Gettysburg Papers

[rpkennedy]

You can question stripping Culps Hill but not the results.

That was probably Meade's biggest error in judgment of the battle and, if not for Greene and his men, it might have cost him the battle. Pfanz was correct when he wrote that along with Vincent's Brigade, Greene and his men were instrumental in holding the line on July 2.

Ryan

 

[wausaubob]

Do you think General Lee was surprised and disappointed by the performance of the US artillery at the battle of Gettysburg? Did he not compute the advantage the US would gain from the rolling terrain at Gettysburg and the greater number of cultivated fields? As the range at which the combatants were using artillery increased at Gettysburg, my guess is the US advantage in 3" ordnance rifles was telling. General Lee never repeated his Gettysburg tactics later in the war.

 

[Scott Brown]

Do you think General Lee was surprised and disappointed by the performance of the US artillery at the battle of Gettysburg? Did he not compute the advantage the US would gain from the rolling terrain at Gettysburg and the greater number of cultivated fields? As the range at which the combatants were using artillery increased at Gettysburg, my guess is the US advantage in 3" ordnance rifles was telling. General Lee never repeated his Gettysburg tactics later in the war.

On the flip side, Hunt (by his own admission) was disappointed with his former students on the Confederate side.

 

[121st PA Vols]

That was probably Meade's biggest error in judgment of the battle and, if not for Greene and his men, it might have cost him the battle. Pfanz was correct when he wrote that along with Vincent's Brigade, Greene and his men were instrumental in holding the line on July 2.

Ryan

The 16th Maine is practically forgotten (1st Corps/Robinson/Paul at Oak Ridge) with their rearguard action that saved many of the 1st and 11th Corps from capture.

 

[wausaubob]

At the start of the Civil War, both sides preferred the brass Napoleon guns. They were more reliable. Their use was more flexible. And there was no method to direct fire much beyond 1,000 yds. The gunners did not like the Parrot guns. Reinforcing the breach was a problem with that method. I don't think the Rodman method every produced a rifled gun. I think the Rodman guns could throw a very big shell, and those types of weapons are what made unarmored wooden ships useless.
I think December 1862 a significant number of 3" Ordnance Rifles were inspected and stamped with the patent number than issued to the Army of the Potomac. But the advantage to the US was delayed because General Hooker and General Hunt(the officer who had created the artillery reserve) did not agree on tactics. Also, at Chancellorsville the Confederates were fighting on terrain of their liking and long distance artillery had no significant role their.
But at Gettysburg General Meade gave the artillery reserve back to Hunt. The terrain at Gettysburg provided better lines of sight. And by that time its probable that the rifled artillery was available in a large amount to the US.

 

[wausaubob]

This is undated: https://thecivilwarcenter.wordpress...etts-charge-failed-analysis-and-significance/
However the map of the US lines of fire on July 3, 1863 looks like a map made during the war, or very soon thereafter. A striking feature of the US artillery lines of fire is Hunt giving his gunners a change to shoot obliquely down the Confederate lines instead of at a perpendicular angle.

 

[wausaubob]

The Confederate fuse problems at Gettysburg were easily solved by testing the fuses that did not originate in Richmond and by switching to a new type of fuse. However there was not another big fight in east until May 1864 and by that time the US had many more rifled guns available.

 

[USS ALASKA]

"I Ordered No Man to go When I Would Not go Myself"
Norman Hall, Alexander Webb, Alonzo Cushing, and the Art of Leading Men in Battle
D. Scott Hartwig

Webster's Third New International Dictionary states that leadership is "that ingredient of personality which causes men to follow," and that "leadership molds individuals into a team." It adds that "only a few people possess the quality of leadership." Leadership can also be defined as the ability to motivate and inspire. In no human activity are these qualities put to a more severe test than in leading people into battle, for in this deadly arena, the leader must motivate and inspire those he leads to risk their lives. As if to underscore that point, a Union officer in the 11th Corps wrote in May 1863, "Troops without confidence in their leaders are worth nothing." This is the story of three men who led soldiers into battle at Gettysburg and who embodied Webster's definition of leadership. They were Brigadier General Alexander Webb, Colonel Norman J. Hall, and Lieutenant Alonzo H. Cushing. What made these men good leaders? How did they develop as leaders? How did they earn their men's trust and confidence? This ability is especially important, for Webb, Hall, and Cushing did not command untested troops -- their men were veterans who knew the risks of battle. And finally, what did these men do at Gettysburg that marked them as effective leaders? These three men were Union officers who commanded troops in the same area of the battlefield on July 2 and July 3. But what made them successful was universal in the Union and Confederate armies, indeed, in any army. By examining their experiences prior to Gettysburg and what they did during that battle, we can perhaps come to a fuller understanding of Webster's statement that "only a few people possess the quality of leadership."

https://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay7.pdf

For a list and links to the published Gettysburg Seminar Papers, please see - https://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[wausaubob]

"I Ordered No Man to go When I Would Not go Myself"
Norman Hall, Alexander Webb, Alonzo Cushing, and the Art of Leading Men in Battle
D. Scott Hartwig

Webster's Third New International Dictionary states that leadership is "that ingredient of personality which causes men to follow," and that "leadership molds individuals into a team." It adds that "only a few people possess the quality of leadership." Leadership can also be defined as the ability to motivate and inspire. In no human activity are these qualities put to a more severe test than in leading people into battle, for in this deadly arena, the leader must motivate and inspire those he leads to risk their lives. As if to underscore that point, a Union officer in the 11th Corps wrote in May 1863, "Troops without confidence in their leaders are worth nothing." This is the story of three men who led soldiers into battle at Gettysburg and who embodied Webster's definition of leadership. They were Brigadier General Alexander Webb, Colonel Norman J. Hall, and Lieutenant Alonzo H. Cushing. What made these men good leaders? How did they develop as leaders? How did they earn their men's trust and confidence? This ability is especially important, for Webb, Hall, and Cushing did not command untested troops -- their men were veterans who knew the risks of battle. And finally, what did these men do at Gettysburg that marked them as effective leaders? These three men were Union officers who commanded troops in the same area of the battlefield on July 2 and July 3. But what made them successful was universal in the Union and Confederate armies, indeed, in any army. By examining their experiences prior to Gettysburg and what they did during that battle, we can perhaps come to a fuller understanding of Webster's statement that "only a few people possess the quality of leadership."

https://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay7.pdf

For a list and links to the published Gettysburg Seminar Papers, please see - https://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Among junior officers the willingness to take the physical risk of battle was important. And many paid with their lives. Among senior officers it was necessary to take the moral risk of commitment with accountability.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Leadership Lessons From The Battle Of Gettysburg
John Franklin
Managing Director and Group Head
BB&T Capital Markets Healthcare Finance Group

I was fortunate recently to participate in The Gettysburg Leadership Experience, which is presented by Battlefield Leadership, LLC (www.battlefieldleadership.com). The program took place on the grounds of Gettysburg National Park, which became our interactive classroom as we walked the battlefield while discussing critical points of the conflict. The purpose of the seminar was to take leadership lessons learned from the battle and apply them to the corporate environment. During this epic battle, with the direction of the war riding on the outcome, the pressure to make the correct decisions was enormous on all leaders involved, which added emotional power to the learning experience. It became very evident that the leadership lessons learned were very relevant to my clients and could be applied to achieve and maintain organizational success. As a result, I thought it would be beneficial to share these lessons with you.

https://battlefieldleadership.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/JohnFranklin_Gettysburg_lowres.pdf

Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

The Confederate Deliberate Attack 5 P.M. July 1 to 8 P.M. July 2
William D. Hewitt

Lee had used certain patterns in previous engagements. In Lee's previous battles, he remained focused on weakened enemy units. Once he made contact with a specific unit, he sought to continue pressure on that same unit. Now, that weakened force was entrenched and reinforced -- no longer open to exploitation. In the past Lee had massed most of his force against a limited portion of the enemy, virtually ignoring other enemy elements. On July 2 he was taking on a significant portion of undamaged Federal forces on exterior lines.

The deliberate attack for July 2 was well- planned, for the most part. Better coordination between wings was essential. That responsibility rests with Lee. Focus on the objective rests with his corps commanders. Lee did not seize his objective and had to settle for limited gains.

Much criticism is leveled against Stuart, Longstreet, Anderson, Hill, and Ewell for July 2. Lee does not, yet he was responsible for coordinating the wings. His knowledge of Hood's shift inferred other adjustments would be needed. While Lee actively supervised some change in effort in Anderson's division,84 he should have exercised more active supervision all along the center of his line.

Limited successes, like those during the hasty attack on July 1, resulted in the belief that continued effort might be successful. The seizure of the Peach Orchard, the lower crest of Culp's Hill, Early's temporary seizure of East Cemetery Hill, and Anderson in the center of the Federal line, would encourage Lee to try another attack. As Lee moved toward another decision point on the evening of July 2, another assessment of enemy, terrain, and friendly troops was needed. However, Lee's condition was worsening. His force was becoming out of balance with the demands of certain tactical missions. This deliberate attack damaged Hood and McLaws and further weakened Early. Added to the damage to Heth, Pender, and Rodes incurred by the hasty attack, further offensive efforts became problematic, even with the addition of Pickett and Stuart.

With Stuart and Pickett rejoining the army, and with the assumption that the Federals had now concentrated, Lee could now consider maneuver to defendable terrain and attempt to force Meade to attack him. But whatever advantages in combat power, terrain, or situation that had existed at the beginning of July 2, no longer existed.

Lee's opponent had again fought well. Unlike previous battles, the Federals did not recoil from a strike, but rather counterattacked. Lee's opponent had skillfully shifted forces during the course of the battle. In the past, his opponent had seemed to hold on to a plan to the point of defeat. Now, he was responding to Lee's efforts decisively by "tailoring units." Tailoring occurs when subordinate elements from other units are dispatched and temporarily fight with other units. Divisions from the 2nd Corps fought alongside other corps. Brigades were intermixed as well. Indeed, even corps were combined while the battle raged. Lee had predicted that Meade would not make an error, and Lee had been right.

These developments in the Federal leadership were significant. Lee's opponent now had the capacity not only to absorb blows but to deliver them as well. While Federal soldiers had fought well in the past, their leadership had been found wanting. The rotating command of the Federal 33 army and the corps had been dysfunctional, because of a lack of ability. However, Lee was witnessing the birth of a worthy opponent under its newly capable, flexible leadership.

https://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/11/essay1.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

AD-A248 156
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
March 1992
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited


Gettysburg: An Analysis of the Training Value of Commercial Models
Jude C. Fernan
Captain, USA

ABSTRACT
This study investigated the possibilities of using commercial combat models/war games dealing with the battle of Gettysburg as aids for the training of soldiers and leaders in the military. With the downsizing of the military and the high cost of training, there exists a need to reduce training costs while not affecting the quality of training. The military employs various military models to assist in training but has yet to fully tap the wealth of commercial combat models. One reason may be the lack of an investigative analysis into the soundness and applicability of commercial combat models to military training. This study selected three commercial combat models, one computer and two manual board games, to examine as an initial investigation into their applicability to military training. The models were evaluated against the concepts of the principles of war, the tenets of Airland Battle, and the factors of METT-T and OCOKA. The results of the study indicated that all three of the models provided opportunities for effective military training. The models could be used to train different military levels of organizations from platoons to battalions. Beyond these initial results, remains a vast area worthy of further investigation concerning the utility of commercial combat models to military training.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA248156.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
Waterloo and Gettysburg: A Campaign Comparison
Lieutenant Colonel George E. Teague
United States Army
U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

ABSTRACT
In June of 1815 Napoleon led French forces on an offensive campaign into Belgium against the Allied Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies under Wellington and Blucher. During this campaign Napoleon and several of his marshals made serious errors that led to missed opportunities for victory and ultimately to defeat at Waterloo. Less than 50 years later Robert E. Lee led Confederate forces on an offensive campaign into Maryland and Pennsylvania against the Union Army under Hooker initially, then Meade. A meeting engagement near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania led to three days of fighting during which Lee and several of his generals made critical errors that allowed opportunities for victory to pass and ultimately led to decisive defeat.

These campaigns were remarkably alike in a number of ways. This paper reviews the campaigns and discusses similarities in the strategic settings, campaign objectives, size and disposition of forces, battlefield terrain, tactics employed, and leadership of each army. In particular, the paper compares the performances of selected French and Confederate leaders and how they contributed to the defeat of their respective armies. These comparisons provide valuable lessons learned for the conduct of future military operations.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA378292.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER
THE ROLE OF THE CAVALRY AT GETTYSBURG JUNE 30, 1863-JULY 3, 1863
A GUIDE TO THE BATTLEFIELD
An Individual Study Project
Lieutenant Colonel Peter M. Davenport, AR (Author)
DISTURBUTION STATEKENT A: Approved for public releases distribution is unlimited.
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
March 18, 1988

ABSTRACT
This study examines in detail the role of the cavalry, both Union and Confederate, during the Battle of Gettysburg and provides a guide to the battlefield, starting with the engagement at Hanover on 30 June 1863 and ending at Gettysburg on 3 July 1863. Using excerpts from the Official Records and contemporary accounts, the study provides coverage of the engagements at Hanover, Carlisle, Buford's covering force on July 1, 1863, the movements of the Union cavalry on July 2, 1863 and the three battles on July 3, 1863, including the East Cavalry Field, Fairfield, and Farnsworth's charge.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA195002.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

The Opening Fight at Gettysburg: A Modern Military Analysis
Tom Vossler
Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)

Our modern military analysis of the opening fight at Gettysburg, and the strategic movements which set the stage for it, indicate that both armies get passing marks for having initially oriented on a proper objective – the enemy force. We also find that General Lee was more closely aligned with the principle of the offensive but falls short in observance of the principles of mass and economy of force. With a shorter interior line and a larger force available to him, General Meade has little difficulty in achieving mass and economy of force on his superb defensive position. The principles of maneuver and unity of command posed a problem for both armies. The Army of the Potomac gets the upper hand where security and surprise are concerned, and both armies are subject to criticism where simplicity is concerned.

So much for an objective analysis of the Gettysburg campaign and battle. While our analysis accentuates the negatives at the expense of the positives, we must bear in mind that we have made this analysis with the advantage of hindsight, an advantage not enjoyed by the participants in the battle. Also, time and properly interpreted scholarship have lessened if not removed the fog of war, again, a luxury not enjoyed by the participants of the battle. We must also remember that in the final analysis the men who fought here, be they Northerners or Southerners, fought and died for a cause they firmly believed in. In that light, we can forgive what imperfections might have existed in relation to the rules of warfare while commending them for their dedication to their cause and for the valor with which they fought.

https://www.npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay2.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

From the gent that wrote the papers in posts #8 and #16...

Gettysburg National Military Park
Frederick Tilberg
Division of Publications
National Park Service
U.S. Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C.. 1954 (Revised 1962)
National Park Service Historical Handbook Series No. 9
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the historical and archeological areas in the National Park System, administered by the National Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402.

In 1895, the battlefield was established by Act of Congress as Gettysburg National Military Park. In that year, the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association—founded April 30, 1864, to commemorate "the great deeds of valor . . . and the signal events which render these battlegrounds illustrious" —transferred its holdings of 600 acres of land to the Federal Government. In 1933, the park was transferred from the War Department to the Department of the Interior, to be administered by the National Park Service. Today, the park has some 30 miles of paved roads and an area of close to 3,000 acres. More than 1,400 monuments, tablets, and markers have been erected over the years to indicate the positions where infantry, artillery, and cavalry units fought. Hundreds of Federal and Confederate cannon are located on the field in the approximate positions of batteries during the battle. Field exhibits on the field describe important phases of the 3-day struggle. In the Park Visitor Center, south of Gettysburg, you can see museum exhibits and the famous Gettysburg Cyclorama, as well as obtain additional information and publications about the battlefield.

https://npshistory.com/handbooks/historical/9-1985.pdf

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

NORTH CAROLINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
H. Lynn Estes
Department of History
East Carolina University
Master of Arts in History
November 1982

This study examines the role that North Carolina played in the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863. Gettysburg was one of the most crucial battles in the conflict and North Carolina's participation was important. General Robert E. Lee won an important victory at Chancellorsville, Virginia in May, 1863. He alone with President Jefferson Davis decided that this victory should be taken advantage of by an invasion of the North. A successful invasion could force the North into a negotiated peace which would undoubtedly recognize the importance of the Confederacy. It had other possible advantages such as obtaining needed supplies and recruits, and even convincing European powers into intervening in the conflict. Early in June Lee's troops crossed the Potomac with Harrisburg, Pennsylvania as the immediate objective. There were several clashes and skirmishes in which North Carolina troops participated as Lee's men passed through Maryland and southern Pennsylvania. North Carolina units participating in the battle included the brigades commanded by James Johnston Pettigrew, Stephen Dodson Ramseur, Junius Daniel, Alfred Iverson, Robert F. Hoke (commanded by Colonel Isaac E. Avery), A. M. Scales, and James K. Lane. Other North Carolina units involved included the 1st and 3rd North Carolina regiments, Robertson's Cavalry brigade, two cavalry regiments and four artillery batteries. Finally, one of Lee's division commanders, Dorsey Pender, was a North Carolinian. North Carolina's casualties at Gettysburg numbered 770 killed, the greatest number of any southern state.

The Scholarship at ECU

thescholarship.ecu.edu

Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Journal Article
"WE NEVER EXPECTED A BATTLE": THE CIVILIANS AT GETTYSBURG, 1863
Robert L. Bloom
Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies
Vol. 55, No. 4 (October, 1988), pp. 161-200
Penn State University Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/27773262

Full article at above link on JSTOR with Google sign-in (In the upper right-hand corner of the linked page, there is a 'Log in' button. If you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Defense Horizons
Number 54
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University
August 2006

Lee's Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett's Charge
David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler

I think that this is the strongest position on which to fight a battle that I ever saw.
— Winfield Scott Hancock, surveying his position on Cemetery Ridge

It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.
— James Longstreet to Robert E. Lee, surveying Hancock's position

This is a desperate thing to attempt.
— Richard Garnett to Lewis Armistead, prior to Pickett's Charge

The fault is entirely my own.
— Robert E. Lee to George Pickett, after the Charge.

Robert E. Lee is widely and rightly regarded as one of the finest generals in history. Yet on July 3, 1863, the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg, he ordered a frontal assault across a mile of open field against the strong center of the Union line. The stunning Confederate defeat that ensued produced heavier casualties than Lee's army could afford and abruptly ended its invasion of the North. That the Army of Northern Virginia could fight on for 2 more years after Gettysburg was a tribute to Lee's abilities. While Lee's disciples defended his decision vigorously—they blamed James Longstreet, the corps commander in charge of the attack, for desultory execution—historians and military analysts agree that it was a mistake. For whatever reason, Lee was reticent about his reasoning at the time and later.

How commanders digest information, draw on experience, weigh options, and make decisions in the face of urgency and uncertainty are concerns as old as human conflict. Yet these concerns are more critical than ever in the fast, unfamiliar, wired warfare of the information age—all the more reason to learn about cognitive performance, good and bad, from military history. Lee's thinking at Gettysburg is an especially intriguing case to study: the facts are known, there is wide agreement that his decision to attack on July 3 was flawed, yet the cause of his misjudgment remains elusive.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/defensehorizon/DH-054.pdf?ver=2016-11-15-092816-290

Please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations
Student Graduate Works
3-1993

The Battle of Little Round Top: An Analysis of Battle Alternatives Through Commercial Wargames
John J. McGuiness

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Abstract
This thesis examines the problem of whether one can use commercial wargames as a tool for historical research. The research examines two wargames dealing with the battle of Little Round Top: Gettysburg: The Turning Point and Thunder at the Crossroads. This research emphasized the need to analyze the wargame's structure prior to playing the game. This will avoid a possible mistake of drawing a conclusion about a particular driver in the battle which may not be from the historical situation but rather an inevitable outcome produced by the model's basic assumptions. Additionally, quantitative measures of timelines, casualty rates, and force ratios were examined during the replay of the historical battle and two other "what if" scenarios. Although some parts of the games are open to debate, for the purpose of exploring the historical battle and playing "what if" type scenarios both served their purpose: to open one's imagination and develop insights. The results of the games must be judged on their insights into the battle, not as a precise prediction of what would happen.

https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8247&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA