Gettysburg not a decisive turning point?

[GwilymT]

Gettysburg as the end all & be all of the Civil War was a product of Jubal Early & the Southern Historical Society. The elevation of Lee, Jackson & Joe Johnston to the status of military demigods was also a product of decades of the SHS's counter factual narrative. Superior Southern manhood was overwhelmed by hoards of deluded emigrants only fighting for money is another one of their tropes. Needless to say, the right to hold other human beings as property was, in the SHS version of events, a vague, peripheral issue. It was an amorphous "state right that the morally superior exemplars of white manhood fought for.

Lee's "invasion" of Pennsylvania was an unsupported raid that terminated in defeat at a meeting engagement at Nowhere, Pennsylvania forty one miles north of the Potomac River. Those are the facts. Compare that with the Tullahoma Campaign that has not even been mentioned in this thread.

June 28, 1863, Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland faced Bragg's Army of Tennessee over a front stretching almost 60 miles wide, east to west. At the end of day one, his front was over 70 miles wide. In a matter of weeks, his army controlled all of Middle Tennessee & the absolutely strategically vital rail & mineral riches of Chattanooga 100 rail miles from his starting position. That is what a turning point looks like… but it is just a point. Campaigns, not turning points win wars.

From where Lincoln sat, at the end of the fighting season in December 1863, his army was victorious in a campaign that stretched from Cumberland Gap to Knoxville to Chattanooga to Vicksburg to Little Rock to Port Hudson, Lincoln's Campaign of 1863 effectively destroyed any avenue for CSA victory.

As Lincoln contemplated his war map in January 1864, it was a matter of how & when the war would be won, not if it could be won. That is what a real turning point looks like.

Just an FYI... I stole your "postage stamp" metaphor!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Just an FYI... I stole your "postage stamp" metaphor!

As they say, amateurs plagiarize, pros steal out right. Think I first heard Ed Bearss say that, but can't guarantee it. The 240,000 casualties suffered under Lee's command in that postage stamp distorted the entire CSA war effort. More's the pity, barely a square inch of it had any strategic value.

 

[Belfoured]

As they say, amateurs plagiarize, pros steal out right. Think I first heard Ed Bearss say that, but can't guarantee it. The 240,000 casualties suffered under Lee's command in that postage stamp distorted the entire CSA war effort. More's the pity, barely a square inch of it had any strategic value.

Or, as another author once told me, the pros "borrow" and "rent" if they're caught.

 

[wausaubob]

What's the difference between a defeat and a surrender? The US defeated the Confederates at Gettysburg, but Grant had the Confederates trapped against a river patrolled by the US navy at Vicksburg and the Confederates surrendered.
What was the difference?
General Lee's forces retreated from Pennsylvania, with their equipment in tow and most of their wounded made it back to Virginia. The losses were severe, but the army continued to be a threat.
Pemberton's army was paroled. But all knew they have been whipped. All of their artillery, the munitions and their small arms. all of their wagons and mules, were filtered through the US force, which took what they wanted and destroyed the rest. The Confederate army ceased to exist. The soldiers could be recycled. But I wonder how many were never available to the eastern Confederacy?
In addition, when Grant forced the Confederates to surrender the US gained an important political and strategic goal. The odds that the Midwest, Missouri, Kansas and the Far West would vote Republican in 1864 were dramatically increased when the US defeated the Confederacy at Vicksburg.
In history Gettysburg seems important. But that's only because the US was winning everywhere until Bragg defeated Rosecrans' force in Georgia. As a famous commentator here admonished me, correlation and causation are not the same thing. The US economy, its navy and its logistical network were so much stronger by July 1863 that a string of victories were going to occur. General Bragg achieved a temporary reversal of the trend. But within 60 days of his victory everything he had gained was wiped out.
Burnside made it to Knoxville. Curtis and Steele made it to Little Rock. The US navy forced the Confederates out of Battery Wagner, which essentially closed Charleston to blockade runners. Most importantly, without sustaining significant casualties, Rosecrans back pedalled Bragg out of Tennessee.
Gettysburg happened at about the same time as these other events, but there was not a substantial causal connection.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Or, as another author once told me, the pros "borrow" and "rent" if they're caught.

I misspent a great deal of my life in "the binis" as they say in Nashville. How many ways can you sing, 'I got drunk, crashed my pickup & my woman won't take me back?' I am as cynical as a mafia don where copyrights are concerned.

 

[Rhea Cole]

What's the difference between a defeat and a surrender? The US defeated the Confederates at Gettysburg, but Grant had the Confederates trapped against a river patrolled by the US navy at Vicksburg and the Confederates surrendered.
What was the difference?
General Lee's forces retreated from Pennsylvania, with their equipment in tow and most of their wounded made it back to Virginia. The losses were severe, but the army continued to be a threat.
Pemberton's army was paroled. But all knew they have been whipped. All of their artillery, the munitions and their small arms. all of their wagons and mules, were filtered through the US force, which took what they wanted and destroyed the rest. The Confederate army ceased to exist. The soldiers could be recycled. But I wonder how many were never available to the eastern Confederacy?
In addition, when Grant forced the Confederates to surrender the US gained an important political and strategic goal. The odds that the Midwest, Missouri, Kansas and the Far West would vote Republican in 1864 were dramatically increased when the US defeated the Confederacy at Vicksburg.
In history Gettysburg seems important. But that's only because the US was winning everywhere until Bragg defeated Rosecrans' force in Georgia. As a famous commentator here admonished me, correlation and causation are not the same thing. The US economy, its navy and its logistical network were so much stronger by July 1863 that a string of victories were going to occur. General Bragg achieved a temporary reversal of the trend. But within 60 days of his victory everything he had gained was wiped out.
Burnside made it to Knoxville. Curtis and Steele made it to Little Rock. The US navy forced the Confederates out of Battery Wagner, which essentially closed Charleston to blockade runners. Most importantly, without sustaining significant casualties, Rosecrans back pedalled Bragg out of Tennessee.

Grant suffered fewer casualties at Henry, Donelson, & Vicksburg together than Lee did at Gettysburg. That is a profound repudiation of CSA strategy East & West of the mountains.

 

[Bruce Vail]

As between Antietam and Gettysburg, they were both nothing more than the repulse of Confederate invasions with the ensuing escape of the ANV - wars aren't won that way where winning or losing involves the survival of the CSA. But, unlike Gettysburg, Antietam directly resulted in issuance of the EP and that was a significant contribution to the ultimate victory.

Of course you are right. I misstated my own views in my haste to finish the post.

A series of important Union victories in 1862 effectively closed off any chance that the Confederates would win the war. None of those Union victories, including Antietam, was a definitive turning point, but collectively they had the effect of ending any hope for the Confederacy. Antietam, and more importantly the EP, provided a neat exclamation point.

 

[JerryD]

I agree entirely. It is campaigns that win wars. Because he had no logistical support, Lee would have had to return to his base. As it was, his entire wagon train was filled with wounded. There was no source for remounts. It wasn't until he reached the Potomac crossing that any artillery ammunition arrived. It is hard to define what, given the logistical realities, the definition of a victory would have been.

This is an excellent point that few understand. Even if Pickett's Charge had been successful, Lee's army was so bled dry that it would have been in no condition to do anything other than to fall back on its supply line and retreat back into Maryland, if not Virginia. It would have been the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory.

 

[Irishtom29]

I think the greatest threat to the United States during the rebellion was the rebel invasion of Kentucky in 1862.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I think the greatest threat to the United States during the rebellion was the rebel invasion of Kentucky in 1862.

I think you make a good point. The command disfunction that plagued the CSA war in the west made any hope of exploiting the Bragg / Kirby Smith incursion a success. As you say, it is one of the war's great might have beens.

 

[Belfoured]

I think you make a good point. The command disfunction that plagued the CSA war in the west made any hope of exploiting the Bragg / Kirby Smith incursion a success. As you say, it is one of the war's great might have beens.

Of course, one could also weigh in that on the Union side the Confederate opportunity was enhanced by having Don Carlos Buell as the opponent. Sort of like paying for NHL tickets and finding out you're at a Beer League game.

 

[wausaubob]

Gettysburg was in the middle of three battles and a campaign that sealed the fate of the Confederacy.
Two of those battles the Confederacy won. Not winning battles is not what sped up the end of the Confederacy.
At Chancellorsville the Confederacy won tactically. But the victory was obtained at a cost the Confederacy could not afford, including the death of General Jackson.
The Confederacy also won at Chickamauga, but again US infantry fire power had increased so fast that the cost of victory was unsustainable.
The US won at Gettysburg, and this was another bloody mess that the Confederacy could not afford.
In between the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg surrendered. Thousands more soldiers either refused their parole and went north or refused to fight outside of Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas.
By the end of these four events, and aided by the achievements of Rosecrans, Steele and the US navy. the Confederacy no longer had the manpower or the logistical support to conduct a proper siege at Chattanooga.
The US victory at Gettysburg was decisive evidence that the US had the advantages. But the battle had no strategic consequences. This mismatch in resources was just obvious.

 

[Belfoured]

Gettysburg was in the middle of three battles and a campaign that sealed the fate of the Confederacy.
Two of those battles the Confederacy won. Not winning battles is not sped up the end of the Confederacy.
At Chancellorsville the Confederacy won tactically. But the victory was obtained at a cost the Confederacy could not afford, including the death of General Jackson.
The Confederacy also won at Chickamauga, but again US infantry fire power had increased so fast that the cost of victory was unsustainable.
The US won at Gettysburg, and this was another bloody mess that the Confederacy could not afford.
In between the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg surrendered. Thousands more soldiers either refuse their parole and went north or refused to fight outside of Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas.
By the end of these four events, and aided by the achievements of Rosecrans, Steele and the US navy. the Confederacy no longer had the manpower or the logistical support to conduct a proper siege at Chattanooga.
The US victory at Gettysburg was decisive evidence that the US had the advantages. But the battle had no strategic consequences. This mismatch in resources was just obvious.

One additional impact of Chancellorsville. There has been a fair number of assessments over the years that Chancellorsville emboldened Lee to the recklessness that led to Gettysburg and July 3. That was foreshadowed by his intention to make a bloody and likely doomed May 4 assault on Hooker's extremely strong defensive line. He had to be talked out of it by cooler heads.

 

[wausaubob]

One additional impact of Chancellorsville. There has been a fair number of assessments over the years that Chancellorsville emboldened Lee to the recklessness that led to Gettysburg and July 3. That was foreshadowed by his intention to make a bloody and likely doomed May 4 assault on Hooker's extremely strong defensive line. He had to be talked out of it by cooler heads.

I have to wonder if wounded in action on both sides meant something different by May of 1863, especially in the eastern theater. By that I suggest that the proliferation of rifles, and rifled carbines, was having its disastrous affect on both sides. The rifles had greater range and accuracy. I suppose that the rifled minnie ball retained more speed and hit harder than the obsolete smoothbores. The wounds created were not as recoverable. More wounded men died, and a higher % were seriously handicapped by the rifle wounds.

 

[krkey1]

I do not think there was so to speak one " turning point".

Gettysburg badly mauled the Army of Northern Virginia which allowed for a process to begin in order to destroy it.

However Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in half.

The Battle of Chattanooga opened Georgia to Invasion.

The Blockade caused tremendous economic problems in the South

With so many White Southerners fighting the systems that kept slaves on the plantations collapsed and more and more slaves escaped or stopped working.

Conscription caused a backlash in the South with my Southerners opposing the Confederacy.

It wasn't one thing that destroyed the Confederacy. Many factors caused it to collapse. Gettysburg is the most famous of these factors.

 

[krkey1]

I would not consider Jackson, Lee or Johnson to be " military demigods" but they were all very intelligent commanders. Lee had a realistic chance to win at Gettysburg and this probably would have won the war for the South. Had Jackson been with him this hypothetical victory seems likely. Johnson engaged in an excellent defensive war in Georgia which might have cost the Lincoln the election which might have allowed for a negotiated peace. All of these realistic possibilities of course were realized by the South after the war.
None of this happened obviously. Almost always when a side loses a war they always try to find the decisive moment when they lost and consider hypothetical winning scenarios. After the war Southern society honored and cared for it's veterans; this seems appropriate enough to me as many of them were young men who had little political influence over the decisions of 1861. I do think any society should take care of it's veterans even if their cause was odious.

The biggest problem the South faced was the fact that it's system of slavery required so much non slave owning support. Ironically by leaving the Union they cut themselves off from this support.

Even if the South became a Nation could it hold unto slavery forever? Without slavery why should the South be a separate country?

The Confederacy might not have been stillborn but this baby had a lot of health issues; which it's leadership failed to solve.

 

[JerryD]

I do not think there was so to speak one " turning point".

Gettysburg badly mauled the Army of Northern Virginia which allowed for a process to begin in order to destroy it.

However Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in half.

The Battle of Chattanooga opened Georgia to Invasion.

The Blockade caused tremendous economic problems in the South

With so many White Southerners fighting the systems that kept slaves on the plantations collapsed and more and more slaves escaped or stopped working.

Conscription caused a backlash in the South with my Southerners opposing the Confederacy.

It wasn't one thing that destroyed the Confederacy. Many factors caused it to collapse. Gettysburg is the most famous of these factors.

Currently reading a book on Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism. The author posits that after the first year of war southern will to fight was eroded over time for any number of reasons, not the least of which was the feeling they were losing the war, and claims that they never really adopted a sense of nationalism. Many felt they seceded to get better terms for an eventual return to the Union, many planters prioritized retaining slaves over seeking independence, and the yoeman farmers who did not own slaves were never wholly committed to secession. There is a reason that the CSA had the first conscription law, and that is because volunteers dried up. One thing people may not understand is that the first conscription law also forced those in the army whose enlistment was about to expire to remain in the army. The reason being is the fear they would not re-enlist, as many would not.

 

[CavRTO]

This is an excellent point that few understand. Even if Pickett's Charge had been successful, Lee's army was so bled dry that it would have been in no condition to do anything other than to fall back on its supply line and retreat back into Maryland, if not Virginia. It would have been the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory.

Good point. Lee instead of Meade would've been the target of criticism for not following up his victory. Correct me if I'm wrong but Lee never followed up any of his victories with a pursuit. He was cognizant of his shortcomings vis a vis manpower and logistics. He knew he had to manage his inferiority in numbers and supplies carefully.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I read an article today in the Civil War Monitor about Presidential speeches at Gettysburg which contains the statement that "most historians argue that Gettysburg was not a decisive turning point in the war", noting that Lee was able to "retreat without harassment" and the war continued for 2 years. I am curious what others think of this opinion. Does it accurately express a current historical perspective?

Personally think 'turning point' is a somewhat nebulous term.

Also believe that the question posed implies that there may be multiple turning points rather than a single turning point (by use of 'a' instead of 'the' in the caption).

Would agree with the common assertion that 'Gettysburg was not a decisive turning point in the war'. This is because following the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, the Army of North Virginia continued as an effective (albeit smaller size) fighting force. The war in the eastern theater was reduced to a vitual stalemate in 1864 and into 1865, where gradual attrition took over for an extended period and would determine the final outcome, unless political forces intervened (which was entirely possible) to press for peace.

Think one has to look to the west for any predominantly defining event/occurrence that could possibly be represented as a turning point in the war. Events to consider could include the fall of Vicksburg, the lifting of the siege at Chattanooga, the fall of Atlanta, or the destruction of the Army of Tennessee at Nashville. The effects of these events all involved material deprivations for the South that were irrecoverable. One might ask which of these events that occurred deprived the South of the most (to an extent that there was no way back) and precipitated the South's final defeat. Applying these criteria, would personally argue that it was likely to be either the fall of Vicksburg or Atlanta that were significant and marked the end of the Confederacy. The loss of Vicksburg gave the Union control of the Mississippi and the inland waterways and effectively split the South in two. The fall of Atlanta late in the war also proved critical for the South, because it was the loss of a key railroad center, manufacturing hub and supply depot for the South. It also helped to ensure the re-election of Lincoln.

 

[wausaubob]

Like @Nathan Stuart wrote, Vicksburg and Atlanta were very comparable. Both were very important to the political fortunes of the Republicans, and both seriously reduced the economic area from which the Confederacy could draw support. The battles for Mobile Bay and for Fort Fisher lacked the political impact but the US victories in both instances shortened the war and saved lives on both sides.