Gettysburg not a decisive turning point?

[JerryD]

Antietam can not be considered a defeat for Lee. May have been his best battlefield strategical effort. He held the field at the end of the day. Not to mention the at least 2-1 disadvantage he faced.

This is ludicrous. Antietam should never have been fought. Lee had ample time to retreat across the Potomac and avoid the massive losses his army could ill afford to suffer. He had nothing to gain by fighting this battle, from a strategic perspective, and everything to lose with the river at his back. Lee bled his army dry for no good reason.

You may have meant tactical effort, which means how he handled the battle, as opposed to strategic, which means how you bring all assets to bear to win the war. But even tactically that is extremely questionable. But from a strategic perspective Antietam was a disaster for the CSA, being the end of the campaign and the prompting the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation.

From a tactical perspective, both sides held the field at the end of the day, and Lee ultimately had to quit the field before the Union did, so your stated premise is false. As for the 2-1 disadvantage, this is just silly. The point of fighting a battle is to help win a war, not to put up a good fight despite being outmanned and win some kind of symbolic victory. Its akin to treating war like a sporting event. But the 2-1 disadvantage points out the tactical mistake of fighting with a river at his back and limited means to escape if his lines did not hold. It was just a monumentally stupid decision on his part to fight that battle.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It seems to me there is no way invading the North would draw off forces from Vicksburg. Vicksburg would have been done before Grant got the orders. If anything they would have been better armed had they then been drawn off seeing they had Confederate Enfields.

Lee's army was in motion almost a month before Gettysburg. There was probably also some uncertainty on how long Vicksburg could hold out too.

My question is there any realistic alternative besides invasion to achieve their goals?

If you consider independence to be the goal (and over the course of the war it's what Confederate officials became fixated upon), by 1863 a stunning victory on Pennsylvania soil probably would not achieve that.

Lee probably would have been better off going on the permanent defensive behind the Rappahannock. There he could likely parry every Union blow. This had logistical challenges.

After 1862, war-weariness leading to Lincoln and the Republicans being voted out was probably the Confederates' best hope. Even that was no sure bet, especially if McClellan is the next president.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Antietam can not be considered a defeat for Lee. May have been his best battlefield strategical effort. He held the field at the end of the day. Not to mention the at least 2-1 disadvantage he faced.

When your stated goal for a campaign is fought to a standstill & the "victory" consists of safety retreating across the Potomac with what is left of the army… that is a very empty meaning of the word.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Antietam can not be considered a defeat for Lee. May have been his best battlefield strategical effort. He held the field at the end of the day. Not to mention the at least 2-1 disadvantage he faced.

I think Antietam was a tactical draw and a strategic defeat for Lee.

Antietam is a turning point because Lee lost the initiative for the next nine months, his invasion failed, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in response to the outcome, and the slim chance of British recognition & intervention slipped away.

The greatest Confederate loss at Sharpsburg was no man, animal, or square foot of ground, but rather the chance to win the war.

 

[Rhea Cole]

This thread is an example of how the war in the East is profoundly different from the West. Eastern battles were like beads on a string. They were related, but each was strategically isolated. There was no coherent over arching strategy that the individual battles were part of. You never see the kind of 'what if' scenarios repeatedly brought up about FTs Henry & Donelson, Memphis / Mississippi River, Vicksburg, Stones River, Tullahoma or Chattanooga Campaigns.

The difference being that all of those battles were incidents in months long campaigns. That is why our Eastern War brethren have such a hard time understanding that the Wilderness, Cold Harbor etc are not stand alone battles where both armies returned to the status quo anti. They were incidents during a fifty day campaign that achieved its strategic goal of taking Lee's army off the map. Nobody posits a question based on the history about what would have happened to Lee after he was pinned into place at Petersburg.

Lincoln was absolutely correct when he concluded that the entire war must be managed by one man. Grant was actively managing a continental war, Lee was confined to a few counties in what was left of Virginia.

I don't know how many different ways those of us who know the broad history of the war can declair how moot all these Gettysburg-centric theoreticals are.

 

[krkey1]

My point with Vicksburg is if somehow Lee won at Gettysburg and turned around and besieged Washington DC ( two big IFs) and then the Union Army from Vicksburg was recalled it still would have already captured the city. Simply leave behind a garrison. Then the rest of the army coming to aid Washington DC is better armed then it was during the siege as they have Confederate Enfields.

It seems to me that fighting a purely defensive war just puts Lee into a meat grinder scenario which he loses.

 

[Gettysburg Guide #154]

If you must pick just ONE turning point for the entire war, consider the immediate aftermath of The Wilderness. Union soldiers of the AOP start by moving away from the enemy. Many initially think that this is yet another retreat. Then their columns turn southeast in an effort to move around Lee's right flank. When they make that turn, the prosecution of the war by the North forever changes.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It seems to me that fighting a purely defensive war just puts Lee into a meat grinder scenario which he loses.

As opposed to an offensive war, when casualties are almost always higher for an attacker? Where Lee is usually attacking outnumbered overall and has to find ways to achieve localized numerical superiority? Against superior Union artillery?

I think it's a mistake to look at Petersburg and say "see, Lee is doomed on the defensive." Petersburg was doomed by geography: exposed rail lines, wrong side of a river, few good natural defenses, a right flank that will forever be exposed. Contrast that to the Rappahannock line which was a strong defensive position with secure logistics.

Likewise, Tennesee and North Georgia offered lots of good defensive terrain, provided the Confederates properly screen mountain gaps and react promptly to Union movements. Lots of cavalry failures, and sluggish reactions, from Tullahoma to Atlanta.

 

[Belfoured]

I think Antietam was a tactical draw and a strategic defeat for Lee.

Antietam is a turning point because Lee lost the initiative for the next nine months, his invasion failed, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in response to the outcome, and the slim chance of British recognition & intervention slipped away.

The greatest Confederate loss at Sharpsburg was no man, animal, or square foot of ground, but rather the chance to win the war.

That's fair, although he surrendered his position within 24 hours and headed home, so it might also fairly be labeled a (narrow) tactical defeat. The strategic outcome in the big picture, as you point out, was a debacle.

 

[121st PA Vols]

If you must pick just ONE turning point for the entire war, consider the immediate aftermath of The Wilderness. Union soldiers of the AOP start by moving away from the enemy. Many initially think that this is yet another retreat. Then their columns turn southeast in an effort to move

Has anyone defined 'turning point'? It seems too encompassing saying it's Gettysburg, as in strategic-tactical, or the Emancipation (socio-political?), death of A.S. Johnston and so forth. What are the parameters? I think the question needs work. Maybe it just needs categories.

 

[CowCavalry]

That was not really Lee's purpose in invading the north, according to the historic record.

Yes, it really is one of his intentions, per the historical record, along with the others you cite, for which he gave as his reasons for wanting to take the war North of the Potomac.

 

[hughes]

The conclusion, in my mind, is that Gettysburg was not a turning point nor was any other event a turning point. For there to be a turning point, one must believe that the alternate outcome was possible. That was not a reality in the American Civil War. The self-styled Confederate States of America had no chance of achieving their objective. There are no "what ifs"'. There is only what was.

 

[CavRTO]

The conclusion, in my mind, is that Gettysburg was not a turning point nor was any other event a turning point. For there to be a turning point, one must believe that the alternate outcome was possible. That was not a reality in the American Civil War. The self-styled Confederate States of America had no chance of achieving their objective. There are no "what ifs"'. There is only what was.

From what I've been reading then the sum of the parts is greater than the whole? Yes, there were many battles which contributed to the final outcome but by some thread there is one which may, because of the way history is presented is deemed more important than the others. No matter how thinly it prevails over all others. Think Midway and Stalingrad. You could make the same arguments. Turning points? Just my 2 dongs worth.

 

[Irishtom29]

Think Midway and Stalingrad. You could make the same arguments. Turning points? Just my 2 dongs worth.

Midway and Stalingrad can be considered turning points because up until then the Japanese and Germans were winning their wars and after them they were losing (though some would argue Guadalcanal is a more fitting turning point). But the southern rebels were never winning their war; indeed from early on they were (with the exception of the 1862 invasion of Kentucky) steadily losing it.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

he surrendered his position within 24 hours and headed home, so it might also fairly be labeled a (narrow) tactical defeat.

It depends on your the definition of a tactical draw.

Lee could have stayed where he was. It wouldn't have gained anything, but McClellan wasn't in a position to really force Lee to leave. That was part of the reason Lee stuck around that extra day.

I think tactical win/lose/draw is dependent not just on holding the battlefield, but also casualties.

If Antietam was a tactical defeat for Lee was Wilderness a tactical victory? The AOTP were the ones who left after two days of fighting. However, I would call it a tactical draw and strategic Union victory too. Stones River another example.

Has anyone defined 'turning point'?

Generally, an event where one side goes from winning to losing. Usually in actuality, but sometimes only superficially.

For example, Midway is the classic turning point of the Pacific War, but many would argue Japan had no more chance of defeating the USA in the 1940s than the Confederacy did in the 1860s. However, I argue that line of thinking is flawed because it's based too much on hindsight. We know they "couldn't" win, but nobody really knew that at the time (even if some predicted it).

Perhaps it's more useful to describe a turning point as when one side substantially loses momentum and initiative to the other.

Another way is perhaps gains and loses. If the Confederacy wins at Antietam they might gain western Maryland; Perryville could have gained much of Kentucky. (Japan would have occupied Midway.) Gettysburg doesn't gain the Confederacy any territory. Even under the best circumstances, the ANV was going to be back in Virginia at the end of the campaign. Even Lee understood that.

 

[R. Porter]

Long post, so just skip it or go to the restroom first and then get a snack and something to drink.

After reading through all of the comments posted here, I see that more than a few ideas that I have read about or that occurred to me have been mentioned. Even my choice of turning point and analogy war were mentioned so there is probably no point in even posting (the knowledge base and analysis by the group on this message board can be amazing.) But, I had already written down a response even though I probably don't know much about what is being discussed; so I decided to go ahead and post anyway!

When I was little the only Civil War we heard about was in Virginia. There was some about South Carolina and Antietam and Gettysburg. Vicksburg got mentioned but the war was really fought in Virginia. I think part of that was the number of battlefields in Virginia and the parents and grandparents of people growing up in Virginia knew and heard stories from Civil War veterans when they were growing up themselves. My grandmother had memories of playing on the earthworks on a Confederate general's property when she was a little girl. She was a cousin by marriage to General Heth (I use cousin loosely here since I think her father's brother married the General's daughter or something like that. This was the general whose earthworks she played on, I believe.) After the war the myths began and it was probably more heroic to see the Confederate army making a valiant all or nothing charge against its enemy which decided the war. The sort of thing that ended up in legends of knights of old (Think the Gododdin at Catraeth who lost, or later, the Normans at the battle of Hastings who won).

It has only been much later that I have started paying attention to the western theater in the Civil War, much like the Eastern Front of World War II. Growing up and even to the present the U.S. has been the country that won World War II. The Russians needed our help or they wouldn't have stood a chance. The more you read about the Eastern Front in World War II the more it seems that Russia might have won eventually even if they had no help from the U.S. at all. The western theater of the Civil War is similarly eye-opening. From a western perspective the defeat of the South may have just been a matter of time. Certainly, a number of books on the war point out how the South was out manned, out manufactured, out railroaded, and out navied before the first shot was fired; but after the introduction the reader gets lulled into this belief that the South really did stand a chance. They could have out generaled the north and captured Washington D.C. which they could hold hostage until they were recognized as a sovereign nation. They could have shown that they were superior militarily and gained official recognition and support from foreign countries as the Colonies did from France during the Revolution.

This last idea is what is behind the suggestion that Antietam was the turning point. Lincoln had his Emancipation Proclamation ready to go but needed a victory before he announced it. Politics was at play here. He freed the slaves of the South but not in the border states or the North. He was afraid that if he freed the slaves in the border states those states would turn toward the south and secede. He was waiting for a clear cut victory to announce his proclamation. The Confederacy was negotiating for support and recognition with foreign governments. Their cotton exports were a major component of the economy of Europe, especially of England. They felt that if they could pull off a major military victory against the North they would be able to gain support in the form of arms, and perhaps armies and a sea-going navy. Having read about a British Diplomat living in South Carolina before and during the Civil War and seeing some of his communications with his superiors and others, it looks more like the possibility of the British coming to the aid of the South as the French had to the Americans during the Revolution was never real. The British had just gotten rid of slavery themselves, how could they justify sending troops to help shore up a country based on slavery? Businessmen in Britain had seen the war coming and had built up a surplus of cotton and started to explore growing cotton in India to create a stable supply over which they had more control. So the idea that the turning point was at Fort Sumter because once they declared war it was obvious they were never going to win has some merit.

The plan to move the war north again and invade the Union is associated by a number of writers with an attempt to reduce the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia's drain on Southern resources and to threaten Washington D.C. so that the U.S. government might be willing to strike a deal where the Confederacy could exist as its own sovereign nation and its armies would leave the North in peace. Was this realistic? Washington D.C. was ringed by forts with some pretty big guns. There was a large army in the field that could come to Washington's aid quickly. What if they went after Baltimore or Philadelphia? They would have to be getting all of their supplies off the land because their supply line back to Richmond would not stay intact for long. And what about Richmond? Who would defend the Confederate seat of government while Lee's army was stumbling through Pennsylvania? Maybe a Confederate victory at this point in time wouldn't end in Southern independence.

So it would seem that there would be arguments for a number of "turning points" for the War. Some were dependent on where you were living at the time of the war. Some were dependent on how much you knew about politics and international diplomacy. Some were dependent on how you viewed an acceptable goal for the South. The more I read the more I feel that the true turning point in the war was at Fort Sumter and the American Civil War was analogous to the War in the Pacific during World War II. When was the war lost for the Japanese during World War II? Could Admiral Yamamoto's apocryphal saying apply, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."

I couldn't resist thinking briefly about if the South had won independence. Would they have had a government like under the Articles of Confederation? That didn't seem to work for the U.S. With the South gone from the U.S. slavery would probably have been outlawed (although it would appear that it still legally exists in the U.S. today; see the 13th Amendment.) With no slavery in the U.S. there would be a great northern migration by enslaved people of the South. If the South demanded their slaves back the U.S. could say, "No!" If slave hunters entered the U.S. looking for escaped slaves the U.S. would have reason to send military expeditions into the Confederacy to bring back slave hunters to face justice (think expeditions against Pancho Villa in 1916.) If foreign countries launched military campaigns against a militarily weakened Confederacy, the U.S. could send troops to occupy the South and fight off the invader (think Monroe Doctrine.) If the Confederacy were stable, the political elites might launch military campaigns to gain more territory in northern Mexico or Cuba to gain more land where they could continue to have slavery.

 

[krkey1]

I have never once found that argument to be remotely compelling that the 13th Amendment was created to allow a backdoor slavery because it allowed forced labor of people convicted of crimes. The 13th was created by abolitionists. It was ratified by abolitionist states. None of them seemed to notice this stealth slavery clause.

Why shouldn't people who have been convicted of crimes be required to work while in the penal system. Does anyone know of any country that does not require labor of such people? Does anyone know of such a country in the 19th century?

Obviously the South after the Civil War greatly abused the legal system to force labor from people but that doesn't mean one should not compel labor from those justly convicted. Does one think speed traps are an argument against all police patrolling the highways? Does one think voyeurs using cameras inappropriately is an argument against cameras at traffic lights?

 

[121st PA Vols]

It depends on your the definition of a tactical draw.

Lee could have stayed where he was. It wouldn't have gained anything, but McClellan wasn't in a position to really force Lee to leave. That was part of the reason Lee stuck around that extra day.

I think tactical win/lose/draw is dependent not just on holding the battlefield, but also casualties.

If Antietam was a tactical defeat for Lee was Wilderness a tactical victory? The AOTP were the ones who left after two days of fighting. However, I would call it a tactical draw and strategic Union victory too. Stones River another example.



Generally, an event where one side goes from winning to losing. Usually in actuality, but sometimes only superficially.

For example, Midway is the classic turning point of the Pacific War, but many would argue Japan had no more chance of defeating the USA in the 1940s than the Confederacy did in the 1860s. However, I argue that line of thinking is flawed because it's based too much on hindsight. We know they "couldn't" win, but nobody really knew that at the time (even if some predicted it).

Perhaps it's more useful to describe a turning point as when one side substantially loses momentum and initiative to the other.

Another way is perhaps gains and loses. If the Confederacy wins at Antietam they might gain western Maryland; Perryville could have gained much of Kentucky. (Japan would have occupied Midway.) Gettysburg doesn't gain the Confederacy any territory. Even under the best circumstances, the ANV was going to be back in Virginia at the end of the campaign. Even Lee understood that.

Good points and thanks for the response. For years it has been drummed into us Gettysburgians that 'that' was the turning point. And you can make a good argument, for that and other battles. Further studies years later got me thinking New Orleans was major, recognizing belatedly there was something beyond Gettysburg. Who'd a thunk it!
And finally, I've wondered why I and many others only think in terms of battles as turning points. Very strange. That has a big role in my thinking it all needs better defined as you attempted with a few egs.

Also, I just returned from Florida, Jupiter and Palm City specifically, having a great meal at Twisted Tuna in Jupiter, seeing you show it as your location. Great town but bursting at the seams now with tremendous growth causing family to move north to Palm City.

 

[Belfoured]

It depends on your the definition of a tactical draw.

Lee could have stayed where he was. It wouldn't have gained anything, but McClellan wasn't in a position to really force Lee to leave. That was part of the reason Lee stuck around that extra day.

I think tactical win/lose/draw is dependent not just on holding the battlefield, but also casualties.

If Antietam was a tactical defeat for Lee was Wilderness a tactical victory? The AOTP were the ones who left after two days of fighting. However, I would call it a tactical draw and strategic Union victory too. Stones River another example.



Generally, an event where one side goes from winning to losing. Usually in actuality, but sometimes only superficially.

For example, Midway is the classic turning point of the Pacific War, but many would argue Japan had no more chance of defeating the USA in the 1940s than the Confederacy did in the 1860s. However, I argue that line of thinking is flawed because it's based too much on hindsight. We know they "couldn't" win, but nobody really knew that at the time (even if some predicted it).

Perhaps it's more useful to describe a turning point as when one side substantially loses momentum and initiative to the other.

Another way is perhaps gains and loses. If the Confederacy wins at Antietam they might gain western Maryland; Perryville could have gained much of Kentucky. (Japan would have occupied Midway.) Gettysburg doesn't gain the Confederacy any territory. Even under the best circumstances, the ANV was going to be back in Virginia at the end of the campaign. Even Lee understood that.

Fair points, but I would take issue with the conclusion that McClellan "really wasn't in a position to force Lee to leave." Lee left because he wasn't in a position to stay or - even more clearly - to resume the battle. In addition to having suffered enormous casualties (including extensive losses at the rank of Col. and up), he hadn't yet recovered the large number of stragglers that he had lost before September 17. In addition, while McClellan's forces that were actually engaged also suffered enormous casualties, Lee lacked the equivalent of the significant V and VI Corps units that had suffered few/no losses. I don't see a material difference between Lee staying at Antietam until late on September 18 and Lee staying at Gettysburg until late on July 4.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Fair points, but I would take issue with the conclusion that McClellan "really wasn't in a position to force Lee to leave." Lee left because he wasn't in a position to stay or - even more clearly - to resume the battle. In addition to having suffered enormous casualties (including extensive losses at the rank of Col. and up), he hadn't yet recovered the large number of stragglers that he had lost before September 17. In addition, while McClellan's forces that were actually engaged also suffered enormous casualties, Lee lacked the equivalent of the significant V and VI Corps units that had suffered few/no losses. I don't see a material difference between Lee staying at Antietam until late on September 18 and Lee staying at Gettysburg until late on July 4.

Indeed, in both cases he had to beat the A of the P to the river crossing.