Gettysburg Papers

USS ALASKA

USS ALASKA

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Confederate Brig. Gen. B.H. Robertson and the 1863 Gettysburg campaign
1995-04-28
Bowmaster, Patrick A.
Masters Theses
Virginia Tech

Abstract
Beverly Holcombe Robertson was a military commander around whose Civil War career controversy always seemed to swirl. Robertson was born June 5, 1827, to Dr. William H. and Martha (Holcombe) Robertson at the family plantation, "The Oaks," in Amelia County, Virginia. With the exception of the fact that he was educated locally, nothing is known of young Robertson's life during the period between his birth and his appointment as a cadet to the United States Military Academy at West Point. Based upon his later performance at lithe Point," it can be assumed that this education was solid.


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USS ALASKA
 
University of New Mexico
UNM Digital Repository
History ETDs
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
5-26-1961

Winfield Scott Hancock as a Commander in the Army of the Potomac Through the Battle of Gettysburg
John Richard Street

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in History ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected].

1713453434351.png



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Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
USS ALASKA said:
University of New Mexico
UNM Digital Repository
History ETDs
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
5-26-1961

Winfield Scott Hancock as a Commander in the Army of the Potomac Through the Battle of Gettysburg
John Richard Street

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in History ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected].

View attachment 505032


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Cheers,
USS ALASKA
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Thanks for the interesting read USS ALASKA. It was perceptive of the author in 1961 to mention the value and contribution of junior officers he credits with holding the army together in spite of poor leadership from commanding officers.
I think that was one of the strengths of many corps vs a few in allowing more officers to flourish. Of course the opposite is true as well. But it does allow more capable officers to come to the fore. Thx.
 
USS ALASKA said:
Confederate Brig. Gen. B.H. Robertson and the 1863 Gettysburg campaign
1995-04-28
Bowmaster, Patrick A.
Masters Theses
Virginia Tech

Abstract
Beverly Holcombe Robertson was a military commander around whose Civil War career controversy always seemed to swirl. Robertson was born June 5, 1827, to Dr. William H. and Martha (Holcombe) Robertson at the family plantation, "The Oaks," in Amelia County, Virginia. With the exception of the fact that he was educated locally, nothing is known of young Robertson's life during the period between his birth and his appointment as a cadet to the United States Military Academy at West Point. Based upon his later performance at lithe Point," it can be assumed that this education was solid.


Please use above link

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Click to expand...
Having read this attachment beginning to end Robertson was certianly an educator of creating solid calvary soldiers, even if his battle leadership was sub par. It appears Roberston was more than adaquate out west before the big war doing great service in a hostile climate. I realize Stuart is a hero to the southern cause but also fell he, at times, set subornate officers up to fail. Am I wrong in thinking this? Stuart had his own failures as well but was given a pass where others were not. Lee trusted Longstreet and Stuart perhaps more than all others and felt a real loss when Stuart was killed at Yellow Tavern.
If an officier has high sucess with training others, why then did lee not insist he occupy that role and not use him in battle command where he must have known this man did not do his best work. What do others think of how Robertson was used by superior officiers?
 
Gettysburg: A Study in Command
22 JUN 2012
U.S. Army War College
Department of National Security and Strategy
Carlisle,PA,17013
Strategic Leader Staff Ride
An Overview of the Gettysburg Campaign With Selected Correspondence
Compiled and Edited By Leonard J. Fullenkamp
Professor, Military History and Strategy
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Examples of leadership challenges at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war may be examined during the Gettysburg staff ride. Countless examples of direct leadership successes and failures abound as one looks at the three days of Gettysburg. Moreover, when considering the challenges faced by Meade and Lee, army commanders with both tactical and operational level responsibilities, we can see similarities and differences between direct and indirect, or organizational, leadership skills come sharply into focus. The same may be said for comparisons between strategic leadership and direct and indirect leadership challenges.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

USS ALASKA said:
I don't believe I've ever seen the battle analyzed like this in one document...

View attachment 505683


File too large to attach, please see above link.

I liked the bibliography...many things to explore.

Enjoy!
USS ALASKA
Click to expand...
Interesting concept. I'm working my way through this finding a few mistakes that don't ruin the overall but still surprising being sponsored by: Headquarters, Dept of the Army G3/5/7 Strategic Ops Directorate. (eg, Longstreet delaying 2-Jul attack, {and} awaiting McLaws).
It's an interesting challenge with the application of 'other' technologies and their impact had they been available at battle. And as you said, the bib will keep us busy for a few years! Thanks. Good stuff.
 
gc45 said:
Having read this attachment beginning to end Robertson was certianly an educator of creating solid calvary soldiers, even if his battle leadership was sub par. It appears Roberston was more than adaquate out west before the big war doing great service in a hostile climate. I realize Stuart is a hero to the southern cause but also fell he, at times, set subornate officers up to fail. Am I wrong in thinking this? Stuart had his own failures as well but was given a pass where others were not. Lee trusted Longstreet and Stuart perhaps more than all others and felt a real loss when Stuart was killed at Yellow Tavern.
If an officier has high sucess with training others, why then did lee not insist he occupy that role and not use him in battle command where he must have known this man did not do his best work. What do others think of how Robertson was used by superior officiers?
Click to expand...
Beverly Robertson would have made an excellent cavalry regimental commander. The problem with being a cavalry brigade commander is that it required a certain amount of independence and Robertson was below average in that respect. There's a reason why just about every superior officer of his tried to transfer him away from their commands.

Ryan
 
Eastern Michigan University
DigitalCommons@EMU
Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations
Graduate Capstone Projects
2008

The Union Army had something to do with it: General Lee's plan at Gettysburg and why it failed
Paul Mengel

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses, and Doctoral Dissertations, and Graduate Capstone Projects at DigitalCommons@EMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@EMU. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
The question considered is what General Robert E. Lee's plan for the battle of Gettysburg actually was, and why he fought the battle the way he did, based on a reexamination of extensive commentaries left by the participants in the battle. General Lee believed that the Confederacy could not outlast the Union but had to win battles to cause the Union to abandon the war. This was one purpose of the invasion of the North. An initially favorable opportunity arose at Gettysburg. Despite some setbacks, Lee was encouraged and kept attacking. His plans failed because the Union Army had so weakened the Confederates that, on the third day, Lee's subordinate commanders did not show their usual initiative and a pitifully small percentage of the army was involved. Accordingly, the attack failed, no victory to discourage the North took place, and attrition eventually led to the inevitable logical conclusion.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

USS ALASKA said:
Confederate Brig. Gen. B.H. Robertson and the 1863 Gettysburg campaign
1995-04-28
Bowmaster, Patrick A.
Masters Theses
Virginia Tech

Abstract
Beverly Holcombe Robertson was a military commander around whose Civil War career controversy always seemed to swirl. Robertson was born June 5, 1827, to Dr. William H. and Martha (Holcombe) Robertson at the family plantation, "The Oaks," in Amelia County, Virginia. With the exception of the fact that he was educated locally, nothing is known of young Robertson's life during the period between his birth and his appointment as a cadet to the United States Military Academy at West Point. Based upon his later performance at lithe Point," it can be assumed that this education was solid.


Please use above link

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Click to expand...
This paper was published in Gettysburg Magazine.
 
gc45 said:
Having read this attachment beginning to end Robertson was certianly an educator of creating solid calvary soldiers, even if his battle leadership was sub par. It appears Roberston was more than adaquate out west before the big war doing great service in a hostile climate. I realize Stuart is a hero to the southern cause but also fell he, at times, set subornate officers up to fail. Am I wrong in thinking this? Stuart had his own failures as well but was given a pass where others were not. Lee trusted Longstreet and Stuart perhaps more than all others and felt a real loss when Stuart was killed at Yellow Tavern.
If an officier has high sucess with training others, why then did lee not insist he occupy that role and not use him in battle command where he must have known this man did not do his best work. What do others think of how Robertson was used by superior officiers?
Click to expand...
Robertson was a great trainer of men and a terrible battlefield commander. Mix in the fact that he had been Stuart's principal rival for the hand of Flora Cooke, and you have a recipe for disaster. The fact that he was relieved of command immediately after the end of the Gettysburg Campaign and never commanded troops in the Army of Northern Virginia again should tell you everything you need to know.

Stuart also hated Grumble Jones, but he respected Jones and recognized that Jones had real value to the army. Not so with Robertson. Stuart' couldn't wait to be rid of him after the Maryland Campaign and was not happy when Robertson and his very green two regiment demi-brigade were called north to join the army before the Gettysburg Campaign.
 
rpkennedy said:
Beverly Robertson would have made an excellent cavalry regimental commander. The problem with being a cavalry brigade commander is that it required a certain amount of independence and Robertson was below average in that respect. There's a reason why just about every superior officer of his tried to transfer him away from their commands.

Rya
Click to expand...
 
AN ESSAY ON GENERAL LONGSTREET'S PROPOSED FLANKING MANEUVER
Terrence L. Salada and John D. Wedo

One of the most persistent controversies surrounding the Battle of Gettysburg is Lieutenant General James Longstreet's advice to General Robert E. Lee that the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) should disengage and effect a wide strategic flanking movement around the Army of the Potomac (AOP). Chances are almost everyone reading this article has been involved in a discussion of the battle where this topic arises. Proponents of the move think that it might have resulted in a Confederate victory and even ended the war. Critics argue that the move was a bad idea for a number of reasons, and that General Lee's decision against the move was sound militarily.

Curiously, although each side is adamant about its position, few offer analysis of the proposed move to explain why it was good or bad. Worse, proponents offer no details on how the move would happen or how it would be successful: its objective, route, and timetable for instance. Most arguments refer to well-known valid generalities such as the lack of cavalry or the bad roads. Some descriptions, such as that in Jeffrey C. Hall's The Stand of the Union Army at Gettysburg refer to the move with generic terms such as a flanking movement or by a map showing a large curved arrow from the Confederate position passing through Fairfield south to Emmitsburg thence east with no definite end point.

This essay tries to supply some of the details of what such a move might have entailed. These details include both contemporary knowledge and hindsight.


Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
USS ALASKA said:
AN ESSAY ON GENERAL LONGSTREET'S PROPOSED FLANKING MANEUVER
Terrence L. Salada and John D. Wedo

One of the most persistent controversies surrounding the Battle of Gettysburg is Lieutenant General James Longstreet's advice to General Robert E. Lee that the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) should disengage and effect a wide strategic flanking movement around the Army of the Potomac (AOP). Chances are almost everyone reading this article has been involved in a discussion of the battle where this topic arises. Proponents of the move think that it might have resulted in a Confederate victory and even ended the war. Critics argue that the move was a bad idea for a number of reasons, and that General Lee's decision against the move was sound militarily.

Curiously, although each side is adamant about its position, few offer analysis of the proposed move to explain why it was good or bad. Worse, proponents offer no details on how the move would happen or how it would be successful: its objective, route, and timetable for instance. Most arguments refer to well-known valid generalities such as the lack of cavalry or the bad roads. Some descriptions, such as that in Jeffrey C. Hall's The Stand of the Union Army at Gettysburg refer to the move with generic terms such as a flanking movement or by a map showing a large curved arrow from the Confederate position passing through Fairfield south to Emmitsburg thence east with no definite end point.

This essay tries to supply some of the details of what such a move might have entailed. These details include both contemporary knowledge and hindsight.


Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Click to expand...
This is excellent USS ALASKA. I know the roads west of town at least out to Fairfield and Orrtanna traveling the area often with a sister and family in Orrtanna and her teaching at the HS in Fairfield.
The essay by Terrence L. Salada and John D. Wedo is right on with the roads. My G-G-Uncle (121st PA) got to the battle via Bull Frog road. And all the other roads mentioned are roads us locals know quite well; tooling around in HS, hunting, heading there to ski and so on.
They did their research on the road network (and in Emmitsburg) that definitely discourage any sweeping flank move (Hood-Longstreet) on the 2nd Day. Good roads more often than not simply don't go east-west after skirting south. If it has a flaw it's the lack of any maps (one!) that would make it much easier to understand to those not from the area.
It's good seeing the concept of a flank march and reposition actually researched. Thank you.
 
@121st PA Vols

Sir, thank you for the kind words. I'm glad this posting was of use to you. Also, because I don't have a great deal of knowledge about this battle, responses like yours and others let me know if a paper is of value or not.

Thanks for your help,
USS ALASKA
 
J.E.B Stuart and the Battle of Gettysburg: Was He Responsible for Lee's Defeat?
Patricia K. Roode
Rutgers University,
April 2011

Introduction
This paper will look at the circumstances of the Gettysburg campaign, including the Confederate march northward, and analyze both Stuart's and Lee's actions and the orders given Stuart regarding the march. While many of Lee's defenders have focused their attack on either General Longstreet or General Ewell, I have chosen to focus on the third general often blamed for the loss at Gettysburg, General Stuart. Using resources written by Stuart's contemporaries, battle reports and contemporary orders and other documents reprinted in the 127-volumes of The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion, published by the War Department at the turn of the last century, as well as current analysis of the battle, this paper will strive to determine whether Stuart truly deserves the blame history has assigned to him for Confederate loss at Gettysburg. It will determine this by showing that Lee had sufficient cavalry for reconnaissance and to adequately to establish the whereabouts of the enemy prior to the battle and that Stuart's actions were that of a seasoned army officer who was following the orders he was give. It will show that it was Lee's actions and failures before and during the battle that caused the loss of the Battle of Gettysburg.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

A short paper to go with post #14...

Adams County History
The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College
Volume 3 Article 4
1997

Building a Battle Site: Roads to and through Gettysburg
Elwood W. Christ
Gettysburg College

This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
On the morning of 1 July 1863, lead elements of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia advanced on the town of Gettysburg situated in the lush farmlands of south-central Pennsylvania just eight miles east of the South Mountain in Adams county. The Southern reconnaissance in force made early that summer morning was destined not only to change the history of the struggling Confederacy, but also to set the infant United States republic, indeed the world, on courses towards more democratic forms of government. Although many historians have dwelled on those three fateful days in 1863, few emphasize the role the major roads played in the drama that unfolded at Gettysburg. However, events that transpired over a 116- year period prior to the great battle actually created the highway system that was to draw the opposing forces to town-a hub of ten major roads. This essay will briefly explore the development of state and county ordained roads to and through the site of Gettysburg from 1747 until the year of the battle. After a brief history of the colonial development in the greater Adams County area, emphasis will be placed on the evolution of the ten major roads that join at Gettysburg and how the development of the town affected their positioning and that of some ancillary roads within the borough limits.


Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
USS ALASKA said:
A short paper to go with post #14...

Adams County History
The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College
Volume 3 Article 4
1997

Building a Battle Site: Roads to and through Gettysburg
Elwood W. Christ
Gettysburg College

This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
On the morning of 1 July 1863, lead elements of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia advanced on the town of Gettysburg situated in the lush farmlands of south-central Pennsylvania just eight miles east of the South Mountain in Adams county. The Southern reconnaissance in force made early that summer morning was destined not only to change the history of the struggling Confederacy, but also to set the infant United States republic, indeed the world, on courses towards more democratic forms of government. Although many historians have dwelled on those three fateful days in 1863, few emphasize the role the major roads played in the drama that unfolded at Gettysburg. However, events that transpired over a 116- year period prior to the great battle actually created the highway system that was to draw the opposing forces to town-a hub of ten major roads. This essay will briefly explore the development of state and county ordained roads to and through the site of Gettysburg from 1747 until the year of the battle. After a brief history of the colonial development in the greater Adams County area, emphasis will be placed on the evolution of the ten major roads that join at Gettysburg and how the development of the town affected their positioning and that of some ancillary roads within the borough limits.


Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Click to expand...
Thank you again USS ALASKA. That's probably a tedious read for all but us local yokels who have memories on most if not all those streets and roads. That's the first I've seen the article in its entirety, seeing relevant pages (various studies, reads) over the years but never as a whole.
I have relatives on Ridge Ave that may have been the access lane to McMillan house at one point, stretching south just below (east of) the present day NPS Cannon Rehab Maintenance building and Red Patch on Seminary Ridge (see google), paralleling Long Lane to McMillan's place, ie, on the west side of the Rec Park-Field whereas Long Lane borders the Rec Park on the east.
I believe this touches on another thread recently developed.
 
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