ABSTRACT
This research studies Meade's leadership during the Battle of Gettysburg through the lens of the Army's 2019 leadership doctrine, specifically the philosophy of mission command. Gettysburg was Meade's first battle as commander of the Union Army of the Potomac and occurred only three days after he assumed command. This paper explains the Army doctrine on the philosophy of mission command from the March 28, 2014 version of ADRP 6-0 which contains change two. It then assesses Meade's leadership during each of the three days of battle and how it enabled his corps commanders. Each of these days provided Meade with different and difficult problems. While acknowledging that the philosophy of mission command was not Army doctrine or formally codified for several more decades, the analysis of Meade's leadership during Gettysburg shows that he led in a matter that resembles modern doctrine. This historical example can be useful when envisioning leadership in a communications degraded environment.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments


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